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A b strac t
Various scholarly traditions have contributed to document the multifaceted relations 
between language planning and the distribution of political power in conflict-laden 
nation-building processes. With the construction of the European Union (EU), these 
relations are re-contextualised because the EU project aims to create a supra-national 
polity by integrating nation-states. This involves deciding on an approach to the 
constitutive linguistic diversity resulting from gathering many polities and languages. 
This dissertation looks at sociolinguistic issues of Regional and/or Minority Language 
(RML) status and planning in this European context. It explores the links between 
competing political and linguistic ideologies and RML policy making in the EU at 
supranational, national, and regional levels, concentrating on how political and/or 
linguistic ideologies are enshrined and operationalized in various legal/institutional 
and policy frameworks. Its ultimate objective is to examine whether the EU 
glottopolitical construction has affected one particular case of RML planning: the 
conflict-laden glottopolitical relationship between France and Corsica, and, if so, 
whether this happened in ways that may contribute to reversing French-Corsican 
diglossic hierarchies and language shift.
Language policy formation is examined at three different levels and the analysis takes 
account o f the fact that, at all levels, actual policy outcomes result from the complex 
negotiations between actors possessing varying discursive and/or legal and/or 
institutional powers. Since each level has been historically constructed sui generis and 
involves a specific pattern of distribution o f policy powers amongst varying numbers 
o f actors, each level interacts with other levels in specific ways. Consequently, 
different theoretical and methodological frameworks are used to identify what players 
- with what respective powers - interact at each and/or across levels, and how.
At supranational level, the theoretical/methodological tools used to analyse language 
policies are governance theory and power dependency theory, the concept of policy 
networks and the critical discourse analysis method. The analyses ultimately show 
that, on RML-related decisions, it is nation-states that remain largely sovereign. At
national level, RML policy-making processes vary according to the brand of linguistic 
nationalism that prevailed during nation-building processes. I explore these through 
competing theories of linguistic nationalism and their respective conceptions of the 
nation and of language, focusing in particular on the complex ways in which these 
notions interrelate in French linguistic essentialism. I show how French ‘traditional’ 
linguistic nationalism and its constitutive ideology of monolingualism have been 
historically translated into legal/institutional provisions and then why and how, in 
recent years, a more liberal, national RML policy has emerged that has altered 
France’s diglossic profile, albeit minimally. In Corsica, this has coincided with an 
experimental devolution plan through which a new RML policy network could 
surface. The dominant actors in that network have since attempted to reverse diglossic 
hierarchies through language-in-education planning, but in such very unorthodox and 
contested ways as to sign away language revitalisation.
In that connection, this dissertation shows that whilst legal issues of language status 
predominate in negotiations at, with and between other levels, in Corsican regional- 
local interactions, disputes between policy makers and their addressees largely 
revolve around corpus management issues. In turn, the strong emphasis on corpus 
issues means that language policies devised at the other levels, with their main focus 
on status issues, have less relevance to Corsica’s RML policy developments and elite 
and popular attitudes to language plans at grassroots level.
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Introduction
This dissertation investigates the extent to which the advent and functioning of a 
supranational polity like the European Union (hereafter EU) has modified the 
relations o f power underlying Regional and/or Minority Language (hereafter RML) 
politics and policy making in Western Europe in general and glottopolitical1 relations 
between France and Corsica in particular. I examine the extent to which change in 
RML glottopolitics results from the complex interplay of ideological motivations, 
legal provisions, and institutional practice at and across supranational, national and 
sub-national levels o f society. In that respect, the discourses on language, identity and 
the language-identity link produced at and across these three levels, and the complex 
ways in which these discourses interact in language policy formation, are central 
themes of investigation.
The construction of the EU supranational framework of reference has re-configured 
the context of ideological, legal and institutional bargaining on RML issues, from a 
formerly bi-lateral model of political bargaining over (often conflict-laden) issues of 
RML recognition and rights between individual nation states and their respective, 
territorialized sub-national entities (the regions), into a tri-dimensional space 
characterised by patterns of multi-level, multi-actor governance. In this study, I 
investigate how the interaction of dominant and resistant discourses on language, 
identity and language planning, which occurs at but also transcends all three levels of 
this space, affects RML politics and planning.
Within the aforementioned new ideological/political, legal/institutional and 
sociolinguistic space, I argue that patterns o f power distribution over issues of RML 
rights and policy are negotiated in various supranational, national and sub-national 
fora, and involve, at each and all levels, a variety of actors with various ideological 
motivations and unequal bargaining resources. Put otherwise, considering that
1 The term glottopolitics is synonymous with the expression ‘language politics’. It appeared in French 
sociolinguistic literature in the 1970s/1980s (i.e. la glottopolitique; ethymologically from Greek 
Giotto- which means language) to denote an approach to language politics from a conflict perspective. 
Since this dissertation advocates such a conflit-based perspective, I use it throughout this study as 
shorthand for ‘conflict-laden language politics’.
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ideological changes are constitutive of broad social and cultural change, I examine the 
extent to which European construction has both established a new arena and perhaps 
also modified pre-existing arenas for discursive struggle and changes on RML issues. 
My ultimate objective is to explore how political and/or linguistic ideologies are 
enshrined and operationalized in various legal/institutional and policy frameworks. To 
this end, I consider how the EU glottopolitical construction has affected one particular 
case: the conflict-laden glottopolitical relationship between France and Corsica.
This study thus examines the distribution of glottopolitical power between the 
participants in these arenas, diachronically and synchronically, and both at and across 
European (or supranational), national and sub-national levels. Language policy 
formation is scrutinised both at and across levels because, not only does each level 
possess its own, historically-shaped internal dynamic, thus requiring a specific 
theoretical frame of analysis, but it also interacts with the other two in specific ways.
Several frameworks of analysis are therefore drawn upon, bringing together 
theoretical and/or methodological contributions from political theory, social theory 
and sociolinguistics. Ultimately, this dissertation aims to contribute to the field of 
language planning in particular and sociolinguistics in general, both in its detail and 
by extending the social theoretical framework of sociolinguistics. I
I take the case of language policy formation in Corsica because it is exemplary in at 
least three respects. Firstly, as a Mediterranean, mountainous island whose 
acculturation to France has never been fully achieved, Corsica has maintained a 
cultural and linguistic specificity that could be capitalized on in its recent political 
history. The Corsican case thus offers a telling example of persistent conflict-ridden 
relations between a periphery and its core. Secondly, being within the political sphere 
of France, Corsica has dialogued with what has long been considered by many experts 
as one of the most conservative and RML-unfriendly polities in Western Europe, 
which has led to particularly acute political tensions. At the same time, because of 
these very tensions, Corsica has served as a testing ground for France’s devolution 
policy from the 1980s, and this has reinforced the specific context of the island’s 
glottopolitics. Thirdly, despite sociolinguistic devolution and a thorough process of 
language institutionalisation (albeit within the limits of France’s sociolinguistic
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tolerance), Corsican language revitalization efforts have obtained limited success, for 
reasons I will endeavour to analyze.
Chapter 1 constructs the theoretical frames. I begin at the supranational level. I show 
that by using a governance approach articulated on power dependency theory and the 
methodological tools of policy network and Critical Discourse Analysis, it is possible 
to overcome the weaknesses of more traditional sociolinguistic approaches to 
language status looking exclusively at legal provisions and paying too little attention 
to the actual process of policy formation. Ultimately, the governance framework 
explains how language policy is made in the EU, accounting more satisfactorily for 
the intricacies of policy formation by investigating which actors can have an input in 
policy making, with what bargaining resources, and according to what norms, values 
and motivations. In more traditional sociolinguistic account, this process of 
bargaining is often invisible or unaccounted for. In the rest of this study, this 
analytical framework is then transposed to the national and sub-national levels.
Moreover, as this dissertation later demonstrates, at supranational level, member 
states remain core players in many policy areas, including language, because they 
remain largely hegemonic in producing and interpreting legal texts. To understand 
what the sources of dominant powers and the ideology underpinning them are, and 
ultimately how they inform language policy formation, one must address issues of 
language and political power as they first emerged and became prominent at national 
levels.
The second part of chapter 1 therefore critically outlines several approaches to the 
dynamics of multilingual situations from various academic disciplines. I begin with a 
review of central contribution to the link between language, nationalism and nation­
building processes, showing that approaches with that focus bring useful insights into 
the origins of the language status asymmetries currently observable in modem nation­
states, and how these asymmetries have been historically shaped, during nation­
building processes, both by political rhetoric about the relationship between language 
and identity, and by processes of modernisation. Similarly, the sociolinguistic concept 
of diglossia constitutes a useful snapshot of language status asymmetries, and of the 
distribution of language functions amongst languages, in multilingual contexts.
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Yet, I argue that these approaches suffer from similar, severe limitations on two 
related points. First, they assume that the processes whereby sociolinguistic situations 
changed during nation-building processes - according to various patterns of language 
maintenance and/or language shift - were conflict-free and fully endorsed by the 
social groups amongst whom these changes took place. Second, they promote a 
conception of language - as objectified (reified) and given iconic status (totemized) - 
which reflects these conflict-free perspectives and says little about the dynamics of 
change in language repertoires and about actual language practices.
I then claim that Bourdieu’s sociology of language and power - in particular his 
concepts of linguistic habitus and linguistic markets - is more satisfactory in that it 
integrates the notion of social conflict and resistance to acculturation into descriptions 
of nation-building processes, inter alia by acknowledging that processes of language 
reification and totemization themselves serve to construct social inequalities 
(Bourdieu, 1991). Bourdieu, however, argues that such inequalities can be and are 
resisted and that the social body is not unified and conflict-free. This implies that the 
contexts, meanings and nature of actual language uses themselves are not as clearly 
delineated as the above perspectives suggest, and that the complex ways in which 
actual language uses reflect and enact patterns of identity formation and related 
conceptions of political allegiance must be accounted for. This is where Bourdieu’s 
approach has limited value because Bourdieu’s theoretical contribution indicates no 
methodology to collect data on political and language ideologies and their relations to 
language use.
As a result, to understand language policy formation at local levels, more information 
is needed on: 1. the diachronic and synchronic dynamics of compliance with and 
resistance to political change through which sociolinguistic change took place in 
France and Corsica during nation-building processes and is currently taking place in 
France and Corsica and through the construction of the EU; 2. the various political 
and linguistic ideologies shaped during those processes, which inform both language 
policy actors negotiating policy designs and implementation at and across the 
aforementioned levels of analysis and the people for whom such policies are being 
designed (see Thiers, 1989 and Jaffe, 1999); 3. information on the extent to which the 
various ideologies of policy makers are congruent, or not, with those of the recipients
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of language policies, which will determine the latter’s attitudes to language plans and 
eventually condition the acceptance of such plans.
Chapters 2 to 4 examine the development of language policies in the EU and the 
emergence of a RML policy network, and assess the latter’s success in promoting 
RMLs at EU level. Chapter 2 explores the ideological and legal foundations of the 
EU’s sociolinguistic regime through an analysis of fundamental legal texts regulating 
the use of languages in the EEC and argues that the original 1958 design was 
articulated around discourses of multilingualism and language equality between 
national-state languages but originally devoted no political space to RML protection 
and promotion. Chapters 3 and 4 then bring evidence that, since the 1970s, the legal 
and institutional construction of the EU has then facilitated the emergence of a RML 
policy network that gave institutional representation and/or access to the advocates o f 
a more inclusive EU approach to cultural/linguistic diversity. Chapter 3 shows that 
EU education and cultural policies (which were introduced as new sectors of EU 
competence in 1992), although they contain no explicit reference to RMLs, have been 
a constant site and stake of ideological struggle for RML activists to obtain a durable 
legal basis for RMLs. I assess the success of that struggle, contrasting EU legal 
experts’ and RML activists’ contradictory interpretations of both treaty articles on 
education and culture and a variety of legal texts and implementation provisions, as 
well as on various Opinion texts produced by RML activists, and I show that pro- 
RML discourses of resistance to the exclusive protection of national-state language 
have not, in fact, been actualised in EU law.
Chapter 4 then demonstrates that the EU system of multilevel governance however 
sets up certain contradictions that can allow spaces to be created for RMLs. As a 
result, the RML policy network could succeed in bypassing certain EU legal 
blockages and prompt an actual RML policy. After describing the processes whereby 
this could happen - drawing on historical accounts of the evolving role and powers of 
the European Parliament [hereafter EP] (e.g. Corbett et al, 2000), as well as my own 
data collected through interviews with members of the EP - I argue that, beyond 
financial support, RML activists have nevertheless obtained only limited political 
success in their attempt to obtain some recognition for RMLs at EU level. I then claim 
that, although future RML promotion may benefit from new changes in political
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environment - following the 2004 Enlargement and/or if the Draft Constitution for 
Europe is eventually ratified - in today’s EU it is still nation-states that retain the 
greatest glottopolitical powers because they monopolise legal hegemony.
As was indicated above, to understand whether the current exclusion of RMLs from 
the EU legal corpus may be overcome in the future, it becomes necessary to explore 
the ideologies hegemonic at national levels to see if such ideologies can be effectively 
challenged internally by RML activists.
Chapter 5 therefore examines the history of French language policy-making, relating 
it to the language ideologies that inform both French nation-building processes and 
the perceived role of French beyond the boundaries of the nation. The first part 
reviews the literature on early language planning measures in pre-Revolution France, 
outlining the historical salience of the ideological foundations of French linguistic 
nationalism, and shows that the reification of French and its totemization as the 
embodiment of formal clarity, rationalism and universal humane values predate the 
Revolution. The second part first analyses the reification and totemization of the 
nation during the Revolution through a variety of texts produced by revolutionaries, 
scrutinising the complex relationship between language, the nation and the state that 
revolutionaries theorised in essentialist terms and sought to actualise. It goes on to 
chart corollary institutional and policy developments and to explore actual 
sociolinguistic change in France between the Revolution and WWII, underlining how 
uneven this was across regions.
In the third part, spanning from WWII till today, I first illustrate how, from the 1960s, 
traditional French linguistic nationalism has been increasingly challenged both by 
growing language competition from English and by regionalist political and cultural 
demands largely motivated by uneven economic development amongst regions. As a 
response to the former, France developed more active strategies of language 
institutionalisation and of status and corpus management. As for regionalist demands, 
central authorities have been compelled to accommodate them, notably through 
regionally-differentiated political devolution and greater flexibility towards RML 
education rights. As both forms of pressure intensified in the 1990s, France responded 
to each form of pressure ad hoc, creating a situation in which its discourses and actual
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language policies have become more inconsistent and contradictory both on the 
international scene and domestically, as the analysis of the contrast between French 
domestic language legislation (in 1992 and 1994) and France’s sociolinguistic 
discourses in supranational arenas clearly demonstrates. In the final sections, I 
scrutinise how such contradictions and inconsistencies have eventually culminated 
during the debates around the ratification of the Council of Europe (hereafter CoE)’s 
European Charter for RMLs (1999), showing that political and linguistic ideologies 
inherited from the Revolution remain deeply entrenched.
Chapters 6 to 9 relate the aforementioned contradictions to the (glotto-)political 
struggle between France and Corsica since the island’s annexation (1769). I scrutinize 
the relationships between language ideologies and language planning on Corsica 
within two frameworks: that of Corsica’s conflict-laden glottopolitical relationships 
with France and that of internal socio-political and sociolinguistic developments on 
Corsica itself. Drawing on various monographs on Corsica’s political, socio- 
anthropological and sociolinguistic evolution since 1769 (e.g. respectively, Andréani, 
1999; Gil, 1971; Marchetti, 1989), Chapters 6 and 7 outline the political and 
sociolinguistic history of the island, describing how French nationalism altered 
patterns of political allegiance, nation and identity building, and language use on 
Corsica between 1769 and the late 1960s when France’s traditional political- 
ideological centralism came under challenge. I show how processes of French nation­
building in Corsica - the imposition of French political and language ideologies - have 
failed completely to eradicate traditional patterns of political loyalty and actual 
Corsican language use. I show that socioeconomic inequalities and correlated 
incomplete acculturation to France have cyclically entailed the rise of sentiments of 
Corsican nationhood, and fostered competing discourses on language, identity and the 
nation, and I relate this to massive language shift. In the context of the economic, 
demographic, political and cultural crisis of the 1960s, these discourses have gained 
new political currency, attracted popular support and eventually led to political and 
sociolinguistic devolution.
Chapters 8 and 9 examine the emergence of Corsican language planning in this new 
devolved context from the 1970s and the concomitant, constitutive rise of a Corsican 
language policy network from the early 1980s. Chapter 8 examines various (regional)
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institutional texts, as well as policy documents issued by a number of political and 
sociocultural lobbying groups, and describes the phases and domains of 
institutionalisation of the language, showing that acquisition planning has become the 
main domain of RML promotion. Analysing various texts on Corsica’s patterns of 
supranational institutionalisation, I then look at the extent to which Corsican language 
planners have attempted to find support for Corsican at the European level and argue 
that the EU has had only embryonic spin-offs in Corsica, perhaps unsurprisingly 
given the above history. In the final section, the analysis of quantitative data on school 
attendance and sociolinguistic census data illustrates that, despite substantial progress 
in status planning and institutional developments, especially on the island, language 
shift has not been reversed and Corsican language use continues to decline.
In chapter 9, I argue that this apparent contradiction results from the belief that 
language institutionalisation alone can suffice to reverse language shift and from the 
correlated failure to measure the weight in language revitalisation plans of essentialist 
folk political and language ideologies. I argue that these ideologies have been so 
ingrained in people’s normative approaches to the relations between language, 
identity and the nation during nation-building processes in Western Europe, (as 
demonstrated in chapters 1 and 5 and to some extent chapter 6), that they largely 
determine popular attitudes and behaviours to political and sociolinguistic plans. 
Drawing largely on monographs on Corsican glottopolitics (e.g. Thiers, 1989 and 
Jaffe, 1999), and on my own interview data with various language policy actors 
and/or language activists collected during my fieldwork in Corsica in 2000-2001, I 
analyse how the deeprootedness of ideological forms of political and linguistic 
essentialism, in their various manifestations, explain and enact various resistant 
discourses to the institutionalisation of the Corsican language and to the various 
modalities of corpus planning.
Analysing a number of newspapers' articles, I finally examine how widely these 
various language ideological trends circulated in the Corsican press between 2000 and 
2001, and claim that language-related discursive struggles have now shifted from a 
focus on status planning to issues of corpus planning. My ultimate contention is that 
such disputes significantly account for the limited success of both Corsican language 
revitalisation and the ‘Europeanization’ of Corsican glottopolitics.
14
In that connection, although the construction of the EU as a system of multilevel 
governance can open new spaces for RML promotion, one must bear in mind that 
RML situations largely differ from one another for a variety of reasons, and that such 
differences at local levels need to be understood. Indeed, they largely determine the 
extent to which particular RMLs can exploit the opportunities which the addition of a 
new political level of society beyond that of nation-states - the EU - can create. 
Conversely, by documenting the particulars of individual RML communities, 
comparative analysis should, in the long run, help devise better adapted language 
policies at supranational levels.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical frameworks and Methodological Implications 
Regional and Minority Language Politics and Policy-making in the EU
Introduction
The broad theoretical aim of this dissertation is to expand the social theoretical 
foundations of sociolinguistics in continuation of a process begun inter alia by 
Williams (1992), Cameron (1990) and Jaffe (1999). My own contribution to 
expanding such foundations consists in exploring what political-theoretical and 
social-theoretical frameworks developed in various scholarly traditions can contribute 
to reinforce the theoretical foundations o f sociolinguistics, and ultimately in providing 
a better understanding o f glottopolitics and language policy formation in general and 
minority language policy-making processes in the EU in particular.
This chapter establishes a research framework to study the variety of language issues 
linked to EU integration processes, to questions of political and cultural/linguistic 
identities in national/sub-national relations and to the interaction between 
supranational developments and national/subnational relations. Its ultimate aim is to 
establish a sound theoretical and methodological framework first to measure the 
impact o f EU integration processes on Regional and Minority Language (RML) 
politics and policy-making (hereafter RML glottopolitics) at EU level, second to map 
out the politico-ideological framework against which RML legal/institutional and 
policy developments take place in France and Corsica, and third to examine ways in 
which supranational, national and sub-national levels may each interact with the 
others. The actual impact o f integration processes at national and sub-national levels 
will then be further explored in subsequent chapters of this dissertation. My initial 
hypothesis, which this thesis will test, is that change in RML glottopolitics results 
from the complex interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions, and 
institutional practice at and across all these social levels. Methodologically, this 
implies that this interplay must be studied at each level per se - because the dynamics 
o f each level is sui generis and has been historically shaped in specific ways - and 
across levels because it may be the case that none of the levels is impervious to the 
others.
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In the first part of this chapter, I therefore establish a multi-theoretical framework to 
explore the political economy of languages in the EU at the supranational level. I 
begin by outlining the initial sociolinguistic regime of the EU, broadly sketching the 
ideological assumptions and legal measures that shaped it. In doing so, I argue that 
broad structural models of analysis focusing exclusively on legal provisions fail to 
capture both the causality and the nature of change in the current sociolinguistic 
regimes of the EU. The causes of change include inter alia practical considerations - 
financial and technical - that have come to challenge the original ‘macro-’ design and 
provisions, and the institutional game that eventually led to creating an actual RML 
policy despite the absence of a formal EU competence in that domain. In the 
following sections, I then go on to establish a multi-theoretical and multi- 
methodological framework that draws on various social-theoretical contributions and 
language/textual analytical traditions to explain the discrepancy between the macro- 
structural visions of the legal order and actual institutional practices and policy 
outcomes.
At the end of the ‘supranational’ sections, I argue that despite policy developments 
favourable to RML promotion and possible changes to come, which can already be 
traced in EU glottopolitical discourses and/or anticipated from ongoing political and 
institutional developments, the makeup and control of the EU sociolinguistic regime 
today remains largely in the hands of member states. To see whether the retention of 
glottopolitical powers by member states may result in future, more pro-active 
measures for RML promotion, it is therefore necessary to examine the political and 
linguistic ideologies, norms and values that have prevailed during nation-building 
processes and see if these are and/or can be challenged at domestic levels. To the 
extent that member states remain dominant players in establishing supranational 
frameworks for RML promotion, it is arguable that binding RML international 
legislation is unlikely to emerge if changes do not first occur at national levels.
Consequently, the second part of this chapter establishes a theoretical framework to 
scrutinise the dynamics of RML glottopolitics at national and sub-national levels. I 
critically review several approaches to linguistic diversity (including dialectal variety) 
in nation-state contexts: 1. political theoretical approaches to the relationship between 
language and nationalism; 2. the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia; 3. Bourdieu’s
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sociology of language and power (Bourdieu, 1991) and I point to more recently 
developed ethnographic approaches to language ideologies (Jaffe, 1999). My ultimate 
aim is to examine the context and intricacies of RML policy making at national levels 
by investigating the historical origins and contemporary purchase of the political and 
linguistic ideologies currently dominant in national (and sub-national contexts), in 
particular the hegemonic approaches to the language-identity link underpinning 
dominant political economies of languages.
I begin with a critical exploration of political approaches to linguistic nationalism and 
the role of language in nation-building processes. I show that these offer useful 
insights into how the relationships between language, identity and power were 
durably shaped during nation-building processes but that, because of their 
epistemological biases, they fall short of accounting exhaustively for language 
ideologies and actual language uses. I then look at the sociolinguistic concept of 
diglossia and argue that it suffers from the same epistemological limitations. The 
critique of both these perspectives illustrates the necessity to transcend structuralist 
and essentialist approaches to issues of language status and language use in 
multilingual contexts. In that respect, Bourdieu’s sociology of language and power, 
and in particular the central concepts of his approach to political economies of 
language - linguistic habitus and linguistic markets - illustrate how language 
ideologies and language uses vary across linguistic marketplaces. As he shows, 
dominant ideologies and dominant patterns of identity and attitude prevailing in the 
dominant markets can sometimes yield to alternative ideologies and approaches to 
identity making in alternative markets. In turn, such alternative ideologies can enact 
resistance to language shift. Paradoxically, though, they may also sign away RML 
revitalisation efforts either because those efforts are embedded in dominant, 
essentialist approaches to language planning or, conversely, because they challenge 
such essentialist premises, as the Corsican case shows. To go beyond these apparent 
paradoxes, then, what is needed, as the last section claims, is ethnographic 
information on the wide array of actual language ideologies and language practices 
and how they interrelate. Such information ultimately provides better information on 
the pre-conditions of acceptance of language revitalisation plans by those for whom 
they are designed (Rubin, 1971). Put otherwise, following Cameron (1995) and Jaffe
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(1999), RML revitalisation plans must acknowledge dominant folk ideologies if they 
are to be successful.
Language Issues in the EC - Official and Working Languages, andRMLs
In the initial sociolinguistic regime of the EU set up in 1958, legal provisions were 
made that established official and working languages within the EU institutional 
apparatus. From its inception, the EU opted for a multilingual language policy that 
granted the status of official and institutional working language to all member states’ 
national/state languages.
In 1958, language diversity and multilingualism -  the equal respect for and treatment 
of national/state official languages at the supranational level (see chapter 2) -  did not 
have the scope they have come to acquire following the various EU enlargement 
waves. Four languages were originally concerned and, in that respect, the EC was 
hardly different from other international organisations with official and working 
languages, e.g. the UN.
The Community s stance for multilingualism had predominantly symbolic, 
ideological determinants. Multilingualism was understandably regarded as a highly 
symbolic and necessary feature within a supranational organisation intent on 
constructing long-lasting peace through supra-national economic collaboration and, in 
the longer term, a politico-ideological commitment to liberal democracy: what 
legitimacy could the EC have indeed gained had it not treated its founding members 
equally? In the aftermath of WWII, the idea of national discrimination - the question 
of national preferences and hierarchies was loathed whatever forms it might take The 
reconstruction of Europe was to be anchored in the principles of reconciliation and 
mutual respect between nation-states. The principles of equality and respect for 
diversity governing the granting of language status participated in that effort: the 
sociolinguistic regime of the EU was characterised by (the construction of 
supranational) unity in (the respect of intergovernmental) diversity. These principles 
had constitutive force and were thus logically inscribed in Community law. Insofar as 
rules concerning the languages of the Community were determined by member states’ 
representatives acting unanimously, they first seemed to assure member states that
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official multilingualism and equal working language status were coterminous and 
unchallengeable. Second, the law guaranteed linguistic democracy for European 
citizens who could henceforth access the new body of Community laws to which they 
were subjected in their own state/national language. For their political representatives 
within the Community institutions, in theory, it also meant the possibility to fulfil 
their political mandates in their own respective state/national language (see chapter 2). 
Finally, at a more ‘down-to-earth’ level, the financial cost of official multilingualism 
within the young Community was proportional to the amount of its activity and 
therefore relatively insignificant in relation to the political and economic benefits that 
co-operation was expected to generate.
Throughout the years, however, this cost increased as the Community enlarged and as 
its domains of activity multiplied, but the Community’s language law based on the 
discourse of unity in diversity remained significantly unchanged until the early 2000s. 
Today, especially since the 2004 enlargement, the cost of sustaining supranational 
multilingualism puts tremendous pressure on the EU through the astronomic sums it 
draws on its total budget, so much so that it defies the original economic logic of 
integration. Notwithstanding, the financial burden of multilingualism has sometimes 
been contradictorily assessed (e.g. Knox, 1998). In the post-May 2004 EU, it is seen 
as one of the greatest practical challenges the EU will have to confront. In the very 
short term, the question of sustainability of the EU’s sociolinguistic regime is posed: 
the conflict between pragmatic - financial and technical - and politico-symbolic 
considerations can indeed only sharpen as ever more voices call for a solution to the 
costly language problem of the EU2. Hitherto, the law has prevailed in a sense that has 
reinforced the initial sociolinguistic design and intergovernmental ideological make­
up of the Community, at least in theory. In the implementation of the law through 
institutional practice, as empirical analysis will show, this de jure sociolinguistic 
order of discourse has been considerably undermined de facto, due to the practical 
considerations mentioned above. This is for example largely illustrated by the 
widening of the gap between the persisting symbolic equality in language official-
2 In that respect, as early as December 1994 French Minister for European Affairs Lamassoure 
suggested replacing the eleven official languages with five working languages: French, German, 
English, Italian and Spanish (see chapter 5). For a recent assessment of sociolinguistic problems in the 
EU and the various solutions proposed see Phillipson (2003) and Wright (2004b: 219-242)
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ness and the growing hiérarchisation of institutional working language use (in which 
English, and to a lesser extent French, have become dominant).
The question of how the EU regime might approach RML policy-making only 
became salient in the early 1980s, particularly under the impetus of the Intergroup for 
Regional and Minority Languages of the European Parliament (EP) and through a 
variety of EP-induced political and budgetary measures. Interestingly, promoters of 
EU actions in favour of RMLs summoned up the same principles of unity in diversity 
as nation-states did during the initial negotiations to establish the sociolinguistic 
regime of the EC. Yet, the translation of these principles into concrete legal outcomes 
and concomitant financial measures - the sociolinguistic treatment of RMLs - has 
been very different from that of national/state languages (chapter 4). Differences have 
pertained to both the symbolic and practical levels of language planning. First, no 
symbolic recognition of RMLs has been inscribed in Community law. To date RML 
policy-making is not based upon primary or secondary legislation per se (chapter 3) 
and it remains devised - and budgeted - ad hoc, on a yearly basis. We will see 
throughout the ‘supranational’ chapters (chapters 2 to 4) that the issue of a legal basis 
- that conditions budgetary support for RMLs - has been both a site of and a stake in 
the struggle for the RML cause. Second, although it has been uninterrupted, the 
financial support allotted within the institutional framework of the EU has remained 
extremely modest, and the budgetary limits imposed on actions for RML defence and 
promotion are nowadays clearly established (chapter 4). Both the lack of a clear or 
explicit EU legal competence on the issue and the limited scope of financial support 
have concurred to underline the reluctance and resistance of nation-states to transfer 
their domestic competence on issues of RML defence and promotion to the 
supranational level. The rationales for that resistance will be further explored through 
the case study of France in chapter 5.
From a strictly legal perspective, however, in the absence of an explicit EU 
competence on the issue, the fact that the EU should play a role at all in European 
RML politics through budgetary provisions in particular may appear paradoxical. As 
will be shown in chapter 4, the very existence of an EU RML policy can only be 
attributed to twenty years of parliamentary lobbying efforts at supranational 
institutional level and to a legal void in the EC’s budgetary laws until 1998. The
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purpose of chapters 2 to 4 will be to show the nature, the extent to which, and the 
channels through which such efforts have been successful at the supranational level of 
decision-making and, importantly, the reasons for that state of affairs.
This first section has broadly sketched the variety of issues linked to language 
planning in the EU. I claimed that questions of ideological motivation and politico- 
legal power distribution are central to the practicalities of EU language policy­
making. Moreover, I have argued, the case of RML policy suggests that there is more 
to policy-making than the formal/legal aspects of the allocation of power to the EU 
through primary and secondary legislation and that the legal framework alone cannot 
satisfactorily account for institutional practices and fails to overcome certain apparent 
paradoxes. As I have indicated, language planning in the EU does involve ideological 
choices and a framing legal order. However, the relationship between ideological 
choices and preferences and their translation into legal norms must be made more 
explicit. Relatedly, the failure of RML defenders to fully actualise the primordial 
discourse of unity in diversity, on the one hand, and their capacity, on the other, to 
supersede certain legal constraints, must also be explained. Such an explanation calls 
for a more elaborate theoretical model and methodological approach to the modus 
operandi of ideologies and the legal order in shaping institutional practices and 
determining policy outcomes (Ager, 2001). Such a model must also be able to account 
for the success of pro-RML lobbying efforts despite an ideological environment 
where nation-states remain the primary locus of glottopolitical hegemony and the 
concomitant absence of a legal basis per se for RMLs.
Levels o f Analysis in European Integration Theory: Governance and Policy Networks.
To transcend the aforementioned apparent paradoxes regarding actual RML 
promotion, I use a governance organising perspective to approach RML politics and 
policy making. This perspective constitutes a critical response to previous structural- 
legal attempts to write grand narratives of integration processes, i.e. the 
intergovernmental versus supranational views of the EU. To put it simply, exponents 
of the former approach claim that integration enhances, rather than undermines, the 
member states’ power (Hoffman, 1966; Moravcsik, 1994). By contrast, their 
interlocutors in that debate retort that integration progressively builds the EU as a
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hegemonic super-state on the European scene (Haas, 1964; Sandholtz and Zysman, 
1989 quoted in Cram et a i, 1999: 12-13).
Applied to the EU, a fundamental premise of governance approaches* 3 is that more 
‘ macro- ’ approache s to integration phenomena like the above, that focus essentially on 
the broad structural - legal/institutional - context of policy making to encapsulate the 
whole of the integration processes, have failed to capture the dynamic character of the 
day-to-day functioning of the EU in specific policy areas. One of the underlying 
critical tenets of the governance perspective is indeed that a strictly formal-legal 
perspective on decision-making processes fails to account for the crucial weight of 
unofficial, informal relations, unwritten rules, and individual and interest group 
preferences and agency in political practices (Greenwood, Rote and Gronit, 1992; 
Greenwood, 1997). In the field of public policy studies, the policy networks approach 
has thrived on such initial criticisms (see below).
Since its inception, integration theory building has suffered from the overarching 
dichotomisation between structure and agency so familiar to social and political 
scientists. The theoretical and methodological problems linked to focusing on either 
end of the structure/agency continuum have been substantially documented, and much 
recent social theorising has sought to overcome such divisions by focusing on the 
dialectics of structure and action (Giddens, 1990; Walsh, 1998: 8-33; Peterson and 
Bomberg, 1999: 30-31). These problems have been largely perceived as linked to the 
level of analysis - either ‘too macro-’ or ‘too micro-’ - so that meso-level approaches 
nowadays gain wider acceptance amongst social scientists. Initially developed to 
account for policy processes at national levels, the Policy Network approach, within 
the ‘socio-cybemetic’ governance perspective, is increasingly adopted in EU 
integration studies, as it provides a meso-level methodological response to the 
aforementioned problematic dichotomisation.
Two major tenets of the ‘socio-cybemetic’ governance approach are that, since the 
1980s, decision-making processes in Western polities can be increasingly
3 O f the various conceptualisations and uses o f  the term governance, the one I am using here is closest 
to that which Rhodes describes as ‘governance as a socio-cybemetic system.’ (Rhodes, 1997- chanter
3) It rests substantially on Kooiman (1993) and Rosenau (1992) (both quoted by Rhodes, ibid- 50-51- 
see below). ’ ' ’
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characterised as: 1. polycentric (or centre-less) (Luhman, 1982: xv, 253-255; Kenis 
and Schneider, 1991: 34-36; Kooiman, 1993: 258) and {a fortiori in the EU) multi­
level (Marks, 1992, 1993 and 1996); and 2. functionally differentiated (Rhodes, 1988; 
Mayntz et a l, 1988, quoted by Jachtenfuchs, 1997: 2). The polycentric 
characterisation postulates that decision-making takes place less and less within a 
strong centralized political core (Rhodes, 2001: 47-53). Rather, as a response to 
problems of democratic deficit and cost-effectiveness4, policy outputs result from the 
repeated interactions of a variety of consensus-seeking, public and private social 
actors (Rosenau, 1992: 3-6). These come from and interact at a variety of social 
levels, from the supranational down to local levels, via national and regional strata: 
governance is multi-level (Marks, 1993: 392; Richardson, 2001: 4-7). Additionally, 
each stage of the policy process - from agenda setting and consultation to 
implementation and evaluation - may also involve different and/or new actors: the 
network of policy actors may be rather fluid and open-ended (Bomberg, 1998: 172- 
173). Functional differentiation, on the other hand, implies that, despite broad formal- 
legal structures, policy-making processes are largely sector-specific and involve 
sector-dependent sets of actors: policy networks (Wallace and Wallace, 2000).5 In 
chapter 4, however, we will see that RML policy-making now tends to be more cross- 
sectoral than sector-specific.
In terms of level of analysis, one of the perceived assets of meso-level perspectives is 
thus their ability to include macro-structural elements -  like the constraints and 
powers derived from the legal framework and/or institutional procedures -  whilst not 
ignoring the importance of the ideas, norms and values of the plurality of individuals 
actually participating in decision-making. The latter’s participation occurs in various 
ways and at various levels and times (Kooiman, 1993; cited in Rhodes, 1997: chapter 
2; Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: chapter 2). The advantage of looking at RML policy 
making through a policy network lens is that it allows analysts to operationalize 
informal relations and individual and/or collective non-dominant preferences.
4 Networks thus constitute ‘... une réponse aux problèmes d’efficacité des politiques oublions • n
Galès, 1995: 17; quoted by Bôrzel, 1997: 4; see also Jachtenfuchs 1997) P R PubI'4ues- (Le
5 In early network studies, the functionally differentiated character was seen as synonymous with th„
sector-spec,fie,ty feature. Today empirical observations o f  the modus o p l r a n T l f „ 1 ^ 0 fa 
increasingly pinpoint cross-sectoral relations and patterns o f  mutual influence hetw^n °  
networks (Marsh, 1998: 191-192). een vanous policy
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For all these reasons, this study considers the area of RML policy making as sui 
generis here, even though the aforementioned broad structural framework of decision­
making processes cannot be ignored nor should be underestimated. The particulars of 
decision-making processes within area-specific policy sectors are thus viewed as 
dialectical relations between broad structural constraints and opportunities and the 
actual practices of a variety of policy participants themselves determined in various 
ways or, to put it otherwise, acting according to various, often contradictory, norms 
and preferences. Analysis has therefore to explore such norms and preferences and the 
way they are operationalized in decision-making processes. In that respect, building 
consensus amongst the policy participants implies giving political weight to the 
plurality of norms and preferences. Finally, these broad characteristics of governance- 
based political functioning are not specific to the EU and, as I will argue in chapters 5 
and 8, political devolution can be seen as progress towards a more governance- 
oriented framework of political bargaining in that more actors can participate in fora 
where an emphasis is put on consensus-seeking.
Power Dependency Theory and Network and Policy Change
Given the emphasis on the consensus-seeking characteristic of governance politics, 
power dependence is thus an essential feature of policy networks. The resource/power 
dependency theory indeed stipulates that policies result from the interaction of a 
variety of public and private actors because all enjoy various resources necessary to 
one another for policies to be devised and implemented successfully (Rhodes, 1981; 
quoted in Rhodes, 1997: 8). Such resources can be material or immaterial, 
legal/institutional or discursive, formal or symbolic, and can be deployed at various 
stages of the policy process. In this study, I therefore use ‘resources’ in the broadest 
sense to refer to any bargaining chip that can be thrown into negotiation processes. 
Such resources include inter alia:
1. Legal prerogatives (patterns of distribution of political powers 
amongst policy actors as sanctioned by hierarchized legal texts);
2. Public legitimacy and discourse representation (socio-political 
and/or discursive representativity);
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3. Information and expertise (a command of theoretical and/or 
technical/empirical knowledge);
4. ‘Behind-the-scenes’ bargains or ‘Knowing-someone-who-can-have- 
an-input-in-actual-decision-making’;
5. Material and/or human local resources necessary for 
implementation purposes, etc (adapted from Greenwood, 1997: 18- 
20; see also Rhodes, 1997: 8-9)6.
From a theoretical perspective, looking broadly at resource dependencies thus helps 
integrate different levels of analysis, ranging from broad structural resources down to 
inter-personal factors in decision-making.
Finally, as indicated above, another related, defining feature of meso-level approaches 
is that they endeavour to account for relations between structures and agents as 
dialectical relations. These can be (simplistically) summarized as follows: structures 
constrain agents (Thelen, Steinmo and Longstreth, 1992: 12-13) but agents’ practices 
can modify structures (Marsh, 1998: 185-197). In this context, structure is understood 
in terms of legal-institutional constraints and opportunities but also in the connected 
Bourdieu-ian sense of system o f habits, a sort of institutional habitus based upon 
preferences and resource dependencies as defined above (Bourdieu, 1991; see also 
Giddens, 1990). This institutional habitus can change under various impetuses. 
Hence, it becomes relevant to examine the nature and causality of change. We will see 
that RML policy-making provides an example of drastic and sudden exogenous 
change in decision-making processes and that RML network and policy change has 
substantially been a correlate of change in patterns of resource dependency (chapter 
4).
The relationship between network and policy change, however, is multi-faceted. 
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) identify four broad categories of environment change that 
can affect this relationship: economic/market, ideological, knowledge/technical and 
institutional. Ideological and institutional environment change, in particular, as 
determinants of network and policy change will be crucial issues for this study since
6This representation o f resources as clear-cut is an oversimplification as information and expertise for 
instance also belong to the second category o f discursive powers (see chapters 3 and 4).
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its focus is on the dynamic interaction between change in (political and language) 
ideologies, (legal) change in institutional designs that affect power distribution 
amongst policy actors, and subsequent change in (regional and/or minority language) 
policy outcomes.
As was suggested with the outline of power dependency theory, and as is further 
asserted below, ideology is itself a powerful catalyst of change at the societal level, 
and a policy resource at the institutional level. At the broad societal level, discourses 
constitute a structural order wherein patterns of power distribution can be reproduced 
and/or transformed. In turn, the extent to which the evolving order of discourse shapes 
and can potentially transform the social order in general and institutional practices in 
particular must be measured. For that purpose, Critical Discourse Analysis [hereafter 
CDA] is a useful analytical method, resting upon the idea that power structures and 
relations, a fortiori legal-institutional structures, are text-mediated, and that power 
inter alia resides in privileged patterns of text production and reception/interpretation. 
CDA is useful in that it provides actual tools of language analysis at text level that 
make it possible to decipher power struggles for discursive hegemony as inscribed 
within texts, and thus to detect traces of change.
In the next section I scrutinise the multi-theoretical and methodological tenets of CDA 
and in the following sections, I explore how some of these tenets can be applied to the 
analysis of legal texts.
CDA: Discourse in a Social Theory o f  Language and Social Change
Drawing largely on Foucault’s social theory of discourse and change (Foucault, 1971, 
1972, 1979 and 1981), CDA focuses on the production and/or reproduction or 
transformation of relations of domination/subjection, and on the role and modus 
operandi of discourse in such processes (Fairclough, 1989 and 2001; 1992). Further 
critical discourse analysts argue that the possibility that, and ways in which, relations 
of domination/subjection can be transformed, in particular through competition 
between dominant and resistant discourses, can and must be linguistically analysed, 
through the linguistic analysis of textual and discursive practices. Thus CDA attempts 
to synthesise language studies and social theory. For instance, Fairclough’s starting
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premise is that ‘[...] changes in language use are linked to wider social and cultural 
processes, [...] [so that] language analysis can be used as a method for studying 
social change: (1992: 1). He thus links language use to a theory of social and 
political change. Central to this endeavour is the social-constructionist thesis that 
language and language use do not merely reflect but essentially construct the social 
order from particular ideological positions (see also Cameron, 1990). As Stubbs put 
it: ‘[...] language is never neutral and texts are never innocent [...] all language 
choices are political’ (Stubbs, 1996: 235). This implies that all linguistic choices, 
down to those at the lowest levels of language organisation, are relevant to an 
understanding of the constitution of the social order. CDA thus seeks to decipher 
ideological credentials and assumptions intrinsic to language use, and thus to reveal 
the ways in which language and language users construct and reproduce or transform 
the social world. Fairclough’s theoretical stance summons up and elaborates on 
various social theoretical frameworks and different traditions of language analysis, 
wherein this social-constructionist view of language and language use is salient.
Regarding the social theoretical frameworks, in addition to Foucault’s aforementioned 
works, Fairclough largely borrows from Neo-Marxist theorists of ideology and in 
particular from Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Althusser, 1971; Gramsci, 1971; 
Bourdieu, 1991). Regarding the language and textual analytical methods, he resorts to 
the ‘systemic’ functional linguistics [SFL] of Halliday and his followers7, to 
Bakhtin’s theory of genres and Kristeva’s discussions of the concept of intertextuality 
(Halliday, 1973, 1978, and 1985; Bakhtin, 1981 and 1986; Kristeva 1986). In his 
model, Fairclough thus draws together social-theoretical concepts of ideology, power, 
hegemony and discourse and methods of language analysis. In the remainder of this 
section I deal with the former and will explore the latter in the next section.
Fairclough’s conception of ideology rests on Gramsci’s concepts of hegemony, power 
and consent (Gramsci, 1971). For Gramsci, hegemonies - the manifestation of the 
unequal social distribution of power through coercion and consensus building - are 
products of ideology, but it is important to acknowledge that social hegemonies are 
neither unchallengeable nor unchallenged. On the contrary, by emphasising consent as
7 See for instance Kress and Hodge (1979) and.Kress (1985).
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a determinant factor in social organisation, Gramsci underlines the fragility of social 
consensus, refutes the immutability of the distribution of power, and thereby opens 
the door to understanding the potential transformation of social structures and the 
social order. Gramsci proposes a dynamic and unstable view of sociopolitical 
equilibrium. Gramsci, and later Althusser, indeed claims that political equilibrium is 
achieved by manufacturing/winning the consent of dominated classes/groups, and that 
consent largely obtains through the naturalization of dominant ideologies in and by 
the Ideological State Apparatuses (Althusser, 1971). What he negates is the 
deterministic approach to social reproduction and power relations which seems 
characteristic of structuralism and cannot easily account for social change, promoting 
instead a dynamic understanding of the relationship between social structures and 
power distribution (Gramsci, ibid). Likewise, while taking discourse as the surface 
part of ideology and therefore as tine manifestation of social power, Fairclough 
privileges the dynamics of discourse, and sees discourse as a motor of social change. 
Thence he seeks to analyse linguistically the work of ideology. Further, his approach 
also rests on the assumption that language uses are not always critically weighed and 
analysed, i.e. there is a large part of routine in patterns of language use, so that 
ideologies can be unnoticeably reproduced (see the discussion of intentionality in 
legal interpretation patterns below).
Moreover, Fairclough sees ideology as inherently hierarchical so that ‘grand’ 
discourses are themselves constituted by several ‘sub-discourses’, possibly in 
contradictory and conflict-ridden relations with one another, in ways that can trigger 
social change by altering social organisation and the distribution of power. Hence the 
role of the interaction of these various discourses has to be analytically accounted for. 
Crucial to this driving force of discourse relations is therefore the centrality of orders 
o f  discourse. Before going any further, it is necessary to clarify what discourse and 
orders o f  discourse in this context mean. The notion of discourse is one that has been 
repeatedly used in various disciplines and with very different meanings (for a review, 
see Fairclough, 1992: chapter 1; Mills, 1997). For example, language studies have 
defined discourse sometimes as spoken dialogue, sometimes in reference to both 
written and spoken ‘texts’, and other times as synonymous with register (e.g. 
‘journalistic’ discourse, ‘academic’ discourse, etc). In contrast to these, discourse
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encompasses different meanings in the work of social theorists like Foucault, where it 
refers to ‘[...] different ways o f structuring areas o f knowledge and social practice.'’ 
(Fairclough, 1992: 3) In Fairclough’s perspective (which is largely based on 
Foucault’s), besides, discourses do not merely mirror social relations, they constitute 
them; social relations are constructed by and in discourse. As a result, different 
discourses produced by different social actors will construct different conflict-laden 
social realities and, conversely, the ‘same’ discourse will have different meanings 
depending on what order of discourses it is constitutive of (e.g. multilingualism has 
different ‘meanings’ in Jacobinist and regionalist discourses)8.
Furthermore, one particular discourse may itself be constituted by elements of various 
other discourses (e.g. regionalist discourses in France in the 1960s drew upon de­
colonisation discourses, discourses on multicultural richness, discourses on minority 
protection and rights, etc). Since discourses are not necessarily homogeneous, their 
analysis entails the deconstruction of their constitutive features, i.e. the (sub-) 
discourses they are made of. The composite character of discourses relates to what 
Fairclough refers to as orders o f discourse, a comprehensive definition of which could 
therefore be: a set of discursive practices combined to form a new discursive practice 
at a higher level of discursive organisation. In turn this implies the existence of a 
hierarchization of discourses resulting from the mode of configuration of specific 
discursive practices. To use an analogy, orders of discourse are to discourses what 
texts are to the sentences they consist of: a higher and more complex form of 
organisation with specific properties and calling for specific analytical methods and 
techniques. In other words, the existence of a hierarchical structure of discourses is 
comparable to that which organises texts out of sentences and words, so that orders of 
discourse are inherently heterogeneous.
Hence the usefulness of the concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity that 
account for the textual and discursive traces of the various constitutive (sub-) 
discourses of a larger (order of) discourse (Kristeva, 1986) (see also the concept of 
genre memory in the next section). In this connection, orders o f discourse has also to
8 This points to a crucial issue o f CDA, namely the issue o f interpretation: from what perspective is a 
particular discourse decoded? I will come back to this in the next section and in greater detail later in 
the analysis o f my data.
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be understood in terms of a hierarchy of discourses wherein some discourses are 
hegemonic, and therefore socially dominant, whilst others are less powerful but 
resistant. Thence social change potentially results from the struggle for hegemony 
between and within dominant and dominated, or resistant, orders of discourses.
In his endeavour to synthesise methods developed in language studies and social 
theory in order to understand the dynamics of social change, Fairclough proposes a 
methodological model consisting of three interconnected dimensions. Specifically, he 
suggests seeing every text as the actualisation of a discursive practice and as an 
instance of social practice, where ‘text’ refers to instances of both spoken and written 
language use and therefore includes all types of interaction involving language use 
between social actors, ranging from conversations to interviews to letters to 
newspapers to books, to legal texts, etc. (Halliday, 1978) In other words, like Stubbs 
above, he claims that any communicative event, any ‘text’ production, is also 
ideology-laden, and can be seen and deciphered as an instance of discursive practice 
which actualises broader social and political practices and hierarchies, in the sense of 
power relations. The ideological and sociopolitical constructed-ness of text can be 
revealed with the conceptual tools developed in Halliday’s SFL which distinguishes 
three functions of language, ideational, interpersonal and textual (Halliday, 1978 and 
1985). Halliday thus sees texts as simultaneously referring to reality (the ideational 
function), enacting social relations and establishing social identities (the interpersonal 
function), and organising the cohesion and coherence of information (the textual 
function). This approach to texts’ functions is also characteristic of a politicised 
version of generic analysis most often associated with Bakhtin’s work, which 
constitutes a theory of text production and interpretation/reception and power, and 
which Halliday’s analytical methods can serve to operationalize.
Tbe Politics o f Generic Interpretation - Reading Legal Texts: Patterns o f Meaning 
Making in Legal Production and Interpretation *
The literature on genre theory has long taken literary genres as its unique objects of 
study, focusing predominantly on generic forms. In the 20th century, and significantly 
under the impetus of Neo-Marxist writer Mikhail Bakhtin, the socio-political nature 
and functions of many non-literary genres and their ideological dimension have been 
underlined. Whilst reasserting the inseparability of function and form, Bakhtin indeed
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placed strong emphasis on the problematic of generic content, which he 
predominantly defined in ideological terms. Thus, a central tenet of Bakhtin’s 
approach is the representational function of genres: '[...] genres are not simply sets o f  
devices and conventions, but forms o f seeing and interpreting particular aspects o f  
the world, ways o f conceptualising reality that are stored within the genre memory 
[...]’ (Quoted by Duff, 2000: 6-11) (Emphases added) Such devices and conventions 
effectively serve to convey a particular worldview by way of excluding competing 
visions9, and the resulting hegemonic worldview endorses particular power 
relationships. Generic analysis must relate the structure/morphology of genres to their 
(socio-political) function of power distribution.
Underlying this conceptualisation of the relationship between genres and the social 
order are the claims made above that 1 social institutions and text types are mutually 
defining’ (Stubbs, 1996: 12), and broadly that the whole social order is textually 
mediated (Fairclough, 2000: 164-165). This is where SFL proves useful in that it can 
help convey the actual ways in which language functions in texts for institutional texts 
to fulfil their social functions of power attribution and reproduction.
Halliday’s functional analysis of text-in-context(s), which CDA has largely built 
upon, itself developed drawing on Firth’s approach to social semantics and especially 
his theory of the context-dependency of meaning (Firth, 1935) and on Hill’s 
institutional linguistics (Hill, 1958). SFL allows primary importance to the functions 
of language in the construction and/or reproduction of the social order through 
social/institutional practice (i.e. the ideational and interpersonal functions of 
language). The approach is systemic: special emphasis is put on the ideological and 
social implications of language choices in texts. Texts must be analysed for both what 
they say and what they omit. SFL explores how textual features at lower (e.g. lexical 
and grammatical choices) and higher textual levels (e.g. cohesion and coherence) 
operate in determining a particular configuration of the social order, and in seeking to 
exclude alternative configurations.
In that connection, Halliday and his followers have coined the concept of social 
semiotics, which conflates structural/formal conceptualisations of genre with
9 See also Burke’s similar concepts o f ‘frames o f  acceptance’ and ‘frames of rejection’ fBurke i<m- 
quoted by Duff, 2000: 11). V
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reception -  or reader response -  theory (Iser, 1974; Fish, 1980; both quoted by 
Stubbs, 1996: 7). Reception theory claims that particular interpretations of texts are 
contingent and therefore negotiable: although topics and reader positions are 
ideologically determined by what was called above ‘genre memory’ - which in effect 
naturalises particular readings within a genre through particular linguistic choices - 
various readerships can read the same texts in various ways. I do not embrace post­
modern claims of an absolute contingency of interpretation patterns since, in 
institutional practice, there are still constraints limiting the institutional validity of 
alternative interpretations. However, the analysis of language-based issues in the EU 
will illustrate that the critical interpretation of texts becomes a site of power struggle 
between expert readerships and their challengers. The latter contest conventionalised 
reading positions by proposing alternative, resistant readings and call upon different 
ideology-laden patterns of meaning making that entail changes in the power- 
distributing constitutive schemes of the EU’s order of discourse on language as 
enshrined in EU law.
As in other social sciences, the question of meaning making/interpreting is 
fundamental in legal theory. Indeed, the location of power struggles within patterns of 
interpretation of texts is a fortiori relevant for legal texts because their primary 
function - or communicative purpose - is overtly to distribute political power in a 
directive manner:
[...] the general function o f [legislative] writing is directive, to impose 
obligations and to confer rights... [legal draftsmen attempt to] ... define their 
model world o f obligations and rights, [...] as precisely, clearly and 
unambiguously as linguistic resources permit... they attempt to refer to every 
conceivable contingency within their model world and this gives their writing 
its second key characteristic o f being all-inclusive. (Bhatia, 1993: 102)
Legal draftsmen can use a number of qualifications to be clear and precise in 
constructing their ‘model world’: beside action rules that are mainly meant to impose 
duties and obligations, legislative provisions typically include stipulation rules 
(defining the domain of application of a particular act) and definition rules (meant to
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provide further terminological explanations) (Bhatia, 1993: 104-105). Yet, the more 
detailed the provision, the narrower its scope of application and the less likely to 
incorporate every conceivable contingency that may arise during the application of 
the provision (Bhatia, 1982 and 1983). At production level, draftsmen are somehow 
compelled to choose a strategy between clarity and precision (which tend towards 
more details), and all-inclusiveness (tending towards generalisation). The resulting 
need for more or less interpretation at reception then varies along a continuum 
delimited by clarity/precision at one end and all inclusiveness at the other.
Each production mode is then likely to call upon different interpretive principles. Two 
main theories of legal interpretation prevail: the cognitive - or formalistic - theory of 
legal interpretation and the sceptical theory10, which is similar to the reception theory 
sketched above. The former views interpretation as:
[...] a matter o f empirical knowledge o f either the objective meaning o f  
statutory texts or the subjective intention o f the legislature...the aim o f legal 
interpretation is ... the discovering o f this pre-existing meaning or intention, 
already in legal texts. (Guastini, 1984: 1739)
By contrast, the latter considers that:
[...] words have no proper meaning, since every word may bear the meaning 
put upon it by the user, or the meaning put upon it by the recipient, and no 
coincidence between the former and the latter is granted... each statutory text 
is likely to be interpreted in different ways depending on the different 
evaluative attitudes o f interpreters. (Guastini, ibid)
The cognitive/formalistic theory thus privileges a conceptualisation of meaning 
wherein interpreters retrieve meaning from the text itself - the literal, positivistic 
meaning - and/or from the author’s intention - the so-called ‘spirit of the law’. It 
follows that meanings are more easily perceived as ‘true’ and ‘false’, and expert 
interpreters claim to have the capacity to retrieve the original intended meaning and to
10 The following account is adapted from Guastini (1984: 1738-1744) and Luzzati (1984: 2086-2091).
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do so objectively. In the sceptical or reception theoiy, this objective capacity is 
denied: meaning making is always contingent and ultimately located in the recipient’s 
reading, rather than reflective of the text’s essential meaning and/or author’s 
perceived intentions. Ultimately, although legal meanings can be and are disputed in 
socio-political practice, some meanings become dominant whilst others are discarded. 
Analysis must then explain the rationale for certain interpretations to be privileged.
Law as a Discourse on Society: Formal and Pragmatic Institutional Constraints and 
Intentionality
Following Austin’s and Wiggenstein’s theory of legal interpretation (Austin, 1962; 
Wiggenstein, 1953), I endorse the view that:
[...] legal interpretation has no independent starting point but is entirely 
determined by pragmatic considerations...one cannot understand legal 
language outside the context o f non-linguistic activities in which its use is 
interwoven. A legal interpreter, therefore, must participate in the form o f life 
in which the social practice o f legal interpretation is embedded. In short, 
nobody can understand laws without being trained to be a skilled jurist. 
Interpretation thus becomes the game o f the interpreter’s discretion. 
(Summarised by Luzzati, 1984: 2088)
I therefore see the sceptical approach as largely unsatisfactory as it underplays the 
extent to which legal experts’ readings do prevail and also plainly disregards existing 
objective institutional constraints upon both producers’ and interpreters’ choices, e.g. 
actual usages within a given discourse community and previously accepted 
interpretations (constraints intrinsic to the genre memory). As suggested above, one of 
the central explanatory powers of genre theory lies in its foregrounding of the 
conventions and constraints underlying processes of generic production and 
interpretation. Bhatia emphasizes that:
From the point o f view o f applied genre analysis, our primary concern is 
twofold: first to characterize typical or conventional textual features o f any 
genre-specific text [...] and second to explain such a characterization in the
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context o f the socio-cultural as well as the cognitive constraints operating in 
the relevant area o f specialization, whether professional or academic. (Bhatia, 
1993: 16)
Constraints/conventions determine the structural/formal organisation of legal texts, 
ranging from lexico-grammatical choices to higher patterns of textual organisation 
like structural and cognitive patterning (see Bhatia, 1993: chapter 5) and they specify 
the functional role of legal texts, i.e. to construct worlds of rights and obligations. In 
that connection, action rules in legal texts typically establish the legitimacy of 
authorship and/or authority (i.e. who can legitimately draft texts and how such 
legitimacy is constructed)11 and the correlative distribution of various power positions 
(i.e. the distribution of obligations and rights to various recipients), and they specify 
policy outcomes.
Bhatia underlines that cognitive constraints - the way knowledge is constructed, 
transmitted and shared - are area specific. This implies that experts of a given area of 
specialisation - discourse communities - share area-specific knowledge and/or 
regimes of truth making up the discursive formation they belong to, but they may not 
necessarily be critically aware of it: interpretation is then un-problematically 
described as positivistic and/or cognitive (the foundations of Bhatia’s model world 
and Luzzati’s non-linguistic activities in the quotes above). However, in line with 
Foucault’s idea that the articulation of ‘regimes of truth’ is a means of social control, 
legal practice also catalyses the reproduction (and/or transformation) of society writ 
large (the law is an Ideological State Apparatus in Althusserian terms) (see also 
Geertz, 1973; Kress, 1985: 19). In turn, as will be amply illustrated in the analyses 
below, different discourse communities, such as RML activists, are characterised by 
different, competing ‘regimes of truth’, on the basis of which they challenge legal 
experts’ certainties in order to gain a better power share in the social order.
Consequently, it is necessary to investigate the more area-specific knowledge- 
determined context of expertise, which presides over the selection/construction of 
objects and categories such as ‘official and working languages’ in EU language policy
111 will show in chapter 4 that production rules can to some extent be ‘bent’, for instance as far as 
authorship is concerned when decision-making results from open-ended networks o f policy actors.
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(Foucault, 1972; quoted in Fairclough, 1992: chapter 2 and p. 128). Yet, this meso- 
level approach must be considered within the ‘macro-’ historical/socio-political 
context of meaning making - the order of discourse - which determines the array of 
norms governing the constmction of legal meanings. This calls for several remarks.
Regarding interpretive norms, these can be manifest or unwritten. Manifest norms - 
stipulation rules and/or legal intertextuality - are typically constitutive of legal texts 
and serve to reinforce the coherence and legitimacy of given texts and ultimately of 
the whole legal system. However, lawyers, judges and jurists also acknowledge the 
existence of implicit or unwritten principles: rules not expressly inscribed in legal 
texts but endorsed by legal interpreters, e.g. the necessary preservation and self­
reproduction of the institution itself.
Claiming that certain interpretive principles are unwritten equates with saying that 
they are sometimes naturalised (in their model world) through training, so that 
practitioners’ interpretation patterns can become largely unconscious of the 
ideological choices prefiguring norm and text production, which in turn reinforces the 
positivist illusion of semantic univocity and all-inclusiveness. In other cases, 
unwritten rules relate to the perceived intention of the legislator that only emerges 
when expert interpretation is questioned and when experts are required to explain or 
justify a ruling. We will see below that when such challenges have been produced by 
parliamentary written questions on sociolinguistic issues for instance, the sometimes 
elusive response of the Commission’s legal experts could be construed as reluctance 
to actually make explicit such unwritten rules as a means of self-preservation (see 
chapter 4).
This leads to the question of intentionality both in the production and interpretation of 
legal texts. When meaning making is naturalised during periods of professional 
training, one cannot evoke the interpreter’s intentionality as a conscious device to 
construct hegemony, since the very process of naturalisation makes rule production 
and interpretation unconscious of pre-existing ideological motives. However, 
intentionality in the sense of the strategic back-grounding of ideological motives can 
be identified in other textual devices, e.g. the construction of objects by one given 
discourse community whereby language choices result in maintaining the vagueness
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of the meaning of objects or categories. In that connection, I will show that the 
constitutive categorisation of objects like language and diversity is purposefully 
vague in the EU’s legal discourse community and that its vagueness constitutes an 
effective means for legal interpreters to reinforce their meaning ascription powers.
In turn, critical readers like CDA practitioners endeavour to de-naturalise or de- 
familiarise these motives. Methodologically, CDA is an approach that encompasses a 
theory of generic typicality but attempts to analyse a given generic text as an instance 
of social and discursive practice - as a social discourse - at the macro-political rather 
than meso-institutional level, i.e. in relation to the broad ideological context of texts. 
This discourse can be deciphered by looking at how authority, power positions and 
legal outcomes are textually constructed by dominant players (legal/political readings) 
and at how texts also constitute the site and stake of ideological and political struggle 
for dominated interests (sociolinguistic readings, in this dissertation).
Considering discourse as socially constitutive, CDA seeks to underline the 
aforementioned discursive and linguistic processes of semantic inclusion/exclusion, 
and to explain such processes as the result of ideological struggle. In this dissertation, 
CDA is applied as an interpretative analytical tool with critical reference to legal 
genres in particular. Moreover, the central focus on language status, use and 
promotion in the texts analysed here also suggests grounding critical analysis in 
sociolinguistic analysis. In the following chapters, I contrast the aforementioned two 
interpretative positions and show that, even on sociolinguistic issues of language 
status and/or language definition, legal/political readings curtail sociolinguistic 
readings in ways which have indubitable intergovemmentalist overtones.
In chapters 2 and 3, I show that the EU legal order results from past discursive 
struggle and that the advent of the sociolinguistic regimes of the EU results from the 
order of discourse on glottopolitical hierarchy. In chapter 4 ,1 show that this order of 
discourse is potentially subject to change under the pressures of dominated discourses 
and through their representation in institutional practice. However, as was said above, 
member states currently remain hegemonic in language-based decision-making 
processes. Consequently, as was argued above, to see if RML status change can be
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induced at supranational level, the ideological foundations of member states’ attitudes 
to linguistic diversity must be explored at national and sub-national levels.
I therefore now turn to the theoretical framework relevant to the analysis of RML 
issues at national and sub-national levels. I begin by critically examining two 
frequently used models for analysing societal multilingualism: those of linguistic 
nationalism and diglossia. I then discuss Bourdieu’s sociology of language and power 
as an attempt to overcome some of their disadvantages. I conclude, however, that 
Bourdieu’s framework suffers from not being sufficiently embedded in empirical 
analysis of actual language uses which themselves enact particular political and/or 
language ideologies. In turn, it is essential that, if language planners want to secure 
popular and elite acceptance, these ideologies be understood and integrated into 
language plans.
Linguistic Nationalism, Nation-building and Language Ideologies
Many commentators have argued that the radical politicisation of language dates back 
to the beginning of nation-building processes, which they often locate at the time of 
the French Revolution and the ensuing wake of mass nationalism (e.g. Fishman, 
1972b; Thiesse, 1999; May, 2000 and 2001).12
Students of nationalism and nation-building processes have analyzed how language 
uniformisation policies were both a catalyst and a consequence of modernisation 
processes, treating language as a necessary constitutive feature of political, social and 
economic change (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983). The central roles of a 
common ‘national’ language have also been acknowledged by the multiple architects 
of nation-states: revolutionaries, nationalists, political activists and leaders of all 
trends. In all nationalist discourses, the promotion and/or adoption of a national 
language is closely linked to the modernisation of society, to progress, and ultimately 
to the emancipation of the individual. This shift is legitimised by an evolutionary 
discourse that unproblematically depicts the ‘modernisation’ of society as an 
evolution or progress towards a harmonious, more egalitarian society (May, 2001:
12 Depending on the definition o f a nation, nation-building processes can be traced back to early 
modem times though (Anderson, 1983: 9-46; see chapter 5).
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chapters 1 and 4; see also chapter 5). Besides, in the nineteenth century, the nation­
state modelled by the American and French revolutions was perceived as the ideal 
political system that could make such emancipation possible. Inasmuch as it was 
based upon the sovereignty of the nation, it assumed that nation and state should be 
congruent.
Three fundamental roles of language are put forward by historians of nation-building 
processes and students of nationalism: 1. language as a constitutive element of state­
building processes in terms of the construction of political/institutional and 
bureaucratic structures; 2. language as a factor of economic development and growth 
and concomitantly of social change linked to industrialisation processes and exodus, 
and 3. language as a symbol and cement of national identity. The former two refer to 
the instrumental, communicative function of language in modernisation processes 
whereas the latter has to do with its symbolic role in identity formation. The latter role 
is largely illustrated in the literature on nationalism where a distinction is established 
between French and German ideal-types of the nation and their concomitant political 
discourses on the relation between language and national identity. France is seen as 
the cradle of ‘civic’ nationalism and Germany of ‘ethnic’ nationalism (reviewed by 
Blommaert, 1996: 235-237; see also Edwards, 1985; Schwartzmantel, 1991: chapter 
2, and Crowley, 1994). It is therefore important to distinguish between: 1. language as 
an objective feature of nation-building processes enabling increased communication 
between various social groups (Deutsch, 1966) and 2. language as a discursive object 
in ideal-typical nationalist discourses on language, identity and the nation13. In this 
section, I focus mainly on the latter symbolic role of language and its 
instrumentalisation in nationalist discourses.
In the German nation-building context, the equation between language and identity 
was used as a rallying point in the process of uniting the German nation. Language 
was presented by German intellectuals (e.g. Herder, Von Humboldt) and nationalists 
(e.g. Fichte) as the manifestation of the very soul of the German nation: ‘The soul is 
not only reflected and protected by the mother tongue but, in a sense, the mother 
tongue is itself an aspect o f the soul, if  not the soul made manifest. ’ (Fishman, 1972b:
13 This distinction is however largely made for analytical convenience since, as chapter 5 illustrates 
actual language-based policy development is o f course ideologically informed.
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46)14 In other words, in the German nationalist tradition, language was the tangible 
proof of the historicity of ethnicity, the living link with the past (naturally, family- 
transmitted), which in turn legitimised the access to statehood of language-defined 
ethnic/Wz'o/7-al groups without states, e.g. Germany, Italy. This ‘biological’ 
essentialist view of the relation between language and identity: ‘one language = one 
culture = one nation’ has subsequently given rise to a large body of critical literature 
on the strategic uses of linguistic essentialism by nationalist movements (see inter 
alia Gellner, 1964 and 1983; Smith, 1971 and 1986; Hobsbawm, 1990; Hobsbawm 
and Ranger, 1983). Numerous studies show that late twentieth-century (sub-national) 
nationalist rhetoric largely resorted to the same linguistic essentialism, which, as a 
political discourse on the relationship between language, political identity and 
political legitimacy, retains enormous purchase although it is now also widely 
deconstructed as strategic by academics writing on this topic (Jaffe, 1999; May, 2000, 
2001; Freeland and Patrick, 2004). Nevertheless, this dissertation aims to show that 
the discourse of linguistic essentialism today remains a core component of the order 
of discourse on language at both supra-national, national and sub-national levels.
Language was also seen as a cornerstone of nation-state building at an early stage of 
French socio-political history. The language question was approached as equally 
fundamental in the economic, administrative and ideological construction of the 
French monarchic and then republican states (Achard, 1987, in Vermes, 1987; 
Poignant, 1998 and 2000). From the 16th century, it became clear to various elites that 
language uniformisation was a pre-requisite to economic development, and the 
building of state institutions and administrative structures (see chapter 5). From the 
Revolution language unity also served an ideological function in as far as it was a pre­
requisite to ‘invent’ the French nation, on which the legitimacy of the revolutionaries’ 
power rested.
Interestingly, in the French tradition, the link between language and political identity 
was presented along ideological and political lines of civic equality rather than along 
lines of ethnic essentialism as in the German model. Put otherwise, in the German
H The)1Her?Crian ¡'nk ber * "  language and idemity and culture has also been influential on anthrono
Whort in c m o 1 1 ' i956; bo,h quow  in
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tradition, language served to identify the existence and the members of the nation, in a 
way that excluded non-members of the ‘language community’, and in order to 
legitimise their collective access to state independence. In France, state structures 
already largely existed and French language use was presented both as a condition to 
socio-economic mobility and, at the ideological level, as the endorsement of 
rationalism as the catalyst of progress and, most importantly, of the ‘universal’ values 
inherited from the Enlightenment and embodied in the Jacobin Republic one and 
indivisible (Fenet, 2002: 35-36). Those conceptions were flagged up by the 
Revolution and later under the Third Republic (1870-1939) and the national language 
was legitimised - enshrined in the law - and progressively institutionalised - 
embedded in state/institutional building processes and promoted in civil society (see 
chapters 5 and 7). In those discourses, importantly, shift towards the national 
language was deemed a sign of political loyalty. And, besides this, in that model of 
nationalist mobilization, group-membership was inclusive and regardless of the 
citizens’ origins, unlike in the German model. As May (2001: 53) argues, such a 
dichotomisation rests on the often hegemonic valorisation of civic over ethnic ties
and:
[...] this position suits well the interests o f majority (or dominant) ethnic 
groups in nation-states since it ends up representing their ethnic affiliations, 
particularly their language and cultural traditions, as those o f  the nation­
state. [...] the ethnic interests o f the majority group are legitimated and 
naturalised as civic ones which, in turn, are equated directly with modernity.15
Because they rest on the same essentialist assumptions (i.e. one language -  one 
(political) identity) they stand exclusive and antagonistic. Yet, because they are 
perceived as antithetic, one can be summoned as an alternative to the other (see 
chapter 5) as happened with Corsican cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth 
century serving to mobilise against the negative aspects of so-called French ‘civic’ 
nationalism (see also Herder and Fichte’s anti-French discourses summarised by Mar-
151 will argue in chapter 5 however that this representation of French nationalism as ‘civic’ rather than 
‘ethnic’ should not conceal the fact that the ‘civic’ model to which it seeks to confer some universal 
value beyond and in opposition to ethnic particularism, is itself still largely defined in essentialist 
terms: a language ‘corresponds to’ a given worldview. Therefore, these allegedly antithetical 
approaches to identity and national loyalty are not as divergent as nationalist rhetoric claims.
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Molinero (2000: 8), May (2001: 58); and chapters 6 and 7 in this dissertation for 
Corsica).
These approaches hinging around the desirability of nation-state congruence (Smith, 
1995) thus all assume language is essential to the definition of political identities, 
whether these are conceived as ethnic and exclusive, and therefore biological and 
inherited, or as civic and inclusive and therefore constructed and a matter of choice. 
Moreover, this identity-language link is intrinsic so that the uniqueness of language 
guarantees the uniqueness of identity, and in turn the uniqueness of identity 
guarantees the unity and stability of the nation-state. Put otherwise, the nation must be 
culturally and linguistically homogeneous. This has a number of implications for both 
language and identity and their interrelations. Any corruption of one of the elements 
of the equation necessarily corrupts and/or endangers the other ones. For instance, if 
one language = one nation, giving official recognition to other (minority) languages 
within the nation-state challenges the fundamental congruence of the nation with state 
and undermines its integrity (see the debates around the CoE’s European Charter for 
RMLs in France in chapter 5). In that context, linguistic diversity is represented as 
synonymous with political instability. Likewise, introducing foreign elements into the 
language constitutes a threat to a perceived pure identity: language purism thus 
becomes a legitimate defence of the purity of identity ; (see the discussion of franglais 
in chapter 5 and the stigmatisation of mixed codes in Corsica in chapter 9). As a 
consequence of this political instrumentalisation of language, the construction of 
nation-states implies the construction and ongoing protection of national-state 
languages, both in terms of their status and corpus. Status planning ensures that they 
become fully protected, promoted and diffused and corpus planning that they are 
standardised, which creates the illusion that languages are monolithic, variation-less, 
bounded and autonomous.
In nationalist discourses, the variability of language uses is ignored and/or rejected 
and language is ‘[...] reified and totemized [...] it is made into an object and given 
iconic status.’ (Le Page and Tabouret-Keller,1985: 236)16 What remains unsaid is that
16 As Rushdie (1990) puts it: ‘[ ] language, not territory, [is] the prime cause o f aggression because 
once language reached] the level o f sophistication at which it [can] express abstract concepts it
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language, just like the nation, is engineered: it is not a reified linguistic system 
defined by its unity and boundedness ex nihilo. Rather, as was said above, these 
taken-for-granted qualities are engineered through corpus and status language plans 
(Billig, 1995: 32) during standardisation processes (Haugen, 1966). Then the notions 
of boundedness and autonomy imply that linguistic boundaries are clear-cut so that 
interference from other linguistic systems is seen as impurities to be proscribed. This 
is what literary and/or prescriptive tools do: define what ‘the’ language is, both in 
oppositional terms of style and/or correctness within the same system (e.g. good/bad 
usage17 or grammaticality/a-grammaticality) and in cordoning it off from other 
systems, however similar, by creating dictionaries and grammars. As a result, there 
emerge inequalities between languages but it is a truism to any linguist that languages 
and dialects cannot be hierarchized in linguistic terms (at least before standardisation 
processes). Status distinctions and hierarchisation are political, not linguistic.18 As 
noted above and as will be further illustrated in chapters 5 and 9, one aspect of the 
totemization and idealization of the corpus as the main garment of identity is that this 
entails language purism.
Diglossia - Structural-Functional Models for the Analysis o f Societal 
Multilingualism: Strengths and Limitations
The study and characterisation of situations of bi-/multilingualism has been a central 
concern in sociolinguistic studies. Early scientific attempts to establish an analytical 
framework for the study of societal plurilingualism were constitutive of the discipline 
and can be traced back to Weinreich (1953). However, the earlier literature largely 
focused on Ferguson’s subsequent definition of the concept of diglossìa (1959) and its 
subsequent elaborations by Fishman (1967 and 1972a) as starting points for a 
discussion of patterns of societal bilingualism and these concepts are still widely used.
acquire[s\ the power o f totemization; and once peoples ha[\e] erected totems, they [will] go to war to 
defend them.'
17 In that connection, minority language activists have distinguished between the sur-norme, that
implies value judgements on language production (e.g. good/bad usage), and the norme, that fixes basic 
norms so that communication in the linguistic system can function (Garmady, 1982- 64- quoted bv 
DiMeglio, 1997: 142). ' ’ M y
18 The formula every manual o f  sociolinguistics summons to emphasize the political rather than 
linguistic criteria to distinguish between a language and a dialect is that: ‘A language is a dialect with 
an army and a navy.’ (Fasold, 1984: 261)
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In subsequent critical overviews of the evolution and development of the concept, 
Martin-Jones (1989) and Williams (1992) illustrate some of the limitations of these 
initial typological approaches, pointing to their Durkheimian structural-functional 
‘macro-’orientation. Both also underline the weaknesses inherent in ethnographic 
reactions against macro-structural approaches, showing that the focus on micro­
interactions in bilingual contexts, although it accounts better for variation in use and 
change in practices, falls short of revealing the linkage between large-scale social 
processes and individual language use in micro-interactions (e.g. Gal, 1979; Gumperz, 
1982). Finally, both advocate a multidisciplinary perspective introducing a (Neo- 
Marxist) conflict perspective into the study of patterns of language maintenance and 
shift in situations of language contact. In this section, I selectively draw on these three 
traditions to emphasize some of the strengths and limitations of structural/functional 
approaches to situations of language contact.
Ferguson originally described diglossia as:
[...] a relatively stable situation in which, in addition to the primary dialects o f 
the language (which may include a standard or regional standards), there is a 
divergent, highly codified (often grammatically more complex) superposed 
variety, the vehicle o f a large and respected body o f written literature, either 
o f an earlier period or in another speech community, which is learned largely 
by formal education and is used for most written and formal spoken purposes 
but is not used by any sector o f the community for ordinary conversation. 
(Ferguson, 1959:325)
In this model, a status distinction is made within a given community between two 
language varieties -  High and Low -  of the same language, in complementary 
functional distribution determined by social norms of appropriacy. The core emphasis 
is on functional distribution and status: the High variety is appropriate in formal 
and/or official contexts of use (e.g. school, administration, justice, the media, etc) and 
enjoys social prestige, whilst the Low variety mediates informal relations, essentially 
in the private sphere and is less prestigious (e.g. ordinary conversation).
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Fishman (1972a: 92) placed less emphasis on the reference to societies with only two 
language varieties and his main criterion was on complementary functional 
distribution but without the proviso of linguistic kinship.19 To enlarge the model, 
Fishman overlooks the importance of kinship between the varieties in terms of 
linguistic empowerment and thus, indirectly, socio-political cohesion: the more 
linguistically close varieties are, the more (at least passive) bilingual individuals there 
are, and the least discernible language-based inequalities may be. The Corsican case 
illustrates the importance, but also the limitations, of the relation between linguistic 
kinship and language empowerment (see respectively chapters 7 and 9). As a result, 
Fishman’s modification of the original concept did augment its explanatory power in 
scope and scale and found immediate application in post-colonial case studies. 
However, it also altered Ferguson’s scope and scale qualitatively. In chapter 7 ,1 will 
show that applied to a Western European regional language situation like Corsica 
Ferguson’s emphasis on linguistic kinship retains substantial analytical power and is 
useful in explaining situations that predate the time of nation building and/or 
situations where language features centrally in cultural definitions of the nation.
The notion of unequal linguistic power is central in both Ferguson’s and Fishman’s 
approaches through the uneven distribution of prestige. However, the ideological and 
socio-political origins of power asymmetries are insufficiently pursued. For Williams 
(1992: 122), Ferguson (1959) and Fishman (1967 and 1972c) ‘[...] express an 
evolutionary continuum which depends upon highly questionable assumptions about 
the nature o f modernity, tradition and progress'
19 For a more detailed presentation o f Fishman’s approach, see Fasold (1984: 40-42) and Williams 
(1992: 97-109)
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Diglossia as Power Struggle: Prestige, Linguistic Codification and Linguistic Power
Amongst the ‘questionable assumptions’, one of the main weaknesses of the 
structural/functional bias underpinning diglossia, is that the diglossic model identifies 
language-based power asymmetries based on prestige but does not ground language 
shift processes in historic conflict and injustice between language groups (as social 
groups).
In his critical overview, Williams shows that such structural/functional approaches 
assume a historiography of nation-building processes predicated on the 
‘modernisation thesis’ (see Edwards, 1985 and May’s critique of that thesis as 
linguistic social Darwinism in May, 2001: chapters 1 and 4). As was outlined in the 
section on linguistic nationalism, this thesis hinges around an evolutionary discourse. 
It is assumed that socio-political change and language shift occur through the 
aggregation of individual rational choices and that individuals freely endorse new sets 
of values to participate in the ‘modernisation’ of society. In the process, a series of 
dichotomies is established, creating hierarchies of values and norms, in which 
traditional values become obsolete and/or suspiciously irrational. Inasmuch as 
modernity is synonymous with progress, modern, urban, universal values are lauded 
and confer prestige whilst, conversely, traditional, rural, parochial values are 
stigmatised.20
For both Ferguson and Fishman, the resulting social norms of linguistic appropriacy 
rest on the notion of prestige, which itself is seen as natural and largely resulting from 
the degree of codification - oral and written or just oral - of the respective varieties.
20 See also Hobsbawm, (1995: chapter 13) and for a more recent formulation o f ‘modernisation’ 
reworded ‘globalisation’ see Bourdieu:
[Globalization] a pseudo-concept that is both descriptive and prescriptive, which has replaced 
‘modernization ’ that was long used in the social sciences in the USA as a euphemistic way of 
imposing a naively ethnocentric evolutionary model by means o f which different societies 
were classified according to their distance from the economically most advanced society, i.e. 
American society [...]  the word (and the model it expresses) incarnates the most accomplished 
form o f the imperialism of the universal, which consists of one society universalizing its own 
particularity covertly as a universal model (like French society did for a long time, as the 
presumed incarnation of the Rights of Man and the inheritance o f the French revolution [ 1 )
(2001: 96-97; quoted by Phillipson, 2003: 75)
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The socio-political origins of such norms thus remain un-discussed and the 
superimposition of a language is justified in terms of linguistic resources rather than 
with a political theory of language. The high variety is simply better equipped to do 
the job: it is a ‘language’. Its high status reflects its high level of codification acquired 
first through its canonisation by a body of written literature and then its spread 
through various formal and/or official domains of use, including education.
Like in studies of nationalism, language is conceptualised as a reified linguistic 
system defined by its unity and boundedness, and consecrated by literary models21. 
The unity of the language pre-conditions its suitability for the fulfilment of the High 
social communication purposes of modem society and this unity is conceived of as 
unity of form - uniformity - achieved through standardisation processes. Besides, once 
a set of prescriptive tools exists, any variation - dialectal and/or social - becomes 
stigmatised as the corruption of some ideal state of the language. The standard form 
thus embodies modernity and progress. The Low variety lacks prestige due to the very 
lack of such codification and its confinement to, and oral transmission within, the 
private sphere is perceived as justified and natural. Individuals come to endorse these 
values, and their unproblematic internalisation becomes part of their communicative 
competence which is defined in static, apolitical terms of ‘cultural knowledge ’, as a 
system of shared beliefs, values and attitudes (Gal, 1979: 9).
wIn this framework, then, the national language is presented by architects of modern 
societies - the nation-states - as a symbol of progress and individual emancipation, 
and dialects as reactionary stigmata of the past: ‘[...] the evolutionary process 
assumes an element o f inevitability and bilingualism becomes merely a transitional 
phase, prior to the inevitable progress towards monolingualism.’ (Williams, 1992: 
105) For nationalist leaders, language shift is thus a goal, and even in ethnographic 
studies like Gal’s in Austria (1979), Williams (1992) claims, language shift is often 
implicitly presented as a matter of individual rational choice so that, ultimately, 
minority language maintenance can only be a deviance or an aberration.
21 This conception o f language as discrete is also characteristic o f representations o f language at the 
supranational level among RML institutional supporters (see chapter 4, p. 131).
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The implicit emphasis on social consensus is channelled through individual rather 
than collective choices so that the fact that social/language groups can be 
discriminated against is hidden . Ultimately, the neat complementary functional 
distribution between varieties assumes the unproblematic awakening of a new social 
and linguistic order in which the emphasis on stability leaves little room for 
explaining phenomena of variation in use and change except as deviance. Actual 
patterns of language behaviour are conceived of as the mere endorsement of this 
order, which they contribute to maintain and reproduce. This approach assumes a 
homogeneous, conflict-free social body from which divergent and competing interests 
would be absent and in which patterns of use are determined contextually (e.g. at 
work, at home, etc) rather than sociologically (e.g. age, gender, level of education, 
etc). It leaves no room for strategic, individual choice.
To sum up, in these diglossic models, important questions of power in the shift and 
maintenance of languages in the linguistic market are left unexplored. The advent of 
power asymmetries linked to language status differentiation during nation-building 
processes has been a major theme of activist and academic discourses since the early 
1970s. The absence - or the superficiality - of the discussion of power issues in early 
conceptualisations of diglossia has been underlined by many scholars from and/or 
studying various Western European minority contexts who have indeed forcibly 
criticised how such conceptualisations overlook Mow and perhaps more importantly 
why the high variety was superposed, or perhaps superimposed (Eckert, 1980; Gardy 
and Lafont, 1981; Lafont, 1982; see chapters 5, 6, 7 and 9). They have argued that the 
very notions of prestige and appropriacy result from and reinforce sets of ideological 
values and attitudes - diglossic ideology - which in the long term contribute to 
valorise the high variety and legitimise the socio-political domination of those groups 
that are bilinguals or monolinguals of the High variety (Eckert, 1980). Conversely, 
such notions concur to vilify the practices of those whose command of dominant 
varieties is nonexistent or incomplete, even in their own estimation (Calvet, 1974 and 
2002; Lafont, 1977; Gardy, 1978; Kremnitz, 1981)2 3. The work of legitimation and
22 We will see in chapter 5 that this conception o f individual rights, which is central in French political 
philosophy, is also an insurmountable obstacle to recognizing minority rights political
3 This is what Catalan sociolinguists have called auto-odi and Albert Memmi th* . 
colonised’ (quoted in Thiers, 1989: 23) mi the comPlex of the
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vilification underlying the unequal distribution of linguistic power links a theory of 
the nation with a concomitant, constitutive (normative) theory of language, and part of 
that work is discursive in nature so that it is partially hidden (Gardy and Lafont, 
1981). Yet, it creates its own resistant, counter-discourse (Foucault, 1971, 1972 and 
1979, and Bourdieu, 1994)24. What is lacking in diglossic descriptions is a fuller 
diachronic and synchronic theorisation of the intrinsic conflicts underlying 
differentiated language uses and language shift.
Overall, critical commentaries on studies of linguistic nationalism and diglossia 
emphasize that, contrary to what the modernisation thesis claims, the acquisition of 
new social norms is not a matter of free will but imposed from above (even if this is a 
hidden process), but such analyses often overlook the fact that power asymmetries can 
be and often are resisted, and they overlook the role of language in processes of 
resistance. Historical approaches underline how the diglossic compartmentalisation of 
languages has come to emerge but more emphasis is needed that diglossia is the 
temporary result of unachieved and ongoing ‘language wars’ or processes of 
‘glottophagy’ as Calvet (1974, 1999 and 2002) puts it. For Coulmas, likewise, ‘[...] 
the nation-state as it has evolved since the French Revolution is the natural enemy o f  
minorities: (1998: 67; quoted by May, 2000: 370) This further suggests that the 
speakers of dominated languages have nevertheless the means to resist what some 
commentators have called linguicism (Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas, 1986). These 
means and the conflict they imply must be explored. In that connection, Bourdieu’s 
sociology of language offers interesting insights.
Bourdieu’s Sociology o f  Language and Power
Bourdieu’s own contribution to how language and society interact is an exploration of 
the relationship between language and power with strong Neo-Marxist overtones. It 
begins with an epistemological attempt to move beyond the aforementioned classic 
set of oppositions: ‘macro-’ versus ‘micro-’, society versus individual, structure 
versus agency, etc. Hence, his ‘theory of practice’ and the conceptual framework he 
develops from the notions of habitus, fields and markets. (1991: 17)
24 The Corsican situation is a case in point where such counter-discourses are produced bv academ ic 
closely involved in language planning processes. r c'n,cs
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The habitus is a set of dispositions that incline social actors to act and react in certain 
ways, i.e. a system of habits. The dispositions which constitute the habitus are 
inculcated (i.e. taught or acquired during childhood), structured (i.e. reflect the social 
conditions in which they were acquired, thus differentiating between social groups), 
durable (i.e. because they are embodied), generative and transposable (i.e. they can 
generate a multiplicity of practices and perceptions, so that the habitus is reproduced 
in contexts other than those which inculcated it). In other words, the very notion of 
habitus extends from macro- to micro-levels of society: it is ‘macro-’ in that it is 
structured, i.e. class-related, ‘meso-’ in that it involves the influence of the immediate 
social environment on the attitudes and behaviours of individuals, and ‘micro-’ in that 
it can be observed at the level of interpersonal interaction25. Fields are social contexts 
where ‘products’, i.e. instances of social practices, are exchanged with a view to 
increasing the agents’ capital, i.e. economic and/or cultural and/or symbolic capital, 
according to a pre-determined exchange rate. Indeed, the products exchanged in a 
particular field, are typically granted a particular market value by dominant social 
groups at ‘macro-’ level. Insofar as fields are the locus of the individual’s social 
development, they are also anchored in ‘meso-/micro-’ or local social reality.
Crucially, however, social practices do not merely reflect the habitus of the agent in a 
deterministic way: rather, they are the products of the relation between the habitus and 
the market where participants interact in search of profit. The linguistic habitus is one 
dimension of the habitus, so that linguistic practices, which are characterised as the 
relation between a linguistic habitus and a linguistic market, can be considered as 
social behaviours intent on increasing one’s linguistic capital, and thereby one’s 
symbolic power.
Finally, central to an understanding of Bourdieu’s sociology is that it assumes that 
social actors are in a permanent quest for an increase of their different forms of 
capital, which are seen as the basis of power (for an in-depth discussion of Bourdieu’s 
sociology as resting on an axiom of interest, see Caillé, 1981). Put otherwise,
25 The bond between members o f these groups is somehow similar to the one described by Durkheim’s 
mechanic solidarity (fox a fuller explanation, see Giraud, 1997: 55), itself reminiscent o f TonnYes’ 
Gemeinschaft. This influence o f  the immediate community is particularly observable in social contexts 
o f inculcation o f the habitus (i.e. family, school), therefore recalling Althusser’s Ideological State 
Apparatuses (1971).
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although not all fields are economic in the narrow sense, various practices follow a 
logic that is economic in the broader sense: they are oriented towards the 
augmentation of some kind of capital (e.g. cultural or symbolic), or the maximisation 
of some kind of profit (e.g. honour or prestige). For instance, in a pragmatic way, if 
the value of RMLs augments on the dominant market, they are likely to become more 
coveted and perhaps revitalised.26 The question then becomes how value is 
determined.
When focusing on the relationship between the production and re-production of social 
structures, Bourdieu argues that to understand the way the linguistic market functions, 
one first needs to consider the conditions of emergence of dominant linguistic 
varieties. In other words, as in the nationalism studies considered above, the relation 
between language change and language hiérarchisation, i.e. linguistic market 
determination, first needs to be looked at from a socio-historical perspective - in the 
processes of creation of the nation-state (ibid: 5-6) - and as a device of élites to 
linguistically secure their political and economic domination over the masses. The 
study of nation-building processes highlights how particular linguistic structures were 
imposed by socio-historical change, and how resulting hegemonies are further 
nourished by those who benefit (and, as we will see below, by those who ‘suffer’) 
from it. Thus Bourdieu’s sociology accounts for the variability of language practices 
in a market where varieties are unequally valued. Moreover, like other 
aforementioned theorists of ideology and power (e.g. Gramsci, Foucault), Bourdieu 
underlines the role of ideology in establishing hegemonic hierarchies, thus indicating 
that because these ideologies are typically covert, users of ‘low-value’ varieties 
largely endorse the hierarchy that vilifies their own practices. This is what he calls 
symbolic power which wields symbolic violence.
However, most importantly, Bourdieu also acknowledges the possibility of resisting 
dominant market ideology and its value-system, notably by adopting or maintaining a 
parallel or alternative market on which products are valued according to different 
criteria. The notion of the alternative market itself embodies resistance and shows that
26 This is why language officialisation with its train o f  positive values is so insistently demanded by 
RML activists.
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people behave in complex ways that must be explored and accounted for27. Finally, 
the existence of alternative markets has several important further theoretical and 
methodological implications for our purpose here.
First, the fact that the aforementioned language-identity link is malleable and fluid 
and adaptable to different markets undermines the idea of the fossilization of 
identities and shows that identities can be plural and situated. If the definition of 
identity is plural and malleable, then the intrinsic equation between language and 
identity does not hold and rather seems to confirm, as ‘post-modernist’ commentators 
on the linguistic discourse of nationalism argue, that this relationship is largely 
contingent. [...] language does not define us, and may not be an important feature 
or indeed even a necessary one, in the construction o f our identities, whether at the 
individual or collective levels: (May, 2000: 372; see also Silverstein, 2000; Laakso 
and Ostrnan, 2004; Edwards, 1985) Identity, in this approach, is constructed by 
individuals or groups to achieve political ends. It follows that the nationalists’ 
legitimising discourse of the existence of a cultural nation defined by its common 
language, that in turn legitimises access to statehood, is seriously undermined by the 
characterisation of that link as instrumental and strategic rather than primordial and 
essential. Notwithstanding, as May argues, the persistence of cultural forms of 
nationalism reflects that, engineered or constructed though it may be, essentialism as 
an ideology retains enormous purchase in people’s affects, and can thus be mobilised 
(2001: 70-80)28. In that respect, we will see that plural models of language and 
identity departing from reified conceptions of language and based on actual language 
practices, like the polynomic approach developed by Corsican academics in charge of 
acquisition planning, are not easily accepted as a basis for language plans precisely
because they seek to deconstruct and challenge deeprooted, essentialist linguistic and 
political ideologies (see chapter 9).
27 For an early illustration o f the use o f ethnographic research methods to comolement r „„„a- - 
conceptual framework, see Heller's ethnographic research on language ¡deologlesjanguage a S u d es  
and taguage behavtour a French-medium minority school In Ontario, Canada (HeTr “ „1
28 Put otherwise, analysts must be aware that academic discourse is not necessarilv h*
pointed out above and as the Corsican example dramatically shows folk ideoloLC« 8h 3S Was
accepted "  aCad<!miC 'ermS' ** ack" ™ M^  and a c c o u n t
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Second, and connectedly, the existence of an alternative market both deconstructs and 
confirms the weakness of the central ‘modernist’ assumptions on language and 
nationhood of structural/functional approaches like the ones outlined above. This 
leads to consider the laws and value systems that are hegemonic in the alternative 
markets to see how they function and ultimately if their existence can suffice to thwart 
language shift and perhaps trigger language revitalisation or whether, as many 
scholars warn (Krauss, 1992; Crystal, 1999; Hagège, 2000), massive language death 
is imminent. In other words, analysis must determine the purchase of dominant and 
resistant discourses in both the dominant and alternative markets and in their 
interaction. As Bourdieu’s theory of practice suggests, the order of discourse varies 
across markets. Moreover, as a number of commentators have argued ‘no two 
language-contact situations are alike, nor do language shifts resemble each other 
exactly: (Brenzinger, 1997; quoted by May, 2001: 146). Thence, the nature and 
functioning of the alternative market - its internal characteristics - must be approached 
per se. Analysis must include a description of patterns of identity making and change 
in the alternative market during socio-political, economic and cultural/linguistic 
nation-building processes (see chapters 6 and 7). This constitutes a sort of converse 
historiography of nation-building processes, the bottom-up history of the ‘losers’.
[To sum up, studies of nationalism and nation-building processes provide insightful 
cinematographic conceptualisations of the multifaceted relations between language, 
identity and the nation. As for the concept of diglossia, it remains convenient as 
shorthand for a ‘bird’s eye’ characterisation of situations of language contact and a 
snapshot understanding of patterns of sociolinguistic dominance in a given 
multilingual situation. Because of the limitations of their ‘macro-’perspective though, 
both these approaches must be supplemented with more ‘micro-’ theoretical and 
methodological tools. Bourdieu’s sociology of language and power fills the former 
gap while ethnographies of language practices provide useful information on the 
dialectics of compliance with/resistance to dominant ideologies and on their 
translation into actual practices.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that language planning for contemporary RML 
sociolinguistic situations in the EU context calls for a cross-disciplinary framework 
that draws together concepts both from political and social theory and from 
sociolinguistics. To develop such a framework, I have drawn critically on the 
following approaches and concepts: governance and policy network approaches, 
studies of the role of language in nation-building processes and in nationalist 
discourses, diglossia informed by such socio-historical approaches, Bourdieu’s 
sociological concepts of linguistic habitus and dominant and alternative linguistic 
markets, and ethnographic perspectives on the relationship between language 
ideologies, language institutionalisation and language practice (i.e. language 
maintenance and language shift.)
The governance and policy network approaches developed in the fields of public 
policy and European studies show that, in increasingly differentiated and polycentric 
polities like the EU (but this actually also applies at national and subnational levels as 
we will see), new theoretical models are needed to understand who participates in 
sector-specific decision-making processes, and how. The particulars of language 
decision-making processes and the variety of participants involved in various ways 
and with various resources in such processes need to be identified more satisfactorily 
than through a mere formal/legal lens. In that connection, the policy network concept 
combined with power dependency theory accounts for such processes and interactions 
between actors more satisfactorily than traditional formal/legal models of 
government. Yet, the open-ness intrinsic to the concept of multi-level, multi-actor 
governance should not conceal the fact that member states remain largely hegemonic 
in EU language policy-making processes and that no change in RML glottopolitics is 
likely to take place that has not first occurred at national levels. Further, considering 
that the ideologies that determine member states’ approaches to linguistic diversity 
have been historically shaped in specific ways and therefore vary across national 
contexts, what is needed then to account for potential change in RML legislation at 
supranational level is an analysis of how language policy is devised at national levels: 
according to which principles and/or motivations and how.
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The sections on linguistic nationalism and diglossia have therefore focused on the 
national level. Drawing on studies of linguistic nationalism and the role of language in 
nation-building processes, I first sketched the main theoretical perspectives framing 
the practical and symbolic ways in which the notions of language, nation and identity 
have been conceptualised and operationalised during nation-building processes. I 
emphasized the deeprootedness of essentialist approaches to language and political 
identity and how these notions have been made to interrelate in nationalist discourses. 
As a result, the construction of nation-states has articulated reified and totemized 
conceptions of language and identity. Likewise, early conceptualisations of the 
sociolinguistic concept of diglossia were described as exemplifying equally 
unsophisticated approach to how language relates to conflict-ridden nation-building 
processes and what a ‘language’ actually is. Both these approaches fail to transcend 
the inadequacies, intrinsic to ‘macro-’ structural approaches, to account for actual 
language practices. I showed that the main reason for these limitations has to do with 
an uncritical assumption of the modernisation thesis which itself is rooted in the 
‘evolutionary fallacy’. Ultimately, I suggested that approaches to linguistic 
nationalism document the origins and nature of linguistic and political ideologies and 
diglossie approaches have value as a snapshot for multilingual situations. 
Notwithstanding, the possibility of resisting the ‘modernisation fallacy’ must be better 
accounted for.
In that connection, Bourdieu’s sociology of language and power turns out to be useful 
in that it looks at nation-building processes as predicated on social and discursive 
conflicts, notably through the existence and/or the creation of alternative markets. In 
other words, Bourdieu underscores the concomitance of antagonistic systems of 
values and norms which has resulted from and perpetuated social conflicts originating 
in nation-building processes. By doing so, he undermines the aforementioned 
structuralist/essentialist biases that assume a homogeneous social body. The problem 
with Bourdieu’s theoretical framework is that it lacks a corresponding methodology to 
collect practice-based evidence of patterns of compliance and/or resistance to 
dominant orders of discourse on language and identity. For the heterogeneity of the 
social body to be described and analysed, some ethnographic data on patterns of 
compliance/resistance to diglossic hierarchies and on actual language practices must 
be collected at subnational level (e.g. Heller, 1994 and 1999).
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What is therefore needed to account fully for contemporary RML sociolinguistic 
situations in general and that of Corsica in particular are: 1. diglossic representations 
informed by studies of nation-building processes and nationalism in the wider EU 
context of multilevel governance; 2. ethnographic information on what discourses on 
language planning and language prevail both in dominant and alternative markets; 3. 
legal and policy analysis of which discourses are legitimised and institutionalised, and 
how, which gives an idea of how they interact and which are hegemonic, and who the 
dominant actors in the Corsican language policy network are; 4. finally and most 
importantly, both how these various discourses are accepted or resisted by policy 
recipients and ultimately translated, or not, into actual practices at meso- and micro­
level. With reference to Corsica, Jaffe (1999) following Thiers (1989) has largely 
documented points 1,2 and 4 above.
My own contribution to such issues in this study consists in bringing together the 
scholarly traditions outlined above in complementary ways. On the more specific 
issues of the impact of EU integration processes on French-Corsican glottopolitical 
relations and Corsican language revitalisation processes, further, I ultimately focus on 
the institutionalisation of discourses on language planning and language in 
contemporary Corsica (point 3) and I provide an update on elite and popular attitudes 
towards the modalities and outcomes of that institutionalisation through the analysis 
of media discourse on language and language planning (point 4) (chapters 8 and 9).
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Chapter 2: Foundations of the EU Sociolinguistic Regimes: 
Community Official and/or Working Languages
Introduction
This chapter analyses the EU legal framework regulating issues of language status and 
language use within the EU and the political and linguistic ideologies underpinning it. 
The focus is on the legal configuration of the EU’s sociolinguistic order, and 
especially on the distribution of glottopolitical powers between various European 
actors: member states, Community institutional actors, and European citizens. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, it proposes that decisions made at EU level result 
from the interplay of various ideological motivations, formal legal provisions and 
actual patterns of institutional practice.
The main ideological frameworks relevant here are the ongoing debate on the locus of 
political power in the EU -  the intergovernmental versus supranational debate and, 
within that broad debate, the EU’s discourse on respect for multilingualism and 
language equality -  the ‘unity in diversity’ discourse. Moreover, insofar as European 
integration is largely a law-driven phenomenon wherein primary and secondary 
legislation govern institutional relations and policy-making processes, legal texts play 
a primary role in establishing and legitimizing the pattern of distribution of (glotto-) 
political power within the EU. The analysis therefore investigates the 
attribution/distribution of glottopolitical power as established by the legal provisions 
appertaining to language status and use within the EU: Article 290 and the derived 
Regulation 1/1958 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community.
The implementation of the provisions contained in Regulation 1/58 is scrutinized in 
the context of inter- and intra-institutional practice and EU-European citizens’ 
relations, but I also look at how advocates of a pro-active EU intervention in RML 
protection and promotion - hereafter RML activists - have sought to interpret and 
exploit the glottopolitical provisions of EU law, and their underlying ideological 
assumptions, in ways that can benefit RMLs despite the absence of a legal base for
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RMLs per se. Indeed, although at first sight the question of official and working 
language status may appear largely irrelevant to the cause of RML recognition and 
rights, we will see in this chapter and subsequent ones that the principles of respect 
for multilingualism and language equality inscribed in Regulation 1/58 have been 
largely summoned up by RML promoters. Moreover, the vagueness of the 
requirements for Community official language status granting leaves open a 
discursive space in which language official-ness at national levels can serve to 
catalyse claims for Community language officialisation on the basis of domestic 
statuses, e.g. Catalan and recently Irish. This is an important stake both symbolically 
and financially. Symbolically because for a RML to be recognised beyond the 
national level is unheard-of, and financially because language official-ness determines 
which languages may be recipient of EU policy activities and therefore obtain 
financial assistance, e.g. through education policy and related programs, and which 
ones cannot.
As was claimed in chapter 1, central to these issues of attribution/distribution of 
glottopolitical power are the conditions of production and above all interpretation of 
legal texts, as they are discussed within the EU institutional arenas. To understand 
how legal production and interpretation may constitute a discursive springboard for 
RML activism, I draw on modem genre theory taken as a (critical) discourse theory. 
Modern genre theory indeed sees the rules governing patterns of text production and 
interpretation as socio-political constructs determined by ideological motivations and 
actualising particular schemes of power distribution. Thence the dominant 
interpretation of texts is open to challenges from those who benefit least from such 
schemes.
-♦The analyses offered here therefore contrast two possible readings of legal texts: 1. a 
hegemonic, Tegal/political’ expert reading and 2. a critical - more sociolinguistic - 
reading. The former is highly conventionalised and usually performed by members of 
the EU’s legal discourse community (Swales, 1990) within EU institutions. Typically, 
it focuses essentially on the construction and legitimisation of various positions of 
authority, by defining glottopolitical rights and obligations. Unsurprisingly, the 
categorisations of language itself in these texts are unsophisticated. By contrast, 
critical, sociolinguistically-informed readings performed by RML activists focus on
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the definition/construction of the object language and pinpoint the ideological and 
political conflicts intrinsic to the definitions of the status of languages. This 
alternative reading points to the aforementioned, perceived inconsistencies resulting 
from the different ways in which language status is granted within the EU’s 
glottopolitical framework and at national levels. In turn, these perceived 
inconsistencies constitute a privileged site of discursive struggle for RML activists to 
obtain a pro-active RML policy in the EU.
In the first section, I analyse Regulation 1 from a ‘traditional’ legal/political 
perspective looking at how political authority is contructed and distributed amongst 
various actors and then show that actual institutional language use is in contradiction 
with the statement that the EEC respects and promotes language equality and 
multilingualism. In the second section, I provide a sociolinguistically-informed 
reading and claim that the vagueness and/or absence of clear language definitions in 
Regulation 1 serves exclusive purposes on the Council’s part, which in turn reinforces 
but may also endanger its glottopolitical hegemony. Finally, I conclude on the 
evolution of the EU’s sociolinguistic regime from its establishment up to its 
transformations in the 2000s.
Article 290 and Regulation 1/58: The Initial Language Regime o f the EC
Article 290 (formerly article 217) states that:
'The rules governing the languages o f the institutions o f the Community shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Rules o f  Procedure o f  the 
Court o f  Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously.’
The scope of applicability of this general provision is then further defined in 
Regulation 1/58, which I reproduce here in its entirety and discuss below:
REGULATION No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European 
Economic Community.
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THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY,
Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules 
governing the languages of the Institutions of the Community shall, without 
prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of the Court of 
Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously;
Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is 
recognised as an official language in one or more of the Member States of the 
Community;
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the 
Community shall be Dutch, French, German and Italian.
Article 2
Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the jurisdiction of a 
Member State sends to institutions of the Community may be drafted in any 
one of the official languages selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted 
in the same language.
Article 3
Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a Member State or 
to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a Member State shall be drafted in the 
language of such State.
Article 4
Regulations and other documents of general application shall be drafted in the 
four official languages.
Article 5
The Official Journal of the Community shall be published in the four official 
languages.
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Article 6
The institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure 
which of the languages are to be used in specific cases.
Article 7
The languages to be used in the proceedings of the Court of Justice shall be 
laid down in its rules of procedure.
Article 8
If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be 
used shall, at the request o f such State, be governed by the general rules of its 
law.
Regulation 1 determines the languages to be used within the framework of the EU. It 
sets glottopolitical positions for various social and institutional actors ranging from 
supranational institutions down to individual citizens. It regulates language use for 
both ‘horizontal’ interactions within and between the EU institutions, i.e. working 
languages, (articles 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7) and ‘vertical’ interactions between individual 
Community institutions and the Community as a whole and both member states and 
‘persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state’, i.e. (Community) Official 
languages (articles 2 and 3). My goal in this section is to explore the ideologies 
underlying the glottopolitical power positions that Regulation 1 constructs. In that 
connection, I read the text in terms of the (legal) function it performs -  imposing 
obligations and conferring rights -  but my reading also critically calls upon Systemic 
Functional Linguistics [SFL] within a Critical Discourse Analysis [CDA] approach 
the better to convey the formal linguistic devices at play to fulfill this function and the 
various underlying strands of the ideological struggle. Specifically, I explore the ways 
in which the text is made to cohere as a revelator of the ideological assumptions 
underpinning text production.
In Hallidayan terms, I explore the text’s ideational and interpersonal meaning, i.e. 
how it constructs a specific social reality, social identities and social relations inter 
alia through coherence building. Following Fairciough, my assessment here is three- 
dimensional (Fairclough, 1989; 1992: chapter 3; 2001: chapter 2; Clark and Ivanli,
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1997: chapter 1). I first discuss Regulation 1 as an instance of discursive practice, 
attending to its conditions of production, distribution and reception/interpretation. I 
thus explore its intertextuality, the chain of communication it enters, and its host of in­
built subject positions (Bakhtin, 1981 and 1986). I also scrutinize it as an instance of 
textual practice, looking at diverse textual features - modality, voice and theme - to 
see how their analysis corroborates, or not, the findings of the discursive analysis29 30. 
Throughout, moreover, I attend to Fairclough’s third analytical stratum and 
characterize the findings of the above perspectives as an instance of social practice,
i.e. the EU’s pattern of construction/distribution of glottopolitical power.
Authorship, Authority, and Intertextuality - The Council
I first examine the conditions of production and in-built subject positions of this text, 
discussing the relation between its authorship - who wrote the text? - and its authority 
- what is the nature of the power derived from and distillated through the text? And 
whose power is it?
The Council explicitly claims authorship and authority in the preamble of the text, i.e. 
the Council o f  the European Economic Community...has adopted this regulation20. 
This assertion of authorship and authority frames the whole text and authority is here 
legitimated by the inter-textual reference to Article 290 of the Treaty that provides for 
the Council to act unanimously in language matters31. In turn the unanimity of the 
collective author’s voice reinforces its authority. Moreover, Regulation 1 directly 
originates from the Council and does not follow a Commission proposal, which is 
highly unusual in EU law making. The council is thus the only author, which 
consecrates its hegemony in language-based policy making32. The relationship 
between authorship and authority is twofold: the legitimacy of authorship both 
determines and is determined by legal authority.
29 For a discussion o f the importance o f  convergence to validate analyses, see Gee (1999- 94 95 )
30 In Bhatia’s framework, the preamble thus serves as the main provisionary clause (ibid- 113)
31 For legal texts as a particular genre o f textual product, manifest intertextuality is a requisite to the
process o f  legitimization, a necessary generic feature of the compositional structure o f  legal texts- whit 
Bhatia calls the referential qualifications of legislative provision (Bhatia, 1993) b '
32 For further discussion o f the concept of text authorship, see Goffman (1981- 144- n„ntPrt in
Fairclough, 1992:78-79). ■ quoted m
63
As a Regulation, furthermore, it is a decision ‘legally-binding’ in its entirety. Legal 
binding-ness constitutes a key criterion of legal authority and refers to the nature of 
the power constructed in Regulation 1. In that regard, text types like Directives, 
Regulations and Decisions are necessarily to be enforced, Resolutions and Opinions 
are not. Still, the latter can constitute (non-binding) legal bases for Community action 
even though they do not necessarily generate policy outcomes33. This uneven legal 
status is both reflected and constructed through the distribution of authorship of 
particular texts and the generic conventions of each legal text type, i.e. sub-genres in 
Bhatia’s terms (1993: 21), and by the interpretation of legal provisions. Thus, the EP 
and the Committee of the Regions (hereafter CoR) can only pass Resolutions and emit 
Opinions and, in effect, the consultative, ‘advisory’ status of these legislative acts 
positions them as (glotto-) politically sub-ordinated to the Council in the legislative 
process. In language matters, the Council’s decisions alone are hegemonic in the 
sense that only they can prevail over national laws in cases of conflict, but EP and 
CoR texts can enact resistant discourses to that hegemony, as we shall see later.
Finally, Regulation 1 sets up the glottopolitical power positions of the other 
institutions. They are addressees in Regulation l ’s ‘chain of communication’ 
(Bakhtin, 1986)34 35. Looking at the ‘chain of communication’ that Regulation 1 enters 
into implies both considering its inter-textual relations with other texts, e.g. with 
Article 290, and to whom it is addressed, i.e. individual EU institutions, individual 
member states and European citizens.
Subject Positions - Modality, Voice and Theme: Constructing Power Relations and 
Social Reality
We saw that the Council is the dominant player in determining glottopolitical power. 
Here I focus on how its dominance over other actors is both discursively and textually 
constructed. Regarding the latter I specifically focus on interconnected semantico- 
grammatical categories such as modality, voice, and theme.
33 See the analysis o f  article 149 in chapter 3.
34 On addressivity, see Bhaktin (1986: 95-100).
35 The adjunction o f the prefix semantico- here points to a view o f grammar, as advocated by Hallidav
and his followers, which does not separate form from meaning. y  nailiday
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Modality was traditionally regarded as essentially constructed through the choice of 
particular modal auxiliary verbs. However, Critical Discourse Analysts amongst 
others have argued that this view of modality is over-restrictive. Modality also 
encompasses the use of adverbs, hedges and various other grammatical features like 
voice and syntactic configurations (Halliday, 1985: 85-89; Hodge and Kress, 1988; 
Fairclough, 1992: 158-162; Stubbs, 1996: chapter 8; Thompson, 1997: 56-65). 
Typically, the frequency of such or such modal device varies across text types; in 
legal texts their variety is rather limited. I explore below the text’s modal profile, 
looking at the modal construction, voice (i.e. active or passive) and syntactic 
configuration of articles (i.e. what is thematic or rhematic). The thematic perspective 
relates to Halliday’s textual function of language: how certain elements are 
foregrounded or backgrounded as Theme or Rheme according to their sentential 
positioning. The rationale for that distinction lies in that thematic foregrounding and 
rhematic backgrounding are ideologically motivated emphatic devices as well as 
cohesion devices.
Regarding the interpretation of how power relations are constructed, the use of 
various modal devices reflects/enacts the degree of affinity (Hodge and Kress, 1988) 
the author seeks to establish with its propositions. Further, the construction of affinity 
determines how explicit or implicit, causality, agency and responsibility are, and each 
particular design indexes relations of power between the author and her/his 
addressees. I will explore below the relationship between these grammatical features 
and the construction of agency and authority.
The European Court o f Justice (ECJ): Preamble and Article 7
Amongst EU institutions, the ECJ occupies an outstanding position. In Regulation 1, 
it is dealt with separately from other institutions, first in the preamble and then in 
article 7. The anterior and separate positioning of the ECJ entails a distinction 
between the ECJ and the other institutions, which can be read at two connected levels. 
At the inter-textual level of legitimization, it positions the ECJ on equal footing with 
the Council: the legitimization of the Council’s aforementioned power prerogatives is 
toned down by the constraint that they cannot cause ‘prejudice to the provisions 
contained in the rules o f procedures o f the Court o f Justice Looking at textual
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features though, the use of authoritative modal shall in the agent-deleting passive 
form in article 7 tones down the ECJ’s glottopolitical autonomy to make it look as if 
the Council had granted it35 6. This apparent paradox indicates the hegemonic struggle 
over (glotto)-political authority between the Council and the ECJ.
The Parliament and the Commission: articles 2, 3 and 6
The Parliament and the Commission37 are dually positioned in this text. They are both 
glottopolitically sub-ordinated to the Council’s authority, to member states and 
‘persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state’ (articles 1, 2 and 3), and 
partially autonomous (article 6).
Their subordinate status is manifest in that, in their internal functioning and mutual 
inter-institutional relations (article 1), and when interacting with member states and/or 
‘European citizens’38 (articles 2 and 3), they must exclusively use the working and 
official languages determined by the Council, i.e. excluding RMLs. With member 
states and/or European citizens, furthermore, they must abide by the addressor’s 
language choice, which is not necessarily the language of the state of origin but can be 
any of the EU official languages (article 2). Conversely, when addressing a member 
state and/or European citizens, EU institutions’ communications ‘shall be drafted in 
the language o f such state ’ (article 3). In brief, tire language choice of the EU 
institutions is apparently more constrained than that of European citizens, and this 
constraint is modally imposed by the Council by means of authoritative shall and 
agent-deleting passive form be drafted.
Regarding institutional glottopolitical autonomy, article 6 states that ‘institutions [...] 
may stipulate in their rules o f procedures which o f the languages are to be used in 
specific cases’. The voice is active and agency is thematically foregrounded
35 An alternative syntactic (and modal) organisation o f article 7 could have foregrounded rather thin
backgrounded the ECJ’s glottopolitical prerogatives (e.g. The Court o f  Justice lays down in its rulTs of 
procedures the languages to be used in its proceedings. ’) d
37 No mention is made o f the Committee o f the Regions [CoR], as it did not exist at the time this 
Regulation was adopted. However, since the text refers to ‘the Institutions of the Communitv' L  
same provisions apply to the CoR. °miy , tne
M Tbe reaS°" ^ i ^ g i n g  of ‘citiz,en’ wi" become clear below. For now, I will keep using it as a 
convenient short hand for ‘persons subject to the jurisdiction o f  a Member State.’ b
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conveying the institutions’ glottopolitical autonomy. This autonomy is then further 
reinforced by the vagueness of the expression ‘in specific cases’ to be determined by 
the institutions themselves and not by the Council39. However, the use of permission­
granting auxiliary may still signals that the institutions’ autonomy remains a function 
of the Council’s prerogative to grant some amount of autonomy. Regarding working 
language use too, then, the institutions’ glottopolitical autonomy seems constructed in 
contradictory ways, which signals a process of hegemonic struggle for glottopolitical 
authority.
Member states and ‘persons subject to the jurisdiction of a member state’ apparently 
enjoy greater glottopolitical powers than EU institutions, whilst the latter retain some 
glottopolitical autonomy for their internal workings only40.
Europe, Member States and 'persons subject to the jurisdiction o f a Member
State ’
Article 2 confers special rights to senders of documents to the Community 
institutions, i.e. they can use ‘any one o f the official languages ’ (i.e. as defined by 
article 1), and not necessarily the official language of the Member State ‘to the 
jurisdiction of which they are a subject’. For instance a British national residing in 
France may send a query to a Community institution in English rather than French. 
Senders are thus positioned in a dual manner: as ‘subject to the jurisdiction of a 
Member State’, i.e. in which they reside, and as a ‘subject’ of the larger European 
entity. This provision therefore glottopolitically transcends the notions of citizenship, 
territorial residence and nationality. Within national contexts, the language choice of 
residents is territorially determined: whether nationals/citizens of the Member State or 
not, they must address the institutions in the official language(s) of the Member 
States. Migrants, both from EU and non-EU Member States, have to use ‘the official 
language’ of their country of residence. Thus, a British national residing in France 
must exclusively use French in its communication with French institutions. In 
communications with the EU, Article 2 grants senders glottopolitical rights 
irrespective of their place of residence and rather based upon their ‘national
39 See the discussion o f working languages below.
40 Yet this is no minor issue, as we will see in subsequent sections when we discuss the general 
coherence o f  this text.
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language’41. This significantly undermines Member States’ glottopolitical prerogative 
to govern official language use for all the residents on their territories. Should a 
conflict between a resident and her/his residing Member State’s institutions seek 
supra-national arbitration, the issue of language choice is clearly one of 
empowerment. This provision is therefore reminiscent of the ECJ’s rules governing 
the language of cases which also gives pre-eminence to persons rather than to 
institutions with respect to language choice (see below). Inter-discursively, 
furthermore, this provision can be interpreted as the linguistic correlate of the 
European fundamental stance for the free circulation of goods and workers.) I view it 
as a clear discursive instance of a supra-national, rather than inter-governemental, 
view of European construction wherein the communication channel between 
‘citizens’ and European institutions can be un-mediated by national levels.
At issue here, furthermore, is the category of ‘persons subject to the jurisdiction of a 
Member State’. In that connection it is significant that Regulation 1 should use a 
lengthy periphrastic formula instead of a nominal expression like European citizen for 
instance. This non-categorization is better explained from a historical perspective. 
Indeed, when Regulation 1 was adopted (1958), the concept of European citizenship 
did not exist; it is a Post-Maastricht development. Moreover, one could argue that it is 
a republican concept even though Member States are not all republics. Still, it is 
nowadays broadly accepted as the denomination characterizing all the ‘persons 
subject to the jurisdiction of Member States’, including the ‘subjects’ of the European 
monarchies. If we accept that broad inclusive approach to European citizenship, and 
consider that the text of Regulation 1 was not amended in the post-Maastricht period, 
we can investigate the reason for this non-amendment.
The concept of citizenship has to do with the legal notion of political identity: ‘The 
legal conception o f an individual who owes allegiance to, and receives protection 
from, a state.' (Scruton, 1983: 63-64). It thus relates to the legal ‘positioning’, in our 
terms, of persons subject to the jurisdiction of a state. My contention here is that even 
today the concept does not explicitly appear in amended versions of Regulation 1 as it 
inter-textually refers to states only in current political imagery. Inter-discursively, the
411 broadly take ‘national language’ as the language they have acquired in their country o f  origin, 
provided this is also the state language o f their country o f origin, and not a non-EU language.
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category of European citizen would imply the categorization of the EU as a (supra-) 
state and thereby endorse a significant symbolic move towards supra-national 
hegemony. Non-categorization can thence be construed as recognising resistance to 
instituting a fully-fledged European political regime in which, in language matters 
European citizens would primarily owe allegiance to Europe, i.e as the highest 
jurisdiction, beyond their national allegiances42.
Summary
The above analysis shows that the Council’s authority remains hegemonic but 
unstable. The Council is glottopolitically positioned in complex contradictory ways 
through the combined use of different modal devices and instrumental syntactic 
choices in the successive articles. Critical analysis has helped further qualify the 
apparent omnipotence of the Council, more than a ‘traditional legal analysis’ of 
authority and autonomy, for instance, would. EU institutions are granted a significant 
amount of glottopolitical autonomy and the glottopolitical hierarchy between member 
states and European citizens is configured in such a way that the latter derive new 
glottopolitical powers outside the scope of national decisional arenas.
The next section pursues the analysis of how glottopolitical power and authority are 
constructed and distributed in Regulation 1 considering how glottopolitical power is 
sociolinguistically defined, i.e. through the categorization(s) of language(s) within the 
EU sociolinguistic order.
Categorizing Languages
In this section, I explore the pattern of distribution of glottopolitical power within the 
EU by considering how language is categorized as official and/or working language. 
Whilst above I looked at modal and syntactic characteristics of textual construction I 
now examine nominal and cohesive features of the text to see how the object 
language is discursively constructed43.1 claim that the classifications of languages are
42 For a discussion o f the conception o f Europe as a state and o f the need to depart from tradiHon.i 
definitions o f  state, see Sbragia (1992: 205; cited in Cram, Dinan and Nugent 1992- 363 36s\
43 Lexicalization and nominalization are discussed in Fairclough (ibid: chapters^ and f i t ’ s  i
Kress for his discussion o f the process o f classification (Kress, 1985: 61-67) ' ^  9 S°
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themselves an important element in the EU’s discourse on language and 
glottopolitical authority, within the larger order of discourse of power distribution in 
the EU. I therefore examine the glottopolitical power and subject positioning that such 
categorizations construct. As Fairclough puts it: .‘Cohesive markers have to he 
interpreted by text interpreters as part o f the process o f constructing coherent 
readings o f the texts... Cohesion is one factor in coherence’, and coherence is another 
surface mark of underlying discourses: by looking at how texts are made to cohere, 
we can trace the ideologies they assume (Fairclough, 1992: 177). Here I show that the 
textual construction of language equality and multilingualism displays limited 
coherence, and that textual cohesion/coherence is also defective in the 
characterisation of official languages. This Tack’ of coherence becomes apparent in a 
critical reading and betrays Regulation l ’s failure to be both precise and clear, and all- 
inclusive. To illustrate this claim, I contrast the discourses on language and 
glottopolitical authority with actual patterns of institutional language use to emphasize 
further the discursive tensions and contradictions intrinsic to this Regulation and the 
discrepancies between legal provisions and empirical reality.
Coherence and Cohesion in the Definition o f Working Languages and/or
Community Official Languages
Regulation 1 equips the Community with official and working languages. In article 1, 
these are identified ad hoc rather than conceptually - i.e. through a definition rule - as 
the four languages of the original Community.44 This ad hoc identification suggests 
that the four languages mentioned are equal between themselves and also individually 
both working and official languages. This tends to signify the will of the Community 
to implement language equality and respect for multilingualism. Yet, the repetition of 
article the, and the use of coordinating conjunction and seem to establish a distinction 
between official and working status that is in contradiction with the aforementioned 
ad hoc definition along lines of equality: they act as separators (compare the official 
and working languages with the official and the working languages). The clausal and 
sentential organization of article 1 thus grammatically and semantically constructs the 
relation between official languages and working languages in contradictory ways: the
44 A s the Community was further enlarged in subsequent years, the official language o f the new 
memebers states aquired official recognition and working language status as well.Today there are 20 
EU official languages.
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combined use of the with and establishes a separation whereas the ad hoc definition 
suggests equality between languages and between official and working language 
statuses. As a result of this apparent contradiction, article 1 only displays limited
coherence per se.AS One has therefore to look elsewhere to transcend this apparent 
contradiction.
Working Languages
In the absence of a definition rule for ‘working languages’, I define them as 
languages used within and between the institutions at various structural levels’, so 
that they have to do with actual institutional proceedings. This leads us to look for 
further characterization in articles 6 and 7. Article 6’s expression which o f the 
languages implies a choice without clearly specifying what the options denoted by the 
languages are. It is for the interpreter to make the expression cohere with the 
languages o f the institutions o f the Community as defined in article 1. Via the use of 
which, furthermore, each institution can use some, not necessarily all, languages in 
their procedures according to specific cases. Potential linguistic inequality thus results 
from the fact that each institution enjoys some degree of glottopolitical autonomy 
which is ill-defined by the vagueness of the expression in specific cases (effectively 
the only stipulative rule here) even though this autonomy is intra-textually restricted 
by Article 1. In terms of categorizing languages in their mutual relationship, all 
official languages are not necessarily on an equal footing as working languages. The 
intra-textual, cohesive link established between articles 1 and 6 (i.e. in specific cases) 
regarding the categorization of languages to be used reflects the conflict underlying 
the distribution of glottopolitical power underlined above, i.e. the tension between 
intergovermental and supranational sovereignty evidenced by the limited coherence 
between article l ’s implicit statement of linguistic equality and individual institutional 
working language autonomy which opens some space for some form of language 
hiérarchisation.
Article 7’s wording reflects the ECJ’s aforementioned glottopolitical autonomy and 
its equal glottopolitical footing with the Council. Indeed, the expression ‘the
4> Coherence later emerges from the provisions o f  articles 6  and 7. Article 1 he™™»* .
coherent with articles 6 and 7 . es retr°actively
languages to be used does not refer here to article 1 but to the ECJ’s own rules of 
procedures without any restriction of language choice whatsoever. By constrast with 
Article 6, thus, the meaning of ‘the languages to be used’ is to be read through an 
inter-textual reference to the ECJ’s Rules of Procedures rather than by reference to 
article 1. Arguably the identical collocational use of the expression ‘the languages to 
be used in articles 6 and 7, and the lack of overt semantic differentiation between the 
two referents of article the masks the different glottopolitical status of the ECJ and the 
other Community institutions. This collocational use is therefore a deceptive cohesive 
device.
The limitation in coherence between articles 1 and 6 originates in the actual generic 
legal conventions underlying the production of Regulation 1 where only limited 
aspects o f cohesion are considered: the only cohesive link between articles 1 and 6 is 
a vague expression (i.e. in specific cases) which, if it is all-inclusive, nevertheless 
remains imprecise and leaves more room for legal interpretation. In turn, I see the 
limitation in cohesion/coherence within and/or between the various articles as 
resulting from the discursive tension between the intergovernmental approach to 
integration (resting upon the symbolic equality of national languages) and the 
construction of a suprational entity to some extent autonomous and increasingly 
costly. The original context of production of Regulation 1 did not make that tension 
so acute since only four languages were concerned. As the Community enlarged 
though, as was noted in chapter 1, the equal use of all the member states’ languages as 
working languages became financially and technically difficult due to the important 
costs and time constraints involved. This has progressively become a more sensitive 
political issue and constitutes, after the 2004 enlargement, a further glottopolitical 
challenge. Today, in practice, the use of English and French has become the rule de 
facto at ‘working group’ level in all institutions, including in preparatory meetings of 
the EP despite the latter’s recurrent statements in favour of respect for symbolic 
language equality and practical multilingualism. At higher levels -  in Plenaries and 
Committees -  interpretation is provided in all member states’ languages, but it has to 
be required first (Bakker, 2003).
The limited coherence between article 1 (language equality) and article 6 (institutional 
glottoplitical autonomy) has entailed numerous parliamentary questions denouncing
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the discrepancy between the proclaimed equal use of all official languages as working 
languages and the actual restricted use of English and French on many occasions. The 
Commission has therefore had to further qualify the meaning of specific cases:
• [...] documents intended for use outside the Commission are drawn up in the 
official languages of the Community in the case of instruments of general 
application and in the languages of those to whom they are addressed in 
other cases [Regulation 1/58, article 4].
• [...] documents for internal use are drafted in the languages corresponding to 
the actual needs of the Commission and its departments based on operational 
efficiency [Regulation 1/58, article 6]46.
The need for operational efficiency has not been limited to internal use though, and 
since the creation of the EU’s Website Europa, language equality in information has 
been repeatedly breached where constraints of time and/or money justified language 
restrictions47. The Commission has eventually explicitly acknowledged that 
constraints of efficiency and urgency have to prevail over translation in all 
languages48. Arguably these exceptions could be seen as infringing article 4. The 
Commission having denied infringement following several such accusations, the case 
was eventually brought before the Court of First Instance that concluded against 
allegations of infringement. In its judgement, the Court stated that:
Council Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the 
European Economic Community is merely an act o f  secondary law [...] To 
claim that that regulation sets out a specific Community law principle o f  
equality between languages, which may not be derogated from even by a 
subsequent regulation o f the Council, is tantamount to disregarding its 
character as secondary law [...] [Article 217] does not provide that once the 
Council has established such rules they cannot subsequently be altered. It
46 AnsWer to Written Question E-0615/02, OJ C 309 E, 12/12/2002 (p. 33).
47 See Written Question E-201/02 and the Commission’s Answer (OJ C 92,17/04/03, pp.3-4).
48 See the dispute over the languages in use in the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market 
/Written Question E-2529/01, OJ C 93 E, 18/04/2002 p. 152, and the Commission’s answer, 
o i  C 93 E 18/04/2002 p. 153), and more recently the one over the restricted use o f  languages in the 
European Patent office (answer to Written Question E-1416/02, OJ C 52 E, 06/03/2003 p. 70)
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follows that the rules governing languages laid down by Regulation No 1 
cannot be deemed to amount to a principle o f Community law.4g
The 2001 Court’s conclusions thus denied that Regulation 1 had set out a specific 
Community law principle of equality between languages. Interestingly the repeated 
emphasis that, as an act of secondary law, Regulation 1 could be derogated from shifts 
the focus away from the initial discourse of language equality to the possibility of 
change. Is the Court acknowledging that Regulation 1/58 initially established a de 
facto principle of language equality? The implications of that recent judgement are 
far-reaching and fully legitimise the aforementioned discrepancy between apparent 
language equality (article 1) and institutional language autonomy (article 6) and the 
subsequent limitation in the number of working languages. They also undermine the 
oft-stated EU principles of respect for and promotion of language equality and 
multilingualism (see below).
I claimed above that the definition of working languages had only limited or indirect 
relevance to the question of RML status and use in 1958, because when Regulation 1 
was drafted the question of RML status was not yet as politically salient at domestic 
levels as it later became, let alone at Community level, so that there was no pressure 
from RML activists for RML use within the Community (Milian, 2001). However, 
one 1990 EP Resolution49 50 calling for use of Catalan in official publication and 
information campaigns, and for communication between the Commission and Catalan 
speakers met some success: an agreement between the EEC and the principality of 
Andorra was drafted in all official languages and Catalan51, and it is reported to have 
been occasionally ‘used’ in plenaries in the EP (Strubell, 2002: 31).52
Unsurprisingly in the light of the discussion above, a more notable exception to the 
possibility of institutional use of RMLs as working languages is to found in the ECJ.
49 Christina Kik versus Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market- Case T -l20/99 Av '1 w
http://europjLeminCsm.anap jZcg i/sga_jk)c?smartapi!Celexapi!nro(iir F l p y n„ „ ^ — „ a . at ,
1999AO 120&mode!=guichett accessed Octnher inlh ?nr|4 F ~  ------- — hi^JM ndoc^
50 OJ C 0 19 ,28/01/19 9 1, p. 0042.
31 OJ L 374,31/12/1990 p. 0014 - 0032
proved”f f iX r ,'2 "  * ^  1M “ d ^  no interpretation,,™««!,»
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In practice, in chapter 5 of its Rules of procedure, the ECJ has defined its language o f 
the case as to be chosen from a list including all the official and working languages of 
the Community53. However, and most importantly, article 4 of chapter 5 stipulates 
that ‘ Where a witness or expert states that he is unable adequately to express himself 
in one o f the languages referred to in paragraph (1) o f this Article, the Court o f First 
Instance may authorize him to give his evidence in another language.’ This provision 
constitutes a clear possibility for any RML speaker to use his/her language in the ECJ 
with no restriction whatsoever as it is for the witness or expert to determine the 
language in which s/he can most adequately express him/herself54. It can be seen as 
resting on an intertextual reference to other conventions drafted by a number of 
international organizations where such provision is a basic minority right (e.g. in the 
UN Charter on Human Rights), sometimes the only one (e.g. the 1947 International 
Labour Organization Convention on Minority Rights). At EU level, seeing linguistic 
democracy as the right to use the language of one’s choice in public spheres makes 
the ECJ the most linguistically democratic EU institution.
Community and Member States ’ Official Languages
The only explicit classificatory/definitional references to the official languages o f the 
Community are in articles 1 and 8. The existence of Community official languages (as 
distinct from Member States' official languages) is assumed in Article 1 through two 
linguistic devices: definite article the and the nominal group official languages. 
Besides, the thematic positioning of this noun phrase reinforces the assumption of 
pre-existence, masking the Council’s agency whilst emphasizing its authority with
shall be.
Like working languages, community official languages are identified empirically. 
However, the expression official language recurs throughout the text (articles 2, 4, 5 
and 8). Articles 4 and 5 seem to reinforce the linguistic equality hypothesized above. 
Article 4 establishes that all regulations and other legal documents produced by the 
institutions and aimed at public information must be drafted in all (Community)
53 The ECJ does not actually speak o f  working languages but recognises them as languages o f  a case 
(OJ Doc. No C 39/1, 15-02-1982). Arguably, since they can be used in legal procedures, they are 
effectively working languages in the ECJ.
54 This article has been de facto interpreted in that sense by Catalan speakers (see the 1990 EP’s 
Resolution on languages o f the Community and the situation o f Catalan, paragraph 5).
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official languages, thus allowing EU officials to have access to draft texts in their own 
respective languages. Article 5 states that the Official Journal of the Community must 
be equally published in all official languages, which allows citizens to access 
legislation in their own language. Articles 1, 4 and 5 thus concur to ensure that 
official multilingualism and linguistic equality be built into the legal framework of 
European integration despite the concomitant translation costs.
An important stake for RMLs are the provisions contained in articles 3 and 8. Article 
3 regulates the ways in which Community institutions must communicate with 
Member States and the ‘persons subject to the juridiction’ of such states. 
Communications must ‘be drafted in the language of such State.'(Emphasis added) 
What is implicitly conveyed here, both in the thematic use of article the and in that of 
language in the singular, is a view of Member States as monolingual, which reflects 
the essentialist principles guiding Western European glottopolitics since early modern 
times (see chapters 1, 5, 7 and 9). It is only in Article 8 that this categorization of 
States as monolingual is further qualified. Article 8 acknowledges that Member States 
can potentially have more than one official language. Still, Member States’ potential
multilingualism is only approached from the viewpoint of officiality. This calls for
several observations.
First, Regulation 1 does not deal with non-official languages of the Member States
i.e. (most) RMLs as well as migrant languages. Again, this can be seen as a generic 
constraint of the text, but I believe that it is essentially an attempt not to encroach 
upon national prerogatives in the definition of their own sociolinguistic profiles. 
Second, a coherent reading of article 3 is conditioned by article 8‘s provision: the 
expression The language o f such stale deceptively signals some yet unestablished 
shared knowledge that in situations of official multilingualism, the State in question 
chooses one language to be used in the Community.
Second, since article 8 stipulates that (national) official language choice is ‘governed 
by the general rules of its [i.e. a State’s] law’, the definition of official languages calls 
for a sociolinguistic distinction between different levels of officialness within 
Member States. A more sociolinguistic discourse indeed would clearly distinguish 
between state/natloml official languages and ‘sub-national’ official languages eg
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Catalan in Spain, Frisian in Holland. Insofar as this inter-textual/inter-discursive 
reference remains implicit rather than manifest in article 8, the distinction, or lack 
thereof, remains a stake of hegemonic struggle.
In terms of higher-level textual cohesion and coherence, finally, and given its location 
at the very end of the text, article 8 textually underlines the aforementioned Member 
States’ glottopolitical prerogative only in retrospect, which can be seen as a structural 
‘defect’ in the cohesion, and hence coherence of the text. Thence, it is for the 
reader/interpreter to infer that Community official languages are Member States’ 
national/official languages55. This inference is only implicit in article 1 and only 
becomes partially explicit in article 8 but nowhere is it stated that to become
Community official languages, national official languages have to be official 
throughout the territory of the member state.
The question of official languages seems to have more relevance for RMLs for bolh 
symbolic and more practical/financial reasons. Article 8 remains vague as to how to 
define official languages and does not clearly rule on sub-state official languages In a 
1999 written question MEP Camilo Nogueita Román asked the Commision for some 
clarification regarding •[...] its view on the possibility o f conferring the status of 
official EU languages not only on the official languages of the Member States, but 
also on those languages which are official in the Member Slates’ (written question E- 
1445/99; m OJ 29-1-2000, C27 E/71). The Commission’s answer Invoked article 290 
(ex 217), invariably reiterating that the rules governing the languages of the 
Community are to be 'determined by the Cornai, acting unanimously [and that] the 
Treaty does not provide for Commission proposals on this matter. The answer only 
indicates that granting officialness is beyond the Commission’s remit. This question 
could have been put to the Council, at least to force It to clarify its position on the 
issue. In that connection, it would also have been interesting to ask whether languages 
need to be Community official languages to receive community support through 
certain provisions (e.g. education). Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter on the 
EU education and culture policies, languages may not need official recognition at EU 
level to benefit from EU policy support. What Is therefore also laeking in the E[J.S
55 Incidentally, French only became the official 
It was official de facto before, but not de jure. language o f France via constitutional provision in 1992.
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sociolinguistic regime is an explicit stipulation of the difference between Community 
official languages and languages considered by EU policy activities.
I see the aforementioned lack of conceptual language definition (i.e. through 
definition rules) and the resulting vagueness of certain provisions (e.g. articles 6 and 
8) as a strategic discursive device aimed at avoiding interferences from a 
sociolinguistic discourse and genre where such conceptualizations and categorizations 
could not remain as ‘vague’, or merely empirical. Arguably a sociolinguistic 
discourse on language might put Regulation l ’s author’s authority at risk and would 
point up the lack of coherence in Regulation l ’s discourse on language and 
glottopolitical authority, as the above analysis suggests. Conversely, as the next 
chapter will show, the lack of sociolinguistic definitions also generates challenges to 
authority.
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Conclusion
Regulation 1 establishes the fundamental glottopolitical positions for EU actors at 
large and defines their respective powers. As the author, the Council is the dominant 
producer of language policies and all language-related queries are referred to 
Regulation l ’s provisions. As a multinational body, the Council has pledged to 
respect and promote linguistic equality, restrictively in the definition of Community 
Official languages, and in a less interventionist way regarding the institutions’ 
working languages.
From a sociolinguistic perspective, we have seen that Regulation 1 remains imprecise 
and ambiguous as to its inclusivity. Yet, these features do not come forth as long as 
the legal discourse excludes sociolinguistic analysis. Thence the EU sociolinguistic 
order can only be incomplete, inconsistent and unstable: various languages receive 
uneven treatments at EU level, and various statements regarding the scope and 
meaning of linguistic diversity, the locus of decisional power regarding language 
policies, and/or the appropriate legal basis for RMLs are in contradiction with one 
another because of political reluctance to create and implement a fully coherent EU 
sociolinguistic system. This reluctance is instrumental in maintaining a predominantly 
intergovernmental approach to language issues. Consequently, when sociolinguistic 
issues arise, the EU chooses not to respond in sociolinguistic terms and can only 
retreat behind legal provisions, e.g. role distribution in law-making processes, or 
voting modes. In doing so, it preserves member states’ glottopolitical sovereignties.
Regarding change in the EU’s sociolinguistic regime, finally, the aforementioned 
dismissal of the principle of language equality by the Court of First Instance on July 
12th 2001 signaled an important evolution, which attests to the difficulty of remaining 
loyal to the principles that lay beneath the original sociolinguistic regime of 1958. 
Yet, the EU is not altogether ready to admit that language equality and 
multilingualism remain more symbolic than actual and, whereas the hierarchization of 
languages is well advanced, the EU still adopts a blind eye strategy, continuing to 
claim that:
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All the European languages, in their spoken and written forms, are equal in 
value and dignity from the cultural point o f view and form an integral part o f 
European cultures and civilization (Council Resolution of 14th February 2002; 
in OJ C 50/2,23/02/2002).
In the EU’s sociolinguistic regime, all the European languages are thus theoretically 
‘ equally valuable from the cultural point o f view’ and yet increasingly hierarchized at 
the practical level. It is on that contradiction that RML activism has focused since the 
inclusion in the 1992 Treaty of provisions indirectly establishing an EU language 
policy within member states: article 149 (Education) and 151 (Culture). The next 
chapter therefore provides a critical reading of articles 149 and 151.
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Chapter 3: Language in Education and Cultural Policy: Finding 
for RMLs
a Legal Basis
Introduction
After looking at the ideological foundations o f the EU g e o p o litic a l order in the 
previous chapter, the objective o f this chapter is to show on what legal fronts RML 
activists have fought to obtain a legal basis for an EU RML policy and with what 
success. I therefore analyse the treaty articles with a language content (i.e. articles 149
and 151, respectively regulating the EU competence in education and culture) and 
their translation into concrete EU action programmes.
This chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first deals with the place devoted 
to language promotion in the EU education policy and, in the second section, I look at 
language promotion within the EU cultural policy. In both sections, 1 first undertake n 
•conventional’ legal analysis o f the respective articles mentioned above using the 
same analytical categories as in the previous chapter and then measure the extent to 
which RML activists have been successful, or not, in challenging and elaborating on 
conventional readings to impose their own paradigm(s) o f text interpretation during 
the processes o f implementation o f the legal provisions via programmes and actions.
Put otherwise, I first analyse how glottopolitical power is constructed and distributed 
in the texts o f  articles 149 and 151, looking first at how the subject positions of 
Community institutions and member states are legally defined through particular 
lexical choices. To complement this legal perspective I then also examine the 
sociolinguistic configuration o f education and cultural policy, i.e. how language(s) 
is/are conceptualised within it and how this conceptualisation has positioned the 
various actors and become a stake o f discursive struggle for RML activists. 
Specifically, I focus on the main institutional platforms through which challenges to 
conventional readings have been channelled: parliamentary written questions and the 
still-born project for a Council Decision in favour o f RMLs (i.e. the Archipelago 
project), as far as education policy is concerned. Regarding the place devoled to
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language promotion within the EU’s cultural policy, I analyse other parliamentary 
questions, and then briefly the framework programme Culture 2000 and, in detail, the 
action European Year o f Languages 2001 (hereafter EYL; see selected excerpts in 
Annex 1) for EU cultural actions.
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Languages in Education Policy
As in other policy areas, Community action in the education domain preceded the 
introduction of a legal basis for education per se. Such a legal basis was however 
introduced in the 1992 Treaty of the European Union (TEU) i.e article 126 (now 149). 
I reproduce the entire text here and discuss it below:
1. The Community shall contribute to the development of quality education by 
encouraging cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by 
supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the 
organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity.
2. Community action shall be aimed at:
- developing the European dimension in education, particularly through the 
teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States;
- encouraging mobility of students and teachers, inter alia by encouraging the 
academic recognition of diplomas and periods of study;
- promoting cooperation between educational establishments;
- developing exchanges of information and experience on issues common to 
the education systems of the Member States;
- encouraging the development of youth exchanges and of exchanges of socio- 
educational instructors;
- encouraging the development of distance education.
3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third 
countries and the competent international organisations in the field of 
education, in particular the CoE.
4. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this 
Article, the Council:
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251, after 
consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation of the 
laws and regulations of the Member States;
- acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall 
adopt recommendations.
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Authorship and Authority
The author of the text is the Council and its main addressees are member states. 
Nevertheless, the legislative procedure involves the Commission (that proposes acts 
of secondary legislation to the Council and ultimately devises implementing 
measures, e.g. programmes and/or actions), the EP as a co-decision maker (see 
intertextual reference in clause 4 to article 251 entailing the co-decision procedure), 
and for advisory purposes, the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) and the 
Committee of Regions (CoR). To some extent, the CoE can also be associated to the 
EU education policy (clause 3). Glottopolitical authority derives from clauses 1 and 4. 
The former defines the broad objectives of the EU education policy and provides for 
glottopolitical hierarchical positions. The latter regulates the potential policy 
outcomes.
Clause 1 defines the scope of intervention of the Community in education matters. 
That the Community contributes by encouraging implies that member states retain 
foil decisional powers and that Community action is limited to providing 
material/structural-organisational assistance. Yet, the community can also supplement. 
This leads to interpreting what follows in two significantly different ways. First, the 
article can be semantically understood as if it were written: ‘... whilst fully respecting 
the responsibility o f the member states for the content 1. o f teaching and the 
organisation o f education systems; 2. their cultural and linguistic diversity’, which 
accords responsibility to member states for the content of cultural and linguistic 
diversity. However, an alternative reading found in a report commissioned by the EP, 
and drafted by a group of well-known RML activists, suggests that there already 
exists a legal basis for an EU RML policy in the current Treaty in force, which 
another interpretation illustrates: fully respecting 1. the responsibility o f the
Member States for the content o f  teaching and the organisation o f education systems 
and 2. their cultural and linguistic diversity.’ In this alternative reading the 
Community folly respects member states’ cultural and linguistic diversity. Thence the 
meaning of supporting and supplementing tends to suggest that article 1 allows for 
independent Community action according to the principles of subsidiarity and 
supplementarity whereby the Community can act independently of member states if 
the latter’s policies are ineffective and/or insufficient to attain the Community’s
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objectives56 (Strubell, 2002: 24-25). What usually prevails is the stipulation clause 
that Community action must ‘fully respect the responsibility of the member states’57. 
However, if this is the case, the report claims, 7he statement that the Community will 
act by supporting and supplementing their action’ becomes void’ (ibid). Arguably 
there is only limited coherence between keeping responsibility at member state level 
and allowing the community to act where supplementary action is necessary to 
achieve Community objectives, e.g. promoting linguistic diversity.
The distribution of political power is also a function of particular legislative 
procedures wherein various power positions are granted to various actors. The 
competition between levels of governance is finally arbitrated by the legal basis which 
a proposed policy invokes, and which itself determines: 1. the kind of vote required, 
i.e. qualified majority or unanimity58; 2. the type of legislative outcome for a proposal 
of the Commission to become legally binding (Regulation, Decision and Directive), 
or not (Recommendation, Opinion, Incentive Measures), in the Member-States. These 
measures, along with the substantial importance of the budgetary grants for 
implementation purposes59 60, arguably reflect the political will either to preserve 
national sovereignties or to favour supranational governance.
Clause 4 provides that the voting mode is qualified majority and the legislative 
procedure is co-decision (art. 251, ex 189b). Qualified majority implies that decisions 
on education made at European level could potentially be binding at national levels 
regardless of the opposition of certain Member States if a sufficient blocking minority 
cannot be obtained . Co-decision grants the EP some leverage on the content of 
education provisions. However, clause 4 also stipulates that the Council can only 
adopt ‘soft law’ legislative acts, i.e. incentive measures, excluding any harmonisation 
o f the laws and regulations o f the Member States... and recommendations, so that
561 return to the importance o f objectives for legal interpretation below.
57 See for instance the Council’s answer to written question E- 3948/00 by Pere Esteve (OJ C 23s F 
21/08/2001, p.35.) ' V
Kegaraing voting mooes, article zus ( 1) (ex 148(1)) o f  the Treaty states- 
in this Treaty the Council shall act by a majority of its members. In most cases, though^  Treaty'^ 
does provide for a different system o f voting. fa 1 reaiy
59 The crucial importance o f the budgetaiy issue, both at the legal and practical levels, will be further
(T e r S r E B L U L )56 P ‘°  P6an Bureau for Lesser Used Languages
60 On the issue o f defining a ‘sufficient blocking minority’, see the Ioannina Compromise (1994).
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legislative outcomes provided for cannot be binding at Member-State level no matter 
what voting mode is chosen. Still, even a (non-binding) Recommendation can 
legitimately constitute the legal basis for a Commission proposal for Community 
action even though it cannot be followed by sanctions in case of non-compliance. At
the very least, it can become a potential site for grassroots activists to exert pressure 
(see chapter 4).
Defining Language(s)
Sociolinguistically, the text contains only two direct references to languages. Due to 
the ambivalence of clause 1 discussed above, clause 2’s expression the languages o f 
the Member States is also ambiguous. The Council’s interpretation of article l ’s 
provision suggests that national prerogatives to define their own respective 
sociolinguistic profiles remain unchallenged. In turn, this implies that the above 
expression refers to national/state official languages which establishes an intertextual 
reference to the restrictive interpretation in Regulation 1/58 of the expression the 
languages o f  the Member States (chapter 2). The alternative interpretation of how 
article 149 relates to often-repeated Community objectives such as the promotion of 
and respect for linguistic diversity61, and legal principles - subsidiarity and/or 
supplementary principles - suggests that the Community could thus support and/or 
supplement member states’ actions where their cultural and linguistic diversity is not 
fully supported (Strubell, 2002). Thence, the languages o f the member states would 
refer ex maxima to all the languages used in member states, including RMLs, ex 
minima to those languages which have received officialness at domestic level.
Finally, an issue untouched by article 149 concerns the actual foreign languages to be 
taught in priority. In 1988 the Commission had called for measures to ■[...] diversify 
language teaching [...] [and asserted that] Member-States should be encouraged to 
ensure that all official Community languages are on offer within the educational 
system, even i f  there is an increasing trend towards certain languages [-  by 
implication English and French].' (COM (88) 203, p.S and 280, p.14). In other words *26
61 See for instance the Council Conclusions on Linguistic Diversity and Multil incut
26/06/95 ( ^ ^ ^ 7 * 3 9 / 9 5  at
November 26 2003). See also article 22 o f  the EU charter foT.Fundamental Righl
in the EU,
accessed
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although in principle all Community official languages ought to be on an equal 
footing in member states’ education systems, it has long been acknowledged that 
English is increasingly the first foreign language of a vast majority of European 
citizens despite multiple statements reiterating the need to promote less widely spoken 
Community languages62. Here again, multilingualism and linguistic equality were de 
jure objectives whilst de facto Community languages were steadily hierarchized with 
English rapidly becoming the dominant first, and sometimes only, foreign language of 
European citizens63.
Moreover, by calling for measures merely encouraging Member States, by means of 
(non-binding) measures, to ensure that all official Community languages are on offer 
within the educational system, the Commission perpetuated a policy of laissez-faire 
essentially benefiting English (and to a lesser extent French)64 and excluding non- 
official Community languages, whether non-EC migrant languages or RMLs, from its 
proposed policies of multilingual education.
It is significant that the Commission should have equated multilingualism with 
official Community languages thus stating unambiguously which languages should be 
targeted, whereas later article 149 (2) ambiguously referred to the languages o f the 
Member States. The ambiguity here lies in the fact that if we consider that Member 
States retain lull responsibility to define their cultural and linguistic diversity, 
languages other than national official languages, which are granted some official 
recognition at sub-national level, may be entitled to be embraced by European policy 
activity should a national government so decide (e.g. Catalan in Spain).
62 For example, one o f the LINGUA programme’s objectives was to develop ‘ ...a  strategy 0f  action 
which involves the diversification of the foreign languages on offer in education and tr a in Z  
programmes rather than promoting one or two priority languages. ’ (COM (88) 84 1, p.3 ) S
We will see the importance o f  this de facto  evolution and the consequences it has for the production 
by certain Member-States, o f discourses o f promotion o f multilingualism and respect for l i n o n S  
diversity at European and supra-national level. More specifically chapter 5 illustrates that in the ca S 
o f  France ,n particular, discourses on the desirability o f  multilingualism at European level’are „sheer
contradiction with domestic discourses o f monolingualism when addressing sub-national lo o n s '  
claims. gfuups
64 In the most recent results from the Euro-barometer, the most taught foreign language in Eurone is hv 
far English (89% of pupils), followed by French (32%), German (18%) and Spanish (8%) A vailable^  
tetp:/Aww w ^ urop.a.ejJjnJ/comm/ediicMLonipolicies/lang/languag&s/index en.htmltfFi lo/ ^ n ^ A . ...
%2 0 memberstates: accessed October 11" 2004. ~ -------—-unew
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There seem to be two ways of defining the languages entitled to be the recipients of 
European policy activity: a narrow one implicit in article 290 and Regulation 1/58 and 
a broader one due to the ambiguous wordings of article 149. For interpretation 
purposes when sociolinguistic status-related queries arise, the former prevails.
Most significantly, the interpretation of article 149 to the effect that member states 
retain responsibility for the content of their cultural and linguistic diversity excludes 
sub-national official languages. Yet, the text could also provide for their inclusion in 
the provision. Interestingly, what is naturalised in this essentialist interpretation is that 
member states wish to exclude them. In that connection, it will be interesting to see 
what eventually comes out of Spain’s proposal for Catalan, Galician and Basque to be 
granted the same status as Irish: that the Treaties be translated into these languages 
and that they even be used as languages of communication between citizens and EU 
institutions. This proposal was made in the context of the negotiations around the 
draft Constitution in May 2004, and as EUObserver reported: 'Sources present at the 
meeting in Dublin say that other member states did not object to the request by 
Spain.' fEUObserver, May 6th 2004)65. Ireland made a similar demand for Irish in 
November 200466. In the final Draft of the Constitution to be discussed by Member 
States, moreover, a provision was made for the Treaties to be translated into the 
member states’ official languages ‘whether they are official throughout or just on a 
part o f the territory. ’ (Article V-10, paragraph i f 1.
From Primary Legislation to Practice: The Archipelago Proposal
As indicated above, once a legal basis grants the EU legal competence, the 
Commission can make proposals to have legal provisions and Community objectives 
translated into concrete actions. Practically, various Community education 
programmes and derived actions have been launched over the years, making foreign 
language teaching and learning core priorities. Thus, in 1989, the LINGUA 
programme was established and effective from Januaiy 1st 1990. This pioneered the
65 Available at htte;//www.^  l5  51 accessed ] jth
2004.
“  Available a ! a c c e s s e d  27th November 2004.
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promotion of foreign languages training in the EU. A number of other educational 
programmes and actions have been carried out since the 1990s, mainly under the 
‘umbrella’ programme SOCRATES.68 6970Interestingly participation in these programmes 
is open to 31 countries, thus going well beyond current EU Member-Statehood. As for 
the recipient languages of these programmes, the largest programme, LINGUA, is 
restricted to the 11 EU official languages plus Irish and Luxemburgish. The case of 
Irish and Luxemburgish is symptomatic of the EU’s unequal treatment of languages 
and deserves some explanation: both are national/state languages in their domestic 
contexts but during accession negotiations, Ireland and Luxemburg agreed that they 
would not become Community official languages. They are thus not working 
languages and official documents do not need to be translated in them. Yet, they are 
eligible for all EU programmes and thus constitute a blatant case of exception to
Regulation 1/58’s article 8 and, as we have seen, Irish can also be used for 
communications with the institutions.
RMLs are excluded from LINGUA but RML-based projects can be eligible under 
certain SOCRATES programmes and actions, as we will see later®. For now, I turn to 
a programme project by the Commission intent on creating a legal basis for RML
policy-making within the larger legal framework of education policy: the still-bom
programme Archipelago10.
Archipelago was a 1999 project for a Commission Proposal for a Decision aimed at 
creating a legal basis for Community action regarding the promotion of RMLs. It was 
established by the Commission’s Language Policy Unit (in the Directorate General 
for Education and Culture) after the May 1998 legal ‘crisis’ for RMLs (see chapter 4).
I will return to its interdiscursivity and intertextuality below. For now I want to insist
68 An exhaustive list o f currently implemented Dronramme* 
eligibility can be found in the European Commission’s Le guide des proTrammes ° !  ^  COnditions o f  
et culture (2000 ). Luxembourg: Office des publications officielles àL A et act‘ons. Education 
also EBLUL ( 1998) and Strubell (2002) om belles des Communautés européennes. See
69 On the possibility o f  a Commission linguistic policy for the safomia^ „ a
2 n ? i  2) an8U“geS und' r S0CRATES’ “  wri" “  1“« » "  E-173Ï/00 (OJ c  0 4 ? “ , M M o m  ^ pand
70 Although it is here referred to as Archipelago the „
Archipel. Quotes refer to the original text in French. Thif project is”  C o m m i t  FrenCh’ Le- 
transmitted to me by a source that chose to remain anonymous C ° n lntemal document
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on two fundamental features of this proposal: 1. its invocation of the principles of 
subsidiarity and supplementarity; 2. its definition of linguistic diversity.
The legal basis invoked in the proposal is article 149. The proposal first draws on the 
subsidiarity and supplementarity principles recalling that:
[...] l ’action communautaire vient soutenir et compléter les actions engagées 
par et dans les états membres... Les actions du programme sont conçues de 
façon à produire [...] des résultats qui ne seraient pas réalisables par l ’action 
entreprise au niveau des Etats membres agissant seuls ou sur base de co­
opération bilatérale,71
These actions notably include the:
Développement de matériel didactique;
- Encouragement à l ’établissement de réseaux dans le domaine de 
l ’éducation et de la promotion des langues régionales et/ou minoritaires;
- Observations, diffusion et échanges d ’expérience;
Archipelago thus defined a number of domains wherein Community action could be 
more effective and efficient than at member state level. Most importantly, besides, the 
proposal offered a hitherto unheard-of definition of the EU’s linguistic diversity and 
the languages qualifying for Community support:
[La] diversité linguistique ne se limite pas aux langues officielles de VUnion 
Européenne, mais s ’enrichit également de toutes les langues parlées dans 
certaines de nos régions, langues appelées régionales et/ou minoritaires [...] 
Sont considérées comme langues régionales et/ou minoritaires dans le présent 
programme, les langues autochtones traditionnellement parlées par une partie 
de la population d ’un Etat membre de l ’Union Européenne ou de l'espace 
Economique Européen, excluant à la fois les dialectes, les langues des 
migrants et les langues artificiellement créées.
71 The proposal was originally in French and to my knowledge was never translated as the 
Commission’s legal advisors censored it.
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This definition, which is reminiscent of that of the CoE’s European Charter for 
Regional and/or Minority Languages, is the first and only explicit definition in a EU 
document of ‘linguistic diversity’ which, as was seen, is the core bone of contention 
between RML activists and their opponents. This definition could be read as another 
intertextual reference to Regulation 1/58, expanding its approach to linguistic 
diversity and encompassing RMLs as cultural assets for the EU.
Had it been adopted, this proposition would have constituted a legal basis for 
Community actions in favour of RMLs, and a legal precedent for the contentious 
definition of linguistic diversity. Besides, it provided for the largest budget ever 
devoted to their promotion: € 30 million for a period from January 1st 2001 to 
December 31st 2005. However, it was blocked internally by the Commission’s legal 
services. The only explanation for that refusal I could find was provided by a 
Commission Official via email, in which he commented on the objectives of the 
Action for the promotion and safeguarding o f RMLs (conducted until the ‘1998 
crisis’; see chapter 4) and the impossibility to take education as a legal basis for 
RMLs:
The objective o f safeguarding and promoting regional and minority languages in 
the regions in which they are spoken, which has been the principal objective o f 
action in this field, is not compatible with the objectives o f Article 149. It does not 
constitute per se a contribution to the development o f quality education, nor does it 
f i t  into any o f the aims o f Community action listed in Article 149 (developing the 
European dimension in education, encouraging mobility, promoting cooperation, 
developing exchanges o f information and experience on common issues, 
encouraging distance education, etc.) The appropriate legal basis is therefore 
Article 151 (ex 128) which has as its objective to "contribute to the flowering o f the 
cultures o f the Member States, while respecting their national and regional 
diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore. 
Activities involving regional and minority languages that are acceptable under 
article 149 (mobility, cooperation, exchange o f experience, etc.) are already 
eligible fo r support under the Socrates programme. (Commission Official 
McPhail, Email to the author, 2002) (Emphasis added)
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The legal basis invoked was rejected on the ground that Archipelago did not pursue 
Community objectives, e.g. here quality education, and the proposal was stillborn. 
Arguably, one can question the extent to which the teaching of say English 
objectively contributes more to the quality of education than that of Welsh or 
Corsican. Additionally, the emphasis above clearly establishes that projects seeking to 
promote mobility, cooperation and exchange o f experience contribute to quality 
education and are thus eligible under article 149 (compare with Archipelago’s 
planned actions above) and thus already incorporated in SOCRATES, which shows 
that the actions planned in Archipelago drew on existing practice and may therefore 
have been discarded for reasons of overlap with SOCRATES rather than/as well as 
for legal invalidity. In relation to this, one can also wonder how this state of affairs 
can be made to cohere or be reconciled with the September 1998 statement by the 
Commission, in response to a Written Question about whether article 149 'should be 
recognized in principle and used generally as the legal basis for RMLs\ that:
Community action must also be aimed at "developing the European dimension 
in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination o f the 
languages o f the Member States". In effect, the Commission's action in support 
o f regional and minority languages is based on this article?2
Confronted with what may justifiably, in my opinion, be seen as a series of 
contradictions, I sought to obtain the actual Opinion of the Commission’s legal 
services that declared the invalidity of education as a legal basis, but in vain. After 
sending requests to three different Commission addressees and eventually invoking 
article 255 on transparency, I was finally denied the right to access that document on 
the grounds that disclosure, partial or total, would endanger the independence of the 
legal services. Specifically, it was argued that:
The opinions o f the Legal Service are internal working documents, the 
principal objective o f which is to offer the Commission and its services advice 
on legal questions on the basis o f which they can adopt their final positions. In 
order to ensure that these opinions are given frankly and objectively, it is
Commission Answer, 23,09/m s (bo*
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necessary to preserve their confidentiality. Their disclosure would result in the 
internal discussions and exchanges o f views on the legality and scope o f legal 
measures to be adopted being made public. This, in turn, would give rise to 
uncertainty with regard to the legality o f the measures and have a negative 
effect on the stability o f the Community legal order and the proper functioning 
o f  the institutions, which are matters o f public interest for which it is 
unquestionably necessary to have due regard, (letter by David O’ Sullivan, 
Secretary General of the Commission, received September 9th 2003)
Interestingly this paragraph implicitly acknowledges both the arbitrariness of 
decisions regarding the legality of the measures, and the danger of emphasizing 
arbitrariness to the stability of the Community legal order and the proper functioning 
of the institutions.
Summary
There are inherent conflicts of interpretation over the meaning of legal provisions. 
Central in these conflicts are. 1. The definition of key concepts such as working 
languages, Community official languages, national/state official languages, sub-state 
official languages, or rather the lack of definition, and issues of coherence where such 
definitions lack or overlap (e.g. Regulation 1/58); 2. The interpretation and scope of 
applicability of principles like subsidiarity and supplementarity in particular policy 
areas (e.g. article 149); 3. The interpretation of how proposals concur with 
Community objectives, e.g. Archipelago. One site of such conflicts can be the intra- 
institutional level, e.g. between different services within the Commission, as with the 
Archipelago proposal, which shows that RML supporters can also be found in the 
Commission. The interpretation ultimately favoured, amongst the range of possible 
interpretations, denotes and enacts a specific political choice, a social discourse that 
appropriates meaning according to ideological semantic patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion, e.g. an intergovernmental choice with Archipelago. Ultimately, the 
interpretation of meaning can be contested and the ECJ has the last word, but it is 
today unlikely that the ECJ would challenge the ‘intergovernmental’ legal 
interpretation of the current EU sociolinguistic order.
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Language and Cultural policy
In this section, I analyse the legal framework for EU cultural action and show that the 
provisions of article 151 are even less precise and clear than those of article 149. In 
turn, this allows for greater interpretation. In the next section, I will explore what 
patterns of interpretation have been privileged in cultural actions and programmes - 
Culture 2000 and European Year o f Language 2001 (EYL 2001) - with particular 
reference to the issue of including RML defence and promotion within the EU’s 
cultural policy. To emphasize how discursive struggle is also embedded in the very 
process of text production, I will examine the respective textual contribution to the 
drafting process by the various institutional actors involves in processes of 
negotiation. Put otherwise, I will scrutinise the various drafts eventually produced 
during the textual construction of the action programme EYL 2001. I will show that 
policy formulation constituted a site of discursive struggle between various policy 
actors at the time EYL 2001 was devised and negotiated and before the voting stage 
by the Council in which the final draft was adopted. This somewhat lengthy journey 
into the intricacies of policy text drafting will however provide an insight into who the 
RML policy institutional actors are and how they share decision-making powers. This 
prolegomena will be further elaborated in chapter 4.
As before, I reproduce the entire article and discuss it below.
1. The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at 
the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation 
between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing their 
action in the following areas:
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination o f the culture and history 
o f  the European peoples;
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of European significance;
- non-commercial cultural exchanges;
- artistic and literary creation, including in the audiovisual sector.
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3. The Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third 
countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of
culture, in particular the CoE.
4. The Community shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under 
other provisions of this Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote
the diversity of its cultures.
5. In order to contribute to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this 
Article, the Council:
- acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 251 and after 
consulting the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt incentive measures, 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States. The Council shall act unanimously throughout the procedure referred 
to in Article 251 ;
- acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, shall adopt
recommendations.
Distribution o f Authority -  Legislative and Discursive Powers
Broadly speaking, the subject positions of authority in the legislative process are the 
same here as for education (the legislative procedure is co-decision, the CoR has 
consultative status and policy outcomes are non-binding) and article 1 indicates that 
the Community contributes to the cultural flowering of the member states with the 
possibility for the Community to supplement their action The extent to which RML 
activists might seek to interpret and exploit article 151’s provisions is however 
radically different from their strategy with article 149 for several reasons. First 
language is not mentioned, so that the link between language and culture is never 
explicit. This is extremely significant and revealing since, as chapter 1 illustrated, the 
essential link between language and culture is one of the most potent elements of 
legitimisation of ethnic groups’ or stateless nations’ political claims to various forms 
of political autonomy ranging from partial devolution to full statehood. I will return to
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this link and its ideological and political implications in chapters 5 to 9. Arguably 
however, the link between language and culture is implicit «  minima in the aim to 
support literary creation, but as such it is void of political connotations. Second, and 
most importantly, the Council must endorse any policy outcome unanimously, which 
precludes any measure and/or any interpretation of supporting and supplementing that 
would not be entirely approved by all member states. Culture is clearly a matter of 
intergovernmental sovereignty.
Clause 2’s aims are very broadly worded so that they leave much room for 
interpretation and, in turn, many projects can be related to such broad aims, especially 
as enhancing regional diversity is explicitly considered as an objective in its own right 
(clause 1). Additionally, clause 4 broadens the definition of culture by recognising 
that cultural considerations can also pertain to policy areas from which they may 
traditionally seem to be excluded, e.g. economic policy, social policy, education 
policy. The enlarged characterisation of the scope of cultural community action thus 
broadens the traditional view of cultural development, i.e. as essentially applying to 
domains like literature, art, cinema, and the like, to view culture as a dynamic 
component of a wider array of domains of socio-economic activity in which practices 
may be culturally differentiated, i.e. culture as custom across member states. 
Emphasis is reiterated on cultural aspects of policies as a means to promote diversity.
In sum, clauses 2 and 4 allow great freedom to put bids to benefit from Community 
support, thus opening the door to a multiplicity of project initiatives by a multiplicity 
o f actors but at the same time they subject RML-targeting actions to the necessity of 
obtaining unanimity, which on RML issues can be fraught with difficulty. This is why 
RML activists’ reports on strategic areas to target for RML promotion suggest 
invoking Cultural policy as a last resort (Strubell, 2002: chapter 3).
In the programmes analysed below, the intertextuality and interdiscursivity 
established by a number of stipulation clauses contribute to further define the meaning 
a n d  scope of the EU’s cultural competence. I therefore now examine how the meaning 
and scope of article 151 have been negotiated between institutional RML supporters 
(i.e. the CoR and the EP) and the Commission and/or the Council, and how the EU’s
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cultural p olicy  has been im plem ented through the umbrella programme Culture 2000
and the action programme 2001EYL.
With the EP, the CoR stands out as the most fervent defender of RML rights. From its 
creation in 1994 to 2002, it has multiplied its recommendations for the EU to support 
linguistic diversity, especially RMLs. In its capacity as an EU consultative body, it 
has issued no less than 46 Opinions on the necessity to support and promote minority 
languages within the EU education and culture framework. However, the CoR has 
only consultative powers and its Opinions are legally non-binding.
The EP has also played an important role for the inclusion of RMLs within EU 
cultural policy by making explicit the language-culture link. The Commission issued 
its first report on Community cultural activity in 1996. In two 1997 Resolutions, the 
EP responded to it suggesting a change in the voting mode from unanimity to 
Qualified Majority (hereafter QM), and that ‘the safeguarding o f cultural and 
linguistic diversity forms part o f  the conservation and safeguarding o f cultural 
heritage ... [so that] changes should be made to that article [128,now 151] to enlarge
its scope [accordingly].’73 74It later specified the meaning of linguistic diversity 
pinpointing ’[...] the great importance o f  minority languages and cultures as a key 
feature o f  the European cultural heritage.,74
In the next section, I first briefly examine the extent to which the emphasis on the 
language-culture link was taken into account in the drafting of the current umbrella 
programme for EU cultural action (i.e. Culture 2000), and in particular what space is 
devoted to RMLs within it. Then I focus in greater depth on the action EYL 2001 with 
the same analytical objectives. To scrutinise the various contributions of EU 
institutional actors in text production, I look at the various drafts produced during text 
production processes.
73 OJ C 055, 24/02/1997, p.37
74 OJ C 304, 06/10/1997, p. 40.
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Implementing Culture: Culture 2000 and2001, EYL75
Culture 2000 has been the single programming instrument for Community cultural 
action from January 1st 2000 and will continue to serve this function till December 
31st 2006, bringing together all previous sector-based programmes. Because of the 
unanimity requirement, the adoption of the programme was not without problems: 
100 amendments were discussed and the programme was finally voted on February
14th 2000 (whereas the programme was supposed to start from January 1st 2000) 
(Loup, 2001)
Remarkably, the text contains only three mentions of language. First, paragraph 6 
recalls the role of the EU in ‘[...] contributing to the flowering o f the cultures o f the 
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity [...] ’ and 
indicates that ‘[...] special attention should be devoted to safeguarding the position o f 
small cultures and less widely-spoken languages. ’ The light cast remains very dim 
though, as nowhere is the expression ‘less widely-spoken languages’ defined75 6. On 
that account, two interpretations are possible: it either exclusively refers to less widely 
spoken ‘national official’ languages or encompasses RMLs as well.
Unfortunately, little clarification is offered in the remainder of the text. Only two 
vague references to language(s) appear in the Annexes. The first refers to the support 
o f cultural diversity and multilingualism, the second to the Community’s help in 
translation of literary works especially those in the lesser-used European languages 
and the languages o f Central and East European countries. Ultimately, as a general 
rule, the Commission’s working definition of lesser used and/or lesser taught
European languages is: ‘all Community official languages but English, French and 
Spanish.’ (Loup, 2001)
75 This section must be read in conjunction with the tables in Annex l Th„ - c
Culture 2000 are so few that they are reproduced in the text By contrast them t0  kngUage in 
2001, EYL analysed in this section are reproduced in tables 1 and 2 in M n e x l S T  prOV!sions o f  
24  paragraphs o f the Decision and provides a short descriotian nf A ' ;  1 reProduces the
thematic content and/or functional value of each Table 2 reproduce« th terfextuaIlty> authorship and 
ihe Decision in reletion ,o ,hei,  amhor ,„ d ,ha AT l f  VanOUS * afts of Article I of
negotiated through the policy formulation phase. received as its wording was
76 The EU’s language terminology remains obscure here and eslesewhere *
overlapping, and/or ambiguous expressions as Strubell indicates- lesser ? comPrises many 
languages, lesser-used languages, lesser-used European languages less w id l angaages’ least taught
widely used languages, and regional or minority languages (Strubell 2002*31) ^  anguages’ least
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2001, EYL: Text Structure
The action EYL was conceived as a short term, one-off initiative involving a Europe­
wide information campaign and a number of actions aimed at promoting linguistic 
diversity, in particular through language learning.77
The Commission proposal for the EYL was initially due for March 1999. With the 
resignation of the Commission after allegations of fraud and inefficiency in March 
1999, the proposal was finally postponed until October 1999 (COM (1999) 485 final -  
1999/0208(COD)). In accordance with the co-decision procedure (article 251), it was 
then submitted to the ESCR and the CoR for preliminary Opinions and then passed to 
the EP. After receiving a number of amendments after the EP’s first reading (April 
13th 2000), the EYL was eventually jointly voted on July 17th 2000 by the European 
Parliament and the Council (Decision 1934/2000/EC).
In what follows, I contrast the content of the three texts, i.e. Commission Proposal, EP 
Position and Council/EP Decision, to see what legal provisions and discursive 
legitimisations finally prevailed and came out of the Commission/Council/EP 
trialogue. Dealing with the final product without access to internal intermediary 
documents (at the intra-institutional level and as a result of informal contacts during 
the consultation phase) makes difficult the analyst’s task of eliciting with certainty the 
initiator and drafter responsible for the inclusion of these new paragraphs. In other 
words, the analysis of the product divorced from the minute processes of textual 
construction somewhat blurs the respective contributions of the various actors 
involved in the legislative process, and leaves out of account the informal bargains 
throughout the consultation process. The focus here can therefore only be on the 
ultimate content of each addition: the analysis below thus refers to the final text of the 
Decision.
Broadly speaking the structure of the three texts is fourfold and identical (whereas the 
CoR’s Opinion has a different generic structure). The preamble can be subdivided
77 A  more detailed description o f the EYL’s rationales, conditions o f  eligibility and operational 
modalities is to be found at http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/Ianguages/actions/venrb.OQl.htmltfA- 
accessed July 30 2002.
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into two parts unequal in length: the first part specifies the programme’s legal bases78 
and recalls the phases of the legislative procedures. It thus serves as the legal 
legitimisation of the Decision. The second part fulfils the discursive Iegitimisation 
function. It consists of a series of paragraphs/clauses re-locating the 
Proposal/Opinion/Decision within the broad discursive context of Community 
language-oriented action. The third part, following the Preamble, then consists of a 
number of articles formally establishing the EYL action and defining its scope of 
applicability (article 1), its broad objectives (article 2), content of actions (article 3), 
and modalities of implementation and evaluation (articles 4 to 11). It concludes with 
the ritual formula conditioning the entry into force of the Decision upon its 
publication in the OJ (article 12). The fourth and last part, the annex, complements 
and refines the actions described in article 3. Below, I focus on the preamble’s second 
part and on article 1 of part 3.
Discursive Legitimisation: The Preamble
The Decision’s Preamble eventually consisted of 26 paragraphs as against 12 in the 
Commission’s proposal. Thus 14 new paragraphs were inserted into the original 
Commission proposal throughout the legislative procedure, all sprouting from the 
EP’s Opinion, except for paragraphs 8 and 21 that can be attributed to the CoR. For 
obvious reasons of space, it is impossible to perform a comprehensive analysis of the 
final text’s content. Consequently, I hereafter undertake a selective, linear thematic 
analysis of the Decision, indicating when relevant what paragraphs were subsequently 
added to the Commission’s proposal, how and by what institution (see Table 1 in 
Annex 2). Where the Commission appears as the author/initiator, the clause was 
maintained as such throughout the production process; where the author/initiator is 
the EP, the clause was introduced in the EP’s Opinion.
Unsurprisingly, the Preamble abounds in legitimating manifest inter-textual 
references to the major texts through which the Community has asserted its 
commitment to the promotion of linguistic diversity, multilingualism and language
im o ked bo,h T,cxy midN m  and 150' rsspec,ivel>’m  ™d
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equality throughout the years, and especially from 199579, as a correlate linguistic 
response to Community fundamental principles and objectives. Thus, for instance, 
clauses 1, 2, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19, originally in the Commission’s proposal, 
illustrate the linguistic dimension of broad Community objectives such as building a 
European Knowledge society, promoting multilingualism as a means of favouring 
mobility, etc80.
As can be seen the EP added a number of clauses to the Commission’s original 
proposal (clauses 3 to 11, 14, 17, 21 and 23). With the exception of clauses 3, 6, 14 
and 17, all these contain no manifest intertextual references. They can be seen as ‘off 
the cuff discursive stances by the EP without explicit (intertextual) legal bases. Still, 
they serve to assert a number of principles: language equality (4), the legitimacy of 
EU intervention in language questions and the experiential value of the EYL for 
future (Community) ‘[...] measures to encourage cultural and linguistic diversity 
[ ...]’ (5), language diversity as a source of economic benefit (9), etc.
By contrast with the above clauses, clauses 3, 6, 14 and 17 contain manifest 
intertextual references to other EU texts, possessing a different type of force in that 
their presence in a Decision may constitute a jurisprudential precedent of 
interpretation of their legal value. I now turn to clauses 3 and 17, and 681.
Most interestingly, clause 3 refers to article 151 on culture (which is why this 
programme is analysed here rather than in the previous section). Strictly speaking, 
though, article 151 is not presented here as a legal basis for the Decision. Still, it is 
invoked as a discursive legitimisation of the actions of the programme and, most 
significantly, its presence allows for an explicit linking between language and culture, 
a link which was not explicit in article 151: ‘Among the cultural aspects, matters
79 This commitment is epitomized in paragraph 12 o f the Preamble: ‘linguistic diversity must be 
preserved and multilingualism promoted in the Union with equal respect for the languages o f  the 
Union and with due regard to the principle o f subsidiarity... ’ (Council Conclusions o f  12 June 1995 on 
linguistic diversity and multilingualism in the EU - Council -  General Affairs -12/06/1995 -Press: 174 - 
Nr: 7839/95 - http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/newmain.aso?lang=1: accessed August 8th 2002).
80 The clauses are reproduced in table 1 annex 2 (first column) in the same order and with the same 
numbering system as in the original text.
811 do not dwell on clause 14 because it is an intra-textual response to clause 13 on the Community’s 
objective that European citizens should become trilingual.
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pertaining to languages are o f great importance . , n  In that connection, Clause 17, by 
referring to the objectives of Culture 2000, also reiterates the link between cultural 
diversity and multilingualism as a means o f improving mutual understanding between 
the European peoples.
Clause 6, finally, evokes Article 6 on the EU stance to respect fundamental rights and 
refers back to the 1950 CoE’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. This is the only reference to a non-EU legal provision. 
Article 14 of the Convention states that:
The enjoyment o f the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.
This provision, which positions EU law within a human rights perspective, defines 
article 6’s pledge to protect human rights as an anti-discrimination provision, and 
intertextually refines the nature of the co-operation between the EU and the CoE 
provided by clause 4 in both articles 149 and 151, not only for implementation 
purposes but also in terms of sharing legal standards82 3. However, as many 
international legal scholars have observed, non-discrimination relates to individual 
human rights and remains a rather poor legal basis for actual, efficient (collective) 
language rights protection and promotion (De Varennes, 1996; Henrard, 2003: 42-47).
To conclude on the Preamble, although the ‘main’ legal bases invoked for the EYL 
are articles 149 and 150 on education and vocational training, the link between 
language and culture appears enhanced in a variety of ways especially after the EP 
Opinion’s addition. In the original Commission Proposal, Community support for the 
promotion of linguistic diversity and multilingualism was introduced as the linguistic 
correlate of a number of Community principles and objectives, e.g. achieving the
82 The CoR statement on that link was somewhat more radical: ‘[...] the basic distinguishing feature of 
cultural identity is the language spoken by the people belonging to a Community.' (Introduction, 1. 1.3) 
Significantly this radical formulation was not retained.
83 We will come back to the issue o f the trans-organizational operationalization o f sociolinguistic legal 
standards chapter 4.
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highest level of knowledge for the European peoples (1), multilingualism as a 
correlate of the free movement of persons (2, 13, 15, 16 and 18). In all these clauses, 
the emphasis was on Community action for multilingual education, with essentially 
economic justification and aims. The link between language and culture was then 
added during the legislative procedure, under the joint impetus of the CoR and the EP. 
This additional discursive emphasis was put both with and without explicit inter- 
textual references. The former are of particular interest since, as was noted above, 
they potentially provide a scheme of interpretation for previous texts, which could 
thus gain jurisprudential value. Moreover, the final text was co-signed by the Council 
and the EP, and the Council thus endorsed a number of discursive stances hitherto 
absent from primary legislation. Notwithstanding, the discursive value of clauses 
without explicit legal intertextuality also means that some provisions can potentially 
have far-reaching consequences, e.g. clause 5.
Significantly though, it must be observed that no explicit mention is made in the 
Preamble about the scope of interpretation of linguistic diversity, multilingualism and 
language equality. Directions for interpretations are to be found in Article 1 of the 
Decision establishing the EYL. Article 1 defines its scope of applicability, i.e. the 
languages its provisions encompass. I now turn to the evolution of the wording of 
Article 1 throughout the drafting process (see Table 2, Annex 1).
Article 1: From the Commission Proposal to the Council/EP Decision.
Regarding the languages targeted by the EYL actions, interestingly, the Commission 
initially proposed that measures ‘[...] cover the official languages o f the Community, 
together with Irish and Letzebuergesch, and other languages recognised by the 
Member States.’ (Emphasis added) The same wording was retained in the CoR 
Opinion. Interestingly two comments were added. First, the CoR rejoiced in the 
Member States being responsible for defining which languages the EYL would 
embrace. The choice of languages for the purposes of the EYL was thus not restricted 
to Community Official languages and RMLs could also be included, a première on 
such a territorial scale. Moreover, the second statement testifies to the CoR’s 
knowledge that Member States were not to restrict eligibility to the programme: iln 
2001, all the Community languages will be promoted, and in particular those that are
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not currently widely used, including minority languages, backing up the European 
Year's key principle: that all languages are to be equally respected/. (Paragraph 1.2.5 
of the Opinion of the CoR of February 17th 2000 on the EYL) In my opinion, this 
illustrates the fact that at the time of writing, after the consultation process, the 
positions of each institution was already known to other actors. Methodologically this 
illustrates one limitation of focusing analysis on products, and thereby ignoring 
‘informal contacts’, which I underlined above. Do these informal contacts and 
‘behind-the-scene’ negotiations account for the fact that the EP, in its Opinion, 
reworded the EYL’s scope of applicability in a way that could be threat-free to 
national sovereignties?84 The new formulation indeed clearly manifests the concern to 
avoid encroaching upon national issues of officialness, i.e. recognized, and prefers a 
more neutral, less ‘official-sounding’ wording, i.e. identified, which guarantees the 
respect of national sovereignties .
This ultimate wording was cautious in two ways, finally, as it restricted the 
identification of ‘other languages’ to ‘the purposes of implementing this Decision.’ 
Put otherwise, the definition of linguistic diversity remained empirical rather than 
conceptual in the EYL, which was probably the price to pay for getting voted an EU 
programme involving the ‘identification’ of languages other than those, 
hypothetically, ‘identified’ by the general rules o f its [= each Member State’s] law 
(see regulation 1/58, article 8) to be voted. As a result, whereas the original 
formulation, then retained in the CoR Opinion, could have constituted a 
jurisprudential interpretative precedent, the final wording dismissed that possibility.
EYL: Summary and Outcomes
As indicated above, national committees operating at the selection level did not 
restrict eligibility to EYL to EU official languages, which enabled a number of actions 
involving the promotional participation of RMLs to take place. The 200 odd 
initiatives eventually sponsored included inter alia language tasters, studies and
84 Compare the CoR and the EP formulations in Table 2.
85 As a matter o f fact, the first selection/evaluation o f qualifying projects took place within national 
committees. The final selection at supranational level only occurred a posteriori. Notably, no restriction 
whatsoever governed processes o f selection although the inclusion o f Esperanto remained contentious 
on the ground that it is a ‘language without a culture’. (Loup, 2001; see also Written Question E- 
2631 /0 1, OJ C 093 E, 18/04/2002 P. 0170-0171).
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conferences, publications, multilingual public entertainment and games, etc. Most of 
them also involved a special celebration for the European Day of Languages 
(September 26th 2001).
As a follow-up to EYL, the Council issued a Resolution on February 14th 2002 on the 
promotion o f linguistic diversity and language learning in the framework o f the 
implementation o f the objectives o f the EYL 2001s6. In generic and functional terms, a 
Resolution is a non-binding declaration recalling and emphasizing the discursive 
context of Community action in a particular field and inviting relevant actors to open 
a debate, make proposals (Commission) and/or take action according to defined 
principles and objectives (Member States). The above Resolution constituted a step 
backwards for RML defenders in that almost all the aforementioned EP amendments 
of the EYL Decision that might have constituted a jurisprudential precedent have been 
removed. The only statements potentially beneficial to RMLs were both the (re-) 
assertion already featuring in the aforementioned 1995 Council’s Conclusions that ‘all 
European languages are equal in value and dignity from the cultural point o f view 
and form an integral part o f European culture and civilisation ’ and the reference to 
Article 22 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights which states that ‘the 
Union shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.'*1 Apart from these 
statements, which again can be interpreted more or less selectively, overall, the 
Resolution re-located the promotion of language diversity under the education policy 
umbrella, thus linking linguistic diversity and multilingualism to broad social and 
economic objectives (e.g. language-in-education policy to facilitate freedom of 
movements of workers) rather than to cultural policy as the EP’s introduction of 
clause 3 had entailed. Further, the council also left out the various forms of 
intertextual references linking linguistic diversity and language rights to other more 
political rights (e.g. the 1950 CoE’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms) which, in effect, reduced the promotion of linguistic 
diversity to the exclusive protection of member states’ official languages. 867
86 OJ C 050, 23/02/2002, pp. 1-2.
87 In fact, this reference was absent from the Decision because the Charter dates from December 2000.
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Conclusion
Through the analysis of primary and secondary legislation establishing the EU’s 
competence in educational and cultural matters, this chapter has confirmed chapter 2’s 
findings, showing that member states largely remain dominant players and that their 
sovereignty is enshrined in and protected by a variety of strategic legal devices, e.g. 
the restricted interpretation of the subsidiarity and supplementarity principles. RML 
activists have long sought to find a durable legal basis for an EU RML policy but 
have significantly failed to have that policy secured under the umbrella of education 
and cultural policies.
As far as education policies are concerned, diverging interpretations of article 149’s 
provisions for language issues show how legal and sociolinguistic perspectives can 
conflict but also that, in the interpretation of the EU’s competence as inscribed in 
legal provisions, legal interpretation always prevails. The analysis of the Archipelago 
project further illustrated how Commission lawyers preserving member states’ 
sovereignties avoid entering a sociolinguistic discourse and simultaneously addressing 
RML status issues legally, e.g. through explicit definition of linguistic diversity. 
Therefore, by re-locating linguistic diversity exclusively under the education umbrella 
(which we have seen implies a restrictive approach to linguistic diversity) in its 2002 
Resolution, the Council effectively reinforced its restrictive interpretation of how the 
EU defines linguistic diversity.
In Article 151, the preservation of member states’ sovereignties included inter alia 
particular legislative procedures and legal outcomes, i.e. unanimous vote and non­
binding legal outputs. In the text launching Culture 2000, legal restrictions included 
above all the scarcity and vagueness of the links between language promotion and 
cultural action. In the text launching EYL, finally, the potential benefit for RMLs after 
2001 was curtailed by the absence of explicit reference to RMLs in the Preamble, by 
the rewording of article 1 into a more ‘intergovernmental’ formula and, as was said 
above, by the fact that the EYL innovations regarding the value and scope of linguistic 
diversity, language equality and multilingualism, were not echoed in the 2002 Council 
Resolution that followed and concluded the implementation of EYL. Thus the 
discursive shift introduced by the EP, e.g. the emphasis on the link between language
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and culture (clause 3), was not taken up, although, arguably, it is one of the 
fundamental tenets of definitions of culture in Western European national 
historiographies, as was seen in chapter 1. Whereas RML actors had hoped that the 
EYL could serve as the basis for a genuine, multi-annual promotional programme for 
RMLs, the Council’s 2002 Resolution insisted on the one-off character of EYL in 
terms of both practical actions and discursive production.
Nonetheless, it should not be concluded that, in the longer term, the discursive content 
potentially beneficial to RMLs of programmes like Culture 2000 and especially the 
EYL is nil. Indeed, the view that legal provisions enact a particular order of discourse 
on glottopolitical authority and language does not rule out the discursive force of 
resistant discourses. Moreover, if discourse is the matrix of the socio-political order, 
insofar as resistant discourses are incremental, the aforementioned Preamble clauses 
introduced by the EP still constitute positive steps forward for RML lobbyists, despite 
the limitations delineated by the 2002 Council Resolution. Notwithstanding, indeed, 
the implementation of the EYL granted further symbolic credit to RMLs as recipients - 
without discrimination and for the first time on a large scale - of an EU action 
programme. In that respect, furthermore, the diffusion of ideas in favour of language 
equality, of multilingualism as a source of mutual understanding between the 
European peoples in order to realize the hitherto theoretical idea of European 
citizenship, and of the legitimacy of EU intervention in language questions, all 
gave/give actual substance and discursive legitimacy to actions aimed at supporting 
and promoting RMLs. We will see in the next chapter that the inclusion of such ideas 
in recent EU programmes results from a long process of lobbying at European level, 
process of which the main actors have been the EP and to a lesser extent the CoR as 
well as civil society actors like NGOs, e.g. organizations like the European Bureau 
for Lesser Used Languages (hereafter EBLUL).
Finally, this chapter has provided insights on who the RML institutional actors in the 
EU are and on their respective bargaining powers. As was observed above, the 
Council remains dominant on issues of language status granting and language 
promotion. Regarding the Commission, the Archipelago project showed that a holistic 
view of the Commission ignores that there exists no institutional univocity on RML
107
issues, and that the Language Policy Unit’s efforts to establish a solid legal basis for 
RMLs failed because the Commission’s Legal Service censored it. Regarding the EP, 
the analysis of the different stages of the textual construction of the policy text 
launching the EYL has shown that it remains the most fervent supporter of an EU pro- 
RML policy and that it offers a path for regional RML activists to have their voice 
heard at supranational level (e.g. in academic/policy reports commissioned by the 
EP). In the next chapter, we will see in which practical ways the EP can enact its pro- 
RML advocacy. Just as we saw that the analysis of RML actors needs conducting at 
sub-institutional level, besides, the next chapter examines which EP actors belong to 
the EU RML policy network and how they interact with other institutional and non- 
institutional actors at and below EU level, and how.
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Chapter 4: The EU’s RML Policy Network: Legal Governing and Governance 
Politics
Introduction
Chapter 3 indicated that despite vain efforts to have RML issues integrated into the 
education and cultural legal framework, and the absence of a legal basis per se, some 
kind of EU RML policy has existed since 1981. This chapter provides an explanation 
for this apparent paradox. I show in particular that the very existence o f such a policy 
can be attributed to the political and discursive activity o f a network o f actors - 
institutional and not - who managed to bypass some o f the legal obstacles mentioned 
above and succeeded in creating a supranational RML policy network comprising 
institutional and organisational apparatuses devoted to RML promotion and defence. 
This chapter shows that these actors had these opportunities because of the very 
nature o f  the EU as a system of governance. Limited though policy outcomes may be 
deemed, the successful translation of pro-RML rights discourses into actual policy 
actions exemplifies the very nature of the EU as a system of multi-level/multi-actor 
governance in which the particulars of policy-making and implementation processes 
cannot be reduced to the sole consideration of the power positions intrinsic to the 
legal framework, because access to policy processes is granted to a wider panel of 
actors than in a traditional system of government. Looking at how the RML network 
works, this chapter investigates the kind of policy outcomes that can surface from 
such governance politics.
It is divided into three main sections and distinguishes between two main periods of 
RML lobbying activity which saw drastic change in the balance of decisional powers 
between the actors o f the RML policy network: between 1983 and 1998, and ever 
since. The first section initially provides an overview of the context of the emergence 
o f a RML policy network from 1979 and then assesses the politico-discursive and 
budgetary successes obtained by RML activists until 1998. I show that this period set 
the symbolic (discursive) and material (institutional and organisational) foundations
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of the EU RML policy and that, in legal terms, the question of RML policy benefited 
from a legal void.
The second section first briefly returns to the context of what I have called above the 
1998 ‘budgetary crisis’ and analyses the subsequent change in power distribution 
amongst the actors of the EU RML policy network. Specifically, I focus on the 
strategic responses made by RML activists to the threat of seeing the RML policy 
annihilated and on the outcomes obtained in particular by the EP’s Intergroup for 
RMLs. I explore the Intergroup’s functional role and discursive contributions: the 
actual strategies whereby it collectively seeks to influence and/or determine RML 
policy-making both within and outside the EP. In that connection, by looking at 
written questions to the Commission and the Council, I assess whether the Intergroup 
is a Europeanised organisation or merely a European platform for a limited number of 
RML communities.
The third section then briefly examines the structure and roles and assesses the impact 
of other bodies constituted to represent, promote and defend RMLs: the Mercator 
information centres and, importantly, the European Bureau for Lesser Used 
Languages (EBLUL). I conclude with an assessment of the current situation of RML 
activism in the EU and tentatively explore the challenges RML lobbyists will have to 
confront in the context of the post-2004 EU enlargement and of the Draft Constitution 
for Europe.
RML Policy  MakinS between 1983 and 1998: Structural Foundations and Political 
and Budgetary Outcomes
The EP’s Budgetary Powers
In the 1970s, various societal changes catalysed and legitimised supranational action 
in Western European RML politics. The regionalist movements of the 1960s 
flourished and broadened their social base in the 1970s as they embodied the protest 
against the homogenising effects of nation-state building and the concomitant sense of 
loss of cultural identity. Some communities, e.g. Corsica, sometimes adopted violent 
political strategies which underlined the urgent necessity for political solutions of
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appeasement. Waves of political devolution across Western European states sought to 
defuse the crises, with some success (see chapters 5 and 6).
It is in that context that the EP emerged as a new supranational forum for regional 
representation. Directly elected for the first time in 1979, the EP was to become the 
forum of the peoples in Europe, the champion of regional and minority interests, as 
more voices advocated a more democratic ‘Europe of the Regions’ (Jaffe, 1993). This 
concept was indeed all the more relevant since there was a growing sense of 
democratic deficit in the EU that somehow impeded further supranational integration. 
Moreover, understanding that many regional communities faced similar problems and 
that regional interests might be better defended collectively at supranational level, 
various regional activists turned to the EU to defend minority rights. Alone, 
regional/minority communities were often demographically small, thus with limited 
political weight and sometimes used violence as the last resort; collectively 
represented they numbered tens of millions and might gain a politico-institutional 
alternative to violence. In 1979, the EP was not yet the lull co-legislator it became 
from 1992, yet it already possessed some political leverage, especially through its 
budgetary powers, and to some extent through the Resolutions it could take.
The EP was conferred substantial budgetary powers when the Community opted to 
function with its own resources (1970). Budgetary authority was shared with the 
Council: the latter prevailed on Compulsory Expenditure (CE), e.g. Agriculture, but 
the EP prevailed on Non Compulsory Expenditure (NCE) within certain agreed limits, 
e.g. in the 1980s the EP enjoyed significant discretion in distributing expenditure of 
between 300-400 million ECUs (Corbett et al, 2000: 227). It is under the NCE 
category that it could allocate funds to effectively initiate policies so that budgetary 
allowances could serve small-scale political purposes. The legality of such 
appropriations was disputed in the early 1980s: the EP considered that inscription in 
the budget constituted a sufficient legal base for spending per se, to which the Council 
objected. A compromise was eventually reached in 1982 with the Council, the EP and 
the Commission signing a Joint Declaration specifying that a legislative base was only 
required for ‘significant new Community actions.’ (ibid: 229). Of course, such a 
vague specification left the door open to contradictory interpretations. This perhaps 
partially explains why the EP voted a number of Resolutions from the 1980s that,
111
although non-binding, bore some politico-legal status making it possible to legitimise 
funding for RMLs. Besides, it could be argued that, if significant Community actions 
had been defined in budgetary terms, it would not have been possible to justify calling 
the size of the first RML budgetaiy envelopes significant. Such considerations held 
sway until 1998.
The EP ’s Discursive Powers: Resolutions
Resolutions can be initiated in the EP in several ways: a parliamentary Committee can 
draw a report on its own initiative, or in response to a MEP or group of MEPs tabling 
a motion for a Resolution. Typically, the report is then discussed at Committee level 
and then in plenary and if enough support can be secured, a Resolution is voted which 
calls for new legislative proposals from the Commission. In that latter respect, in 
1982, the Commission agreed to respond to EP initiatives orally first during plenary 
debates and then through actual legislative proposals as long as it did not have major 
objections to the content of EP initiatives88. In other words, Resolutions ‘force’ the 
Commission to clarify its position on a number of issues both as Guardian of the 
Treaties and as drafter of proposals for legislation.
The original sketch of an EU RML policy dates back to 1979 when five Motions for a 
Resolution were put forward in the EP calling up for a ‘Bill of Rights for the Regional 
and Minority Languages of the Community’. North Irish MEP John Hume authored 
one, highlighting the discourse of unity in diversity, a leitmotiv in RML discursive 
activism in subsequent years: ‘[...] this union ought to be and can be made 
compatible with the diversity o f the peoples o f Europe [...] this diversity is one o f the 
main sources o f the vitality, richness and originality o f European civilisation.'’ The 
draft resolution was translated and circulated, and a report was established by Gaetano 
Arfé (which led to the first eponymous Resolution).
In a subsequent seminar in Ireland, Hume also called for the creation of ‘[...] a non­
official group of[ EP] members actively concerned about the fate o f the Lesser-Spoken 
Languages to act as a lobby on their behalf and to ensure in particular that the
88 See the Andriessen Report (Bulletin EEC supplement 3/82).
112
Parliament votes money for them: (Hume, 1981) Thus was defined the raison d'etre 
of the Inter group for RMLs which was formally established in 1983.
RML policy-making between 1981 and 1998 crystallised around both EP Resolutions 
and budgetary lines. Ó Riagáin counts 14 such Resolutions, four of which are 
specifically targeted at RMLs whilst the others only mention RMLs as potential 
recipients of more broadly defined policies (Ó Riagáin, 1998). For reasons of space, 
here I focus on the content and outcomes of the RML-specific four:
- Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures
and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities of October 16th 1981
80(Rapporteur: Arfé )
- Resolution of February 11th 1983 on measures in favour of minority 
languages and cultures (Rapporteur: Arfé89 0)
- Resolution of October 30th 1987 on the languages and cultures of regional 
and ethnic minorities in the European Community (Rapporteur: Kuijpers91)
- Resolution of February 9th 1994 on linguistic minorities in the European 
Community (Rapporteur: Killilea92)
The first two Arfé Resolutions posited the EP’s discursive strategy regarding RML 
issues. They recalled the resurgence o f regionalist movements, thus rooting the 
legitimacy of the EP’s action in both popular demands and the pressing needs to 
respond to tense political situations. Reasserting that regional languages and cultures 
[were] a source o f enrichment for European civilization and an indication o f its 
vitality, they reminded member states of their prior commitment, inscribed in 
international documents by the UN and the CoE, to bolster minority rights. To give 
policy flesh to this commitment, the 1981 Resolution invited member states to grant 
RML communities legal rights in education, media and public life, echoing a similar 
CoE Resolution voted in only a few days before, and anticipating the 1992 CoE 
European Charter for RMLs. At a colloquy on how to implement the 1981 Resolution 
that gathered MEPs, Commission officials, independent experts and RML
89 OJ C 287, 9.11.81, p. 57.
90 OJ C 68 , 14.03.83, p.104.
91 OJC 318, 30.11.87, p. 144.
92 OJC 61, 28.2.94, p. 110.
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representatives, it was then decided to create the European Bureau for Lesser Used 
Languages (EBLUL) (in 1982), an organisation that could speak and act on behalf of 
the various lesser-used language communities at European level. In addition to the 
1983 Resolution, additionally, budget line B3-1006 for RML promotion was 
established with an initial 100,000 ECU envelope.
The 1987 Resolution re-asserted and further developed the principles and provisions 
contained in the first two Resolutions, regretting that so far the Commission has not 
put forward any proposals to implement the abovementioned [1981 and 19831 
resolutions. The EP also raised the RML annual budget up to one million ECUs, thus
allowing the creation of the MERCATOR Information Centres (to produce research
databases on areas of RML promotion).
The 1994 Resolution, finally, the most elaborate hitherto, reiterated the 
aforementioned principles and stressed the Community’s commitment, made in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992), to contribute to the flowering o f the cultures o f the Member 
States while respecting their national and regional diversity93 [clause A] which, it 
declared, included the safeguarding o f minority languages [clauses B and L ] . In 
relation to associated and third countries, and in preparation for its future enlargement 
waves, it re-emphasized the Community’s duty to draw attention to the rights o f  
minorities and [...] to condemn any deliberate denial o f these rights [clause I], and 
recalled that many lesser used languages [were] endangered given the rapid drop in 
their number of speakers [clause M ]93 4. It therefore called on: 1. the Member States for 
the urgent signature and ratification of the CoE’s Charter for RMLs by EU member 
states; 2. the Commission to insert lesser used languages in its existing, mainstream 
education and media programmes (article 10(b)); and 3. the Commission to propose 
for a multi-annual programme for RMLs (11(b)).
93 See the analysis o f  article 151 in chapter 3.
94 In that connection, the 1993 Copenhagen EU summit established economic and political criteria bv 
which candidate countries would have to abide as a precondition to EU accession. The political criteria 
included the 'respect for and protection o f minorities’. For an assessment o f  how the Commission has 
monitored compliance with such criteria focusing on the Baltic States application for membership see 
Adrey (2005).
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Assessment and Outcomes
Over that penod, the EP progressively emerged as the champion of RML rights in the 
EU. EP Resolutions established its role as guardian of RML interests and served to 
diffuse a number of discourses through supranational channels, thus granting some 
sort of supranational access to grassroots regionalist discourses, e.g. the richness of 
diversity, language endangerment and the urgent necessity to preserve diversity, etc.
The EP also emerged as a stronger player in the EU’s decision-making process since 
the budget lines it voted led the Commission to create and fund supranational 
organisations for RMLs, i.e. EBLUL and the Mercator Centres. In that connection, 
resolutions legitimised - and de facto legalised - the granting of increasing budgets for 
RML defence and promotion between 1983 and 1998. Through these years, budget 
line (B3-1006) for RML promotion voted jointly by the EP and the Council steadily 
rose from 100,000 to 4 million euros, a still relatively modest amount though, which 
may explain why the Council yielded to parliamentary pressure to have it increased 
throughout the years.
In practical terms, the Commission implemented line B3-1006 through a specific 
Action for the Promotion and Safeguarding o f Regional and Minority Languages. In 
addition to funding EBLUL and the Mercator Centres, the Action also financed a large 
number of smaller-scale projects directly in the communities through calls for 
proposals, so that both symbolic and material supranational support for RMLs became 
somewhat visible in domestic contexts, arguably an important social-psychological 
development for RML communities and for the legitimisation of the EU level of 
governance. Through its budgetaty powers and discursive production, and despite its 
initial lack o f formal legislative powers, the EP could thus initiate and sustain a RML 
policy by establishing and annually negotiating a budget line for RMLs despite certain 
Council ministers’ reluctance (O’Riagain, 2001: 24).
Although they remained non-binding legal instruments, these resolutions also served 
to exert discursive pressure on both member states and EU institutions. In a variety of 
domestic contexts, some provisions were made for RML use in education and the 
media, and sometimes in the public service as well. Although it is difficult to assess
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the role played by EP Resolutions in these developments - were they causal or 
coincidental? - my contention is that discursive productions such as the EP’s were 
conducive to more pro-active promotional policies for RMLs. In that respect, through 
its discursive contributions, at the very least, the EP participated in a general 
movement of liberalisation of RML politics in a number of national contexts.
At EU level, however, resolutions could not induce the Commission to encompass 
RMLs within mainstream EU programmes, ‘for lack o f legal basis ’ as was seen in 
chapters 2 and 3. Moreover, MEPs could not bring member states to sign and ratify 
the CoE’s Charter for RMLs nor bring the Commission to propose a multi-annual 
Programme for RMLs. The former was obviously not a domain of EU competence 
and, arguably, the EU could not have signed it because it does not have legal 
personality95. As for the latter, this failure indicates that conciliatory and consensus­
seeking though it may have been, the Commission could nevertheless not exceed its 
legal-administrative remit. A multi-annual programme would have required a legal 
decision well beyond the EP’s autonomous budgetary powers - multi-annual 
programmes fall under CE, a Council prerogative - or the Commission’s 
administrative powers. Arguably, if the Commission did not take up that proposal it 
was because it knew that the Council would not vote for it96. RML policy thus 
continued to be devised on a yearly rather than multi-annual basis. These restricted 
outcomes provide an indication of what the limits of discursive inputs during that 
period could be.
In sum, then, the EP had only partially ‘captured’ the RML policy process, working 
‘hand-in-hand’ with the relevant working group in the Commission that was to 
administer budget line B-1006, but it could not induce a legislative proposal to create 
a legal basis for RMLs per se. The 1998 budget crisis dealt a more serious blow to 
RML activists as it challenged and eventually led to suppressing line B-1006.
95 In that respect, the Draft Constitution s article 6 would give the EU legal personality so that it could 
sign and ratify international treaties.
96 See discussion of the Archipelago project in chapter 3.
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RML Policy Making since 1998
The 1998 budgetary ‘crisis’ was not initially linked to the RML question but to the 
UK challenging a Community action programme against social exclusion on the 
ground that it was not a domain of EU competence for lack of a valid legal basis. The 
ECJ ruled in favour of the UK, thus making obsolete the aforementioned 1982 Joint 
Declaration on budgetary procedure97. The Commission then had to ‘freeze’ a number 
of budget lines (including B3-1006) lest their legality might be challenged. Ever 
since, it has monitored the legality of budget lines much more closely. Thus, this 
ruling put an end to the concern-free years during which the EP merely needed to vote 
line B-1006 for RML-based projects to be EU-funded.
The establishment of the illegality of budget lines like B3-1006 entailed two Inter- 
Institutional Agreements (1998 and 1999): the Council, the Commission and the EP 
indeed sat to negotiate ways not to interrupt altogether all Community actions with 
uncertain legal bases98. In the 1998 Agreement, effective as of October 1998, 
paragraph 36 stated that: '[...] Recommendations and Opinions do not constitute basic 
acts [=legal bases], nor do Resolutions or Declarations. ’ confirming the invalidity of 
resolutions as sole legal bases for RML budgets and the consequent need to find other 
legal bases for RML funding. Before 1998, there had been a legal void as to what 
constituted a sufficient legal base for EU funding; the institutional agreement shed 
new light on the issue. From 1998 on, therefore, the legal-political value of 
resolutions shrivelled. Subsequently, RML activists saw their legitimising resource 
for RML promotion reduced to a mere discursive device and had to focus on 
obtaining more solid legal bases for RMLs.
However, paragraph 37 of the Agreement stipulated that certain budgets could be 
appropriated for pilot schemes and preparatory actions without a basic act, provided 
that such actions fell within the competence o f the Community (Introduction), i.e. 
intended actions should pertain to policy areas where the EU had been delegated 
competence. Further, two types of appropriations could be made: a. for pilot schemes 
[...] aimed at testing the feasibility o f an action [...] The relevant commitment
97 It was formally cancelled in the 1999 inter-institutional agreement.
98 OJ C 344, 12/11/1998, p.l and C 172, 18/06/1999, pp.1-22.
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appropriations may be entered in the budget for only two financial years; and b. 
relating to preparatory actions to prepare proposals with a view to the adoption o f  
future Community actions [...] for only three financial years at most [...] The 
legislative procedure [had to be] concluded before the end o f the third financial year 
(par. 37, art. a (ii)). Both types were allocated a limited annual budget that the EP’s 
Budget Committee would distribute and for which all interest groups whose budget 
lines had been frozen would compete. The struggle for a RML policy was thus also 
relocated onto the intra-institutional scene, with MEPs seeking to obtain the largest 
possible share of the budgets available for actions without a basic act. I now examine 
who lobbied, where and how, and with what results, scrutinising in particular the role 
of the Intergroup for Regional and minority Languages in intra- and inter-institutional 
lobbying.
Institutional Representation o f RML Interests within the EP: The Intergroup for 
Regional and Minority Languages and the 1998 Crisis"
In his 1997 study on interest group representation in the EU, Greenwood insists on the 
variety of Intergroups present in the EP:
‘[...] groupings o f MEPs clustered around particular areas where members 
have particular interests. [...] Because o f their unofficial9 100 and sometimes 
rather fluid status, no one seems clear precisely how many Intergroups there 
are. [...]The semi-anarchic existence o f these groups means that they do quite 
different things and offer quite different avenues o f influence to the EP for 
outside interests [...] Some meet frequently and have a full time secretariat, 
whereas others are little more than letterheads. Some restrict membership to 
MEPs, while others are open to a variety o f outside interests' (Greenwood, 
1997:44)
Of course, Intergroups vary in their focus but also, importantly, in the actual role they 
can play in decision-making processes in their respective policy areas because they
99 This Intergroup’s exact name remains uncertain, as various names have been used in the literature. 
For convenience’s sake I henceforth simply refer to the Intergroup.
100 Although the Intergroup for RMLs was granted '[...] full status as an official Intergroup o f  the 
European Parliament’, such a status is largely symbolic and implies consultative rather than formal 
decisional powers. See also Kuipers Resolution above, 30/10/1987: Article 17
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widely differ in status, resources, and membership101. Here, I investigate which EU 
RML policy actors belong to the Intergroup for RMLs and their respective bargaining 
powers, and the extent to which meetings of the RML Intergroup are one of the main 
fora where RML interests are represented, promotional strategies devised, and where 
RML-based decisions are negotiated on the European institutional scene.
The Intergroup meets monthly in Strasbourg to tackle various RML-related issues. At 
the time of analysis, it comprised102:
1. 40 MEPs sitting on various Committees (including 9 MEPs on the Education 
and Culture Committee, and 5 on the Budget Committee).
2. EBLUL representatives attending meetings to report on EBLUL’s activities 
and providing secretarial assistance.
3. Sometimes, Commission officials from the Education and Culture DG’s 
language policy unit.
4. Occasionally, representatives of the CoE and/or guest speakers from RML 
communities, e.g. to present EP-commissioned studies on RMLs.
It thus brings most EU RML actors together103 although, more often than not, RML 
communities are only virtually present through their MEPs. Meetings serve to keep 
members in touch, diffuse information, examine the Commission’s actions in favour 
of RMLs, or the lack thereof and in that case pressure it, and to update lobbying 
strategies. I will return to the Intergroup’s interinstitutional role later. For now, I focus 
on its response to the budgetary crisis.
A first crucial outcome of the negotiations between budgetary authorities that 
followed the crisis was that, from 1999, EBLUL and the Mercator Centres would be 
co-funded under line A-3015, an ‘administrative’ (sic) line requiring no legal basis
101 Jacobs et al. listed around 50 Intergroups in 1994 and Corbett et al. over 80 in 2000, gathered 
around subjects ranging from Ageing, Ceramics, Ethnic Minorities, to Rugby League via Friends of 
Music and Indian Peoples (Jacobs, et al., 1995; quoted in Greenwood, 1997: 44-45; Corbett, 2001: 81- 
82; for a more recent list see Corbett et al., 2000: Chapter 10).
102 Because o f its fluid nature, the membership is in permanent flux. Here I use the membership list o f  
March 2003 provided by EBLUL. The parliamentary questions analysed below were posed between 
1999 and March 2003 by MEPs on that list.
103 Notable absentees are state representatives though, but these are present at Committee level.
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other than that the recipients of funds should be 'institutions of European interests.’ 
(Grin and Moring, 2002) The next target was to secure funds to finance projects in the 
communities through calls for proposals.
The Intergroup rapidly secured fimds for RMLs from the total allowance of 32 million 
euros negotiated at the inter-institutional level by the Budget Committee. According 
to former Intergroup Chairwoman MEP Eluned Morgan, this proved no difficulty 
since fourteen Intergroup members, belonging to six different political parties and 
sitting either on the Culture and Education Committee or on the Budget Committee, 
were personally sympathetic and actively supportive to the RML cause (Morgan, 
2002). The Intergroup thus ensured that the Education and Budget Committee would 
earmark funds specifically for RMLs from two budgetary lines: Lines B3-1000 
(Cooperation in the Fields of Education and of Youth Policy) for 2000-2001 with 2.5 
out of 4.5 million euros, and B3-1003 N (Preparatory Actions for Promotion of the 
Linguistic Diversity of the Community in the Information Society) with 2 out of 10 
million euros for 2000.104 Following calls for proposals, funds could then be allocated 
to a number of projects.
Regarding line B3-1000, an agreement could be reached because that Cooperation 
Programme established no restrictions whatsoever as to the languages targeted by its 
action. In other cases, the Commission, acting as the Guardian of the Treaties, 
rejected the proposed legal basis for RML promotion due to such restrictions, e.g. 
RMLs are excluded from the action LINGUA105. Funding RML-based projects under 
the education heading was problematic and it took some negotiations for the 
Commission to finally accept the validity of some of the proposed legal bases106.
On balance, the question of education as the legal basis for RMLs points to an 
apparent paradox: RML promotion can be funded within obviously education- 
oriented actions -  e.g. the Cooperation Programme -  whilst legal services have 
refused to endorse other proposals taking the Treaty article 149 as the RML legal 
basis, e.g. Archipelago (see chapter 3). Article 149’s scope as primary legislation is
104 For more details, see Written Questions E 0465/00 and E 1732/00 by Daniel Varela Suanzes- 
Carpegna.
105 See Written Question E 1731/00.
106 See Written Questions E 1730/00 and E 3098/00.
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indeed much wider and durable whereas action programmes are ‘soft law’ - 
implementation rather than legislative measures - and thus provisional and outside the 
ECJ’s domain of competence. Article 149 is legally much wider ranging than action 
programmes. In chapter 2, we saw that the Court of First Instance had denied that 
Regulation 1/58 established the legal principle of language equality because it was a 
piece of secondary legislation. Likewise, the education issue illustrates that one way 
to prevent the interpretation of RML-promoting actions from having jurisprudential 
value is to base such actions on secondary legislation only. Put otherwise, the EU 
does support RML policy making, in part as a response to pro-RML lobbying, but 
only to the extent that this does not grant them formal recognition.
As for line B3-1003 N, the negotiations around it show that although the Commission 
could not fund RML projects under an action per se, these could be financed as 
preparatory measures inasmuch as they corresponded to objectives of other 
programmes or actions no matter what the legal bases were, e.g. preparatory actions 
for promotion of the linguistic diversity of the Community in the information society, 
or preparatory measures for the action 2001 European Year o f Languages (EYL)107.
Inter-Institutional Representation o f RML Interests: The Intergroup and the 
Commission
In its relations with the Commission regarding policy initiation and implementation, 
the Intergroup possesses two main instruments of political leverage: Resolutions and 
parliamentary questions. This section assesses the impact of these resources in terms 
of the policy outcomes they produce, directly or indirectly.
Notably, when decisions to push forward a draft Resolution are put to the vote in the 
Intergroup, only MEPs can vote: they constitute the decisional ‘core’ while other 
members enjoy more ‘peripheral status’ (adapted from Maloney et ah, 1995/ 
However, although here I focus largely on MEPs, it must be borne in mind that ‘non- 
MEP members’ can participate in debates and in the production if not in the final 
adoption of draft texts. Indeed, various sources claim that RML-related Resolutions
See Written Question E 1732/00. For a more recent illustration, see also Written Question E
0043/02 by Barbara Duhrkop Duhrkop tabled on 23/01/03.
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are first collectively drafted in Intergroup meetings (EBLUL Official Bakker, email to 
the author, 2003; Corbett et a l , 2000: chapter 10). Regarding written questions, 
besides, even if perhaps not systematically discussed at Intergroup meetings, they are 
undoubtedly informed by those meetings (see role of EBLUL below). Authorship is 
therefore extremely difficult to establish: it is easy to know who signs texts, but not 
who participated in text production processes108. Another related difficulty is that 
parliamentary questions, which can be important lobbying platforms, are usually 
individual questions and therefore not conspicuously attributable to the Intergroup ex 
cathedra since it possesses no formal existence109.
The actual outcomes of resolutions were assessed in the previous section. The data I 
analyse now consists of 42 Written Questions addressed by MEPs to the Commission 
and/or the Council on sociolinguistic issues. Parliamentaiy questions are an essential 
feature of the EP exercising its prerogative of scrutiny and control of the executive, 
and their number has constantly increased during the 1990s. They serve various 
purposes: to control the implementation of the budget; to obtain technical information 
for non-specialist MEPs, but also, importantly, as discursive platforms (e.g. 
recognition of official multilingualism in the EU on the basis of the existing 
legislation in the Member States).110 They can effectively force a policy statement to 
be made (e.g. Is the threat made by the French state on bilingual RML immersion 
schools compatible with the Copenhagen criteria?)111, as the addressees must obey 
time constraints to answer, and replies are published in the OJ. I classify the questions 
asked as follows:
1. General Questions relating to RML defence and promotion in general (type 1).
108 This requires a reconsideration o f the actual authorship o f policy texts and the relevance o f  
distinguishing between policy consultation and policy formulation; in turn, this can be seen as 
emblematic o f  the permeability o f  institutions in the EU system o f multi-governance.
109 In the past, in particular policy sectors, Intergroup meetings have been perceived as a direct 
challenge to the Committee level regarding the locus o f decision-making. In 1999, the EP’s Bureau 
issued a statement recalling the unofficial status o f Intergroups. This status is ambiguous though as 
they can be recognised as official but not in an institutional ‘decisional’ sense (Corbett et al., 2000: 
chapter 10).
110 Written Question E 1445/99 by Camilo Nogueira Román to the Commission.
111 Written Question E 3812/02 by Miquel Mayol I Raynal to the Commission. The Copenhagen 
Criteria comprise inter alia the respect o f minority rights, including linguistic rights. There exists a 
controversy because current member states do not have to comply with them whereas candidate 
countries do which in fact seems to establish a ‘double standard’ o f minority rights protection in the 
EU. I return to this issue in the General Conclusion of this study.
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2. Questions specifically relating to the addressor’s home RML community (type 2).
3. Questions relating to a RML different from the addressor’s original RML (type 3).
A first observation was that type 1 questions (28) largely outnumbered the other types 
(14), so that the Intergroup did not seem to constitute an arena for individual RML 
communities to promote their domestic regional interests112 13. In their supra-national 
capacity MEPs embody the collective voice of RML communities in general rather 
than defend the particular sociolinguistic interests of their own regional community, 
despite the fact that the most ‘prolific’ MEPs (in terms of producing questions) 
originate from regionalist/autonomist parties in their countries.
Type 2 and type 3 questions showed that MEPs remained attentive on a variety of 
problematic sociolinguistic situations throughout Europe. For instance, two questions 
referred to minority issues and freedom of expression in Greece after a language 
activist was sentenced to 15 months in prison for distributing a Commission-funded 
EBLUL information brochure entitled Unity in Diversity that mentioned Greek 
minority languages. Several MEPs protested asking the Commission to verify the 
compatibility of such a sentence with the fundamental rights of self-expression 
(convicted February 2001; released December 2001)'13. Other questions on less 
dramatic situations were issued about language discrimination in France, Slovakia, 
Istria, and Spain. Even if they do not systematically entail the desired effects, such 
questions undoubtedly exert pressure on the addressees, distill discourses supporting 
RML rights, and contribute to sustaining the EP’s profile as a prominent attentive 
public on European RML issues. Crucially, they also remind RML communities of 
the support they can find at supranational level and can draw RML groups out of 
isolation by revealing similar situations and needs across communities.
As for General Questions, they were usually more technical in nature and essentially 
pertained to securing the implementation of budgetary lines benefiting RMLs on a 
yearly basis, and to the establishment of a durable legal basis for RMLs. In other 
words, general questions are also significantly a reflection of the EP’s role of
112 This was further illustrated by the fact that there were only 5 type 3 questions.
113 Written questions E-0487/01, E-2884/01. For further details, see Contact Bulletin, March 2002, 
volume 18, N o l.
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budgetary scrutiny and control rather than essentially discursive platforms like types 2 
and 3. In recent years though, some have also focused on the Copenhagen Criteria for 
the protection of linguistic rights amongst candidate countries, and the Commission’s 
monitoring process of candidate countries’ compliance with these criteria. For reasons 
that will become clearer later, I will return to the question of the Copenhagen Criteria 
in the concluding section.
Another illustration of lobbying through general questions was the action EYL 2001, 
Data examined in the previous chapter indicated that this action had entailed 
important financial support for RML projects in 2001. The previous section of this 
chapter showed that from the cancellation of the specific Action for RMLs, financial 
support for RMLs had been temporarily relocated within other programmes until, it 
was hoped, a durable RML-specific legal basis would be established, in particular as a 
follow-up to the action EYL 2001 (see also chapter 3).
This was the sense of a collective question put to the Commission on November 11th 
2000 requesting ‘[...] a solid legal basis for a specific programme at European level 
in favour o f the lesser-used languages’114. The Commission’s answer indicated its 
incapacity (political reluctance?) to yield to pressures: it replied that it would ‘be 
looking at the possibility o f presenting a draft programme for safeguarding and 
promoting regional and lesser-used languages as a follow-up to the European Year o f 
Languages’ (Emphasis added) Likewise, to a similar question in March 2001, the 
Commission merely asserted its intention ‘[...] to draw lessons from all these 
initiatives and discussions, and to arrive at conclusions as early as next year 
[2002].’115 *
Finally, a Resolution on Regional and Lesser-Used European languages116 was tabled 
on December 13th 2001 that called for the execution of a budget line the EP had voted 
in 2001 for the 2002 budget; it targeted Preparatory Actions Concerning the 
Promotion and Safeguarding o f RMLs, Dialects and Cultures (B3-1007). However, 
the Commission cancelled its execution on the ground that there was no prospect o f
114 See collective Written Question E 3702/00.
115 See Written Question E 0620/01.
1,6 OJ C 177 E, 25/07/2002 pp. 334-336.
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the legislative procedure for a legal base being concluded before the end o f the third 
financial year o f preparatory actions117. The Commission added that: 'it [would] 
conduct a thoroughgoing evaluation o f the European Year o f Languages 2001 from 
which it [would] draw conclusions with a view to presenting proposals fo r  actions in 
favour o f  linguistic diversity and language learning in 20032 (ibid) (Emphases 
added) Here again, it was clear that the Commission carefully avoided committing 
itself to announcing the future tabling of a specific proposal for RML-based actions, 
let alone for a specific RML legal basis and that the Intergroup no longer had the 
means to impose its preferences through the combination of resolutions and budgetary 
lines.
Notwithstanding, the Action Plan on linguistic diversity and language learning for 
2004-2006 issued in August 2003 can be seen as a positive response to the 
Intergroup’s pressure. It was drafted after the Commission launched a vast 
consultation process on promoting language learning and linguistic diversity. In the 
eponymous Consultation Document, it indicated its philosophical approach to 
language learning and linguistic diversity in Whorfian terms, i.e. ‘[...] each language 
shelters a subtly distinct view o f the world and is fundamental to the personal, social 
and spiritual identity o f its speakers [...]’, and advocated an approach including 
RML-promotion into more EU programmes actions in a more systematic way118.
Hitherto, however, this Action plan has brought no significant achievement to the 
cause yet because of its limited legal scope - it is only a Commission Communication 
- but it clearly advocates the inclusion of RML policy under mainstream Education 
programmes from which they have hitherto been excluded and encourages member 
states to adopt the principles behind and provisions of the European Charter for 
RMLs in *[—] education, the media, culture, economic and social life and, where 
appropriate, government, public services and judicial proceedings.’I19 Attentive 
publics are now eager to see how member states will respond to the Commission’s
117 See Written Question E 0445/02 and minutes o f the Intergroup meeting (03/07/2002).
118 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/policv/consult en.html [accessed October 
13th 2003]
119 See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/doc/official/kevdoc/actlang/act lang en.pdf 
[accessed: October 13th 2003]
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suggestions, and what concrete support for RMLs may indeed emerge from 
mainstream Education programmes.
Semi- and Non-institutionalised Representation o f RML Interests in the EU: 
Structures, Discourse and RML Network Change.
Before concluding this chapter, I concentrate on the main semi- and non-institutional 
organs for representation of RML interests in the EU: the Mercator Centres and the 
EBLUL, the Europa Diversa Network, and I will examine their structures and actions 
to promote RMLs in the EU outside institutional spheres.
The Mercator Information Centres
The Mercator Centres were founded in 1987 to constitute research databases and 
documentation centres on RML issues and to network RML-interested researchers. 
These databases were divided along the three traditional domains of language policy­
making: Education (Mercator, Friesland), Media (Mercator, Wales) and Law 
(Mercator, Catalonia) and the centres are hosted by RML-promoting academic 
institutions: the Fryske Akademy, the Centre Internacional Escarréper a les Minories 
Etniques i les Nacions (CIEMEN), and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Over 
the years, beyond such databases, the centres’ activities have also revolved around a 
publishing role (i.e. bulletin, reports and working papers, articles and books) and the 
organisation of conferences gathering RML activists and/or academics and thus 
fulfilling a networking function. Often these events have led to the publication of 
pleas for RML promotion. In sum, the centres serve to gather expert knowledge on 
RML policy-related issues and to provide scientific backing and legitimacy to RML 
defence and promotion strategies at supranational level.
EBLUL: Status, Roles and Structures, Discourse
The EBLUL presents itself as a NGO and has observer status at the CoE, UNESCO 
and the UN. Due to its particular relation with the Commission, its status is 
problematic though. NGO status implies full independence in speech and practice 
from official/state institutions. In EBLUL’s case, its almost total financial dependence
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on the Commission, which has forced it to adapt its modus operandi to the 
Commission’s prerequisites, tends to suggest seeing it as a QuaNGO: an
organisation pursuing goals and operating using principles similar to fully 
independent NGOs, but receiving most o f their funding from states' (Adapted from 
Grin and Moring, 2002: 60)120 Yet, its freedom of speech has been rather 
unrestrained, which is a defining characteristic of NGOs. This calls for further 
explanation.
Within EBLUL, two sets of actors must be distinguished: the executive/administrative 
antennas based in Brussels and Dublin, and the General Assembly federating the 
representatives of its Member State Committees (MSCs), which constitutes its 
political arm. Broadly speaking, the executive deals with the day-to-day activities: 
publications, project development, expert consultancy in relation to the Commission’s 
calls for proposals, facilitating networking and partnerships between RML 
organisations, secretarial assistance, diffusion of information, RML-focused web tool 
development and representing EBLUL at conferences and in RML-targeting fora in 
general. As for political actors, their objectives are:
• to promote active EU policy-making in favour of regional or minority 
languages and to defend the linguistic rights of the speakers of those 
languages
• to represent regional or minority languages in dealings with EU 
institutions and other international organisations
• to maintain a permanent communication between communities and to 
facilitate contacts and exchanges between them
• to identify legal and political instruments in favour of the promotion of 
lesser used languages of the Union's Member States.
Two strategies serve to attain those objectives: 1. bringing together MSCs three times 
a year to establish EBLUL’s lines of actions, 2. designing and issuing lobbying 
documents during consultation phases in various policy-making contexts.
120The bankruptcy situation o f the Brussels’ Office at the time of writing is a telling illustration o f  
Eblul’s dependency on Commission money. (October 2004).
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One of the major achievements of EBLUL since its creation has indeed been its 
networking function at supranational level, bringing together RML representatives 
from all member states. At one level, EBLUL thus helped create a RML community 
at supranational level, in which local communities could benefit from each other’s 
experience and practices in RML planning, e.g. EBLUL’s Study Visit Programme.121 
Also importantly, MSCs have allowed the RML communities of a given state to 
network and voice their demands and/or grievances collectively to their own 
governments, and to express themselves on supranational developments.122 Other 
types of action, as was indicated above, include offering expert help to apply for EU 
funding, establishing networking platforms for local, provincial and regional 
authorities to collaborate on RML-promoting initiatives, etc. Finally, it launched the 
Eurolang news agency (February 2000) - online daily news on RML issues - that 
eventually became an autonomous agency.
On the political front, as a consultant and interest group representative, EBLUL has 
conducted an important informative and/or discursive activity, notably through 
numerous publications, from countless booklets describing various RML 
communities’ sociolinguistic situations, through glossaries about RML debates for 
non-experts, to pamphlets praising diversity and linking it to economic developments, 
etc. EBLUL has targeted publics at both domestic and supranational levels. At 
domestic levels, in a way similar to the Intergroup’s type 3 questions above, 
EBLUL’s Assembly has passed many resolutions on RML ‘current affairs’, e.g. 
calling various member states to adopt more RML-friendly legislation. In that sense, 
its freedom of expression has been unrestrained and it has helped increase the 
visibility of domestic RML developments in Europe123.
At supranational level, O’Riagain (2001) draws attention to EBLUL’s participation in 
the drafting of a number of international documents and its incessant lobbying of
121 More than 105 visits, in 41 RML communities and involving 1140 persons have been organised 
since 1983 (www.eblul.orgl [accessed December 2003],
122 We will see in chapter 8 that in the case of Corsica, this opportunity has not been fully exploited. 
Besides, some MSCs were only created recently due to enduring reluctance to acknowledge the 
existence o f  minorities in some states (e.g. Greece, Portugal) and new additions were made as a 
consequence o f  eastwards enlargement (e.g. Poland).
123 A notable exception to its freedom o f action was mentioned above with the case of Greece 
imprisoning a RML activist for diffusing EBLUL’s discursive material.
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voters when texts were to be voted by international bodies, such as the CoE’s Charter 
for RMLs, and/or EP Resolutions. Further, EBLUL has issued Opinions and 
Recommendations each time a consultation process was undertaken by the 
Commission or other international organisations. During the consultation process 
before the Convention for the Future o f Europe, for instance, EBLUL’s General 
Assembly reiterated the broad principles of richness in diversity and suggested a 
number of amendments to the Treaty: proposing a legal basis for RMLs per se, adding 
‘language’ to Article 13 on non-discrimination, changing voting from unanimity to 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in Article 151, creating a multi-annual programme 
for linguistic diversity with special reference to RMLs, etc (EBLUL, 2002).
Its ideological positions, epitomised in its motto ‘unity in diversity’ that has since 
become the motto of the 2004 EU, are well epitomised in its Contribution to the 
[Commission’s] Consultation on Language Learning and Linguistic Diversity 
(01/02/03). This document shows that EBLUL’s typical discourse on diversity is 
extremely heterogeneous. Beyond broadly praising diversity as ‘[...] a democratic 
and cultural cornerstone o f the European construction ’, it argues that:
[...] linguistic diversity including lesser-used languages also importantly 
increases social cohesion, cross-border and inter-regional co-operation [...] 
[and that] [our] cultures and our linguistic heritage are not only part o f the 
Union's wealth and a key element o f the identity o f its regions, but as well an 
important source o f economic activity and new jobs [...] [and] a valuable and 
constructive mechanism for conflict prevention and conflict management [...]. 
(EBLUL, 2003)
As can be seen, the heterogeneous discourse of diversity displays broad 
interdiscursive and intertextual strategies. As the excerpts quoted above illustrate, 
EBLUL strategically relates to a number of domains where EU actions have become 
legitimate and preponderant, e.g. social cohesion, cross-border cooperation, and links
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diversity to economic development124 and conflict management. Economic 
development is a founding objective of the EEC and conflict management refers to a 
growing body of minority rights literature that advocates granting political rights to 
regions, including language rights, as a solution to core-periphery conflict 
management (Loughlin and Daftary, 1999; Daftary, 2000; Poleschuk, 2003). 
EBLUL’s pleas typically also call for defining language rights as fundamental rights 
and condemning language discrimination. In sum, EBLUL’s discourse heterogeneity 
seeks to legitimate an EU pro-active approach to RML promotion by relating the 
preservation of diversity to the broad umbrella of the EU’s traditional or more recent 
objectives and accepted domains of intervention.
RML Network change?
In recent years, the legitimacy and functional role of the EBLUL’s EU 
‘superstructure’ as main representative and ‘spokes-organisation’ of RML 
communities in the EU has nevertheless been questioned. While its usefulness as a 
lobbyist at EU level is unchallenged, critiques have emerged arguing that EBLUL has 
been too institutionalised and dependent on public manna, and consequently not 
critical enough vis-à-vis the Commission, and that decision-making has been too 
centralised so that many civil society associations are not fairly represented. In that 
connection, in 1999, the Commission organised a meeting asking MSCs to increase 
their representativity at national levels (Menciassi, 2003)125. Other trans-national 
networks have also emerged, like Europa Diversa, an organisation including mainly 
Catalan RML-defending organisations, the broad aims and objectives of which largely 
replicate EBLUL’s: promoting cultural and linguistic diversity and RMLs in Europe 
through publications, networking and lobbying activities, etc. In that connection, a 
number of other projects have also been sponsored by the Commission that provide 
similar information on RML issues. For instance, the Universität Oberta de 
Catalunya, in collaboration with other academic and research centres in Belgium, 
Wales, Slovenia, Italy and Ireland, coordinates a project for a virtual community on
124 The link between diversity and economic development is explored in detail in the Euromosaic final 
Report (Neide, Strubell and Williams, 1996).
125 See also Comités Catalan, Galicien et Basque (2001)
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minority languages: ADUM (Press release, 27/02/2004)126. While the discourse on 
diversity as richness remains a broad common umbrella and whereas the 
multiplication of RML-promoting organisations may increase the pressure on 
deciders, it may also be seen as a reflection of divisions amongst RML communities’ 
representatives and therefore as an obstacle to their becoming a unified lobbying 
force. Thus, organisational diversity may undermine lobbying efficiency.
Interestingly, the aforementioned new networks involve more academic actors than 
mainly political representatives from RML communities as in EBLUL’s MSCs, even 
though the separation is not always clear-cut, as the Corsican example demonstrates 
(chapter 8). One may therefore perhaps expect a change in their political agenda and 
in their lobbying discourse and/or methods that will require further investigation. We 
will see in chapters 8 and 9 how Corsican academics address language revitalisation 
issues in Corsica as they play a central role in the Corsican language policy network.
As regards lobbying strength, finally, it is also interesting to observe here that 
Mercator and EBLUL RML activists lobbying at EU level exclusively focus on status 
issues. Thus the information they provide on RML communities typically comprises 
sociolinguistic data on the demographic weight of RMLs in their respective states and 
on their legal status and institutional use. In the accompanying comment to that data, 
moreover, it is typically assumed that RML revitalisation depends essentially if not 
solely on obtaining a more favourable status and concomitant institutional space. This 
conception, largely inspired by structural/functional models and inherited from the 
sociolinguistic processes accompanying and/or enacting nation-building processes 
described in chapters 1, 5 and 7, thus leaves aside many other issues linked to 
language revitalisation, e.g. corpus management issues and popular language 
attitudes.
acc«s*d D u m b er 3-
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The recent, apparent evolution in the sociology of the networks of RML activists at 
EU level and the institutionalisation of scholars of various origins with an interest in 
minority issues may induce a change in that approach. Scientifically-informed claims 
may become more politically radical but less supranational, e.g. lobbying for an 
official EU recognition of certain RMLs only as some locally-oriented organisations 
may not seek to become ‘spokes-organisation’ for all RMLs but rather work for their 
more immediate, own interest. They may also become more materially pragmatic and 
focus on obtaining more funds to address RML issues in the communities (e.g. how 
folk ideologies intervene and/or interfere in planning processes; see chapters 1 and 9), 
and for trans-community networking. In that connection, multiplying opportunities for 
RML academics to network may further contribute to the development and diffusion 
of new discourses on and practices of language and language planning. It remains to 
be seen how these actors could lobby EU institutions and in what ways their action 
could come to supplement rather than being redundant with that of EBLUL’s 
domestic and EU structures.
Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated that in a system o f governance, legal/institutional 
obstacles can be bypassed but that, even in a RML policy network characterised by 
power dependency and consensus seeking attitudes, legal powers remain largely 
hegemonic. RML activists can and have persuaded the EU to support RML 
safeguarding. Between 1983 and 1998, the unclear legal weight of Resolutions 
enabled the EP to vote a yearly budget line that served to fund projects in the 
communities. When the legal status of Resolutions was clarified in 1998, however 
the EP lost its legitimising device and the Commission found itself in the difficult 
situation of having to respond to the EP’s pressure to perpetuate its Action for RMLS, 
notably that o f the lntergronp. Moreover, the Commission’s response remained 
strictly curtailed by the ECJ’s 1998 judgement and by its function as Guardian of the 
Treaties. The compromise found through the inter-institutional agreements enabled 
the Commission to overcome this predicament and grant RMLs some support to an 
extent acceptable by the Council. Yet, it could not go as far as creating the legal basis 
for RMLs demanded by activists, which the Council would not have accepted Some
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solutions were also found so that the institutional apparatus that had emerged from the
15 years of legal void could be preserved, at low symbolic and material cost for the 
Council.
The main cause of the Commission’s ongoing predicament is the persistent ambiguity 
around the EU’s commitment to the value of cultural diversity and multilingualism, 
and the necessity to preserve and promote them. Chapter 2 demonstrated, through the 
analysis of the Archipelago proposal, that the Commission could not use the 
education-legal basis for RMLs, depite the fact that it is acknowledged to be the main 
channel to preserve multilingualism, and that any attempt to define diversity more 
broadly and as encompassing RMLs was doomed to fail. Yet, we have also seen that, 
paradoxically, the action for RMLs is largely based on educational actions but that 
these stay legitimised at a secondary legal level, e.g. inter-institutional budgetary 
agreements between the EP and the Council, well beneath the level primary 
legislation and not subject to the ECJ s scrutiny.
What clearly emerged from the analyses was that the EU will support RMLs but that 
the Commission, and behind it the Council, sole legislator on language issues, will not 
share decision-making powers with the EP in a way that would grant RML 
communities some symbolic recognition at supranational level, which they may not 
have at domestic level. They will continue to receive material support within the 
framework of a number of programmes127 but anything that would entail some 
specific recognition at EU level and go against any member state’s will, e.g. granting 
them some symbolic recognition derived from their inclusion in primary legislation, is 
for the time being out of the question.
The RML policy is now strongly established and, considering the political salience of 
the discourse of diversity in recent years, it is unthinkable that the EU could stop 
promoting RMLs as it does now even though their institutional representation may 
change quite drastically. In the absence of a genuine legal basis based on primary 
legislation, however, RML policy-making undeniably remains a domain of national 
sovereignty, and a veiy sensitive one. It is therefore quite unlikely that a legal basis
127 Material support for RMLs within non RML-specific programmes 
to 3, 667, 409 euros for 1999-2000 (Grin and Moring, 2002: 67). irom j  n ,  855 euros in 1997
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for RMLs per se could emerge in the near future. In that connection, the evolution of 
the RML network and of RML-related claims in recent years might appease concerns 
of intergovemmentalists that the EU could constitute a forum for RML communities
seeking to bypass national levels on RML status issues.
Indeed, the developments since the 1998 crisis in particular have had consequences 
for RML activists’ future strategies. RML activists and lobbyists are nowadays 
‘divided’ as the appropriate legal basis for RMLs: academic proponents of a more 
pragmatic approach advocate obtaining money for RML indirectly, under the aegis of 
programmes not specifically geared at the RML promotion, the better to respond to 
each RML community’s specific needs. This is the direction suggested early in the 
Euromosaic Report (Nelde et a!., 1996) and in the most recent SMILE Report 
established on RML support strategies (Grin and Moring, 2002)128, and endorsed in 
the Commission’s Action Plan mentioned above. The other, more radical, route 
typically favoured by RML activists remains that of lobbying for a legal basis per se, 
possibly through the constitutionalisation of article 22 of the European Charter o f  
Fundamental Rights on linguistic diversity. It is yet too early to anticipate such 
developments but, at the time of writing, legal research has already pointed to existing 
legal limitations on the operationalisation of fundamental rights in the Draft 
Constitution (Hofmann, 2003: 19-21). Consequently, the advocacy of mainstreaming 
RML policy rather than seeking symbolic recognition seems to be gaining ground 
among academics. This may further alleviate remaining worries that the EU’s 
treatment of RMLs could undermine national sovereignties.
I will return to possible routes of evolution of the EU legal framework and their 
implications for RML rights in the General Conclusion of this study. For the time 
being, in any case, RML-oriented decision making powers remain located at national 
levels. If  any evolution towards granting RML communities more language rights is 
to be found, it must primarily be within national arenas. To see if  Corsican may be 
granted additional rights in the future, I therefore now turn to RML policy-making 
processes in France.
128 Available on http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/langmin/sviPDort.pdf [accessed 
09-07-2003]
134
Chapter 5: Language, Nation ami State in French Linguistic Nationalism History,
Developments and Perspectives
La langue française est un élément constitutif de l ’identité, de 
l'histoire et de la culture nationales. La reaffirmation du statut du 
français symbolise l ’unité de la République et favorise la complète 
intégration de tous dans la vie de la cité.
Circulaire du 12 avril 1994, J.O. 20 avril 1994, p. 5 773.
La Révolution, comme le catholicisme, est d'essence universaliste, 
phare autoproclamé pour les autres nations. L'outil par excellence 
de l'universalisme de la République française est la langue 
française, langue de la clarté et de la raison; le ciel bleu de 
Touraine ("Là où le français est le plus pur") s'opposant aux 
sombres forêts germaniques dont les ténèbres ne pouvaient 
qu'engendrer des parler s obscurs, faits en même temps d'à-peu- 
près et de mots rudes, voués à l'efficacité immédiate. Le français, 
que sa clarté emporte sur les ailes du Progrès, s'opposerait 
également aux langues régionales, empêtrées dans leurs lourds 
sabots, embrumées de superstitions, repliées sur un passé 
obscurantiste.
Gabriel Krom, courier des lecteurs, Libération (July 1999)
In tro d u c tio n
This chapter looks at the dynamics o f glottopolitics and language policy formation at 
the national level in France. I explore France’s internal glottopolitical dynamics and 
how this internal dynamics is also partly shaped by (glotto-)political developments at 
both supra- and sub-national levels.
This chapter thus maps out the politics o f the French language in France and abroad 
and their inter-relations over three distinct periods: from early modern times until the 
Revolution, from the Revolution until WWII and since WWII. These three periods are 
characterized by different conceptions and ideologies of language, identity and the 
nation and of the ways in which they interrelate. The first period sees the reification 
and totemization o f the French language and its ‘intergovernmentalisation’; the
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second’s main characteristics are the construction of the French nation through the 
politicization of language and its slow diffusion in French society; the third witnesses 
the rise o f political and linguistic insecurity leading to more active, but ultimately 
contradictory, discourses and strategies of language promotion and exclusion.
Throughout the chapter, I show how ideological, sociopolitical change and 
sociolinguistic change have been mutually constitutive in France and how the 
concepts of language, identity and the nation have been engineered in different and 
strategically connected ways according to the perceived and/or desired evolution of 
political situations. I base this analysis on the view, outlined in chapter 1, that 
language, identity and the nation are largely constructed, situational and mutually 
constitutive notions. Besides this, I look at the ideological context in which 
legal/institutional developments take place for each of the aforesaid periods, and at 
the implementation, or not, of the policies official discourses prescribe. Regarding the 
latter, I show that policy implementation and acceptance is not only a matter of formal 
structures but also, and perhaps most importantly, of attitudes towards the underlying 
discourses. In other words, the possibility of resistance to change and the maintenance 
o f former structures and political and cultural/linguistic loyalties and practices must 
be acknowledged.
In the first part of this chapter, I show that, from the late middle-ages, a number of 
broad contextual changes in Western Europe facilitated the rise of new fonns of elite 
national consciousness which led to the standardization of national languages 
(Anderson, 1983). At the political level in France, this also entailed the gradual 
construction of a state apparatus and the concomitant reification and totemization of 
the ‘national' language and, i„ Western European politics more widely the 
establishment o f soclolmguistlc hierarchies between national languages, the latter 
process eventually seeing the progressive hegemonisafion of French as the 
international language (e.g. Calvet, 1974 and 2002; Wright, 2004). Thus, French J s  
ideologically constructed or totemized as a superior, ‘universal languag^- due to the 
image projected abroad of the mutually constitutive relation between its intrinsic 
‘fossilized’ linguistic characteristics (he. reification) and its embodiment of universal
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values (i.e. totemization). During that period, the idea of the nation emerged but only 
in a restricted, elitist sense that did not include popular masses.
The second part analyses the politics of language and the advent of new political 
economies of language in France as a consequence of the politicization of those 
masses. I begin with an account of the Revolutionary discourses on language and the 
nation which promoted their congruence as a corollary of the advent of French, so- 
called, ‘civic’ nationalism. I then examine the extent to which discourses on language 
and the nation led to structural/institutional developments and actual policy-induced 
sociolinguistic change, or not, from the nineteenth century until WWII, and I consider 
the consequences in terms of popular attitudes to sociolinguistic developments and 
actual language use. The discussion first focuses on the construction of the 
heterogeneous discourse on language and the nation at the time of the Revolution and 
during the Third Republic and then moves on to other factors underpinning language 
shift, institutional or not, between the 1880s and WWII. Structural/institutional 
developments and the importance of non-institutional and/or unplanned factors for 
language maintenance and shift in Corsica will be considered in detail in chapters 6
a  n  129and 7.
In the final part, I examine French politics and the political economy of language 
since WWII. I show that the domestic and international politics of the French 
language, which had hitherto followed parallel paths, converged in the 1960s under 
the pressure of a number of socio-economic, political and cultural internal and 
external developments. These developments catalyzed glottopolitical change as a 
reaction to growing feelings of sociolinguistic insecurity and loss of image (Ager, 
1999). On the international scene, these developments included the demise of French 
as the international language, decolonization, and the creation of Francophonie. 
Internally, they included the phenomenon known as franglais and the language 
protectionist reaction it triggered, regionalism and sub-national cultural/linguistic 
demands, and the political and (relative) cultural devolution that ensued. After this 
broad contextualization, I analyze a corpus of legislative measures on the French 129
129 For reasons o f  space, I do not tackle the issues linked to the sociolinguistic developments o f  French 
in its colonial empire here.
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language and on the RMLs, as well as divisive language debates, e.g. over the 
ratification of the CoE’s European Charter for RMLs (1999). I show that French 
language politics and discourses and the various language policies of the 1990s seem 
to have evolved in contradictory directions, and argue that the French case constitutes 
an interesting illustration of the difficulty of transcending essentialist approaches to 
language, identity and the nation, and their interrelations, inherited from the 
Revolutionary period.
Language Reification and Totemization: The Politics o f the French Language in and 
out o f  France before the Revolution (1539-1789)
In his oft-cited Reflection on the Origins and Spread o f  Nationalism, Anderson (1983) 
locates the emergence, or rather invention, of national forms of consciousness as a 
consequence of the gradual waning of Christendom and the dynastic realm. The rise 
o f national languages from the 16,h centuiy thus coincides with the progressive 
decline of the political hegemony of Christendom and its unifying language Latin, 
facilitated and accelerated by the Reformation, and then the Counter-Reformation,' 
and later by I «»-century rationalist secularism. Later, national vernaculars also’ 
beneftted from the growing importance of the ‘mass nation' as an alternative source 
o f political legitimacy as divinely-ordained legitimacy slowly declined. Anderson also 
points to other important catalysts and consequences of sociopolitical and 
sociolinguistic change favouring the promotion of national languages: the advent and 
exponential development of print capitalism130, the rise o f an increasingly educated, 
urban middle class and the spread of bourgeois mercantilism facilitated by the 
extension and multiplication of trade routes, and the more systematic use of 
vernaculars in the increasingly centralized administrative structures of developing 
states (regarding the significance of bureaucracy, see also Giddens, 1984, quoted in 
May, 2001: 64).13' Anderson particularly insists on the prominence of the printing 
revolution as an overarching determinant factor of change. Although he recalls that
Printing did not only favour „ate languages though and also facilitated the publication in ,
m Z ’m - m *  '  8,01,5 aimed“ educa,ingandeva"esli2i" s **
tESSrir'/  e “ » prosressivel>
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the development of administrative languages preceded both religious decline and the 
printing revolution132, he underlines that the progress of printing techniques largely 
laid the bases for national consciousness, as communication and transactions became 
faster and easier, and as printing required the increased fixity of the language 
(Anderson, 1983:41-45).
In France, the usefulness of a common ‘national’ language as an auxiliary for state 
building was understood at an early stage. The first important action on language is 
usually regarded as François l er’s Edit de Villers Cotterêts (1539), establishing that all 
public dealings (i.e. legal and administrative documents, notarized acts, contracts, etc) 
should henceforth be written in the ‘langage maternel françois’ and no longer in 
Latin: French thus became the state/administrative language, and this measure 
initially targeted Latin rather than regional/local ‘languages’. 133 Arguably, although 
the promotion of a state language increasingly served the centralization of power from 
the 16th century, the equation of language with the nation mentioned in chapter 1 was 
yet unrealized and not even anticipated. What mattered for the consolidation of the 
King’s political power was that all subjects should endorse the motto ‘one faith, one 
law, one king’ (Peyre, 1933: 10) and:
[...] [although] the existence o f a unique administrative language is an 
element favourable to the organization o f the state which has attained a 
certain level o f centralization [...] linguistic unity is not to be imposed on 
peoples speaking different languages who live under the same sovereign, (ibid, 
217)
France at the time was what Gellner describes as an ‘agro-literate’ society, i.e. where 
‘the state is interested in extracting taxes, maintaining peace [...] and has no interest 
in promoting lateral communication between its subject communities.' (1983:10). The
132 On the early spread of French as the administrative language, see for instance Poignant (2000: 
chapter 1)
133 This formula is usually accepted as meaning the language spoken in the Kingdom o f France so that 
the edict is seen as the birth of ‘country-wide’ language planning (for another interpretation o f the 
expression’s meaning as referring to the respective regional languages within the territory under the 
king’s rule, see Peyre’s thesis (Peyre, 1933, cited by Grilio, 1989a: 22 and Poignant, 2000))
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policy of language unification was therefore more symbolic than effective and it was 
implemented with caution. Although subsequent edicts confirmed official 
monolingualism in French in 1563 and 1629 (Grau, 1992: 94; Bell, 2001: 171), a 
large measure of bilingualism was tolerated (Grillo, 1989a: 28).
In addition to being one domestic factor in the consolidation and spread of the King’s 
administrative and fiscal power, and one important factor in the development of the 
mercantile, increasingly self-aware middle class, more drastic French language status 
change was taking place on the European scene. The gradual demise of Latin had 
created a vacancy for a dominant European language which, it was increasingly 
understood, would bolster political hegemony, and the developing ‘national’ 
vernaculars - French, German and to a lesser extent Italian - joined the contest 
(Calvet, 2002: 29-35). The terms and stake of the conflict articulated around the so- 
called intrinsic linguistic values of each competing language which were seen as 
depending on their alleged etymological relation with the idealized, superior, pre- 
Babel unique language. Beyond linguistic disputes, however, Calvet argues, was a 
struggle for political and linguistic hegemony between the European dynastic 
families, i.e. the French-speaking Valois-Angoulême versus the German-speaking 
Habsburg (ibid). What is important here is the embryonic theorization of language 
superiority - the construction of language hierarchies based on formal characteristics - 
as a corollary of political disputes and a prolegomenon justifying colonization, 
whether internal or external.
The theorization of the superiority of French was asserted on two mutually reinforcing 
fronts in the seventeenth century. On the internal front, the hegemony of the ‘langage 
maternel françois' was further consolidated through language institutionalisation and 
corpus development measures: the creation in 1635 by Richelieu of a body 
responsible for standardizing and elaborating the language by publishing prescriptive 
tools that would fix the norms of French and its status with respect to other languages 
of the kingdom: the Académie Française. The Dictionnaire de l'Académie was 
published in 1694. Thence notions of a bel usage developed, refining domestic 
sociolinguistic hierarchies and postulating that the variety of French spoken in Paris
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(Malherbe) and/or by the Court (Vaugelas) and written by the great literary figures of 
the time had attained an unheard-of level of formal perfection. Thus, the theorization 
of formal linguistic perfection created or reinforced geographical ‘Paris/province’ 
(Malherbe) and social ‘aristocrat/people’ (Vaugelas) dichotomies.134 Likewise, the 
Grammaire raisonnée et générale de Port-Royal (1660) allegedly attempted a 
‘scientific’ description of what constituted the logic of Language (rather than 
languages). Yet, as Calvet (ibid: 40) shows, the elements of comparison remained 
limited to very few languages and, under the pretext of comparative analysis, it was 
sought to prove ‘scientifically’ that French was the most logical language because its 
syntax reflected the natural order of logic.
On the international stage, from the seventeenth century and throughout the 18<h 
century, French became the unchallenged international language. This was not merely 
due to its increased standardization, since other national languages had preceded 
French on that route (e.g. the Italian Academia della Crusca had been created in 1582 
and issued its Vocabolario degli Academici della Crusca in 1611). France was 
dominant economically and militarily, had the largest population of Europe (Schoell, 
1936; Braudel, 1986), and Paris was acclaimed as the nucleus of the Enlightenment, 
o f progress, savoir-vivre, cultural and artistic production, etc. Through a process of 
totemization, then, the French language came to embody all these qualities and 
virtues, so it was ‘naturally’ adopted in many European courts (from Germany to 
Russia, via Prussia, Poland and Sweden) as the language of diplomacy, the arts, 
literature and philosophy, scholarly writing, religion, and in general as the language of 
communication of European elites (Fumaroli, 2001; Wright, 2004: 121-122).
As many European courts adopted French, the theme of the •universality of the 
French language largely spread (see Montesquieu’s and Voltaire’s testimonies, quoted 
in Calvet, 1999: 71). As an illustration, in 1782, the Berlin academy’s c o n cu rs  
invited candidates to reflect on the universalism of the French language- its origins 
and its prospects. One of the two laureates’ essays, R ivaroPs, epitomised ^
These dichotomisations paved me way ,or me language-patois dichotomy underlying one  
Revolutionary language policies (see next section). y y g post'
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ideological values attached to French: it is universal because it channels a prestigious, 
enlightened culture and is the language of a great political power. A second reason 
has to do with formal characteristics of the language: whereas men are torn between 
logic and passion, Rivarol argued, French syntax respects the logical order (i.e. it is 
the ‘natural’ vehicle of reason), whereas other languages, indulging passion, have 
unavoidably become corrupted:
[...] Le français, par un privilège unique est seul resté fidèle à l'ordre direct... 
la syntaxe française est incorruptible. C ’est de là que résulte cette admirable 
clarté, base éternelle de notre langue. Ce qui n ’est pas clair n ’est pas 
français. Ce qui n 'estpas clair est encore anglais, italien, grec ou latin, (ibid: 
74)
What was profiled here, through the salience of this heterogeneous discourse on the 
French language as the (only) natural vehicle of clarity and reason, was the struggle 
between reason- and passion-oriented philosophies which was to dominate the 
nineteenth century and ideologically justify internal and external colonisation as a 
mission civilisatrice. The hegemonisation of French among European elites was 
indeed not uncontested by the time of the Revolution, and in the nineteenth century 
resisting the dominance of France also meant resisting the French language (Fumaroli,
2001: 18).
To recapitulate, by the end of the 18* centtuy, through the combined effects of 
becoming the state language, the Academy's authoritative norm-setting activities that 
had taken over the standardization process initiated by printers, the pseudo-sciemific 
conclusions of the Gmmmaire conveyed and furthered in Rivard's essay and the 
prestigious status it had acquired amongst European elites, the French language had 
become reified  - thus represented as bounded and autonomous - and <o,emhed 
embodying in its forms the multifaceted (geographical, social, aesthetic) prestige and 
the universal (philosophical) values it conveyed135. The period covered here thus 
witnessed the construction of a multifaceted ideology about the French language that 
is still salient today whenever a new language debate surfaces, as the final part o f this
135 France has not been isolated in producing a „#•••
colonialism. Fishman has collected a number o f similar Hi<sr ingu!stIC suPer>ority justifying linguistic 
quoted by Phillipson, 2003:214) <hscourses "> ™ n°“* “ "texts (Fishman I » “
142
chapter shows. Further, this ideology received institutional support and, most 
importantly, an authoritative language institution developed (i.e. the Académie) that 
helped French displace Latin in a number of diglossic domains, e.g. administration, 
literature, and has continued to regulate and promote the French language ever since.
In terms of language diffusion, however, the hegemonisation of French largely 
remained an elite phenomenon, as language education remained the privilege of the 
aristocracy and the growing urban middle class (i.e. bourgeois and professionals). 
Arguably, there was no congruence between language and the nation, and the 
sentiment of national consciousness remained a limited and restrictive notion: the 
term nation was already used in the 17th century but as a self-description o f  the
bourgeois elements o f society: (Guiomar, 1974: 28-29), and lthe rest were the 
people.' (Smith, 1983:191; both quoted in Grillo, 1989a: 29) Yet, importantly, the 
link between language proficiency in French and social mobility had been established: 
French was the language of administrative acts, economic (pre-industrial) 
modernisation and growth, and political power. At the dawn of the Revolution, 
however, the masses remained largely monolingual in their local dialects.
Political Nationalism and Language: The Revolutionary Discourses on Language, the 
Nation, and Language Planning
Article 3 of the Declaration des droits de l ’Homme et du citoyen (1789) states that: 
He principe de toute souveraineté réside essentiellement dans la Nation. Nul corps, 
nul individu ne peut exercer d'autorité qui n'en émane expressément: After 1789, for 
the Revolution to stabilise, the nation had to be enlarged and ‘invented’: the various 
provincial peoples had to be politicised and made to imagine themselves as one nation 
eventually embodied in the monolingual state. The polity already had a state, the 
revolutionaries then had to proceed to ’the ethnicisation o f the polity’ (Grillo, 1980, 
quoted in Grillo, 1989a: 29), i.e. to transform ‘newly promoted citizens’ into 
‘nationals’. This implied that all should share and identify with the ‘national’ 
language.
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From a discursive point of view, the revolutionaries could summon the heterogeneous 
discourse on the superiority of the French language developed during the 17th century 
(see Rivard’s quote in the previous section). To this, the revolutionaries added a new 
political strand to the discourse on language: French became the language through 
which the sovereignty of the nation could finally be embodied in the institutions of the 
République, une et indivisible to attain the Enlightenment ideals of ‘Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité’. As was suggested in chapter 1, the actualisation of that idealised modern
political system promised to generate progress, happiness, welfare, equality, etc, to all 
those who endorsed its values.
To sketch it briefly, in the republican political ideology, each citizen endorsed a moral 
and social contract with every other and the sum of these contracts created the nation 
which in turn was embodied by state institutions. In that process, the emphasis was 
put on equality and the abolition of any discrimination. To avoid discrimination, the 
citizen was in direct, unmediated, association with the rest of the nation, through the 
state structures and institutions (articles 1 and 3 of the Déclaration des droits de 
l ’Homme et du citoyen). No intermediate body was officially acknowledged by the 
state. One of the consequences of this form of republicanism is that the indivisibility 
o f the people, which guarantees their unity, precludes any recognition of minorities 
however defined (which would be a form of discrimination). Moreover, equality is 
interpreted formally and thus implies a uniform treatment. In terms of identity this 
meant that citizens would renounce their former regional/ethnic identity in exchange 
for their citizenship. Put in modern political scientific terms, the revolutionaries 
promoted liberal democracy that valorises individual citizenship rights for their 
apparent universalism, their protection of fundamental liberal freedoms, and their 
strict impartiality. Personal and political participation in liberal democracies ends up 
denying group difference and posits all persons as interchangeable from a moral and 
political point of view (adapted from Dworkin, 1978 and Young, 1993; cited in May, 
2000: 375-376).
At a more practical level, one priority was the diffusion of the revolutionary 
‘programme’ country-wide to inform citizens of their new legal rights and duties (De
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Certeau et a l, 1975: 303). The first language decrees emerged in 1790 requiring that 
official texts be translated into the local languages of the territory. The understandable 
rationale underlying this bilingual policy, however, soon yielded to more radical 
discourses of linguistic unification and uniformisation. These changes stemmed from 
the technical and time difficulties of having texts faithfully translated in the great 
variety of dialects and, more importantly, after the 1793 insurrection of Lyons, 
Marseilles, Toulon, etc, from the fear of Counter-Revolution which regional 
languages were alleged to channel.
Two particularly important discourses significantly set the tone of French linguistic 
nationalism and have informed French official linguistic philosophy ever since: 
Barrère’s and the Abbé Grégoire’s 1794 speeches before the Convention. Both called 
for the eradication of local languages and the exclusive adoption of the French 
language. This call was still implicit in Barrère’s laudatory speech on the French 
language and his vilifying portrait of other languages:
[...}laplus belle langue de l ’Europe [...] celle des [...] droits de l ’homme et 
du citoyen [...] chargée de transmettre au monde les plus sublimes pensées de 
la liberté et les plus grandes spéculations de la politique [...] il n'appartient 
qu’à elle de devenir la langue universelle [...] la langue italienne doit être 
laissée aux expressions d ’une poésie molle et corruptrice, l ’allemande est peu 
faite pour des peuples libres, l ’espagnol est celle de l ’Inquisition, et l ’anglais 
celle de la banque et des lettres de change. (Quoted by Marchetti, 1989: 106- 
107)
Flaving fustigated other national languages, Barrère then scathes the idioms of France 
and takes the example of Corsica to advocate changing policy vis-à-vis these 
‘languages’:
[...] l ’idiome appelé bas-breton, l ’idiome basque, les langues allemandes et 
italiennes [pour respectivement l’Alsace et la Corse] ... ces jargons barbares
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et ces idiomes grossiers qui ne peuvent plus servir que les fanatiques et les 
contre-révolutionnaires [...] Le fédéralisme et la superstition parlent bas- 
breton; l ’émigration et la haine de la République parlent allemand ; la contre- 
révolution parle italien, et le fanatisme parle le basque. Cassons ces 
instruments de dommage et d ’e r r e u r (Quoted in De Certeau et al., 1975: 
299) [...] Paoli [leader of Corsica and founding father of the Corsican
nation136] [...] se sert puissamment de la langue italienne pour pervertir 
l'esprit public, pour égarer le peuple [...] ne vaut-il pas mieux y  établir des 
instituteurs de notre langue que des traducteurs d ’une langue étrangère ? (op. 
cit.)
in June 1794, Grégoire presented the results of the survey launched in 1790, in his 
famous report entitled ‘Sur la nécessité et les moyens d ’anéantir les patois et 
d ’universaliser la langue française’, for which he had sent around questionnaires 
investigating language behaviour and attitudes. He made his argument for the 
eradication of local languages even more forceful by presenting quantitative data on 
language competence and behaviour:
[...] au moins six millions de Français, surtout dans les campagnes, ignorent 
la langue nationale; [...] un nombre égal est à peu près incapable de soutenir 
une conversation suivie; [...] en dernier résultat, [...] ceux qui la parlent 
purement n excèdent pas trois millions, et probablement le nombre de ceux 
qui l ’écrivent correctement est encore moindre. (Quoted by Calvet, 1999; 
72)137
Not only are various languages differentiated according to their intrinsic qualities but 
also for the political discourses they serve to convey which, simplistically, are taken 
to reflect political loyalties. The dichotomies established here echo the ones
136 Between 1794 and 1796, Corsica under Paoli’s leadership had seceded, see chapter 7.
137 These figures are to be taken with caution though as they add up to 13 millions whereas the 
Dooulation o f  the time was attested to be around 23 million (e.g. Schoell, 1936; Hobsbawm, 1995: 56). 
'38 Against this radical Jacobin position, some Girondine (i.e. federal) voices emerged that denied the 
intrinsic relation between language behaviour and politic loyalty and advocated linguistic federalism.
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mentioned in chapter 1 as a corollary of the modernization discourse. What permeates 
the vilification of regional languages reified as ‘jargon barbares' and ‘idiomes 
grossiers’ and totemized as the language of ‘fanatiques et contre-revolutionnaires’, 
furthermore, is an ideology of contempt justifying their eradication among ‘[...] a 
peasantry perceived as alien, primitive and incapable o f abstract reasoning’ and thus 
needing to be enlightened (De Certeau et al., 1975:155-169; quoted by Bell, 2001: 
180). The linguistic nation was still to be constructed: ‘universal’ in some European 
Courts and among educated urban elites, French remained a foreign language for the 
vast rural masses.
To sum up, what is distinctive in the Revolutionaries’ discourses is that they 
established a durable, coterminous relation between a theory of language and a theory 
of the nation. That relation expanded the hierarchies established during the 17th and 
18th centuries to include other languages and/or dialects. This ideologically prepared 
the unification of France, and later the colonial empire. Once these political and 
linguistic ideologies were clearly established and/or reinforced, policy makers had 
indeed to translate them into durable and efficient practical measures. Two main 
channels of language diffusion were identified: 1. education and 2. the development 
and spread of republican administrative structures to monitor the implementation of 
the new body of laws.
Regarding education, on account of Grdgoire’s alarming statistics, one priority was to 
develop popular education in rural areas, and in particular language education.'3'’ It 
was therefore decided to appoint a French-speaking schoolteacher in eve^ non- 
French-speaking commune of the territoty within ten days. However, this rapidly 
proved unfeasible for lack of qualified teachers (see Gray, 1992: 95 trad Furet and 
Ozouf, 1982, for a detailed account of the spread of literacy in France). In general the 
early 1790s saw a profusion of education plans (see the Talleyrand (1791), Condorcet 
(1792), Le Peletier de Saint-Fargeau (1793), Lakanal (1794) Plans and the Daunou *139
Jacobinism nevertheless prevailed and Girondine nersnprtivf.c „ -n, T  "— -—
80-83; De Certeau et al, 1975: 280-283; Bell, 2001:^85^186) y dlScarded (Brun<>t, 1967:
139 Although they were important North-South • *•
in cities since the 17th century, inter alia as a result o f  the deve^T’ rencll had steadily progressed 
(Combes, 1997: chapter 6). rCSUlt ° f  the develoPment o f  middle class education
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law (1795), summarised in Combes (1997: 70-73)). All fell through, which indicates 
that the education of the masses aroused significant difficulties and resistance. The 
final blow to the revolutionaries’s mass education discourse was then given by 
Napoleon who did not share their concern for mass education and focused his 
education policy on secondary education for elites.
As far as state institutional/administrative structures are concerned, an initial 1794 
decree inaugurated what Brunot called the ‘terreur linguistique' (1967: 189), 
stipulating that all public acts should henceforth be written exclusively in French and 
that any civil servant caught doing otherwise risked a prison sentence. This decree 
was rapidly suspended and then excavated again in 1803 (Marchetti, 1989: 108-109). 
In practice, after threatening civil servants, the state sought to develop a more 
incentive-based policy and the command of correct French spelling soon imposed 
itself as the main requirement to obtain any public position and thus became a class 
marker which favoured the middle classes’ access to administrative and bureaucratic 
power. In the ‘less French-speaking South’, however, official French monolingualism 
was often unrealistic to implement. In Corsica, for instance, an imperial decree 
exempted the island from that measure - thus tolerating official bilingualism - 
‘ju squ ’à ce qu’il soit autrement ordonné [...]’ (it was repealed in 1852). Overall, 
despite apparent inconsistency and confusion in law making, the important 
recruitment conditionality requiring the mastery of French spelling was permanently 
adopted in 1805 and reinforced in 1833 (i.e. Guizot Law) (Ager, 1999: 129). This 
conditionality was unevenly applied though and, as Marchetti recalls, in Corsica 
official instructions required some proficiency in French. (Marchetti, ibid)
During the nineteenth centuty, the revolutions^ discourses of „ass instruction 
largely failed to be implemented because of the lack of resources and political will 
From Napoleon's rule, under the Restoration (1815-1848), the Second Republic 
(1848-1852) and then the Second Empire (1852-1870)14“, primary and secondary 
education structures multiplied but, as education was neither free nor compulsory 
they served the privileged classes only. Thus the growing, already French speaking’ 140
140 For an overview see Furet and Ozouf (1982) and Combes (1997: chapter 8).
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urban middle class continued its acquisition of French, responding to new job 
incentives and ultimately providing the French-speaking workforce needed in the 
rapidly developing bureaucratic system'41, in its various new domains of state 
intervention (e.g. transport, communication) and in the growing domestic economic 
market (Balibar et Lapporte, 1974; Higonnet, 1980). Regarding free and compulsory 
popular (i.e. primary) education, not until the Third Republic did a genuinely efficient 
education policy accelerate massive French language diffusion (Calvet, 1974 and 
2002: 226-227). Initially, the restricted scope of language education reinforced social 
inequalities and the power positions of the already French-speaking middle and upper 
classes.
Language Wars? Education Policy under the Third Republic (1870-1939)
In 1864, the Duruy country-wide language survey was launched which underscored 
hugely different levels in proficiency above and beneath a diagonal 'running from 
Saint-Malo to Geneva at the south of which illiteracy rates remained much higher 
than in the north (Weber, 1979: 309). Weber stresses the discrepancy in literacy rates 
between rural and urban areas and argues that the provision and quality of education 
did not sensibly modify until the turn of the century (Weber, 1979; quoted by May, 
2001: 160). Finally, the survey also indicated huge discrepancies among southern 
départements and that Corsica belonged to the five departments where more than 90% 
of the population did not know French (De Certeau et al., 1975: 270-272).
The efforts to accelerate the acculturation process inter alia through public education 
were therefore redoubled: new budgets were voted, new schools opened and the 
material conditions and salaries for schoolteachers improved. However, it is with the 
1880s policies of free, compulsory and secular school education known as the Lois 
Ferry that French spread more rapidly. Interestingly and signiftcantly, Jules Ferry 
the acclaimed architect of French nation building through education in French 
mainstream historiography ■ was also the theoretician and minister in charge of 14
141 Hobsbawm indicates that ‘Mid-ninetepnfh.^nf,,^, r
expenditures and the size o f  state bureaucracies [ .? ] ¡ 7 / ^  in state
increased by 40% in France [ .. .] ’ (1995: 229; quoted by Anderson, 1 9 8 3 ^ 2 ) ^ '  eXpenditure
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colonial expansion. Ferry’s several hats were no quirk and the discourse of France’s 
mission civilisatrice - which epitomised all the revolutionary positions on language 
and language planning - legitimated both French hegemony at home and the colonial 
enterprise. In view of the uneven knowledge of French across regions which was 
alleged to lie behind the persistent fragility of the new republican regime, the need to 
spread the French language was keenly felt and equally applied at home and 
abroad.142
As in 1793, the republican regime was indeed fragile and weakened by various anti- 
Republican forces (amongst them monarchists, ecclesiastical authorities, 
Bonapartists) and certain provincial elites inclined to cultural regionalism and in some 
cases, like Brittany and the Basque country, to regional separatism (Poignant, 2000: 
103). The conquest of inner France remained incomplete and republican 
schoolmasters - les hussards noirs de la République - were to play a prominent role. 
To counterbalance the forces of opposition and succeed where the revolutionarties 
had failed, republican school was to be compulsory, secular, and free143. Moreover, 
article 14 of the application decree for the 1881 Education Law reiterated the 1853 
imperial language-in-education provision that: 7<? français sera seul en usage à 
l'école’ (Fusina, 1994:64).
Various historiographies of education policies and practices during that period offer 
contrasting views on schoolteachers’ management of multilingualism though. For a 
long time, ‘regionalist’ discourses (e.g. Front Régionaliste Corse [FRC], 1971; see 
also Poignant, 2000) have claimed that the use of regional languages, or patois, was 
systematically, severely repressed by schoolmasters through a range of punishments 
and measures of humiliation (for attested evidence, see Helias, 1975: chapter 4; 
Calvet, 1974: 229). A recent study by Chanet (1996) - L'école républicaine et les 
petites patries - offers a more qualified account144. Chanet based his research on
142 The network o f  the Alliance française, the institution in charge o f  diffusing French linguistic 
ideology and the French language in the colonies, was created in 1883 (Bruézière 1983)
143 Yet, even when education became free, Weber (1979) writes, school truancy remained high in rural 
contexts where child labour on the farm long remained a necessity.
144 See also Agulhon (1988), Thiesse (1999) and Lacome et Judt (2002: chapter 1).
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interviews with schoolmasters and pupils of the schools of the Third Republic and the 
analysis of the contributions of many schoolmasters to the rich pedagogical debate 
that emerged and was published in educational reviews in the late nineteenth century 
and flourished until WWII (see also Martel, 1992: 115-117).
Recalling that schoolmasters were typically recruited at the county level, Chanct 
reports that many praised the local cultures and used the ‘dialect’ as an auxiliary to 
the learning of French, not as a subject but as a medium of instruction. The two 
schools of thought - for the radical prohibition of local languages or for their use to 
supplement French language teaching and avoid alienating pupils - actually coexisted 
amongst schoolteachers, academics and education officials (Chanet, 1996: 216-234). 
Moreover, he adds that if the former view was hegemonic in certain regions like 
Brittany and the Basque country, where separatist struggle was fiercer, until the late 
nineteenth century, broadly speaking the general tendency was reversed from the 
1920s, reflecting the more liberal approach to the issue at the national level and the 
increasing participation and influence of schoolmasters in the pedagogical debate on 
the instrumentalist use of local languages (ibid; see also Fusina, 1994: chapter 4)145. 
Notwithstanding, as Jaffe (1999) points out, this dichotomisation of the French 
‘language’ versus the local ‘dialects’ reinforced French linguistic ideology of 
superiority. After all, as a mere auxiliary, the dialect could but remain a less 
prestigious form than ‘the language’: the language was written, codified and 
channeled a prestigious body of literature, etc. The dialect was fragmented and 
geographically varied, essentially used orally and did not have a h'/erature (except
essentially religious writings which Jesuits had translated or written in local 
languages; see Bell, 2001: 187-190).
All this illustrates the discrepancy between the radicalism of the official discourse 
(largely shaped during the most radical times of the Revolution) and the reality of 
educational practices by schoolmasters uneasily acting as mediators between the local 
and the national in an evolving ideological and political, and sociolinguistic context.
145 This liberalisation undoubtedly also mirrored the massive spread o f French throughout the territory 
(see below). y
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Their pedagogical philosophies and practices under the Third Republic often departed 
from the radical official discourse and largely respected the plurality of identities: to 
many, love of the petite patrie and the grande patrie were not incompatible. Besides, 
official policies became somewhat more liberal between the beginning and the end of 
the Third Republic as a function of broader socio-political and socio-cultural change. 
Overall, Chanet’s work tones down the systematic, deliberate plan of cultural and 
linguistic genocide often uncritically attributed to republican schools and 
schoolmasters even though it does not question that, liberal though some 
schoolmasters may have been, they did promote a French linguistic ideology of 
language hierarchy. (Chanet, ibid: chapters 6 and 7; Poignant, 2000)
Finally, this study also reminds us that, central as the role of official discourse and the 
school may have been, other socioeconomic and social psychological factors weighed 
in favour of language shift, including the popular will to be associated with the new 
political, economic and socio-cultural orders. As Ozouf summarizes it:
[...] ce n ’est pas l ’école seule qu’ils ont dans leur camp, mais les lumières de 
la ville, les rêves des parents, la culture de la réussite, la religion de l ’utilité. 
C 'est donc la société tout entière qu ’il faut accuser de logique meurtrière à 
l ’égard des langues minoritaires. Non les maîtres eux-mêmes, en posture trop 
commode de boucs émissaires. (Ozouf, 1996, préfacé to Chanet, 1996: 12)146
Ozouf emphasizes social psychological change and argues that popular perceptions of 
the benefits of language shift and the unavoidability and/or desirability of 
modernisation processes are equally important alongside ideologies, official 
discourses, policies and plans. Weber’s aforementioned detailed study of the 
Modernization of Rural France under the Third Republic shows that central factors of 
modernisation included demographic growth, industrialisation and massive 
urbanisation and increased geographical mobility in general, compulsory conscription
“ S  “ “  H“ 'h (1' ^  «“ «  »  »>r.Mor,„em. 2000:
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(1905) and enhanced patriotism during WWI, the spread of literacy, the growth of the 
press, and then of the media (Weber, 1979).147 In brief, planned and unplanned factors 
participated in nation-building processes and people were often willing to acculturate 
and acquire literacy to get on the train of modernisation. In Marxist historiographies 
of nation-building processes, the question of the spread of literacy is of course viewed 
as a planned effort from ruling classes to create the necessary workforce to reproduce 
their domination; people did not acculturate by free choice - the modernisation thesis -
but because they were manipulated to do so by hegemonic discourses. (Hobsbawm, 
1990; Bourdieu, 1991)
As was indicated in chapter 1, however, modernisation processes did not entail the 
unconditional language acculturation of the masses and language shift. First, as we 
saw, they did not take place evenly throughout the territory. Second, and relatedly, 
various patterns of resistance to the disturbing effects of so-called economic 
‘modernisation’ and the hegemony of French republican nationalism also flourished, 
notably through the valorisation of local cultures and the interest in folklore, traditions 
and rural knowledge induced by the Romantic movement throughout the nineteenth 
century148. Despite French nationalist discourses and the demands of a modernising 
society that eventually seriously undermined the value of local cultures and languages 
on the newly created dominant symbolic and material markets, forms of cultural and 
sometimes political regionalism also emerged that contributed to preserve dominated 
cultures. The revival of local cultures did not systematically lead to political demands 
for statehood. Yet, in some cases like Brittany and Corsica, they became salient and 
sociopolitically significant in the interwar period and again from the 1960s, as they 
catalysed significant popular support at times when these regions resented the action, 
or lack thereof, of the central state (see chapters 6, 7 and 8)549. In turn, this led to a
147 See also Aguihon (1988: 172-173).
» d o t1 £ zzsz&izrs? t esMWiy •“ « *
regionalist/autonomist/nationalist 'cutaralisf nwuvemenB '(Nairn 1977)*' i t t S  7  ° f
“ T 1 beri,ase for"“ ™ '« « -
violence and therefore morally indefensible. There mav seenfto hP ^  rf Sp°"se to a form o f  symbolic 
topic as the value o f one’s cultural heritage varies across individuals °  ° bjec*,ve m?ral Position on this 
o f  dominant classes to abandon local uses in exchange for
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gradual and modest recognition of the value of regional cultures and languages and 
their eventual tolerance in education, as the next section will show. Finally, Giordan 
argues that local languages also survived because the elites did not want the local 
population to become completely acculturated, which would undermine their local
dominance (1992: 129-144). Put cynically, hegemony requires perpetuating 
inequalities.
To summarise the argument so far, this chapter has illustrated the discursive 
continuity between the Ancien Regime and the Revolution through to WWII regarding 
the linguistic superiority and universalism of the French language and, at the same 
time, the inevitable stigmatisation and exclusion of other languages and/or dialects. I 
showed that the construction of linguistic superiority and universalism resulted from a 
double process of reification and totemization - itself supported by discursive and 
institutional means - which both reflected and furthered French economic, political, 
artistic, literary, domination in Europe. As a result, French became the dominant 
international lingua franca until WWII (Gordon, 1978 and see below). With the 
advent o f the Revolution and the politicisation of the masses, the French language, 
became a stake in gaining political legitimacy and stability and of national identity in 
a mass nation. The discourse about the universalism of the French language was again 
couched in evolutionary terms that legitimised its mission to civilise the ‘primitives’:
both the unenlightened French people* 150 and more external ‘savages’ in the colonies 
from the Third Republic.
Through these processes of reification and above all totemization, successive regimes 
have thus conflated theories of political legitimacy based on the sovereignty of the 
nation with theories of language in a way whereby unity and uniformity of the 
language and of the nation are mutually constitutive and reinforcing: ‘one language -  
one nation’. In its social constructivist guise, the equation reads: one (superior)
classes incited to reason in the same way were not rewarded in the same way Hence the un kent 
promises o f  the modernisation discourse, with its language shift corollary, may legitimise the academic
and nationalist discourse o f deception and the attitudes o f  resistance that are further exolored in 
chapters 6 ,7 ,8  and 9. v 1,1
150 In t^hat connection, it is significant that Weber’s opening chapter is entitled ‘a country of savages’
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language must become the unique language of one (superior) nation, whose mission is 
also to spread its values by spreading the totemized language that embodies and best 
serves them.
French nationalism is thus just as essentialist as German nationalism in that it rests 
upon the equation of a conception of a reified language which is the totem of a 
monolithic, uniform and all encompassing nation (as opposed to just an elite nation). 
The difference is that nationality can be acquired and must be diffused whereas in the 
German model it is a given and remains exclusive. Although German imperialism is 
also justified as based on superiority, this is a superiority grounded on racial 
particularity.
Moreover, as was underscored in chapter 1 and above, even under its post hoc guise, 
socially-constructed linguistic ‘essentialism’ always refers to a language which is not 
‘nobody’s language’ and so everyone’s: it is the language of what Smith calls the 
lateral ‘ethnie’, that develops around a centralised state and is confined to a social and 
political elite (1986: chapter 4; quoted in May, 2001: 71 & 89). Linguistic ‘civic’ 
essentialism, in that it articulates around a process of totemization, which itself is 
based upon the values of a particular group, inevitably contains ‘ethnic elements of 
identification’. This group is a partially ethnically- partially socially-defined group, 
i.e. the pre-revolutionary (elite) French nation.
The second point that emerges from the argument so far is the large discrepancy 
between official discourses and their derived policies and plans on the one hand, and 
the implementation of such plans both domestically and in the colonies on the other 
In effect, the mass instruction advocated by the revolutionaries to construct a 
genuinely all-encompassing nation based upon the aforementioned ideological 
principles did not begin to materialise for the masses until the Education laws of the 
Third Republic. Even them a significant discrepancy remained between official 
instructions and their implementation: the process of language education remained 
slow, socially divisive and geographically uneven, both catalysing and enabling
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resistance to acculturation. As a result, Chanet (1996: 205-206) indicates, local 
bilingualism persisted at least until the 1930s. In the colonies, where language 
planning started almost at the same time as in metropolitan France, the process also 
fell short of being massive and only applied to colonised elites that mediate between 
colonial authorities and the population (see Calvet, 2002: chapter 11, for actual rates 
of literacy in Western Africa one and half centuries after the beginning of the mission 
civilisatrice). Notwithstanding, by denoting a French-speaking empire, and inasmuch 
as French was the international language at least until WWI and largely dominant 
until WWII, French retained a lot of the prestige acquired in the 17th and 18,h centuiy
until recently (for the domestic impact of the demise of French linguistic dominance 
in the world, see next section).
Third, I have highlighted the importance of other factors leading to language shift but 
have claimed that, planned or unplanned, they failed to eradicate the linguistic 
diversity targeted by the revolutionaries and later Third Republic officials. Despite 
overall massive language acculturation, a number of regional languages survived 
alongside French. As the dominant linguistic market was unevenly created in certain 
regions, an alternative linguistic market survived and/or was created which secured 
the survival of these languages. In a number of cases, e.g. Brittany, Corsica, this 
unachieved acculturation and the growing opposition to the dominant discourses and 
the political hegemony of the centre entailed the cyclical rise of regionalist 
movements. For Corsica and Brittany, the first movements emerged during the Third 
Republic but were eventually de-legitimised by their alleged or actual associations 
with foreign interests in the interwar period (Corsica and the Irredentist movement) 
and during WWII (Brittany and the collaboration of certain regional activists with the 
Nazi regime). They re-emerged in the 1960s, but in a different socioeconomic, 
cultural, political and discursive context to which the next sections now turn.
156
Post-WWll France and French Influence in the World: Internal and External Socio- 
Economic, Political and Cultural Factors o f Change
The processes of modernisation - including industrialisation and exodus - initiated in 
the 19<h century significantly accelerated in the interwar period and even more so after 
WWII. Their effect on language use and shift was emphasized above. By the time 
WWII broke out, France had become globally French-speaking. In many regions, 
RML family transmission had ceased even in the country. In many others, it still 
existed but was increasingly in jeopardy. With accelerated modernisation and the 
colonisation of the spaces of orality (still hitherto largely occupied by local modes of 
expression) by the media after the war, language shift accelerated exponentially.
The post-WWII period was indeed called the Trente Glorieuses to signify that the 
years 1946-1975 were years of drastic economic and sociocultural change (Fourastié, 
1979). Fourastié’s book's subtitle la révolution invisible refers to rapid demographic 
change and unprecedented economic growth, hinging on massive rural exodus as 
rural, agricultural France turned into an urbanised, mass-consuming, tertiary society. 
Beyond averaged national statistics, a very uneven picture emerges though, separating 
France into two halves, above and beneath a Brest-Marseille diagonal (comparable 
with Weber’s St Malo-Geneva diagonal above and see how the map of RML activism 
overlaps with economic underdevelopment in France below). Above this line, France 
was rapidly industrialising and modernising. Beneath it, it remained more agricultural 
and poorer. Moreover, economic backwardness and rising unemployment (due to the 
decreasing competitivity of traditional products) were driving people away from their 
original regions. Dayries and Dayries (1986: 15) indicate that between 1954 and 1962, 
depopulation affected 20 départements. Already in 1947, French geographer J.f ' 
Gravier could talk about ‘Paris et le désert français.’ (Gravier, 1958) To respond to 
this unbalance, the state began a prudent double regional policy of economic planning 
and political déconcentration.151
151 The term devolu tion  unsatisfactorily renders the distinction in French between déconcen tra tion  (i.e.
the process whereby state authority is exerted by state representatives in regions rather than in Paris)
and décen tra lisa tion  (i.e. more authority is granted to regional, non-state, actors). In what follows I will
157
In the 1960s, the pressing need to reduce growing economic and demographic 
disparities between Paris and the southern and western regions entailed more top 
down régionalisation: regions progressively emerged as new economic and 
administrative strata to which some state authority was devolved. By the late 1960s, 
the reshaped Socialist Party made devolution one of its electoral battle-horses. After 
the 1981 socialist victory, regional entities slowly gained new powers and 
responsibilities, so that devolution partially accommodated regionalist demands 
(Keating, 1985), but these debates have remained highly controversial because of the 
aforementioned deeply ingrained idea that any form of division between the citizen 
and state authorities (centralised or deconcentrated) is a threat to national integrity. 
Less rigid attitudes have nevertheless surfaced among certain national political 
leaders, as the debates around the CoE’s European Charter for RMLs and the 
Matignon negotiations analysed below show.
Meanwhile, bottom up regionalist movements surfaced longing for more devolution 
(Dayries and Dayries, 1986). The political salience of regionalist movements in the 
1960s/1970s was a Europe-wide phenomenon and many movements developed 
political agendas emphasizing their self-perception as peripheries exploited and/or 
abandoned by their respective cores. Sub-state nationalist rhetoric drawing on the 
centre-periphery theory of internal colonialism could then appeal to decolonisation 
discourses.* 152 In France, Occitan activist Robert Lafont diffused the thesis and the 
Socialist Party in opposition even endorsed it at its 1966 national congress153. As 
decolonisation became the orthodoxy, territorialized groups that considered they had 
been treated like colonies felt legitimate in claiming various forms of autonomy or 
‘home rule’. This discourse was especially topical in the post-1968 anti-centralisation 
atmosphere and at the dawn of De Gaulle’s failed attempt to reform régionalisation
use devolution for décentralisation, and keep déconcentration as a synonymous o f  state power’s
relocalisation.
152 On the relationship between uneven economic development and nationalism, see Naim (1977V for 
‘regional’ case studies, see Lafont (1967) for Occitanie; Front Régionaliste Corse [FRC] f 1971 ') for 
Corsica; Hechter (1975) for Wales, Scotland and Ireland; McDonald (1989) for Brittany
153 See the report its leader’s -  Michel Rocard -  entitled Décoloniser la province (1966). On the 
relations between regionalist movements and the socialist party between 1966 and 1991, see Giordan
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within regional assemblies154. As was noted above and will be seen in chapters 6 and 
7, the thesis of internal colonialism is linked to uneven economic development and 
found a favourable echo in such underdeveloped regions as Corsica in the early 
1970s. Underdevelopment thus contributed to increasing popular support for 
autonomists’ economic, political and cultural claims. In turn this led to more RML
planning as a state strategy to defuse swelling political tensions (see below in this 
chapter and chapter 8).
Two important external and internal developments determined France’s language 
policy making from the 1960s. The first had to do with the waning of French language 
status on the international scene due to the rise of English. The international status of 
French constructed in the seventeenth century was relatively unchallenged even by 
France’s political opponents until WWI when English was also used in the Versaille 
Treaty (1919) (although opposition to France was sometimes paralleled by opposition 
to French). Its decline as the preeminent international language accelerated with 
decolonisation processes after WWII and has continued ever since, proportionally to 
the rise in power of the US and English. Relatedly, feelings of growing insecurity 
linked to the ‘Americanisation’ of French society and the phenomenon offranglais - a 
corollary of a wider cultural phenomenon - emerged. Second, the international status 
o f French also suffered through decolonisation. Before the creation and growth of la 
francophonie from the 1960s, and its subsequent discursive construction as the 
alternative to ultra-liberal, English-only globalisation in the 1990s, decolonisation was 
initially experienced as another blow to the French language since within twenty years 
France lost most of her colonial possessions. In the following sections I analyse the 
consequences of these changes on French glottopolitics.
Language
Legislation
Insecurity, Palliative Language Institution Building and Language
The threat to French pre-eminence was felt at an early stage and the first institution of
defence and promotion of the language was created in 1937 (Ager, 1999; 102- Wright
2004: 122). Feelings of linguistic insecurity then re-emerged in thè mid-1960s and a ’ 134
134 A further consequence was that the wide diffusion of this discourse thm.. i, * c
contexts strengthened the trans-regional links established at the turn of the centtw and"0^ 3" min0rity 
the 1950s (Fusma, 1994). m 01 tne century a"d re-actualised in
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De Gaulle launched his manifold policy to restore la grandeur de la France (notably 
against American dominance and through French hegemony in the EC), he 
inaugurated a new era of institution-building for the French language. The founding 
institution was the Haut comité pour la défense et l'expansion de la langue française 
(1966) that later split into the Délégation générale à la langue française (DGLF) and 
the Conseil supérieur de la langue française (1989). Their role has been to defend 
and, significantly, to promote French against the threat of English both at home and 
abroad, in terms both of its corpus and status. Since 1995, they have been seconded by 
officially-approved ‘civil’ associations, i.e. Défense de la langue française (DLF) 
(1958 ; housed by the Académie Française), Avenir de la langue française (1992), 
Droit de comprendre (1994), etc.
This institutionalisation responded to the so-called massive invasion of French by 
English expressions and the rise of a mixed code: franglais. Certain intellectuals 
denounced the bastardization of French at an early stage (Etiemble, 1954; see Noguez, 
1991, below). Etiemble’s widely-echoed manifesto against franglais made subsequent 
recommendations for the state to take legal measures to thwart the ‘decline of 
French’, which led to: 1. The creation of the Haut comité and of terminology 
committees in all ministers to propose alternatives to the use of English155; 2. the Loi 
Bas-Lauriol (1975), the first significant law on the status of French156. The themes of 
invasion and decline have never waned since and countless publications have 
developed them, often authored by well-known public figures. Noguez - chair of 
Avenir de la langue française in 1993 - published La colonisation douce in which he 
denounced:
[...] a form of colonisation, agreeable and friendly but highly destructive [...] 
[which] had forced the French to believe in their own inferiority [...] 
[affecting] those who are socially and culturally least able to defend 
themselves: those in the lower social groups and the worst educated.’ 
(Noguez, 1991; cited in Ager, 1999:107-108)
155 Most of the legal measures taken on the French language since the 1970s have to do with the official 
publication of thematic terminology. See
hrtp://www.legifrance.gouy.if/WAspad/SardeUneRubriqueBase?num=25200000: accessed January 1st
2005. *
156 This was the first law, rather than edict or decree, on the French language in French sociolinguistic 
history, which attests to the new approach adopted by the state on status issues.
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Similarly, Maurice Druon - permament secretary of the Académie française and as 
such member of the Conseil supérieur de la langue française - wrote a Lettre aux 
français sur leur langue et leur âme (1994), warning them against the continuing 
impoverishment of the French language and its consequences: *[...] l ’irrespect de la 
langue traduit l ’irrespect de tout; and that da France ne saurait conserver son rang 
de grande puissance, et mener une politique mondiale que si elle continue de disposer 
[...J de la maîtrise d ’une langue universelle: (1994: 23-39; quoted by Ager, 1999; 
231) Variations on the same theme abound on the websites of the aforementioned 
associations.
Interesting in the above quotes is the denunciation of an implied strategy of 
brainwashing by American colonialists targeted at those least able to defend 
themselves. Put otherwise, Noguez patronisingly emphasizes the duty of the elites to 
defend their unaware, attacked population, and Americanisation is portrayed as 
reinforcing social inequalities, which reasserts the alleged role of French as a weapon 
against such inequalities. This position recalls both the actual strategy whereby 
French was first compared to dialects - the glorification/stigmatisation strategy - and 
totemizes the French/American language relation in terms of then 
equality/inequalities opposition157. Druon’s letter’s title is interesting in emphasizing 
the essentialist relation between language and the soul of the nation. Although his 
argument is about corpus protection, Druon reiterates the revolutionary assumption 
that the nation is the unmediated sum of the totality of individual language uses 
finding the language use of la France in the sum of individual usages. In turn, this 
justifies that France should take the necessary measures to conserve her universalism.
Facing such alleged threats, research was conducted to examine if the discourse of 
invasion was grounded in reality. Hagège (1987: 74) argued that statistical analysis of 
lexical borrowings revealed that borrowings from English amounted to a mere 2 5% 
of the whole lexical stock and 0.6% in speech, which seriously undermined the claims 
of ‘invasion’. An investigation of language attitudes in 1988 revealed the French had 
a generally positive attitude towards English and that although they acknowledged the 
link between a language and the culture it carries, they did not believe that ‘[...]
157 Kuisel notes the same o f dichotomisation o f French ‘individualism, good taste [ . i m d  ahm0 „  
civilisation’ against American •[...] vulgarity and [...]  Yankee barbarism: (Kuisel, j 9 9 3 ^ 3 3 )
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speaking English would result in the adoption o f American values' (Flaitz, 1988: 
191-197) Finally, a 1994 poll surveyed popular reactions and attitudes to the 
increasing presence of English in the French sociolinguistic panorama and people’s 
evaluation of their own uses (SOFRES, 1994; all surveys cited in Ager, 1999: 102- 
111). The results show that the majority of French are aware of the increasing 
presence of English but do not feel that it threatens French and are less idealistic than 
practical about fostering Americanisms and if they can be useful158. They also largely 
see school and the lack of vigilance by the French as responsible for the alleged 
impoverishment of the French language. For Ager, this clearly indicates that 
sentiments of linguistic insecurity vis-à-vis the entrenchment of English in French 
society are mainly found in ‘[...] the literary world and [...] those working on 
language and culture in government-related organisations or in associations devoted 
to the defence o f French, which tend to see an Anglo-Saxon (i.e. American) plot for 
w o r ld  domination.' (Ager, 1999: 113)
As a result of growing linguistic insecurity, new legislation updated the 1975 Loi Bas- 
Lauriol. The latter had been largely inspired by Etiemble’s recommendations and it 
made the use of French compulsory in commerce, the workplace, official notices and 
advertising. Despite modifications in 1976 and 1982, following European 
Commission arguments that its provisions hampered free competition, the law was 
universally regarded as ineffective because the fines were small and little effort was 
made to enforce it. In the 1990s, the legal apparatus to protect French was therefore 
reinforced, first with the modification of article 2 of the Constitution in preparation 
for the ratification of the TEU (1992) and second through the Toubon Law (1994). 
Article 2 of the French Constitution was modified and Le français est la langue de la 
République added. This provision vested the French language with constitutional 
recognition making it a symbol of French identity alongside the flag, national anthem, 
etc. This consecrated de jure  a long standing de facto situation and inscribed the 
defence of the French language at the highest level of the French legal hierarchy
158 In that connection, Wright shows that, despite government calls for the diversification o f  the foreign 
languages chosen by French pupils, English continues to remain the largely dominant first choice She 
argues that government efforts can only be successful if they accompany rather than seek to thwart 
general social trends and notably that English learning is seen as an inevitable necessity to «jorial 
mobility (2004a: chapter 6).
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(whereas as we will see most RML provisions have only regulatory status)159. 
Indirectly, it endowed French with a powerful legal principle against the 
encroachment of English and other languages (i.e. RMLs) in official, public domains 
of use. As for the Toubon Law of 1994, which applied the 1992 constitutional 
principle, it updated and expanded the Loi Bas-Lauriol and has incontestably been the 
widest-ranging legal measure of language protection in France.
The 1994 Loi Toubon: Discourse, Legal Scope and Implementation160
The Legendre Report that preceded the discussion of the Toubon Bill before the 
parliament recalled the domains of use in which English had gained ground and was 
threatening French, particularly emphasizing the scientific domain and cultural 
production, both cinema and radio, and the alleged increasing choice of English by 
artists because it opens wider markets. In other words, the report opposed a view of 
culture as the expression of cultural identity and an instrumentalisation of culture in 
exclusively economic terms. French represented the former approach, based on 
intrinsic values (channeling universalism and humanism for cultural production) and 
English was depicted as the agent of ‘economic savagery and cultural sterility.’ 
Facing such a plight, parliamentarians had no choice except to engage protective 
measures against English attacks and the risk of absorption of French values by the 
English world (Ager, 1999: 114-115).
Article 1 of the Toubon law recalls that: ‘La langue française est un élément 
fondamental de la personnalité et du patrimoine de la France.’ The meaning of that 
article is further specified by the Circular of April 12th 1994 quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter. To Fenet, this legally furthers '[...] Tethnicisation du lien national et 
[...] estompe la distinction entre nation subjective et nation objective.’ (2002: 72)
The law imposes the exclusive or dominant use of French in five domains: 
employment, education, publicity and commerce, the media, and scientific meetings 
and publication. As for its implementation it is supervised by the DGLF with the
159 France is the only country with exclusive reference to only one language in its Constitution. Other 
national constitutions refer to the differentiated status o f  other languages as well.
160 The entire text is reproduced in Annex 2.
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collaboration of the aforementioned officially-approved associations for the defense 
of the French language. In the foreword of its 1996 yearly report, the DGLF states 
that its actions aim at preserving le français [qui] est un élément essentiel de 
notre cohésion sociale'. (Ager, 1999: 234) doser analysis in the domains of 
employment, commerce, media (with quotas of French-language programmes and 
music) and even education show that behind that honourable purpose actually lie a 
number of economic protectionist measures (Ager, 1999:135-141)
Although it is predominantly aimed at safeguarding the status of French in these 
domains, an important outcome of the Toubon Law has been the development of 
corpus planning, and in particular the actual implementation of the poorly-enforced 
use of official terminology by civil servants for fear of career sanctions: 7/ est 
souhaitable que, parmi l'ensemble des éléments dont il est tenu compte pour la 
notation des agents, soit pris en considération l'intérêt que porte et le zèle que met 
chacun au respect de la langue française: (<Circulaire du 12 avril 1994, relative à 
l'emploi de la langue française par les agents publics, article 4).
The role of the approved associations has been to oversee the implementation of the 
regulations of French language use and to inform the DGLF of infractions and/or to 
act as aggrieved party injustice. Interestingly, the main action of the associations has 
been to check on the quality of the language, especially in the media, and their reports 
are exemplars of purist attitudes. Moreover, being independent associations rather 
than government agencies, their freedom of speech has been less curtailed. The 
association Droit de comprendre, for instance, hosts the Académie de la carpette 
anglaise [English Doormat Academy]: ‘[...] La Carpette anglaise, prix d'indignité 
civique, est attribué à un membre des « élites françaises » qui s'est particulièrement 
distingué par son acharnement à promouvoir la domination de l'anglo-américain en 
France au détriment de la langue française. ’ 161 In terms of corpus-based action, the 
purist attitudes are usually overt. The DLF, for instance, states as one of its main 
aims: [...] Assurer la sauvegarde des qualités qui ont longtemps valu aux Français 
la précellence au sein des langues européennes, en s'opposant en particulier à
161 Available at http://www.langue-francaise.org/Actions carpette 2004.nhn: accessed January 4th
2005.
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l ’invasion incontrôlée, et pourtant nuisible, des vocables étrangers.,162 Overall, 
whereas the DGLF has endeavoured to fulfill its mission through information and 
negotiations rather than court cases, it is clear that the associations’ tone is much less 
diplomatic and amounts to a call to arms. As for their avowed motives, they summon 
the discourse of language endangerment, identifying both internal and external 
threats, and present their action as the noblest mission to preserve the integrity and 
rayonnement of the French language. Finally although their membership includes 
well-known figures from Parisian French academic, literary and scientific milieux, 
their numerous branches in the French regions attest to the concern of French 
language-based issues among provincial elites too.
The reception of the Bill and then of the law was very mixed: it was widely supported 
by elites but the Socialist Party denounced the institution of a ‘language police’ and 
the number of offences remains high (Ager, 1999: 143). Overall, the law and its 
implementation stimulated various negative reactions to the simplistic dichotomies 
conveyed in the preparation of the law and the purist assumptions during its 
implementation. As a result, the initial elitist discourse in government communication 
strategy on language, relayed and amplified by the associations, shifted towards 
stronger emphases on the rights of speakers of French and the economic advantages 
of the law (Ager, 1999: 151). However, this should not conceal the fact that, elitist 
though their representation of the language may be, the ideas propagated by the 
defence associations remain very deep rooted in France and, as Ager points (ibid: 
152): ‘[...] there are many very active, self-appointed guardians o f the language both 
in and outside the Associations.'' In the process of discursive shift, more space was 
also made to justify the law as an example of the defence of multilingualism which 
was also one dimension present in the associations’ discourse againt American 
domination. As the next section shows, this element had long been a core theme of the 
defence of the status of French on the international scene.
162 Available at http://www.langue-francaise.org/Origine.php: accessed January 1st 2005.
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I claimed above that one of the sources of growing linguistic insecurity in France was 
the collapse of its colonial empire. Somehow, worries were rapidly lifted as several 
leaders from the former colonies founded an organization aimed at preserving some 
influence for French in the world: la Francophonie. Ironically, at the time of its 
creation, it appealed little to De Gaulle the goal of whose strategy to maintain the 
prestige of French against the rise of English was to reinforce French through the 
EEC. From the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the growing structures and 
membership of the francophonie made it a privileged forum to promote Frenchness. 
Beyond economic cooperation, the theme of diffusing the French language was co­
located with that of contributing to building a more democratic world. Another theme 
that developed in the 1990s equated the promotion of French with the promotion of 
cultural and linguistic diversity and multilingualism in the world, against cultural 
uniformisation through the hegemonisation of English-mediated dominance (Ager, 
1996 and 1999; Wright, 2004a: 127)163. Arguments against the economic 
instrumentalisation of culture were also forcefully made in the 1993 GATT 
negotiations at which France and other countries obtained the recognition of the 
exception culturelle to the advocated reinforcement of ultra-liberalism (Baer, 2003; 
see also the discussion of the Toubon law above). At the last bi-annual summit of the 
Francophonie at Ougadougou (November 2004), finally, the defence of cultural 
diversity was also portrayed as one crucial aspect for achieving sustainable 
development.
In sum, the creation and growth of the ‘French commonwealth’ has somehow 
compensated for decolonisation and maintained some French influence in one of the 
largest intergovernmental organisations. Although the French language was the initial 
precondition for membership, this requirement considerably loosened through the 
years until 1995 when non-French speaking countries were admitted. The 
organisation then also asserted more political and economic ambitions, although the 
defence of multilingualism and cultural diversity has become its core discursive 
battlehorse and France remains its standard bearer, the world champion of cultural
Language Planning outside France: The Francophonie and the EU
|63 eariy formulation of that thesis can be found in Bruézière (1983).
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and linguistic diversity. Vested with this new mission, France thus retains its role of 
the diffuser of universal values, and the amalgamation of those values with that of the 
French language itself perpetuates the totemization of the French language 
incrementally shaped earlier.
Within the EC and then the EU, France also sought to preserve its hegemony at an 
early stage. If Regulation 1/58 seemed to guarantee language status equality amongst 
the national languages of member states (see chapter 2), it is not in doubt that the long 
domination of French in European diplomacy and its continuing privileged position in 
a number of international organisations (e.g. UN, UNESCO) favoured its de facto pre­
eminence as the EC’s institutional working language. As late as 1971, President 
Pompidou could declare that: ‘French is the natural language o f the peoples o f 
Europe, English that o f America: (Haigh, 1974: 33) De Gaulle’s objection to the UK 
joining the EC for fear that it could be a Trojan horse for American interests was 
noted above. When Pompidou finally assented to the UK joining, however, Phillipson 
reports (2003: 54), he demanded:
[...] that the preeminence o f French as the dominant language o f EU 
institutions should remain unchallenged [to which Prime Minister Heath 
reportedly agreed that] all British civil servants connected to the EU should be 
proficient in French.
This dominance gradually vanished as Europe enlarged and new non-French speaking 
countries acceded. Gradually, English superseded French as the de facto institutional 
working language (Phillipson, 2003: 129-138; see also chapter 2). Several attempts 
were then made to respond to the technical and financial problems created by EU’s de 
jure commitment to official multilingualism and the de facto increasing pre-eminence 
of English in working groups. We mentioned in chapter 2 the aborted proposal by 
French minister Lamassoure to establish five working languages, including French 
and English (1994), thus compromising between full multilingualism as equality and 
reduced multilingualism as reasoned, functional equality. This would have formalised 
status equality between French and English and perhaps the inevitability of the 
hegemonisation of Europe on issues of supranational language status. More recently, 
in October 2004, another campaign was launched by Maurice Druon who sent a
167
manifesto to have French adopted as the only legal reference language of the EU {Le 
Monde, October 20th 2004). As Druon’s text claims:
[...] la langue française, comme jadis le latin, est celle qui offre, grâce à son 
vocabulaire, sa syntaxe et sa grammaire, le plus de garanties de clarté et de 
précision, et qui réduit au minimum les risques de divergences 
d ’interprétation.
Beyond providing another illustration of the perennial heritage of Rivarol, this text 
singularly departs from the logic of multilingualism to which France has allegedly 
been committed during the 1990s. If the French government did not officially endorse 
this text164, it cannot deny the 1994 one. The question of the absolute promotion of 
cultural pluralism and mutilingualism, then, can only be seen as an anti-English 
discursive strategy. It also finds its empirical limits in the way RML issues have been 
dealt with in France since 1951.
RML Legislation: From Deixonne to Lang (1951-2001)
Unlike other language legislation, RML legislation has almost exclusively been 
concerned with acquisition planning, which remained the hot potato of RML rights 
debates, until the 1999 debates around the European Charter for  RMLs165. The 
Deixonne Law (1951) was the first legal act granting some (implicit and limited) 
recognition that RMLs no longer constituted the danger they had been deemed to 
embody since the Revolution. The law itself reflected more tolerance than the genuine 
political will to promote RMLs. Initially (i.e. until 1974) the law restrictively applied 
to Breton, Basque, Catalan and Occitan, excluding Corsica on the ground that 
Corsican was a dialect of Italian rather than of French. Not only were the provisions
164 The text was however signed by high-level politicians from various countries, such as two former 
heads o f state, two prime ministers, and five ministers.
165 Provisions were also made for the use o f RMLs in the media (1982 and 1986 laws respectively on 
audiovisual communication and freedom o f  expression). Available at
hffp://www.legifrance1gguy.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleTexte?fs ioiour=&fs iomois=&fs ioannee= 
# fs  natu=loi&fs num=&fs nor=&fs iour=30&fs mois=Septembre&fs annee=1986&fs piihjour=01 
&fs pubmoisOctobre&fs pubannee=1986&fs rech=T!T&fs mot=&checkMot=&checkMntTit=cher. 
liprl&checkMotTitTex=; accessed January 3rd 2005.
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very limited and actually defined in ways that make their fullest implementation 
unlikely, but the first actual implementation measures were only issued in the late 
1960s (Fusina, 1994: 126). Besides, the law’s minimal provisions for RML use - one 
hour a week in primary schools and three weekly hours for a minimum of 10 students 
in secondary schools, outside normal timetables and on a strictly voluntary basis - 
granted limited scope for genuine language promotion. The Commissions 
Académiques d ’Etudes Régionales constituted in 1966 offered little improvement to 
the various practical problems linked to RML teaching.
Further legal progress was made in 1975 with the Haby Law, which reasserted that 
regional cultures constituted a patrimony to be preserved but with a telling proviso 
assuming the potential sociopolitical danger of granting some recognition to RMLs 
and implicitly reasserting the primacy of French: lLe respect absolu de notre unité 
nationale ne saurait être remis en cause par une opposition artificielle entre les 
cultures locales et la réalité nationale qu’incarne l ’Etat: Notwithstanding, Article 12 
stipulated that ‘[L’] enseignement des langues et cultures régionales peut être 
dispensé tout au long de la scolarité: The law also provided for teacher training 
measures but emphasized that such measures should remain voluntary (quoted by 
Fusina, 1994: 153-155).
The first really influential and more systematic law in favour of RML was 
undoubtedly the 1982 Savary Circular (text reproduced in Fusina, 1994: 256-264). It 
established a three year language-in-education plan defining more clearly the role of 
the state in RML promotion throughout school education. Crucially, it established that 
the state would henceforth take central responsibility for such promotion, by 
establishing syllabuses, a pedagogical council, exams and training programmes, by 
sponsoring research and production of teaching material, and by coordinating actions 
with civil society organisations (article 1). This marked a significant change for 
Corsica from the Deixonne Law under which schoolteachers and families had to 
obtain Corsican language classes with no official support. Article 2 also made RML 
education a specific, rather than marginal, subject, timetabling up to three weekly 
hours for it. Article 3 re-emphasized the optional character of such teaching and 
learning. Finally, most importantly, as a circular aimed at providing guidelines for
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interpretation of the Haby Law, it left a large amount of discretion to interpreters in 
RML communities. The importance of having discretion in legal interpretation was 
outlined above and will be forcefully illustrated in chapter 8.
In the 1984 and 1989 Laws166, it was respectively reasserted that: 'Le service public 
de l ’enseignement supérieur [...] veille à la promotion et à l'enrichissement de la 
langue française et des langues et cultures régionales ’ (article 7) and that ‘[...] Les 
écoles, les collèges, les lycées et les établissements d'enseignement supérieur [...] 
dispensent une formation [qui] peut comprendre un enseignement à tous les niveaux, 
de langues et cultures régionales.' (Article 1) These provisions that echo the 1975 
law, nevertheless attest to the political will of the Socialist governments of the 1980s 
to boost RML promotion (for the implementation of these provisions in Corsica see 
chapter 8).
Even more significant progress was made during the 1990s, beginning with the 
creation in 1991 of the IUFM and the extension to RMLs of the Certificat d\Aptitude 
à l ’Enseignement Secondaire (CAPES) (analogous to the PGCE in the UK education 
qualification system). The former enabled primary and secondary schoolteacher 
training to be provided in a systematic way, remedying one of the major weaknesses 
of language teaching during the 1970s/1980s. The latter formally put RML training on 
a par with any academic subject (see chapter 8).
Finally, the 1990s saw the development of bilingual education legislation in France in 
application of the principles of generalised RML education in the aforementioned 
successive laws. Yet, the implementation of the law was largely left to the 
deconcentrated state education authorities - the Rectorats - and as chapter 8 further 
illustrates, implementation varied across regions. Bilingual education was regulated 
by the Circulaire Ministérielle No 95-086 du 7 avril 1995: mise en place de 
l ’enseignement des langues et cultures régionales. The text remained rather vague, 
leaving significant discretion to its interpreters. In Corsica, for instance, its 
interpretation/implementation led to both the creation of bilingual sections in a 
number of schools where French and Corsican were used on a par as medium of
166 Relevant excerpts available at http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/dplf/parHe litnv accessed January
2nd 2005.
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instruction, and the creation of a few schools where teaching was articulated around 
the method of full immersion (chapter 8). Both methods were only fully enshrined in 
national legislation for other French regions post facto through two ministerial orders 
on August 5 2001 and on April 19th 2002, under the socialist government in which 
Jack Lang - a notorious supporter of RML rights - was the Education Minister. The 
lost election of April 20th 2002 and the subsequent return of a right-wing government 
led to the amendment of the orders and the full immersion method was repealed167.
Overall, despite limited provisions and slow implementation, the Deixonne Law and 
its legal offspring marked an apparent discursive shift in French glottopolitics. 
Although RMLs became legalised and institutionalised in educational settings ex 
minima, the process seemed to put an end to the anti-dialect rhetoric of the Revolution 
and the Third Republic. In the 1990s, French attitudes towards English-induced 
corpus change appear to have remained veiy puristic among certain intellectual elites 
but less so among the population. In terms of status, the internal dominant discourse 
shifted from an elitist representation of the language to the defense of people’s rights 
to live in their languages. On the external front, France positioned herself as the 
champion of cultural and linguistic diversity, both through the francophonie network 
and in the EU, despite certain contradictory moves to reduce multilingualism and 
impose French within the latter. The real test to this new approach to diversity and the 
advocacy of multilingualism to preserve the intrinsic values of all cultures came with 
the debates around the CoE’s European Charter for RMLs, which the next section 
briefly analyses.
Diversity and Multilingualism: Debates around the European Charter for RMLs.
The idea of a charter for RMLs dates back to the late 1970s/early 1980s and was first 
formally brought forward by the EP in the 1981 Arfé Resolution (see chapter 4). The 
Charter finally came out in 1992 and entered into force in 1998.
167 The texts o f  these three ministerial orders are available at
http7/www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/SardeUneRubriQueBase?niim=642300Q0: accessed January 2nd 
2005.
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The Charter comprises three main parts. Part I deals with general provisions 
(including language definitions), part II establishes the objectives and principles to be 
retained for the application of general provisions, and part III comprises 98 articles 
regarding language use in education, judicial authorities, administrative authorities 
and public services, media, cultural activities and facilities, economic and social life 
and transfrontier exchanges. The meaning and legal scope of the provisions contained 
in parts I and II were also made explicit in the Charter’s explanatory joint report. 
Signatories must endorse the provisions of parts I and II and choose 35 out the 98 
articles, including three articles from the ‘education’ and ‘cultural activities and 
facilities’ headings, and one under other headings. Each heading comprises articles 
sorted by their degree of constraint.
The debate around the Charter in France has been widely commented on not only in 
academic writing (e.g. Poignant, 1998 and 2000; Moutouh, 1999; Wright, 2000; De 
Saint Robert, 2000; Fenet, 2000 and 2002) but also in the press and m edil The first 
stage in the Charter ‘saga’ was Chirac’s speech at a banquet in Brittany in 1996 
where he lauded regional cultures and pledged to facilitate the signature and 
ratification of the Charter. After the return of the Socialists to power in 1997, prime 
Minister Jospin commissioned a report on RMLs (Poignant Report, 1998) and an 
expert opinion on the Charter’s compatibility with the Constitution from a Professor 
in Constitutional Law (Carcassonne, 1998). The Poignant Report promoted the idea of 
republican regionalism as an alternative to the resurgence of regional nationalisms 
and strongly advocated signing and ratifying the Charter arguing inter alia that RMLs 
no longer constituted a threat to national integrity and that continuing a policy of 
exclusion could exacerbate reglonallsms: ‘Le XXIe siècle aura à gérer ¡a 
revendication identitaire. Les républicains doivent le faire. Sinon d ’autres s ’en 
chargeront.’ (Poignant, 1998: 20)'“  The Carcassonne Report identified 39 of the 98 
articles immediately compatible with the Constitution. Jospin subsequently declared 
that: ‘[...] Le respect et la promotion du pluralisme supposent également que soit 
reconnue la contribution des cultures et langues régionales à notre patrimoine 
national [...) U  temps est révolu où l'unité nationale et la pluralité des cultures 168
168 We saw in chapter 4 that this has now also become a central element o f  the nro Riui a- 
supranational level (EBLUL, 1/02/03). e ^r°  discourse at
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régionales paraissaient antagonistes.' (September 29th 1998). The Charter was then 
signed on May 7th 1999. Notwithstanding the Carcassonne Report, Chirac then 
solicited the Constitutional Council’s opinion on the Charter’s compatibility with the 
Constitution to see if a Constitutional revision would be necessary before its 
ratification. The latter ruled on June 15th 1999 that the 38 retained articles constituted 
no obstacles but that part II’s provisions would force the government to deal with the 
rights of groups and established the right to use a language other than French in public 
matters: both provisions contravened the Constitution. Finally, Jospin asked Chirac to 
start of procedure to amend the Constitution accordingly, which Chirac refused to do. 
Since then, the whole process has stalled.
An assessment of the legal interpretation of the Constitutional Council and its legal 
critics is beyond the author’s expertise (for some contradictory expert legal analyses, 
see Moutouh, 2000 and Fenet, 2000 and 2002). As was claimed in chapter 1 and 
illustrated in chapters 2 and 3, legal analysis cannot be completely divorced from 
political considerations in any case. For our purpose here, I will just emphasize a few
points.
First, in its interpretation, the Constitutional Council ignored the proviso in the 
explanatory report that: ‘The Charter does not establish any individual or collective 
rights for the speakers o f RMLs.’ (p.5), and that this proviso was reiterated almost 
verbatim in the government’s legal reservation accompanying the Charter’s signature: 
*[...] [le gouvernement] interprète la charte dans un sens compatible avec le 
préambule de la Constitution [...] qui ne connaît que le peuple français sans 
distinction d ’origine, de race ou de religion.'169 Second, the 38 selected provisions 
largely overlapped and/or were often less constraining than the legislation current in 
domestic law (e.g. education and media). Third, where no provisions existed in the 
RML legislation such as RML use with public authorities, the options retained were 
the minimal ones and merely established that certain legal texts may be translated into
169 A precedent in the use o f such a proviso to ratify an international treaty was in 1980 when France 
ratified the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in force from 1976) with the 
reservation that article 27 on minority rights did not apply in France since there are no minorities 
(Fenet, 2002: 64).
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RMLs (e.g. article 9 on judicial authorities, paragraph 3: ‘The parties undertake to 
make available in the regional or minority languages the most important statutory 
texts and those relating particularly to users o f  these languages unless they are 
otherwise provided.'’). Fourth, the Charter somehow innovates with its final 
provisions on transfrontier collaboration. We saw above that this is one of the main 
areas where RMLs have benefited from EU funds (e.g. through the interregional 
(INTERREG) programmes; see chapters 4, 6 and 8). Finally, the whole texual 
modality, with such hedges as ‘the Parties undertake as far as this is reasonably 
possible’ and verbs such as ‘encourage’ and facilitate’, largely preserve the 
signatories’ discretion for implementation purposes. Overall, it seems that the Council 
of Europe allowed a series of ‘diplomatic’ textual and discursive devices intent on 
diminishing the Charter’s potentially threatening character. If the main contradictory 
interpretations had political rather than legal motives then, the importance of the 
Charter must be measured in ideological terms. I therefore now look at elite and 
popular responses to the debates and events.
What emerges from the analysis of elite and popular reactions in the media and press 
is the vociferous character of debates, the polarisation of positions and, most 
remarkably, that opposition to the Charter substantially echoed Revolutionary 
rhetoric, both Jacobin (i.e. in favour of a high level of political centralisation) and 
Girondine (i.e. in favour of a more federal system). On the Jacobin front, best 
embodied on the left by the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC), Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement stated that granting RML a status would lead to ‘balkaniser la France.' 
and in a very Manichean approach to the civic/ethnic dichotomy he objected that *[...] 
on substitue a la notion de peuple français d ’autres concepts plus fumeux gui ont un 
rapport avec ¡ ’origine éthnique’ (Reuters. June 23,d 1999). Georges Sarre, echoing 
Barrère, denounced •[...] une arme politique [dans les mains] des mouvements 
autonomistes et régionalistes [qui s’en serviraient] pour favoriser l ’éclatement du 
cadre national et ta création d ’une Europe des régions.’ (l e  Monde, June 24th) What 
is common to these approaches is that they equate RML recognition with the 
inevitable return to pre-Revolution political and dialectal fragmentation In that 
connection, Wright (2000: 420) quotes Gallo (1999) who foresees the break-up of
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French society into its old provinces if RML rights were granted and the advent of 
regional language/English bilingualism in France [sic].
On the Girondine side, the advocates of the Charter fustigate the aforementioned 
rearguard Jacobin positions (in ways reminiscent of Poignant’s arguments p. 171) and 
redefine linguistic diversity as a vanguard European characteristic, notably against the 
hegemony of English. Le Drian, spokesman of Breton socialists, for instance, called 
the Council’s decision ‘ [...]jacobinisme intégriste et archaïque qui me parait 
complètement dépassé.’ (Agence France Presse [AFP], June 24th 1999). Other 
defenders of diversity like Bayrou, president of Démocratie Libérale, also emphasized 
the European general approach to diversity, evoking RMLs as ‘[...] un trésor de 
l 'humanité', and denouncing the French contradictory discourses on diversity at 
home and abroad, arguing that ‘ [...] la défense des langues régionales n'est pas du 
tout incompatible avec la défense du français, mais au contraire, c ’est 
complémentaire vis-à-vis du rouleau compresseur anglo-saxon.' Finally, 
Méhaignerie, former centrist minister declared he was ‘[...] favorable à la Charte 
européenne’ and that '[...] le système uniforme ne correspond plus à notre 
société .’ (Both in AFP, June 24th 1999) Unsurprisingly, the regionalists reacted 
violently to the stalemate created by the Constitutional Council’s Decision and 
demonstrations and pledges to continue the struggle emerged in all RML regionalist 
movements (Wright, 2000: 421).
As for popular reactions, finally, they broadly reflected the discourses of the elites 
sketched above even though in popular discourse the pro-Charter position seems to 
have gained some ground between 1999 and 2000. A 1999 CSA/DN survey revealed 
that 50% were favourable to the Charter and 31% against (July 8th 1999). A 
subsequent poll, after heated debates had cooled down, indicated that 80% would be 
favourable to its ratification and 79% even if it required a Constitutional amendment 
(IFOP, 2000)170. Overall the debates around the Charter clearly show that, on the one
170 These results are provided by the website available at
http://french.abouLcom/g.i/dvnamic/offsite.htm?site=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ciral nlnvni
Faml.xmonde%2Ffrancophonie%2Ffrancophonie.htm: accessed January Vd Ofins ~~ ~ ~
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hand, a significant proportion of the French society no longer endorses the radical, 
exclusive approach to RMLs inherited from the Revolution -while, on the other, 
certain elite circles do perpetuate radical forms of linguistic Jacobinism.
Conclusion
Although the French language became totemized in the 17lh centuiy, language use 
only became a litmus test of political loyalty at the time of the Revolution. Thence, 
the coterminous relation between language and nation became the Revolutionaries’ 
goal: to create a unified nation out of the ‘objective’ linguistic, cultural and 
sociopolitical fragmentation characterising the various peoples living on the territory. 
Once that project was deemed to be achieved, the concept of the nation ceased to be a 
quest for an inclusive ‘coming together’ but fossilized into a form of ‘being’, 
exclusive of any variation and difference.
The very concept of universalism implies a constant process of spread of values, i.e. 
linguistic and political ideologies. As was seen, in French history it goes hand in hand 
with imperialism under a civilizing guise. Moreover, by definition, universalism can 
of course accept no challenge, and it knows no limits so that any potential check can 
only be seen as a return to a former, more fragmented and regressive state. The 
‘essence’ of universalism is to be all-encompassing, holistic and indivisible; any 
divisions, even if merely formal and not at the level of values (i.e. one can speak 
Breton and endorse the values of Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité) is necessarily seen as a 
challenge to these values because in a totemized approach form and substance are 
conflated. Hence it is impossible to accept the idea of mixed identities and value 
systems.
Because it was constructed in opposition to biological (ethnic) loyalties (see also how 
the biological evolutionary metaphor justifies imperialism) themselves exclusive of 
other loyalties, French political ideology has become totemized in the 
political/institutional system as oppositional: divergence/difference is seen as regress
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and as opposition. Any admission of divergence/difference, or of the divisibility of the 
French nation (to put it in the dominant republican metaphor), is a denial of the 
Republique’s very legitimacy as opposed to exclusive ‘ethnic’ systems. 
Republicanism therefore reproduces the very exclusiveness and intolerance it claims 
to oppose. Transposed to the sociolinguistic level within a logic where languages are 
totemized, to acknowledge languages that are clearly identified with some long­
standing ethnic culture in the republican domain of legitimacy - the public domain -  is 
to deny republicanism’s own raison d ’etre (i.e. to combat the alleged exclusivism and 
arrierisme of those languages and cultures). As long as the essentialist equation ‘one 
language = one nation = one political system’ and its converse ‘one political system = 
[can only have] one nation = [and speak only] one language’ prevail, there can be no 
official liberalization of the RML question in France.
Article 2 o f the Constitution, the Toubon Law and the debates around the Charter 
show that French nationalism has long ceased to be, if it ever was (Smith, 1986), a 
form of political nationalism, and both language purism (a reified and totemized 
vision of the ‘formal language/clarity/universal values’ equation) and the refusal to 
admit any linguistic diversity are telling evidence of the ethnic essentialism 
characterizing some proportion of the French society. It is precisely because the 
French society has sanctified a covert form  of ‘biological’ essencialist approach to 
political and cultural hegemony that it cannot open up to diversity and become more 
liberal towards RMLs. In that light, French liberal discourse about multilingualism in 
Europe is clearly an additional device to promote a French ethnic identity. The fact 
that it stemmed from linguistic insecurity following the rise of English can only 
confirm this. In a sense, accepting diversity in France would be tantamount to denying 
all French political history and the ideological construction of the superiority of 
French as universal since before the Revolution. Since that ideology is inevitably 
being forced to evolve in the outer, supranational spheres, the territory of the Republic 
is increasingly seen as the last redoubt of such values. This eventually results in the 
contradiction between France’s intransigeance at home - its monolithic, monolingual 
and monocultural discourse - and its external pluralist discourse where it serves to 
thwart the ongoing minoritisation of French in relation to English. As France must
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admit that it is no longer the dominant world power, it seeks to compensate its 
international demise through more rigid attitudes at home.
The question of RMLs is therefore stalled at the level of rhetoric as long as political 
deciders cannot transcend these national/international contradictions and see the 
unity/diversity relation dialectically rather than as a set of incompatible and radically 
antithetical (political and cultural) value systems. At the level of practice though, as 
this chapter has illustrated, the universalisation of the core’s dominance has always 
been very uneven because the different peripheral contexts made the uniform 
implementation of dominant policies impossible. Consequently, different forms of 
resistance linked to different histories, geographies, economic resources, and cultural 
backgrounds, have contributed to maintaining a large number of exceptions to the so- 
called uniform or indivisible system. This unachieved uniformisation has led to the 
cyclical rise of resistant forms throughout history when uniformisation under the 
guise of modernisation seemed to deliver more evils than benefits. It is to such 
resistant forms in Corsica - seen as the result of unachieved uniformisation (chapter 6) 
in the context of different cultural histories and loyalties (chapter 7) - that I now turn.
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Chapter 6: Unity and Diversity in Corsica: Patterns of identity and Political
Separatism
Introduction
This chapter and the following ones focus on the regional and sub-regional levels 
This chapter provides the general backdrop o f geographical, socio-psychologica! and 
political elements that have contributed to shape Corsican identity and patterns o f 
political loyalty especially since 1769. As indicated in chapter 1 and illustrated in 
chapter 5, identities are durable and ingrained on the one hand, and plural, 
inconsistent and shifting on the other. As Bourdieu’s sociology has it, identities are 
shaped by the habitm  but their actualisations are unstable, contingent and context- 
dependent. This chapter illustrates the dual, dialectical nature o f Corsican identity.
The first part begins with the influence o f geography in Corsican perceptions and 
patterns o f identity and political allegiance, pointing to two fundamental factors in 
identity formation: island-ness and mediterraneity. In the Corsican context, following 
Corsican anthropologists (e.g. Gil, 1991), I argue that the prominence o f localism and 
local forms o f political loyalty, and their political correlate - the rejection o f external 
authority - are fundamental facets o f Corsican-ness for certain social groups. Localism 
has fossilised diversity and maintained social fragmentation, and the rejection o f 
external authority features as an attitude reinforcing separateness. At the supra-local 
level, the rejection o f authority especially expressed as opposition to French 
hegemony, has helped maintain some Corsican cultural distinctiveness, which was 
eventually institutionally acknowledged and recognised by the state. At the local 
level, however, it has undermined efforts to erect an internal, supra-loeal, pan- 
Corsican framework of political reference and loyalty.
In the second part, I continue with historical elements that have moulded Corsicans' 
political identity through their conflict-ridden experience o f otherness in general and 
their contact with French-ness and the French state in particular. I outline economic, 
demographic and political changes in Corsica between the nineteenth century and the
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1960s that have aggravated the social fracture between pro- and anti-French forces on 
the island and thereby reinforced the local, oppositional nature of the identity of a 
significant part of the Corsican population. This illustrates that certain elements of 
identities are also largely the product of historical experience but can become 
ingrained and durable so that discourses questioning and attempting to reshape them 
are likely to be resisted, as we shall see in this chapter and chapter 9.
The third part provides a brief sketch of political developments since the 1970s that 
have transposed the aforementioned divisions between region and state into the local 
versus the supra-Iocal, thereby nourishing ‘natural’ inclinations towards defiance and 
wariness of forms of authority that overflow the local frame of reference. In this 
enduring, fragmented socio-political context, any form of supra-Iocal planning after 
the 1980s devolution, including language planning, became subject to contestation by 
a significant proportion of the population. In turn, inner fragmentation has also 
considerably limited the potential Europeanisation of the island during the 1990s as 
the last section shows.
Geography and Perceptions o f Identity -  Corsica’s 'Double Insularity ’
Corsica is a Mediterranean island located 90 km west from the Italian peninsula and 
170 km southeast from continental France. To Andreani, these two dimensions - 
insularity and mediterraneity - are fundamental constitutive facets of Corsican identity 
patterns (1999: chapter 1).
First, insularity crystallises a sense of eternity due to immutable natural borders: 
Corsica has always existed (Dottelonde, 1989; cited by Jaffe: 1999; 35) ancj 
archaeology has recorded human presence as far back as the Neolithic. Second, the 
lack of territorial continuity - the natural bounded-ness of the island - has favoured the 
perception of the island as a centre rather than as a periphery, translating its natural 
closed-ness into social-psychological perceptions of ‘us’ and ‘them’. This has had 
clear consequences for the social-psychological definition of Corsican identity and for 
the relation to ‘others’ throughout Corsican history, especially since the presence of 
the various regimes by which Corsica was ‘conquered’ have long been confined to a 
few coastal cities, leaving inner Corsica largely unexplored and untamed until
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recently. Invaders have thus never completed assimilation and, even in the recent past, 
tradition has not disappeared but survived and conflicted with the advent of 
modernity. Island-ness has thus closed Corsica to the rest of the world; even with 
modern transportation, leaving the island remains no casual enterprise, if only because 
of the cost of travelling. This experience of closed-ness has somehow acted as cement 
amongst Corsican populations. At the same time, Corsica’s strategic position exposed 
native islanders to the imperialist ambitions of their numerous invaders. Corsicans 
have been linked together in their experience of danger and wars, learning at their 
own expense that danger irremediably came from the sea. Corsican cultural tradition 
recalls past experiences of murder, kidnapping, and human exportation into slavery. 
Hence, a cultural wariness of aliens still persists today, which is further enhanced by 
the internal isolation created the mountainous relief of the island.171
For, Corsica is also, and perhaps above all, a chain of mountains, a mountain in the 
sea, to use the traditional formulaic definition. This chain of mountains running from 
the northwest to the southeast divides Corsica into two halves. With about fifty peaks 
reaching above 6,000 feet, and many passes and valleys, Corsica’s internal 
communications were considerably limited for a long time, except in rare plains such 
as the central-eastern Aleria plain. Yet, harsh though a mountainous environment may 
be in terms of economic development, mountains have not been altogether hostile to 
Corsicans: rather, they have constituted natural fortresses and refuges from invasions 
and contributed to preserve inner Corsican communities from acculturation. Indeed, 
as was said above, foreign administrative centres long remained confined to the cities 
of the littoral and foreign influences hardly penetrated inner communities.
In a significant way, nonetheless, the mountainous configuration also kept village 
communities isolated from one another. In his Rapport sur l ’état économique et moral 
de la Corse en 1839 Adolphe Blanqui indicated that:
Tous les villages, sans exceptions, sont situés sur des hauteurs [..,] cet 
isolement des villages est tel, que deux communes adossées aux flancs de la 
même montagne, et séparées seulement par un trajet de quelques heures,
171 The theme o f invasion is a recurrent element of Corsican consciousness and has been passed on 
almost genealogically.
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demeurent sans communication d ’aucune sorte pendant plusieurs années.
(Quoted in Gil, 1991)
Andreani adds that [■••] avant le percement des routes et l ’invention des véhicules 
automobiles l ’isolement était la règle pour la Corse de l ’intérieur.'' (1999; 11) Eugene 
Weber amongst others has largely documented the importance of the road networks in 
the social psychological building of communities beyond the village community 
(Weber, 1979, chapter 12). First initiatives to build a road network in Corsica date 
back from the 183 Os-1840s and were re-launched under the Second Empire (from 
1853). However, these modest structural developments did not suffice to break the 
isolation of villages (Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997: 100). Thus, the lack of mass road 
construction in Corsica until the 1960s contributed to sustaining a way of life, a 
particular socio-political, socio-cultural and linguistic set of habits, and non-industrial 
modes of production until late in the 20th century. The main locus of identity and 
political loyalty has therefore long been, and largely remains, local: the immediate 
village community. In the village-based location of Corsican identities, them is 
somehow defined as everything external to the village, including other villages. 
Furthermore, although today half of the island population spends its working week in 
coastal cities, villages fill again at weekends and, during summertime, the Corsican 
Diaspora returns to live in the villages whose population then more than doubles172.
In sum, because of its mountainous landscapes and due to the late development of its 
road network and routes of communication, Corsica is a Mediterranean island divided 
into a great number of ‘mountain’ islands: a geographic, geopolitical and socio­
cultural (and therefore linguistic) archipelago. Analogically, it can be seen as a 
microcosm of the political, social-psychological and socio-cultural fragmentation of 
other nation-states before nation building processes. The consequences of such a 
persistent localism have been numerous and have inter alia significantly shaped 
popular responses to centralising language planning efforts since the 1970s, as will be 
seen in chapters 8 and 9.
172 Jaffe (1999: chapter 2) shows that the village is the locus o f the inalienable identity where diasporic 
members retire and, in many accounts, this return wipes out a sometimes life-long parenthesis away 
from the village. The village is then the unbroken cord and living one’s Corsican-ness is tied to village 
life.
182
As for mediterraneity, it can be defined as the set of characteristics common to the 
peoples living around the Mediterranean. Amongst these features, family ties are 
preponderant and constitute the matrix of solidarity. Further, the family is defined 
both narrowly as kinship and more broadly as the clan - the socio-political extension 
of the immediate family - itself the sole and ultimate limit of identity and social 
loyalty before the advent of the Republic. Mediterraneity also denotes a set of values 
such as honour and solidarity, and its bloody correlate vendetta, that participates in a 
justice system wherein solidarity prompts ‘family’ members to avenge in blood the 
maculate honour of any group member, without resorting to institutional arbitration. 
In other words, mediterraneity implies a form of violent justice autonomous from a 
formal legal system imposed by outer forces. By extension, mediterraneity entails 
defiance towards forms of external authority that explains some Corsicans’ resistance 
to that which is imposed in general. In a sort of antithetical way, island-ness and 
Mediterraneity thus constitute unifying links between Corsicans, based upon defiance 
and/or rejection of the other’s authority. At the same time, inner insularity acts as a 
separator of communities: culturally unified in their mediterraneity, politically diverse 
and often opposed in their inner insularity (see chapter 9).
In the next sections, I survey the historical stages of the politicisation of the island 
from the 18th century, contrasting patterns of resistance to authority with trends 
towards acculturation. I begin with Corsica’s short-lived attempt to constitute itself as 
an independent nation-state from the 1730s and explore the extent and limitation of 
the Frenchification of the island from 1768 till today.
From Independence to the French Aegis.
Colombani describes the 18th century as the grand siècle for Corsica (1999: 1). It is 
indeed the century of the Corsican Revolutions which, starting in the 1730s in the 
context of a loosened domination from Genoa, eventually led to the independence of 
Corsica, under the leadership of Pasquale Paoli, the father o f the nation in 
contemporary nationalist imagery, between 1755 and 1769 (Ettori, 1971; quoted by 
Andréani, 1999: 64). This short period of time saw an embryonic Corsican nation­
state develop its own political and judicial institutional structures, navy, conscripts, 
currency, flag, national anthem, university (1765-1769), Official Bulletin, etc, but no
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national language'” . Although this period was short, later Corsican nationalist 
historiography largely glorified the years of independence that brought the turmoil of 
the previous 40 years to a halt and saw the birth of political feelings of Corsicanhood, 
especially as great 18* centuty figures like Jean-Jacques Rousseau hailed the birth of
the Corsican nation and begun drafting a constitution for it.
The advent of French rule in 1769 was resisted but royal forces eventually defeated 
nationalists at the battle of Ponte Novu. Royal administration then engaged in a 
number of economic, legal and political reforms that privileged a few supporters of 
the French presence but soon also entailed growing resentment and marked opposition 
to the new regime by many others. The news of the first troubles of the Revolution 
was therefore unsurprisingly followed by popular uprisings: Corsicans embraced early 
revolutionary ideals, hoping for reform to bring them more egalitarian treatment and 
some material prosperity. Arrighi and Pomponi (1997: 87) argue that even ideas of an 
independent Corsica faded before the prospect of joining the Revolution. On 
November 30th 1789, a decree promulgated by the National Assembly established that 
‘[••■1la Corse fait partie de l ’empire français et [que] ses habitants seront régis par 
la même constitution que les autres Français’, (ibid) Paoli, exiled in England since 
Ponte-Novu, returned and, re-installed in his role of leader of the nation, represented 
the island in Paris. However, he swiftly disapproved of the ‘excesses’ of the 
Revolution, and stood against radical Jacobinism, which he foresaw as a new form of 
tyranny. His vision for Corsica was incompatible with the Jacobin conception of a 
highly centralized state that Napoleon was later to embody: Paoli advocated a more 
‘federalist’ Girondine position. The two conflicting positions divided Corsicans but 
Napoleon’s Jacobinism eventually prevailed174. Subsequent pockets of resistance 
could not constitute a really serious challenge to French domination. Notwithstanding, 
they were severely repressed.
After the ultimate armed upheaval of 1816 in Fium’orbu, ‘[...] la Corse s ’intégre à la 
France. Son histoire n ’est plus celle d ’une nation. Elle est celle d ’un département: 
(Antonetti, 1990) But historians disagree on the unproblematic welding of Corsica in
Z In the next Z apt! T 1 ° ffer SOme exPlanat'ons for what, at first, could seem to be an odditv 
It is no wonder then that Paoli’s image and discourse should have been re-appropriated bv 
regional ist and then nationalist movements in the 1960-70s, as the terms o f the discursive conflict* 
have remained almost identical. contacts
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the French mould. As Vergé-Franceschi puts it: ‘[...] [in the first half of the 19lh 
century], la greffe française ne s ’est pas opérée et Vile demeure sur la lancée des 
siècles antérieurs avec ses troupeaux d ’ovins et caprins, ses exportations livournaises 
et l ’attrait toujours exercé par les universités italiennes: (Both quoted in Andréani 
1999:68)
Economie Underdevelopment, Demography and Social Fracture175 176
During the 19 century, the island population substantially rose so that villages ended 
up overcrowded and, by the end of the century, the meagre resources could no longer 
feed everyone . Although, the insular economy had seen unprecedented positive 
developments from the 1820s, and demographic growth had entailed a proportional 
economic boom based on cattle breeding, the increase of pastoral activity, and the 
development of agriculture and viticulture177, agricultural techniques remained 
fundamentally unchanged and did not experience the technological innovations 
spreading elsewhere on mainland France: production increased but productivity did 
not, which in the longer run proved lethal to Corsican products in competition with 
less costly external products.
By the last quarter of the century, the Corsican agro-pastoral economy collapsed 
under the combined pressures of demographic growth and increasing economic 
competition from mainland France and the colonies at the turn of the century. The 
fragile prosperity of the early nineteenth century, characterized by an autarchic agro­
pastoral type of socio-economic organization of life in ‘inner Corsica’, failed to resist 
the economic changes of the time. The international economy was increasingly based 
on policies of free-exchange and on industrial modes of production with which agro­
pastoral economic modes and craftsmanship could no longer compete. The crisis was 
all the more drastic in that internal communication channels were still largely 
underdeveloped. Communications with mainland France were in no better state and 
exchanges functioned in a colonial mode: Corsican exports were heavily taxed whilst
175 The following account is largely based on Pomponi (1979)
176 From 130,000 inhabitants in 1770, it rose to 185,000 in the mid-1820s to 255 onn in « «  , „
i% ?ia330r-33Clh)abOUt 300,000 inhabitantS at the tum 0 f the century> its highest rat’e ever. (Pomponi ’
177 Pomponi reports that between 1830 and 1874, agricultural production tripled (ibid).
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continental products benefited from custom facilities (Parliamentary Report; 
Rapporteur Delannay, 1908). Prices therefore fell dramatically and the first waves of 
mass emigration ensued, prompted by the prospect of social ascent in the French 
administration and within the growing French colonial empire.
Corsica entered the twentieth century in a state of economic backwardness and moral 
despair and ever more voices emerged to denounce the abandonment of the island by 
France and the concomitant corruption of the clans, which were held largely 
responsible for the lack of genuine policies of economic development. The Great War 
bracketed out protest for some time. Enrolling massively, Corsicans paid a large 
tribute in human lives. As in other French regions, this significantly cemented their 
loyalty to France178. Yet, the commitment of island forces and the trauma caused by 
high losses were poorly rewarded, as relations with mainland France temporarily 
loosened up:
Des milliers de morts, la coupure des relations avec le continent d ’autant plus 
grave que l ’île en était devenue de plus en plus dépendante, le retour en 
catastrophe aux pratiques culturales les plus archaïques pour pouvoir 
survivre, l ’absence de circulation monétaire semblèrent replonger la Corse en 
plein XVIIIième siècle. (Arrighi and Pomponi, ibid: 108)
The economic situation of the island continued its endemic decay during the first half 
of the twentieth century, due to both the lack of adequate economic structures and the 
increasing dependence on public sources of income.179 Beside this, few economic 
incentives were offered for war veterans to return to the island and emigration 
continued. With an average yearly migration rate of 2.3% in the post-WWII period 
(between 1946 and 1954), the population dropped to approximately 191,000 
inhabitants in 1954.
178 Estimations vary from 16,000 (Andrdani, 1999: 160) to 30 000 (FRC 19711
179 Briquet indicates that by the 1930s, salaries and pensions amounted to 40% of th* - • ,
and more than 50% by the 1950s (1997) '  o f the regional revenue,
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To regenerate the economy and compensate for Corsica’s increasing dependence on 
public money, the state launched a Plan d\Action Régionale (1957) to promote 
economic and social expansion along two main lines: agriculture (and especially 
viticulture) and tourism. But many commentators have reported that the provisions of 
the Plan favoured immigration and essentially benefited the 17,000 Northern African 
repatriated French nationals whose settlement in Corsica the government of the time 
found convenient to facilitate (Labro, 1977; Arrighi & Pomponi, 1997). Thus, the 
arrival of French Pieds-Noirsm  and Northern African immigrants significantly 
accounted for post-WWII population growth180 81. Yet, little or no room was made for 
the masses of Corsicans whom decolonisation left unemployed and increasingly bitter 
and frustrated, in a context of cultural revival heralded by the slogan ‘vivre et 
travailler au pays’.
Indeed, during the 1960s, it was felt that native Corsicans had been excluded from the 
process of economic regeneration that the central state had finally undertaken after 
two centuries of perceived abandonment, whilst continental France lived the ‘Trente 
glorieuses’, years of accelerated and unprecedented economic boom. The bulk of 
Corsica’s new workforce was thus of ‘foreign’ breed182 183, and favourable fiscal and 
banking facilities were offered to newcomers but not to ‘Corsican natives’, which 
aggravated feelings of discrimination. Unsurprisingly, this fuelled the discourse of 
colonial invasion that was latent in many European regional contexts of the time (see 
below). As a result, although in absolute figures the island’s population rose again, the 
proportion of Corsican natives slowly began to decline whilst that of non-Corsicans
In parallel with this re-modelling of the demographic picture, coastal cities developed, 
whilst villages, offering little prospect of economic success, were progressively and
180 This is the generic term to cal) French nationals residing in Northern Africa before independence
181 The INSEE reports an average yearly immigration rate of 2.1% between 1962 and 1968, while 
28,000 Corsicans left the island during that period, the FRC claims (1971: chapter 3).
182 ‘Foreign’ here is to be understood in the sense o f ‘non Corsican natives’, therefore including both
Northern African nationals (Moroccans and Algerians) and repatriated French nationals (even thoueh a 
certain proportion o f  the Pieds-Noirs was o f Corsican ascent). °
183 Still, it must be borne in mind that some Corsican natives returned to the island to retire: the 
Diaspora also fed into demographic growth, but an ageing population.
187
massively abandoned and shrivelled during the 1960s. Internal emigration and 
immigration indeed converged towards the city accelerating the depopulation of rural 
areas and the concomitant growth of urban centres like Ajaccio and Bastia, 
respectively Corsica’s administrative and economic capitals184. As Andréani writes: 
‘La société corse est déchirée entre l ’immobilisme et le movement, la nostalgie du 
passé, le refus du changement et la force de la m odern ité (1999: 35) and quoting 
Taddei and Antomarchi put it:
Le XXe siècle, celui de la ville s ’est imposé tardivement mais avec brutalité, 
dans cette société rurale et archaïque [...] En deux générations, un peuple de 
montagnards est devenu un peuple de banlieusards, fl 997)
For Franchi (in Corsica, Mars 2000: 57), the change was even more sudden from the 
1960s:
Brutalement, c ’est l ’implosion. En moins de dix ans toute une société de type 
agropastoral s ’effondre, les activités communautaires s ’arrêtent, les écoles 
ferment, les familles avec de jeunes enfants doivent quitter le village. C ’est la 
fin  d ’une société, d ’une culture et, par là même, l ’évaporation de la langue qui 
en était le vecteur.
The 1960s thus saw drastic socio-demographic change in Corsica, through population 
movements towards increasingly cosmopolitan cities, with all the social problems 
rapid urbanisation entails, and this situation accelerated language shift into French. 
For the uprooted rural population, all this contributed to further stigmatize the ‘evils 
of modernisation’ that France embodied.
184 For an illustration o f the rate o f  depopulation o f rural areas, see the map o f the Evolution o f  
Communal Population between 1901 and 1990 (INSEE, 1999: 35).
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In the 2000 census, the proportion of non-Corsican natives amongst Corsica’s 
residents almost equalled that of Corsica-born residents185 and about half of the 
population of the island now live in urban areas. This is a demographic fact that 
weighs a great deal in the difficulty of keeping Corsican from language death today. 
Regionalist, autonomist and then nationalist political discourses since the 1960s have 
denounced emigration, immigration and demographic change as the deliberate 
minorisation of the Corsican people.
In the next sections, I briefly survey the evolution of Corsican socio-political 
structures under French rule. I first examine the development of clanic politics in the 
1850s, the concomitant rise of regionalism in the early days of the 20lh century, and 
then focus on the revival of regionalism and the advent and development of 
nationalism within the post-WWII context to the present.
Clanism, State Dependency, More Social Fracture and Early Forms o f Regionalism
Clanism is a pyramidal type of organisation that can be seen as a remnant of 
feudalism in that the people pledge their political and military allegiance to the head 
in exchange for physical protection. It pre-existed the French presence on the island 
but French rule gave it a new impetus whilst disturbing the balance of power between 
rival clans through the selective distribution of public manna. Clanism can be seen as 
the theoretical opposite of republicanism since it implies renunciation of one’s 
political rights whilst republicanism enhances and individualises such rights. In 
Corsica, the traditional and the modern types of political allegiance were conflated 
and dominant clanic structures were intertwined with nascent republican structures: 
Mes dans se sont adaptés à la République, et la République aux clans. ’ (Andréani, 
ibid: 71)
Modem forms of clanism developed under Napoleon Ill’s Second Empire (1852- 
1870) and during the Third Republic (1870-1939) republican clanism fully spread its 
wings. During the first half of the century, despite the advent of a liberal bourgeoisie
185 This leads to a situation where the Corsican Diaspora on the continent far outnumbers native 
Corsicans on the island, with consequences for contemporary Corsican language politics.
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on the island and forms of mimesis of mainland politics, Corsican elites were initially 
restrictively associated to French power structures and still largely linked to the Italian 
peninsula. It is from the second half of the 19th century, under the return of a 
Bonaparte to power, that links with Italy loosened while Corsican dynastic families 
fully became agents of Frenchification. Numerous Corsican elites were appointed in 
the highest political spheres on the mainland whence they distributed favours and 
positions to their clientele in the island, or attained positions in colonial 
administrations, and most importantly in the colonial army. This entailed two 
phenomena. First, power distribution was bipolar and uneven amongst rival clans at 
regional level; each had its own network of ramification at municipal levels, the 
effective level where individual-state relations were mediated. This favoured 
competition and conflicts of interests, since favours and privileges could not be 
granted to all: some clans were dominant, some not.
Second, as the century advanced, the survival of that part of the population that was 
still largely agro-pastoral that had suffered from agrarian reforms that privatised free 
communal lands, and that had not benefited from public manna, became increasingly 
jeopardized. This contributed to the widening of social divisions. If a growing part of 
Corsica’s social spectrum opportunistically endorsed French rule and its symbolic and 
material endowments, certain rural areas of society felt cheated and abandoned; they 
strongly resented socio-political evolutions, and sometimes rebelled against 
authority186. It was these sectors who came to fill the ranks of regionalists and 
autonomists at the turn of century and from the 1960s. Typically, it was they who 
maintained village life and cultural traditions when urbanisation and depopulation 
transformed patterns of residence on the island187. Today they largely constitute the 
remaining stock of Corsican native speakers.
The denunciation of clanism and clientelism were fundamental tenets of early 
regionalist protest and later nationalist revival. This situation was however somewhat 
paradoxical as autonomists and nationalists championed the defence of the Corsican 
nation and its decaying culture while clan-based politico-administrative power and
186 Some were forced into exile in the mountain becoming bandits d ’honneur.
187 It would be exaggerated to dichotomise the urban-rural divide as reflecting the pro-/anti-clan divide
since the rural world - as the guard.an of tradition - has helped preserve clanism as a tradition^ ,  
political loyalty (Andrdani, 1999:78) traditional form of
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practices were an integral part of Corsican collective identity. Hitherto, the clans had 
always protected Corsicans against invaders. Under French rule, the system had been 
perverted and many felt they were led a stray.
Regionalist protest received a new impetus between the wars for the economic 
reasons mentioned above, which strengthened the discourse of cultural and linguistic 
loss and general abandonment of the island formulated in the late 19(h century. As 
levels of instruction and basic literacy rose, protest was mediated through increasingly 
diffused newspapers and reviews, starting with Santu Casanova’s A Tramuntcma 
(1896-1914), and through associations promoting insular interests, e.g. L ’union corse 
Casanova projected the themes of the betrayal of the clans in the public sphere and, 
moreover, did it in Corsican. This was symbolically important because it associated 
the Corsican language with the oppressed but resistant Corsican people and French 
with that of the corrupted, betraying elites (Arrighi and Pomponi, 1997: 106-107) 
Besides, as we shall see in the next chapter, it also divorced Corsican from Italian as 
the language of writing, which announced the symbolic individuation of both the 
‘dialect’ from its ‘standard language’ and the people from their peninsular cousins 
(Thiers, 1989:41-47).
The regionalist themes of abandonment and elite corruption were then relayed and 
transformed into autonomist discourses. The manifesto A Cipra (1914) claimed: 
‘Z ’autonomie, voilà le salut: Autonomism was thwarted by the Great War and the 
autonomous discourse was temporarily discredited in the interwar period when some 
autonomists embraced Mussolini’s irredentism. In 1938, this led the population of 
Bastia to pledge loyalty to France through the Bastia Oath. The heroic resistance of 
Corsicans during WWII completed the demise of autonomism and delayed its re- 
emergence until the 1960s.
Régionalisation, Regionalism and Nationalism in Corsica: The Ideological 
Socio-Political Context o f the 1960s/l990s logical and
The socio-political context of the 1960s/1990s can be approached from different 
angles. I have already discussed the supra-national level within the framework of 
international integration agencies such as the EU, the CoE and the UN, and the state-
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national level covering ideological, socio-political and institutional developments in 
metropolitan France in earlier parts of this dissertation. This section considers 
developments at the regional level, examining ideological, socio-political and 
institutional developments in Corsica.188 189These distinctions are of course largely 
artificial as discursive and political developments at each analytical level overlap and 
interact with other levels but it is analytically convenient to separate them. As we saw 
in those earlier chapters, the national frame of political reference underwent drastic 
changes during the past half-century. Since the Revolution and under the various 
successive regimes, the strong Jacobin, centralising impetus had periodically been 
challenged by competing political discourses on the nation and the state. Contending 
models of the nation state and its cultural and linguistic ideologies were manifest 
throughout: political centralisation versus a more federal organisation of society and 
distribution of legal and political prerogatives; cultural uniformity and 
monolingualism versus some respect for and/or promotion of cultural diversity and 
multilingualism, etc. As was seen in chapter 5, the post-WWII period eventually saw 
a form of political déconcentration first and then more genuine devolution. To a 
significant extent, Corsican regionalist movements can be credited for the form and 
scope o f political devolution that began in the early 1980s.
Like earlier Corsican regionalist and/or autonomist protest movements, those of the 
1970s consolidated group mobilisation and solidarity around a series of socio­
economic themes and a renewed social-psychological mindset towards cultural 
revival and the preservation of regional identities. Economic backwardness, the fear 
of mass tourism and its danger for the environment, as well as important demographic 
change, however, gave them a wider social appeal than before. Multiple 
demonstrations by Corsican civil society’s during the 1960s/1970s largely testified to 
this18 . In Corsica, the thesis of internal colonialism was theorised in 1971 by the 
Front Régionaliste Corse (FRC) (created in 1966), which synthesized and gave new 
force to the socio-economic, political and cultural grievances mentioned earlier, in a
188 To these levels of analysis can be added the trans-regional level of cooperation and exchange 
bringing together various regions of Western Europe, which will be examined in the final sections of 
this chapter.
189 Dayries and Dayries indicate that a 1975 meeting of the Action Regionaliste C orse (ARC1 brought
together 30,000 people, a considerable number for Corsica. J y
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major publication, Main basse sur une He [Takeover of An Island]190 (FRC, 1971). 
Regionalist rhetoric revolved around the defence of the environment against attempts 
to ‘balearise’ the island with mass tourism structures financed by non-Corsican 
capital, and significantly around the cultural and linguistic loss portrayed as 
symptomatic of a deliberate minorisation of the Corsican people. Likewise, the Action 
Regionaliste Corse (ARC) (created from a schism from the FRC in 1967) later issued 
another important manifesto, Autonomia (1974), demanding a special statute for 
Corsica. Articulating their political discourse around the thesis of internal colonialism, 
regionalist, and then autonomist or nationalist movements successfully summoned the 
concept of a Corsican nation, as inscribed in the Herderian and Fichtean approaches. 
Corsican culture and language were thus represented as the banners of Corsican 
nationhood that state policies since the Revolution had endeavoured to eradicate. This 
struck a familiar chord among the Corsican population, since earlier nationalist 
rhetoric had also used language endangerment to stand for the endangerment of the 
Corsican nation. Nationalist groups also benefited from the discrediting of the 
traditional political class - the clans, held largely responsible for the under­
development of the island - which failed to seize the language question until later in 
the 1980s, and even then only rather inconsistently and weakly (see chapter 8). The 
nationalists did not come up with a practical language revitalisation programme, yet 
they contributed to restore the symbolic significance of the language.
The political context of the island, however, became more complex after the Aleria 
crisis191 and the subsequent creation of the Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale (FLNC). 
Inspired in choosing its name by the Algerian anti-colonial FLN and claiming 
independence for Corsica, the FLNC thus went beyond the more limited claims of 
prior movements for forms of autonomy based on Corsica’s specificity within the 
Republic. This spawned a radical split in the nationalist family - between autonomists 
and clandestine separatist groups for whom the state became the enemy. For the latter 
this was the beginning of violence as a political strategy. This split also entailed 
changes in popular support for radical nationalism. The subsequent drift by some
190 My translation.
191 In 1975, the illegal practice among powerful winegrowers in the central-eastern plain of sweetening 
wine to increase productivity was denounced through the armed occupation o f a cellar in Aliria The 
State responded by sending troops and the conflict escalated causing several casualties. The Aldria 
crisis marked the beginning o f political violence and was soon followed by the creation o f the FLNC 
Political violence through bombings and killings has been endemic ever since.
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groups towards corruption and mafia-like activities in the 1980s, and the fratricidal 
murders of the 1990s, alienated many Corsicans who disapproved of nationalist anti- 
state ideology and violent methods and eroded their legitimacy. To the extent that the 
defence of the language amalgamated with nationalism, too, language activism was 
not altogether and unconditionally supported.
In the 1980s, the new Socialist regime sought to contain political and military 
activism through devolution and Corsica was granted a special status in the Republic. 
The Assemblée de Corse created in 1982 served as a laboratory for devolution laws 
and it was endowed with unheard-of, but nevertheless limited, economic, social and 
cultural prerogatives in the administration of the island (see chapter 8). However, its 
creation and ensuing mitigated success hardly appeased tensions, inter alia because it 
was seen to consolidate the power of the clans, and it was provisionally dissolved in 
1984 for lack of consensus. In the late 1980s, as violence persisted and political 
activists became increasingly fragmented into competing autonomist and 
independentist organisations which engaged in bloody conflicts with one another, 
negotiations were undertaken which led to the second Statut Particulier for Corsica in 
1991. Much wider ranging than the previous Statut, it granted the Assemblée de Corse 
increased powers in a variety of policy areas such as environment, education and
culture.
Yet, throughout the 1990s, killings between rival nationalist groups and bombings 
targeting State buildings and mainland interests in general, private and public, 
continued and climaxed. Further, the nationalist families lost much of their credit as 
proof of the corruption and mafia-like behaviours of some of their members emerged 
in parliamentary reports and was largely echoed by the press. An anonymous 
interviewee concluded that the nationalists had become lun nouveau clan, organisé en 
sous-clans' (quoted by Andréani, 1999) thus losing their position as a potential, 
reformist political alternative to the clans.
All in all, since Aléria, successive French governments have alternated strategies of 
dialogue with and repression against the nationalists, some of whom opted for 
democratic channels of political action, but to no avail. Despite nationalist electoral 
successes in the 1992 regional elections, political violence culminated with the
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murder of the French Préfet Erignac, the highest representative of the State on the 
island in 1998. A new plan for a solution to the problème corse was launched in 1999 
-  the Matignon Agreements -  but did not survive the change of government in France 
in 2002. The majority of ‘no’ answers at the 2003 referendum asking Corsicans if 
they desired more autonomy might indicate a growing disillusion with political 
autonomy as a solution to Corsica’s endemic violence and economic difficulties.
Corsica and Europeanisation: Prospects and Limitations
A growing body of European studies literature looks at Europeanisation as a method 
for conflict management, as was indicated in the concluding sections of chapter 4 (e.g. 
Daftary, 2000). This literature suggests two paths of Europeanisation: socialization, 
which includes networking, and conditionality, which refers to enlargement.
We saw in the conclusions of chapter 4 that the conditionalities attached to EU 
enlargement, especially the minority rights conditionality since 1993, may have 
consequences for the future RML-promotion strategy in the EU. I will return to that 
hypothesis in the general conclusion of the thesis. I also suggested that the EU offered 
few bridges for RML communities politically to bypass the national level in terms of 
RML promotion. Here I examine the second path mentioned above: socialization as 
networking, in which I take networking in the broad sense of economic and/or 
political and/or cultural networking. Specifically, I look at the extent to which the 
Europeanisation of Corsica has been synonymous first with direct political and 
economic support from the EU, and second with economic/political/cultural 
networking activities, and consider whether this has had a significant impact on RML 
promotion in Corsica.
As far as the EU’s political impact on Corsica may be concerned, the Collectivité 
Territoriale de Corse (CTC) has a permanent representative in Brussels whose role is 
to cascade EU information of relevance down to Corsica. I have only very recently 
been made aware of this so that, in the absence of further information, I can attempt 
no analysis of the activities of that antenna here. In theory, Corsican interests are also 
represented in the Committee of Regions created in 1994. However, we saw in 
chapter 3 that the latter has essentially consultative powers and does little more than
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emit Opinions in the few sectors about which it is consulted. Moreover, every 
member state has full discretion to choose its appointment procedure: in France 
members are appointed by the government which of course precludes the appointment 
of radical regionalists. Finally, the idea of a ‘Europe of the Regions’ is perhaps best 
embodied by the EP but, given similar selection procedures in France, it is unlikely 
that French MEPs would be appointed on a regionalist agenda, although Max Simeoni 
(a founding figure of Corsican nationalism who was in the Aleria cellar) had a seat in 
the EP between 1979 and 1994. However, we saw that the EP powers also remained 
limited. In Corsica itself, as Jaffe (1993) indicates in her analysis of Corsican attitudes 
and expectations at the dawn of 1992, the media, academic and political discourses 
displayed a mixture of hopes (that the ‘Europe of Peoples’ would bring economic 
welfare and larger political autonomous) and fears (that Corsica would find herself 
even more marginalised in a framework wider than the national framework). In 
economic terms, due to its weak economy, Corsica has been a recipient of EU 
structural funds and the management of these funds is a shared competence between 
the deconcentrated and the devolved institutions.
Most importantly for our purpose, the main impact of Europeanization and chief 
source of expected economic and political spin-offs for Corsica was its increasing 
networking activity with other European regions. At a time when membership in large 
lobbies was seen as a springboard for political influence, Corsica joined several large 
organisations. For instance Corsica is a member of the Conference for Peripheral 
Maritime Regions o f Europe (CPMRE) created in 1973 to coordinate between the 
European Commission and sixty European island regions; it also sits in the 
Association o f European Regions (AER), a political lobby organisation created in 
1985 comprising 250 regions. In 1995, it founded the IMEDOC {lies de la 
Meditterannee Occidentale) network aimed at fostering economic, social and cultural 
cooperation between Western Mediterranean Islands and, in particular, at bidding for 
funds within the framework of the INTERREG EU programme of interregional 
cooperation (e.g. bringing together Corsica, and neighbouring regions Tuscany and 
Sardegna).
The programme INTERREG funds cross-border cooperation in a number of areas and 
‘[...] aims to encourage exchanges, transfers and various types o f  cooperation
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between economic, institutional, cultural and social players, with a view to fostering 
dynamic cross-border cooperation.,m  In particular, support is provided for 
exchanges and cooperation in the fields of research, and the socio-cultural area. 
Amongst the cultural activities thus financed, a number of projects led by the Cultural 
Centre of the University of Corsica can be mentioned, e.g. the literature review 
Bonanova, various conferences and academic exchanges, cross-border projects of 
literary and/or drama creations, etc. It is through this network that Corsican been 
indirectly (i.e. not per se) promoted.
Overall, the ‘Europe of Peoples’ imagined in the late 1970s and again on the eve of 
the Maastricht Treaty as an alternative to the ‘Europe of Nations’ has not materialised 
as hoped and the main outcomes of networking have been economic - through 
cooperation funds - rather than political. Two discernible effects, trivial though they 
may seem, have been to lead ‘[...] Corsicans to compare and contrast their political 
economy with other European regions [...]’ (Jaffe, 1993: 65) and to renew cultural 
and economic links with Italy which until the 1990s were perceived ‘[...] as an elitist 
attempt to undermine both the status o f Corsican and the resources allocated to its 
teaching: (ibid: 67)192 93 To a lesser extent, Corsican autonomists have established links 
with the Sardininan autonomist party (ibid: 68).194 I will explore in chapter 8 the 
extent to which Corsica has exploited, or not, the few opportunities made available at 
supranational level, i.e. EBLUL’s activities, the EYL 2001.
Conclusion
Corsican identity, we have seen, is complex and multifaceted. This chapter has 
identified some factors - geographical and sociopolitical - that have determined a 
particular psychological mindset for Corsicans. Amongst these, I have underscored 
the dialectics of unity and diversity shaped by both Corsica’s double insularity and its
192 Information on the scope of cooperation funded under the INTERREG programme is available at 
hftp7/www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional policv/countrv/prordn/details.cfm?py PAY=FR&nv ren=Af. 
i vfrgy PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5: accessed January 5th 2005.
193 The reasons for anti-ltalianism will be made clear in chapters 7 and 9.
194 In that connection, Corsican nationalist parties also belong to the federation o f political parties 
Régions et peuples solidaires created in 1995 that lobbies for a more federalist Europe o f autonomous 
regions.
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mediterraneity, and by the uneven establishment of French rule on the island. 
Regarding the latter, a series of apparent paradoxes were mentioned which result from 
the persisting blend of traditional and modern forms of economic and socio-political 
organisation and political allegiance.
Social divisions have indeed been polarised over the past two centuries, as France was 
both a material benefactor and a tutorial authority long perceived as indifferent to the 
economic predicaments of many islanders, and even as contributing to Corsica’s 
economic and cultural decay with the complicity of certain elites. We saw that the rise 
of regionalist and subsequently nationalist forms of opposition to the dominant regime 
has largely contributed to the polarisation of political loyalty, although the case of 
clanism somehow blurs the divide between the belief in republicanism and in the rule 
of law that guarantees equal rights, on the one hand, and ancient, ingrained habits of 
political loyalty based on family ties, on the other. All this reinforces a hereditary 
inclination to wariness of external authority and suspicion against those who are in 
charge of its internal representation and implementation.
I also emphasized emigration and immigration on the island, and the consequences of 
recent urbanisation, as core determinants of that polarisation. The result today is an 
image of a Corsican society fragmented by different logics which, however, are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive: the logic of the Corsica of the villages and that of the 
cities, the regionalist and/or nationalist Corsica championing the cause of the peuple 
corse and the advocates of French legitimacy and loyalty to the Republic.
To respond to tensions created by these divisions and resolve the endemic violence 
that began in 1975, the State has granted Corsica unheard-of political autonomy since 
1982 which, in effect, has displaced poles of political loyalty back to the internal 
arena with unanticipated consequences. Part of this ‘autonomy package’ had to do 
with sociolinguistic liberalisation and devolution as we will see in chapter 8. The 
other more recent pole of autonomisation of Corsica, as the last section underscored, 
has been through the direct and indirect Europeanisation of the island. However, we 
saw that Europeanisation entailed rather few political gains and that it was more 
conspicuous through direct economic support, i.e. EU structural funds and to a lesser
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extent cross-border cultural exchanges, and through networking. So far this has 
entailed only limited direct benefits for the Corsican language.
The great absence from these prolegomena is Italy and Corsica’s italianità. This was 
briefly touched upon in the last section and, as we will see in the next chapter, 
constitutes the third explanatory, cultural pole of Corsican identity and identity 
politics. Through the evolution of the sociolinguistic situation of Corsica since its 
annexation by France, we will indeed see that although the political ties with Italy 
faded out at an early stage in the 19th century, Italy remained a cultural and linguistic 
point of reference for Corsicans well into the 20th century. This legacy and how to 
tackle it are still widely debated today, to say the least, (see chapter 9)
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Chapter 7: From one Diglnssic Situation to Another -
Ideological and Sociolinguistic Change in Modernising Corsica
(1769-1974)
In tro d u c tio n
This chapter reviews the evolution of Corsica’s sociolinguistic situation from the 
island’s annexation by France, as a preparation for a more thorough analysis of the 
cultural and linguistic revival from the 1970s and its contemporary consequences. In 
this chapter, I show how the diglossic conceptions of language, identity, and their 
interrelation first emerged in Corsica. Its main aim is to describe how the various 
political and linguistic ideologies shaping Corsicans’ cultural and linguistic identities 
and informing current language debates and attitudes to language planning were 
progressively constructed and distilled beween 1769 and 1974, who the actors 
involved in ideological struggle were and the nature and scope of their respective 
glottopolitical powers.
To do this, I explore a number of related sociolinguistic issues. Specifically, I analyse 
changes in the functional status of Corsican within evolving diglossic frameworks - 
first Corsican-Italian, then Corsican-French - before Corsican benefited from the 
language-ln-education policies developed since the 1970s. This description of the 
evolution of diglossic functional compartmentalization is predicated on the complex 
links outlined in chapter I between competing conceptions of what a ‘language’ (as 
opposed to a dialect) is - i.e. the link between the status of a language, its use in 
writing and its degree of codification - and antagonistic political theories of the 
nation, i.e. the civic versus the cultural nation, and I show that the Corsican case 
presents a situation where ‘cultural nationalisms can [...] be seen as contrapuntal to 
political nationalism: (May, 2001: 78) I will examine the practical response that 
Corsican Sociolinguists have given to the language planning problems resulting from 
the dichotomies created by the diglossic model of language and identity in chapter 9
200
A critical exploration of the sociolinguistic concept of diglossia was made in chapter 
1. Following Martin-Jones (1989) and Williams (1992), I argued that the synchronic 
structural-functional approach underlying its use as an analytical concept does not 
satisfactorily account for the complex issues of historical construction and distribution 
of sociolinguistic power which are fundamental features of nation-building processes. 
Consequently, I claimed that socio-historical approaches to language maintenance, 
language shift and bilingualism provide a better understanding of how linguistic 
ideologies and language policy measures interplay with the construction of state- 
national socio-political structures. Notwithstanding, I also indicated that diglossia 
constitutes a useful snapshot device of sociolinguistic situations of dominance. It is in 
that sense that I use the concept here: I outline the processes of domination that lead 
to the establishment of diglossic political economies of language, and I use diglossia 
as a convenient shorthand.
I first briefly examine the Corsican sociolinguistic situation before annexation to 
France, and then explore in greater detail the paths followed by the French 
administrators of the island throughout the nineteenth century to achieve political and 
cultural assimilation, inter alia through linguistic acculturation. I argue that this 
assimilation was long delayed due both to the discrepancy delineated in chapter 5 
between French nationalist rhetoric and actual language policy measures and to the 
ongoing vitality of a number of fronts of resistance to French rule and acculturation. 
In the context of Corsica’s dire economic, demographic and sociocultural situations 
towards the end of the nineteenth centuiy, evoked in the previous chapter, I 
investigate the rise of Corsican regionalist and nationalist movements during the 
Third Republic (1870-1939) as a political alternative to French nationalist ideology 
and its homogenising policies. I argue that these movements of resistance to French 
hegemony, however, further increased endemic social and geopolitical divisions 
amongst Corsicans and I investigate the role of language in the maturation and 
fragmentation of these movements. I conclude with an account of Corsican language 
activism after WWII as the result of the exclusion of Corsican from the provisions of 
the 1951 Deixonne Law, which contributed to the rebirth of cultural regionalism and 
its political radicalisation in the mid-1970s.
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Corsican-Italian Diglossia
Corsica was under peninsular influence since the early eleventh century, first under 
Pisan rule and then, between the thirteenth and eighteenth century, under Genoese 
rule until France acquired it in 1768. The Tuscanisation of elite milieux thus started at 
an early stage, as even under Genoese domination Tuscan was widely adopted as the 
language of culture and administration in the peninsula and within the whole 
geographical area under its influence (Dalberra-Stefanaggi, 2002: 12). Its prevalence 
was reinforced as it became the vehicle of a prestigious body of literature, both 
written and oral, that gained immense cultural prestige at the European level as the 
channel of the Italian literary Renaissance (De Mauro, 1963; Migliorini, 1966).
At first sight, the Corsican sociolinguistic situation at the time of annexation, before 
French came onto the sociolinguistic stage, seemed to fit quite neatly within the 
contours of Ferguson’s model discussed in chapter 1. The High variety, Tuscan, was 
the language of culture and Letters, (elite) education, religion, the press, law and 
administration, superposed on a range of oral varieties (Marchetti, 1989: 66-93). 
These were the vehicles of the intimate, of social memory, popular wisdom and rural 
religious practice, and thus mediated traditional forms of social and cultural 
communication in inner Corsica, including some forms of oral literacy and religious 
practice (Marchetti, ibid: 77; Arrighi, 2002: 49-54). The diglossic framework of 
complementary distribution of this period can be seen as stable for a number of 
reasons, but a closer look at the Corsican situation also illustrates some of the 
conceptual and methodological limitations of this framework.
After centuries of coexistence punctuated by regular economic, cultural and linguistic 
exchanges (especially between Bastía, the capital, and Tuscany), and due to the 
original linguistic kinship between Corsican varieties and their peninsular cousins 
within the Italo-Romance dialect continuum, the Corsican varieties spoken by the 
masses were perceived as dialects of Tuscan. On rare occasions when diglossic 
domains of use were ‘trespassed’, e.g. the low variety used in written productions, this 
was clearly marked as exceptional. Salvatore Viale’s U Serinatu di Scapinu (1817),
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one of the early traces of a written use of Corsican, consists of eleven lines inserted 
into a long poem in Tuscan when he stages a shepherd. It was part of the Romantic 
interest in popular culture that, however, represented no immediate challenge to the 
diglossie order. By contrast, travellers visiting Corsica well into the twentieth century 
reported on shepherds reciting great sixteenth-century Tuscan poetry from memory, 
which testifies to the enduring presence of oral forms of literacy characteristic of 
Mediterranean societies inter alia (Marchetti, 1989: 68-69)195.
The oppositional values given to the written and the oral, in Ferguson’s diglossic 
model, fail to account for the prestige of profane and religious forms of literacy 
transmitted orally - oral literature - rather than through formal, writing-based school 
education. This also points to the importance of linguistic kinship between Corsican 
dialects and Tuscan, which facilitated access to prestigious forms without the 
mediation of schooling. As was suggested in the discussion of diglossia in chapter 1, 
in a diglossic situation where varieties are perceived as akin and therefore where there 
exists some measure of societal bilingualism, the conflict between the varieties is 
significantly toned down or at least less pregnant or visible. This calls for a discussion 
of the community’s language repertoire.
Discussing the language repertoire of Corsicans, Thiers (1989) and Jaffe (1999) warn 
of the discrepancy between perception and representation of language use and actual 
language use, claiming that self-assessments of Tuscan/Italian proficiency cannot be 
taken as indicators of language performance, because of the linguistic kinship 
between Corsican dialects and Tuscan/Italian. Indeed, linguistic kinship allowed 
‘tapping into’ the High variety when the context demanded it, but no data can 
conclusively document the extent to which actual speech resulted in consistently 
switching between clearly differentiated varieties rather than in mixing codes. In her 
recent ethnographic research, Jaffe indeed observes that inserting certain linguistic 
markers of Italian in their speech in Corsican sufficed for some speakers to qualify it 
as Italian (Jaffe, ibid: 73). This recent observation certainly bears the mark of time as 
during the pre-French period, Corsicans were quantitatively more exposed to
1951 will return to the ingrained cultural presence of orality and to its consequences with regard to 
popular responses to language planning in the following chapter.
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Tuscan/Italian, and also the kind of Italian to which they were exposed was not yet 
modem Italian as it exists today, which is more remote from Corsican dialects (and 
Tuscan) than it was some two hundred years ago. In that connection, it is interesting 
to note the multiple accounts of the linguistic closeness of Corsican dialects and pre­
modern Tuscan/Italian, which led many observers to claim that Corsican was ‘the 
purest dialect of Italian’ (Marchetti, 1989). This is not surprising as Tuscan served as 
the basis for modern Italian (De Mauro, 1963).
A tentative typology by Coco (1977) distinguishes between four levels of the lingua 
materna: literary Italian (written), regional Italian (used orally in Corsica in formal 
contexts and tinged with Corsicanisms), the regional dialects (distinguishing between 
northern and southern Corsican dialect families) and the range of local dialects 
(spoken in a limited geographical area like the village). Yet, this typology, 
analytically convenient though it may be, only offers a coarse-grained photograph of 
actual variation and its broad assumption of the bounded-ness of linguistic systems 
fails to account for actual patterns of language use. As was indicated above, the 
diglossic model suffers from the same defect: it fails to encompass mixed codes that 
make up people’s language repertoires in situations of language contact.
Nevertheless, on balance, one can speculate that the situation was a long one of 
diglossia with broad societal bilingualism or rather, uneven patterns of individual 
bilingualism, since it is difficult to measure a posteriori how proficient in (what 
register of?) Tuscan/Italian ‘uneducated’ Corsicans were, and impossible to draw 
quantitative conclusions. Ettori offers a simplified picture: ‘[...] le notable parlait 
corse et le berger n'ignorait pas l ’italien, même s ’il n ’en usait pas, du moins dans le 
quotidien.’ (1981: 17-18) The majority did not have a command of written literary 
Italian, and their knowledge o f ‘regional Italian’ as defined above - passive or active - 
varied across individuals. Notwithstanding, linguistic kinship with Italian was 
important and proficiency in French nonexistent. In that sense, the Corsican- 
Tuscan/Italian diglossic order was certainly not the most blatant mirror of social 
inequalities and, importantly, no apparent danger to social cohesion.
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Finally there is a third major reason, more socio-political than strictly linguistic, that 
explains diglossic stability during that period. Under the umbrella of Tuscan, and in 
part because isolation largely remained the rule for the vast majority of Corsicans, 
Corsican varieties were not perceived as endangered, as they would be with the 
advent of French socio-political structures and their sociolinguistic correlate and 
instrument, French linguistic ideology and policies of monolingualism. While the two 
varieties were seen as one language and crucially, in the absence of a centralising 
project including the politicisation and uniformisation of the social body and of 
language use, no attempt was made to eradicate speech varieties'96. With a dominant 
language like French, linguistically remote (thus unintelligible) and belonging to a 
different political and cultural tradition, most Corsicans were de facto excluded from 
nascent power structures, and through the aggressive homogenising policies of French 
nation-builders, the demise of Italian and Corsican, henceforth on the French agenda, 
threatened the cultural equilibrium of Corsican society.
In sum, with the beginning of Frenchification, an altogether different diglossic 
framework was to emerge. In the long term, in the process of Italian nation-building, 
one can conjecture that Corsican would probably have been partially absorbed into 
Italian too, as Italian would have become the linguistic referent for upward social 
mobility, but Italian gradually lost crucial domains of use to French before this could 
happen196 97. As Thiers puts it:
Si le toscan exerçait son hégémonie, le français agit par glottophagie. Dans 
les deux cas la menace est importante car, pour le dire avec les terribles 
métaphores conventionnelles, l ’un étouffe tandis que Vautre dévore! (1989: 
55)198
196 Thus, Paoli’s ‘failure’ to include a national language among the various symbolic attributes o f his 
state-national project mentioned in chapter 6 makes more sense. In a context where Tuscan/Italian was 
not yet the language o f another state, conserving Tuscan as the national language did not compromise 
ambitions o f  political independence and Tuscan represented no linguistic exclusion o f Corsican masses.
197 Also, the linguistic ideologies o f  the two countries and the respective states’ management o f
multilingualism are in sharp contrast. b
198 What is assumed in this view is that Corsican varieties and Tuscan were different languages which 
itself is an ideological position which I will return too in the last chapter.
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Following Calvet’s model of linguistic colonialism (1974), the next section illustrates 
the phases of the gradual demise of Italian and its concomitant replacement by 
French, spanning from the French Revolution to broadly speaking WWII.
Corsicon-Itolion Diylossici versus Corsican-French Diglossio? From He^ewiony to 
Glottophagy
Calvet distinguishes between three phases of linguistic colonisation: first, the colonial 
language penetrates through the settlement of soldiers, administrators and merchants, 
essentially in urban contexts; then the acculturation of collaborative local elites eager 
to secure positions in new power structures begins. In the mid- or long-term, this 
results in a double exclusion: of both the local language and of its speakers from 
power spheres. This first phase is characterised by the monolingualism of colonial 
elites, local (urban) elite bilingualism, and popular monolingualism in the dominated 
language. Different patterns of language use thus serve to consolidate social 
differentiations.
In the second phase, the dominant language permeates the lower urban classes who 
become bilingual, thus sharpening the contrast between urban dwellers and rural 
masses, the latter initially remaining monolingual. In addition to the political and 
economic incentives to acquire the dominant language, this second phase is catalysed 
by a whole array of language policies and plans aiming at diffusing the dominant 
language in administration, courts, schools, and in more recent times, the press, radio 
and television. This second phase reinforces the diglossic functional distribution and 
sees language attitudes change in opposite directions: whereas the dominant language 
gains increasing prestige among lower social strata, dominated varieties are 
progressively devalued, eventually by their own speakers too, as was seen above. 
Ultimately, the elites may end up monolingual in the dominant language whilst first 
urban and then rural masses gradually become bilingual. This phase, extending over 
various lengths of time in different contexts, also sees the emergence of contact- 
induced mixed codes amongst the less educated masses whose linguistic acculturation 
remains incomplete.
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The third and final phase is that of completed, successful glottophagy in which the 
dominant language has totally eradicated dominated varieties, but this situation 
remains rare because pockets of resistance typically thwart complete glottophagy.
In what follows, I will assess the evolution of the sociolinguistic situation in Corsica 
using this broad model, pointing to the specificity of the Corsican situation, with the 
ultimate aim to glimpse Corsicans’ language repertoires at the eve of the language 
revival processes of the 1970s.
In the initial phases of the conquest of Corsica, French planners aimed at dethroning 
Italian to foster Corsican elites, and what the masses spoke mattered little. The 
process was then slow due to the interplay of three factors. Firstly, the penetration of 
French into the inner circles of Corsican society was significantly delayed until the 
late nineteenth century due to the dichotomy between the French rhetoric of mass 
political integration and cultural assimilation and actual institutional and policy 
measures on the island (see pp. 147-149). Secondly, Corsican society remained 
largely anchored within Italy’s socio-cultural sphere. Finally, as was illustrated in the 
preceding chapter, most Corsicans were remote from outer and urban influences and 
therefore preserved traditional rural ways of living in which Corsican long remained 
dominant and unchallenged.
Diglossic Conflict: French or Italian? Language Shift and Language Maintenance in 
Corsica till the Third Republic
At the time of annexation, only a minute proportion of Corsicans knew French. The 
beginning of the language plan of assimilation of the island is usually located at the 
time of the Revolution although premises of a policy of Frenchification can be found 
under the Ancien Régime. The initial plans only targeted Corsican elites, not the 
masses, and provided for them to attend French schools or seminaries before they 
could come back and rule over the masses whilst remaining subordinated to France 
(Marchetti, 1989: 100-105). During the Revolution, as was seen in chapter 5, no 
significant measures were actually taken and the first important status change
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occurred in 1804, when it was decreed that the command of French would henceforth 
be a condition for a position in French institutions and administrative structures. It 
was also noted that this requirement was less drastically worded in Corsica than 
elsewhere. These efforts initially had little effect on Corsican elites. Various reports 
from the 1820s by French civil servants on the island indeed indicate the slow rate of 
penetration of French fifty years after annexation. Inspector of Public Education 
Mourre thus testifies:
Voilà l ’état de la Corse en 1818 relativement à la langue française et 
cinquante ans après la réunion de cette île à la France; les avocats plaidant 
en italien, la plupart des notaires passent leurs actes dans cette langue, les 
autres les rédigeant en un français barbare, les administrations obligées de 
tenir leur correspondance dans les deux langues, ce qui double le travail et les 
frais de bureau; très peu de maires, de juges de paix, encore moins de 
fonctionnaires ecclésiastiques qui sachent écrire le français, et quelques 
centaines tout au plus d ’individus en état de le parler [...] (quoted by 
Marchetti, ibid: 110)
The situation changed somewhat more rapidly after 1818 when a number of schools 
opened where French was taught, but in a way that only sharpened the urban-rural 
contrast. A Calvi official observed in 1822: ‘Je ne crois pas me tromper en avançant 
que, dans aucune école de village, on n ’enseigne la langue nationale Dans les 
villes aussi, la grande masse des habitants demeurent réfractaire au français.' 
(Marchetti, ibid: 110-111) Thiers’ studyontheFrenchificationofthe island in the 19th 
century nevertheless shows that during the 1814-1830 period, the use of French did 
progress in education and religious settings, especially through the successive actions 
of Education Inspectors Mourre (1817-1821) and Cottard (1821-1827) (Thiers, 1977). 
Yet, Arrighi recalls, in 1829 there were still as many schools teaching in Italian as in 
French (2002: 59). State education in French was still to be generalised and become 
secular and popular education by clergymen in Corsican and Italian was to be 
undermined.
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In administration and justice, French did not make great strides but through the 
development of the aforementioned public employment policy it eventually slowly 
penetrated domains of use hitherto exclusively occupied by Italian-speaking clerks 
(Calvet’s second phase) (Fusina, 1994: 32). In justice, a 1777 decision had made 
French compulsory in higher courts and tolerated Italian in lower, ‘police’ courts. As 
illustrated above, by the 1820s, some lawyers and notaries had opted for French. An 
1833 judgement set a precedent abrogating legal bilingualism and thus consecrated 
the exclusive use of French, making Italian judgements invalid (quoted by Marchetti, 
1989: 113-114). This decision was forcefully reasserted by the Cour de Cassation in 
1859 that declared: ‘7/ n ’y  a aucune distinction a faire entre la Corse et les autres 
portions du territoire.’ (Grau, 1992: 96)
These policies were not always passively accepted. Several fronts of resistance can be 
mentioned. Some elites still largely connected to Italy carried on sending their 
children to Italy to study despite the 1803 decree on the invalidity of diplomas not 
obtained from a French University, and the attachment of Corsica to the University of 
Aix-en-Provence in 1814. Beretti (1990: 14) reports that around the early 1830s, 
Corsican students still made up a quarter of Pisa University’s student population. 
Corsican departmental authorities also resisted Mourre’s efforts to multiply the 
number of schools teaching French only (Thiers, 1977). In religious practice, bilingual 
editions of ‘manuals’ for catechism did not manage to supplant Italian ones, and 
testimonies report the use of Italian in homilies until the 1930s (Monti, 1982: 166; 
quoted by Fusina, 1994: 38). In literature, the first half of the century saw the 
production of acclaimed works in Tuscan, under the impetus of Corsican (e.g. Viale, 
1817) and Italian (e.g. Tommaseo, 1841) intellectuals, while island literary production 
in French was long non-existent, and when it appeared it was deemed of mediocre 
quality. In that connection, in 1858, Viale’s Dell’uso della linguapatria in Corsica 
[Of the use of the fatherland language in Corsica]199 condemned the negative effects 
of the switch to French in literature (denouncing the ‘literary sterility’ of those 
Corsicans who attempted to switch to French for literary writing), justice (i.e. the 
promotion of language competence to the detriment of professional value)200,
199 My translation.
200 Viale was a lawyer in Bastia from 1817.
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education, etc. More widely, he denounced the danger, intrinsic to the French policy 
of cultural and linguistic assimilation, of debilitating Corsicans as they were slowly 
deprived from their cultura materna even though cultural contacts with the peninsula 
remained frequent (Marchetti, 1989: 116-119). Literature in particular remained one 
of the few domains, with rural religious practice, where the Corsican-Tuscan diglossie 
coupling was maintained until the twentieth century but the number of Italian-medium 
authors declined during the second half of the century.
By the mid-nineteenth centuiy, French had been successful in gradually displacing 
Italian in a number of official domains. Through official bilingual policies first, and 
then through progressively exclusive monolingualism in French, the French presence 
had become more tangible in administrations, schools and courts, and increasing 
numbers of Corsican elites embraced French as a springboard for social promotion. 
With the Second Empire (1852-1870), the pace of Frenchification greatly accelerated 
as Napoleon Ill’s policy of assimilation of Corsica targeted larger layers of the 
population, hinging on the attribution of positions and employment in both national 
and colonial administrations, justice and political life.
This acculturation was however very uneven and sharpened divisions among 
Corsicans, along patterns of residency (rural/urban) and to some extent social lines 
(popular/elites) even though cultural elites were divided and some still hesitated 
between France and Italy (Ettori, 1980). If many urban elites had been convinced to 
foster French for written social communication, in villages where orality still very 
largely dominated social interactions, the demise of written Italian little affected 
traditional Corsican language use. In cities, though, the downfall of Italian in the 
public sphere closed the door to job opportunities in the developing administrative 
apparatus, which created new incentives to learn French. In 1854, a traveller observed 
that:
Le gouvernement fait de grands efforts pour remplacer le français par 
l ’italien; tous les Corses instruits parlent le français [...] La mode, 
l ’ambition, la nécessité poussent tout le monde à l'apprendre. [...] La langue
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française est fort répandue dans les villes mais les gens du peuple ne parlent 
qu ’italien, même s ’ils connaissent le français. La nouvelle langue n 'a pas du 
tout pénétré dans les vallées profondes. (Gregorovius, 1854; quoted by 
Marchetti, 1989: 115)201
Adapting Fasold (1984: 48-49), the resulting situation can be seen as one of 
embedded polyglossia between three languages: French was becoming the exclusive 
official language, Italian largely remained the language of written cultural production 
and religious practice and most rural Corsicans remained ‘monolingual’ in Corsican. 
The conflict had initially opposed French to Italian for hegemony in official domains, 
taking little account of what people spoke. With Italian on its way out except 
somewhat in the cultural and religious domains, Corsican varieties were to be the next 
main targets of French mono-cultural/monolingual ideology, and after the first phase 
of assimilation, targeting the upper classes and urban population, the second phase 
aimed for inner, rural Corsica.
As was seen in chapters 1 and 5, French strategy included several dimensions, 
ideological and practical. On the ideological side, the aforementioned revolutionary 
dialectics of praise and vilification were re-actualised with the diffusion of the label 
patois and its luggage of derogatory connotations (for examples of the pejorative use 
of the term in the context of Occitan, see Lafont, 1977 and Gardy, 1978; both cited in 
Martin-Jones, 1989: 120). On the more practical side, the blooming institutional and 
colonial structures offered material reward to those who would command French and 
the school system was to prepare Corsicans to seize these new opportunities: French 
became la langue du pain. On Corsica, integration was fostered by allocating 
administrative positions to Corsicans through clanic networks, rather than through a 
genuine project of economic development, but these positions were limited: many had 
to leave the island and those who stayed and did not obtain administrative positions 
grew embittered.
201 Press production also indicates the rate of penetration o f French. Poggioli (1971) shows that o f  the 
newspapers existing before 1865 still published after, 3 are in French and only 1 in Italian. From 1880, 
only French remains.
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Chapter 6 indicated that although a significant proportion of the population living on 
the island felt abandoned by central authorities, many others had embraced French 
rule and its socio-economic promises. Incentives were particularly abundant in 
Corsica since, as we have seen, the assimilation strategy largely rested on the 
allocation of positions in the public sector, for which the knowledge of French was a 
pre-requisite. This resulted in exacerbated social divisions amongst the Corsican 
people: whilst an ever-wider proportion of the population endorsed cultural and 
language shift, those feeling deprived of the socio-economic benefits associated with 
French dominance and betrayed by certain leaders found a new forum in the nascent 
regionalist protest movement. The next section sketches the ideological basis of that 
movement and the symbolic and practical role of the Corsican language therein.
Corsican Regionalism and the Language Question
I argued in chapter 5 that one of the origins of regionalist movements in various 
regions of France can be traced back to Romantic interest in popular cultures, 
literatures and oraluures that developed in Western Europe in the nineteenth 
century202. This influential movement for cultural revivalism granted renewed prestige 
- as in the Felibrige movement in Provence (Fusina. 1994), sometimes catalysing or 
accompanying the growth of sub-state cultural nationalism as in Catalonia (Conversi, 
1997; Mar-Molinero, 2000: chapter 3) - to regional cultures and languages. Although 
that movement did not always have political motives and echoes, as in Corsica, it 
allotted prestige to popular cultural production that dominant ‘colonial' ideologies 
were at pains to devalue. It also paved the way for later more radical forms of 
nationalism o f the Fichtean type, in which nationalist mobilising ideology, and in 
particular the conceptualisation of national identity, rested on the idea that nations are
202 For a genealogy o f Romantic interests in popular arts and culture, see for example Belmont (1975) 
and Ozouf (1981), both cited in Bernard (2004). Similar efforts to retrieve, translate and thus preserve 
oral tradition existed in other countries. A pioneering work in that genre is James McPherson’ s 
Fragments o f  Ancient Poetry, collected in the Highlands o f Scotland and translated from the Gaelic or 
Erse Language (1760) (for more details see Thiesse, 1999: 23-28)
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primarily defined by an inherited community of culture and language (see chapter 1). 
In some cases, this led to claims for statehood, in others it did not.203
In Corsica, arguably, intellectuals such as Viale and Tommaseo paved the way to 
cultural politics, albeit unintentionally. Towards the turn of the century, this 
essentialist form of cultural nationalism was re-actualised by members of the 
intellectual elite still culturally attached to Italy, who strongly resented the cultural 
void engineered by French language shift strategies as a threat to their national and 
intellectual identity, especially as literary production in Italian disappeared at the turn 
of the century. Thence, many promoted Corsican to fill the cultural and identity gap.
In that connection, the pioneer, seminal journal was Santu Casanova’s A Tramuntana 
(Marchetti, 1989: 95-98). Published between 1896 and 1914, exclusively in Corsican, 
it voiced these feelings of dissatisfaction, denouncing the derelict condition of the 
island and the minorisation of the Corsican people through ‘forced’ emigration, and 
the responsibility of clans therein. It enjoyed great popular success. This unheard-of 
use of the language heralded the birth of Corsican regionalism and later nationalism 
and the sociolinguistic individuation of Corsican, notably its nascent codification and 
elaboration and growing use in writing, and accelerated the demise of the Corsican- 
Italian diglossic couple. One outcome of this demise was the publication of the first 
dictionary of Corsican in 19 1 5204.
In 1914, A Tramuntana was succeeded by the journal A Cispra, created by two 
schoolmasters, but its publication was interrupted by the war. Its one issue was 
however important as it advocated political autonomy, thus vesting the Corsican 
language with a new political symbolism in the Fichtean tradition. As the authors put 
it; lLa Corse n'est pas un département français, mais une nation vaincue qui va 
renaître.’ (Quoted by Arrighi, 2002: 66) Advocating the maximum distantiation from
m  For a synthesis o f  the phases o f cultural nationalism, see Hroch’s influential model (Hroch, 1985; 
cited by Hobsbawm, 1990: 103-104).
204 However, the chosen variety was very much based on northern dialectal varieties, which was later to 
undermine its representativity and its acceptance as the norm (see below and next chapter).
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Italian, they sought to promote Corsican language production in its own right along 
the federalist lines of the Felibrige movement: the nation must be reborn through its 
literary maturation.
In the interwar period, two competing reviews shared the heritage of A Cispra, A 
Muvra and L ’Annu Corsu, respectively created in 1920 and 1923, and they 
disappeared at the dawn of WWII (Yvia-Croce, 1979). Almost entirely published in 
Corsican for nineteen years, they produced two contrapuntal political discourses. The 
former advocated political autonomy and demanded that Corsican culture and 
language be taught in schools, as a natural right of the Corsican nation, taking 
Tuscan/Italian as its natural linguistic reference point205. The latter’s discourse 
responded to the growing nationalist orientation of the former and the perception that 
some collaborators to A Muvra were even tempted by fascist irredentism and 
separatism. Initially bilingual in Corsican and French and then increasingly in French 
so that it eventually changed its name to L ’Année Corse (1937), it channelled a more 
moderate, regionalist discourse asserting the need to acknowledge and bolster 
Corsica’s cultural individuality but ‘[...] en tant que province de la Grande Patrie’ 
(Arrighi, 2002: 68). On the question of Corsican language education, it also distanced 
itself from the Muvrist demand for Corsican teaching per se on the ground that 
Corsican remained insufficiently codified (Paul Arrighi, in L ’annu Corsu, 1924:228).
All these journals had an important role, both symbolically and in terms of language 
elaboration: through the multiplication of Corsican-medium journalistic writings and 
literary works, they propelled Corsican into functional domains whence it had hitherto 
been excluded, thereby prefiguring the new Corsican-French diglossic coupling in 
which Corsican was to gain a new status as a written language. Importantly, they 
diffused the various contending discourses circulating on the island: discourses on the 
Corsican nation and its political recognition within the French ensemble, and 
corresponding discourses on the Corsican language. As to the latter, they established
205 This movement echoed a number o f similar movements in other regions in the aftermath o f the war 
as the project o f  reconstruction re-actualised the revolutionary debates between federalist and Jacobin 
conceptions o f the nation state (for an account of such movements in Brittany, see Fusina’s account! 
(Fusina: 1994:78-81) '
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the foundations of the discourses on language later forcefully re-actualised by 
Corsican political and language activists during the 1970s’ revival (see next chapter). 
These foundations concerned both the status of Corsican as the core feature of 
Corsican nationhood and, in the Muvrist discourse, the related demand for its 
teaching, and various attitudes to the language itself. In particular, voices urged its 
codification (through grammar and dictionaries) and further linguistic elaboration 
(through written production). In that connection, opinions diverged on the 
instrumentalisation of its linguistic kinship to Italian: keeping Italian as the referent or 
advocating maximum distanciation. Also, some expressed the concerns to keep 
Corsican ‘pure’ and untouched by linguistic interference from French in a context 
where such interference was increasing as French was acquired by greater numbers.
Between the 1920s’ early regionalist activism and the 1970s’ political and cultural 
revival, the defence of the Corsican language and culture was for some time 
suspended, for several reasons. Beside the Iinks/amalgamation between Corsican 
language activism and political separatism, largely echoed by the pro-French press, 
there were ongoing perceptions that Corsican was still a dialect of Italian and 
insufficiently codified and that its teaching could even hinder the learning of 
French.206 This bears witness to the fact that pedagogical debates on the advantages of 
using it as an auxiliary language largely remained confined to intellectual circles. For 
some time after WWII, as Fusina points out, island socio-economic and political 
issues were also deemed more central than the defence of the local cultures and 
languages: the economic and infra-structural development of the island, the 
reconfiguration of the island’s political leadership, etc (Fusina, 1994).
When regional language activism in other regions, parliamentary lobbying and 
pedagogical debates eventually culminated in the 1951 Deixonne Law on the 
‘teaching of local languages and dialects’, Corsican remained outside its scope (until 
its 1974 extension) (Poignant, 1998). If the Deixonne Law reflected a more tolerant 
attitude from the central state towards regional languages, authorising their teaching
206 This last aspect was particularly significant, as the social basis o f  the partisans o f  French rule had 
considerably widened after the two wars.
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on a voluntary basis outside the normal curriculum, it was arguably more 
assimilation- than maintenance-oriented (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1994: 79- 
85)207. Discrimination against Corsican triggered little immediate protest, which 
indicates the deep rooted-ness of the aforementioned political, sociolinguistic and 
pedagogical arguments against its teaching per sc208.
Yet, cultural demands did re-emerge again in the mid-1950s, channelled by new 
regionalist reviews, e.g. U Muntese (1955), and associations, e.g. Parlemu corsu 
[Let’s speak Corsican] (1953) and Lingua corsa (1956) leading a ‘Holy Crusade’ [A 
Santa Cruciata]. Counting amongst their members former central figures from A 
Muvra and L ’Annu corsu, these associations reiterated previous status demands but in 
a somewhat more radical manner, calling for mandatory Corsican language education:
[...] [nous demandons que] la langue corse soit enseignée officiellement dans 
l ’enseignement secondaire au titre de seconde langue, facultative hors de l ’île, 
obligatoire dans l ’île, valable pour l ’obtention des titres et des diplômes. (U 
Muntese, 1959: No 51 ; quoted in Fusina, 1994 : 118) (Original emphasis)
Similarly, the Statutes of Lingua Corsa included inter alia the following founding 
objectives:
- Maintenir, ordonner et illustrer la langue corse écrite et parlée;
- Poursuivre l ’élaboration d ’une grammaire et d ’un dictionnaire pour 
assurer la pérennité de la langue corse;
- Cultiver et encourager la littérature corse [...] (quoted in Fusina, 1994: 
123)
207 Besides, its application decrees were delayed until the mid-/Iate-I960s (Fusina, 1994- 1 5 1 )
208 Regarding the political argument though, the involvement o f Corsicans in the Resistance and the
symbolic self-liberation o f the island from the occupiers in 1943 eventually eclipsed suspicions o f  
political separatism. '
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Moreover, activists also re-engaged in reflection around the desirability of language 
unification: ‘[l’association] tentera de dégager de î ’actuelpolymorphisme desparlers 
de l ’île, les principes permanents aptes à régir une enrichissante et féconde 
unification des différents parlers c o r s e s (ibid: 124). The latter dialectical approach 
to unity and diversity (see also the implicit conflict between the first two objectives 
above) later proved to be a divisive issue amongst activists, as we will see in the next 
chapter.
Notwithstanding, the activism of the 1950s, however confined within small circles 
initially, ensured the continuity of language-related demands between the pioneers 
and the 1970s generation in a context where post-WWII language shift knew 
unprecedented impetus. It also heralded the emergence of academic language activism 
and research from the late 1950s, the trans-regional networking of the language 
activists from various regional language communities in the early 1960s and, finally, 
the relative mobilisation of island parliamentarians on the language status question, 
(ibid, 128-142)
By the late 1960s, in addition to more economic reasons, the regionalist discourses on 
culture, language and nation eventually attracted more supporters, the more so as the 
discourse of endangerment of the Corsican nation became more acutely felt due to 
mass emigration and economic backwardness. The question of cultural and language 
loss then became the banner of socio-political protesters, and popular mobilisation 
ultimately catalysed the institutionalisation of Corsican language education under the 
aegis o f the Deixonne Law, auguring new language debates and practical problems.
Conclusion
This chapter has delineated the long process of acculturation whereby the Corsican- 
Tuscan diglossie couple eventually yielded to the Corsican-French diglossie order, 
after a transitional period that saw Corsican varieties, Tuscan/Italian and French in 
complex polyglossic interrelations. That gradual process, catalysed by slow state-
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nation building and uneven socio-economic and socio-political developments, led to 
the polarisation of competing theories of the nation: ‘cultural’ versus ‘civic’. 
Concomitantly, the hegemonisation of the French language over Tuscan/Italian and 
the spread of French linguistic ideology was paralleled by the nascent, resistant 
individuation of the Corsican language amongst intellectual circles. This initially 
cultural form of resistance eventually served to cement alternative patterns of political 
loyalty towards the re-bom Corsican nation but remained significantly confined 
within intellectual circles, whilst patterns of mass language shift attest to the 
entrenchment of dominant French discourses on the nation and language. 
Notwithstanding, to draw on Cal vet’s model again (1974 and 2002), glottophagy was 
not completed and the resulting unfinished acculturation of the island paved the way 
for new forms of plural and/or mixed identities and, in some milieus, collective 
support for cultural regionalism and regional language activism after WWII and even 
more forcefully from the 1970s.
From a sociolinguistic viewpoint, the outcomes of these acculturation processes 
resulted in important changes in the language repertoires of Corsicans. Tuscan/Italian 
exited the stage as the cultural and literary reference idiom, and French colonised 
public spheres and largely permeated the private domain, undermining the family 
transmission of Corsican. The sociolinguistic situation between the 1920s and the 
1970s varied greatly in one crucial respect: in the 1920s, all Corsicans spoke Corsican 
and it was still largely family transmitted, even if signs of language shift within the 
family cell could be detected as French became the dominant language of power and 
as the Great War boosted sentiments of patriotism. In the 1970s, family transmission 
was much weaker, and the percentage of immigrants residing on the island - both 
continental and foreign - who were monolingual in French was higher. During the 
former period, Corsican speakers largely outnumbered French speakers although 
many were becoming bilingual; during the latter, it was the reverse: perceptions of 
language endangerment were more salient whilst surviving, ‘minoritised’ Corsican 
varieties were also vested with new identity garments. Finally, mixed codes resulting 
from contacts between French and Corsican varieties had progressively emerged as 
new linguistic resources (see chapter 9).
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In terms of language attitudes, the discursive dichotomisation between the French 
language and the Corsican dialects, still largely geographically fragmented and un­
codified in the 1970s, reflected the successful hegemonisation of French linguistic 
ideology even amongst activists, i.e. the mutually constitutive relations between 
language prestige, the level of codification and language formalism, and literary 
production. Within that diglossie language ideological framework, Corsican varieties 
were inevitably stigmatised and relegated to a position of lesser prestige and value. By 
the time the Deixonne Law was extended to Corsican in 1974, this set of language 
values had become a central issue to tackle for the Corsican language activists 
undertaking to prevent the death of the Corsican language and nation. Yet, these 
values and the dominant discourses underpinning them were not fully endorsed and 
unquestioned by Corsican language activists and planners, nor by the layers of the 
population still speaking Corsican varieties, and alternative discourses on the 
symbolic value of Corsican, and on the language itself, gradually made their way into 
language decision-making circles from the 1980s.
The next chapter focuses on the institutionalisation of the Corsican language and the 
concomitant rise of a Corsican language policy network after a period of ‘semi- 
anarchic’ language planning from 1974.
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Chapter 8: Language Institutionalisation in Contemporary Corsica
(1974-2004)
Introduction
In this chapter and the next, the focus is on Corsica’s contemporary sociolinguistic 
situation. This chapter thus aims to scrutinise the ways in which the Corsican 
language was eventually admitted within the scope of the Deixonne Law in 1974 and 
then institutionalised, to reconstitute the Corsican language policy network that 
emerged from the progressive institutionalisation of Corsican from 1974, to identify 
who the dominant players in that network are and their respective powers, and to 
assess the success of the language revitalisation plans they have devised amongst the 
population by looking at popular attitudes to such plans.
The first section outlines the historical conditions and modalities of the emergence of 
a Corsican language policy network, showing that after the ‘semi-anarchic’ débuts 
that followed the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law, the defence and 
promotion of the language was largely placed under the responsibility of a more 
formal network of Corsican language activists occupying official positions in newly 
deconcentrated state institutions and devolved Corsican institutions from the early 
1980s. Specifically, three main institutional arenas emerged, to which language 
decision-making powers have gradually been largely devolved: the Rectorat, the 
Assemblée de Corse and the Université de Corse. By looking at what revitalisation 
actions each regional institutional actor has undertaken under the overarching aegis of 
French central authorities and national law, moreover, I analyse the extent and the 
legal and political limits of the glottopolitical autonomy and powers granted to 
regional activists. Then, I review a number of other domains that Corsican has also 
entered, such as radio and TV broadcasting, literary production, the written press and 
performing arts, and I claim that the impact of these developments on actual practice 
may appear quantitatively limited. On balance, however, it is more difficult to assess 
their effectiveness in the revitalisation process for lack of significant objective 
criteria, and these domains may have important symbolic effects that need exploring 
(see chapter 9). 1 finally examine the extent to which Corsican language planners have 
sought to Europeanize their language promotion strategies.
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In the subsequent sections, I assess the impact of revitalisation actions on Corsican 
society, seeking to draw a sociological picture of Corsican speakers and non-speakers 
from statistical data. Drawing critically on quantitative data (i.e. census results and 
statistics on school attendance), I show that, despite the aforementioned 
institutionalisation and structural developments, including the adaptation of European 
programmes to Corsican, and the most favourable interpretation and application of 
national legislation on RMLs by local policy actors, Corsican language policies since 
the 1970s have hitherto largely failed to reverse language shift. Census data indeed 
illustrates a continued decline in practice and statistics on school attendance reveal 
that the attendance of Corsican language education decreases as students advance 
through the curriculum. I interpret this data as an index of popular indifference and/or 
opposition to Corsican language planning, which itself constitutes an indication of 
language planners’ failure to sustain the initial popular support towards language 
revitalisation processes.
In the conclusion, I argue that this failure illustrates the necessity of devising more 
qualitative methods to supplement the abovementioned more quantitative methods of 
assessment of success or failure of language revitalisation processes: quantitative 
methods indicate trends and correlations but fail to provide explanations for such 
trends. In that connection, the limitations of an analysis of language revitalisation 
strategies through objective, traditional categories based on the diglossic model (i.e. 
positive legislation, institutionalisation and structural developments, spread of the 
dominated variety in new domains of use) demonstrate that, necessary though they 
may be, these legal/institutional measures do not suffice to guarantee successful 
language revitalisation. In other words, there is more to effective language 
revitalisation than just reversing institution-based language hierarchies. As Jaffe 
(1999) amongst others forcefully demonstrates, what is needed here is a theoretical 
approach to policy evaluation that also takes greater account of all language and 
political ideologies, both the ideologies of policy actors, whether they are dominant or 
not, and folk ideologies, and of how these ideologies interplay. Put otherwise the 
community’s norms and attitudes largely determine its will to presetve and/or revive 
its language, or lack thereof, which in turn remains one prevailing factor in language
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maintenance or shift and the possibility o f  reversing diglossia. Chapter 9 explores 
such norms and attitudes in depth.
Language Activism, Language Institutionalisation and Language Planning in the
1970s: Context, Developments and Outcomes 8  g m the
l  indicated in the previous chapter that Corsican language activism had been ‘kept 
alive’ in the after-war period, albeit within restricted cultural circles. I also argued in 
chapter 6 that the 1960s had constituted a major turning point in the political, socio­
economic, socio-cultural and sociolinguistic make-up of the island. Sociolinguistic 
issues were indeed revived with new momentum in the 1960s for various reasons. 
First, the ‘top down’ economic régionalisation of the island little benefited many 
Corsicans, it entailed unprecedented waves of emigration and hindered the return of 
many of those Corsicans who had lived in the colonial empire. Second, this was 
accompanied by important waves of non-Corsican speaking immigration, whilst 
massive internal migrations brought Corsicans into contact with them in coastal 
cities209. Third, the demise of family transmission that had begun in the interwar 
period became more conspicuous. Many youths no longer spoke the language.
Overall, the demographic weight of Corsican speakers in relation to the whole island 
population was therefore largely reduced. All this reinforced the perception that the 
Corsican people or nation had been deliberately minoritised and was facing extinction 
(Fusina, 1992: 158). As an early nationalist slogan put it: Morta a lingua, mortu u 
populu [The death of the language is the death of the people] This gave a new impetus 
to regionalist claims and regional movements championing the defence of the 
Corsican nation and its most prominent sign of identity - its language - and the very 
exclusion of Corsican from the 1951 Deixonne Law could easily and successfully be 
presented as another form of discrimination against Corsicans.
Language activism emerged first on mainland France and then on the island and was 
taken up both by academic institutions and civil society organisations. On mainland 
France, various university courses were created in the late 1960s, e.g. Certificates in
209 in 1954, Bastia and Ajaccio gathered 54,000 inhabitants, in 1975 they were 100 000 *
third o f  the population. y ,uuu>more than a
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Corsican Language, Literature and Civilisation at the Universities of Provence (1969), 
Nice (1970) and Paris III (1972). The diaspora also organised various Corsican 
courses from 1971. On the island, where the language question had become a central 
rallying point and aroused renewed interest in learning the language, isolated 
language courses were established from 1971 and eventually federated under the 
umbrella of the newly-created association Scola Corsa in 1972. Commentators of that 
period describe 1972 as a milestone in language activism. Scola Corsa indeed 
networked all scattered initiatives and lobbied for the extension of the Deixonne Law 
and the creation of a university on the island. Regarding the former demand, in 
September, the minister of Education initially responded to a written parliamentary 
question on the possible extension of the law that: ‘[...] l ’enseignement du dialecte 
corse dans les écoles publiques pose un problème complexe [ ...] // apparaît nettement 
que le dialecte corse n ’a encore trouvé ni son unité ni sa codification. La mesure 
proposée ne peut donc intervenir dans la situation actuelle.'’ (Quoted in Marchetti, 
1989: 184-185) His successor, however, relentlessly lobbied by activists, reconsidered 
the issue in January 1973 and agreed in principle to an ‘experimental’ extension of the 
law, perhaps responding to the growing popular mobilisation around the issue on the 
island, as Marchetti suggests (ibid).210 The law was finally extended in January 1974 
granting Corsican some official recognition as a regional language of France. As for 
the university, it opened its doors to 500 students in 1982 in the symbolic fortress of
Paoli in Corte.
Having obtained juridical status for the language, language planners were 
nevertheless confronted with a series of symbolic and practical challenges to actually 
achieving its revitalisation. First, due to its lack of unity and codification, many saw 
Corsican as a dialect -  or series of dialects -  and dialectal variety as an 
insurmountable obstacle: what variety should be taught? For others, besides, it was a 
still dialect of Italian and not a language per se (Marchetti, 1989: 185-188). Second, 
the language had hardly been taught before so that extensive language-in-education 
planning was needed: teacher-training programmes were almost nonexistent, 
volunteer teachers and teaching materials were scarce, no curriculum existed etc. 
Third, as chapter 5 indicated, the provisions of the Deixonne Law were very minimal
2,0 A petition with 12,000 signatures mirrored the large mobilisation in favour o f  the inclusion of 
Corsican in the law and was sent to the minister (Arrighi, 2002: 78).
223
and denoted a tolerance rather than a genuine political will. After Scola Corsa 
dissolved in 1977 due to internal dissensions, besides, the responsibility for Corsican 
language teaching increasingly fell on schoolteachers whose motivations and 
commitment varied greatly. Fourth, many stood against the institutionalisation of the 
language at all for ideological (see the resistance o f separation in the next chapter) 
and/or practical reasons such as that other subjects should be prioritised.
Regarding the lack of language unity and codification, language activists responded in 
various ways. DiMeglio (1997) shows that the public funds devoted to didactic 
production in the 1970s were largely used to produce textbooks in which a northern 
variety had been selected as part of a classical process of standardisation: one single 
variety is selected, codified, and diffused to the detriment of others (Haugen, 1983: 
275; quoted by Kaplan and Baldauf, 1997: 21). This approach was very controversial 
and challenged by southern activists, so that other scholars advocated a conception of 
language that saw diversity as richness and contacts as mutual enrichment and, in 
practical terms, endorsed that teachers should teach their own dialectal variety (see 
the discussion of the concept of langue polynomique in the next chapter). The pioneer 
work in that respect, Intricciate e Cambierini [Connectors and Alternators], was 
published by Geronimi and Marchetti (1971) who devised a spelling system that could 
take account of and respect dialectal variety, running counter to the aforementioned 
dominant model of standardisation. Equally important was the creation of the 
Association pour le Développement des Etudes Archéologiques, Historiques, 
Linguistiques et Naturalistes du Centre-Est de la Corse (ADECEC) in 1970. In the 
field of lexicographie research and innovations, it has remained the most active 
association to date, and since the 1970s has produced a very large body of work211. As 
for teaching methods, they were typically devised ad hoc, although networks were 
progressively constituted to develop ‘best practice’ strategies (Fusina, 1994).
In sum, throughout the 1970s the implementation of the Deixonne Law and the 
concomitant standardisation of the language remained largely improvised, sometimes 
following opposite directions, and predominantly dependent on the good will, 
motivations and commitment of language activists, in the initial absence of solid
2ii http://www adecec.net/adecec-net/brochures.html: Accessed June 18th 2004
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institutional structures. Further legal progress was made in 1975 with the Haby Law 
although, here again, little effective implementation followed declarations and at the 
time when France was voting its first radical law of language protectionism (the Bas 
Lauriol law; see chapter 5, pp. 159 & 161-162), its apparent commitment to promote 
RMLs must be viewed with extreme caution.
In the light of the obstacles to these first steps towards language revitalisation, 
assessments of the evolution of the situation were primarily subjective and tended to 
contradict each other. Thus, Ettori’s initial account optimistically pointed to the 
progress made in enrolment figures (Ettori, 1975; quoted in Fusina, 1994: 144). The 
Bozzi Report for the Regional Council (1979) however regretted the scarcity of 
teachers participating in episodic teacher training days and, on the basis of statistical 
data on attendance, questions the population’s support for Corsican language 
education212. It concluded that: ‘[...] sans m e ardente croisade pour l'emploi du 
corse dans la vie quotidienne et d ’abord au sein des familles qui peuvent encore le 
pratiquer convenablement, et dans la rue, la bataille de sa survie ne sera pas 
g a g n é e (Bozzi, 1979; quoted by Fusina, 1994:159-160)
To a large extent, crusaders emerged outside official institutional structures through 
associations with more ore less radical nationalist agendas. In that connection, the 
revival of traditional Corsican-medium singing, under the impetus in particular of 
groups like Canta U Populu Corsu [The Corsican People Sings] that undertook to 
revive feelings of Corsican nationhood by travelling and performing concerts in inner 
Corsica from village to village, played an important symbolic and practical role. In 
doing so, they diffused Herderian nationalist themes and prompted Corsicans to 
reacquire their endangered cultural heritage. Their appeal can be measured by the fact 
that the state went so far as to prohibit some performances because of the subversive 
message they channelled. Notwithstanding, many youths joined the band and/or 
created new bands reviving Corsicans’ predominantly oral culture and experience of 
language use.
212 A 1981 report established by state authorities observed the same situation: low commitment o f  
teachers and poor attendance (Fusina, ibid: 163-169).
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In the next section, I sketch the institutional evolution pertaining to Corsican language 
status, focusing on the interplay of changing legal provisions at the national level and 
the creation of new language-planning institutional structures. By examining 
structural developments, one can reconstitute the institutional pillars of the emerging 
Corsican language policy network on the island and identify the dominant actors in it: 
the Rectorat de l ’Académie de Corse, the University of Corsica and the Assemblée de 
Corse.
This is not to say that these are the only actors. I take the concept of network in its 
broad acceptation as all the actors with an interest in Corsican revitalisation and who 
have an input into Corsican-related policy debates and/or decision-making processes 
and/or who are involved in the implementation of policies and thus produce an output. 
In some cases, that input may be merely discursive in which case it can be retrieved 
through the analysis of policy text production patterns, e.g. the nationalist legitimising 
discourse and the demand for compulsory bilingualism and/or language co-officiality; 
in other cases the output may be more objectively measurable, e.g. the number of 
articles published in Corsican in the written press. In yet other cases, the input and 
output in terms of revitalisation might be more difficult to gauge objectively, e.g. the 
effect of polyphonic bands like Canta U Populu Corsu on revitalisation processes. I 
will therefore deal with policy inputs that have an effect on attitudes rather than on 
structures/institutions in the next chapter.
Language Institutionalisation, Policy Network Formation and Language Planning: 
Overview o f the 1980s/1990s.
The 1980s/1990s saw drastic legal change for RMLs through their institutionalisation 
within French state educational structures. For Corsica, this took place under the 
umbrella of the Rectorat de l Académie de Corse (which had been made autonomous 
from that of the Provence Académie in 1975). Moreover, the University of Corsica 
was opened, which was also to play a prominent role in subsequent plans of language 
revitalisation. These changes coincided with the national programme of increased 
political devolution, piloted in Corsica (see chapter 6, pp. 190-194), from which the 
Assemblée de Corse gradually gained new powers, notably in terms of cultural and
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language planning. These developments led to the emergence of an institutional 
language policy network which is examined in the next three sections.
The Rectorat: Primary and Secondary School education.
In France, institutional responsibility for primary and secondary education rests with 
the Rectorats, the decentralised state education authorities in regions. They are in 
charge of implementing national education laws and adapting them to regional 
realities and therefore enjoy some budgetary autonomy.
As we saw in discussing the chronology of national language legislation on RMLs 
(chapter 5, pp. 167-170), the 1982 Savary circular constituted a significant change in 
the state’s approach to the question because the State seemed to commit itself to 
taking active measures for RML promotion rather than simply adopting a tolerant 
laissez-faire policy as before. Significantly, though, this change was made by a 
circular, that is through a regulatory measure with less legal status and scope than a 
law. On the other hand, that circular gave interpretative directions to the Ilaby Law 
while leaving more discretion to administrators to implement it.
To monitor the implementation of these provisions, additional structures were created 
within the Rectorat and official responsibilities allotted to Corsican cultural activists, 
which would impact greatly on the design and implementation of policies. In other 
words, state authority was granted to Corsican activists within the limits of new legal 
provisions. Implemented from 1983, the first language-in-education plan was 
evaluated in 1986. The following table summarises some results for secondary 
education (<collèges and lycées):
N u m b e r  o f s tu d e n ts  a tte n d in g  C o rs ic a n  
c la s s e s
H o u rs  d e v o te d  to  C o rs ic a n  
la n g u a g e  e d u c a tio n
1 9 7 5 4 5 0  (n o t inc lud ing  c o llè g e s ) 1 0 5 0  h o u rs  /y e a r
1 9 8 2 -1 9 8 3 1 4 8 5
1 9 8 6 -1 9 8 7 3 4 1 7 3 7 5  h o u rs  /w e e k
Table 1: Number of secondary school students attending Corsican language 
classes between 1975 and 1986-1987 [adapted from Fusina (1994: 178-179) and 
Arrighi (2002:104)]
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The increase in secondary school students choosing to study Corsican since 1975 was 
thus clear and marked some positive popular responses to secondary school education 
in Langue et Culture Corses (LCC) as it became more available. As far as primary 
education was concerned though, evaluation was more difficult as the content of 
Corsican language classes, less formalised than in secondaiy schools, varied 
significantly across schools, due to unequal teacher competence in and/or motivation 
for Corsican language teaching (Fusina, ibid: 183). This pointed to the dire need to 
boost teacher-training programmes. Teacher training was systematised from the 
creation of Instituts Universitaires de Formation des Maîtres (IUFM) [University 
Teacher Training Institutes] from 1991.
As far as teaching materials were concerned, their production, sponsored by the 
Departmental/Regional Centres for Pedagogical Documentation (CDDP/CRDP) 
steadily augmented from 1982. Since 1992 they have received EU education funds213. 
Regarding syllabuses, first outlines were produced in the early 1980s but only 
officially endorsed in 1988, which illustrates a recurrent concern for activists: the 
delay between policy design and decision making/ implementation. On the other 
hand, state authorities decided to encourage initiatives from cultural associations 
aiming at developing bilingual pre-elementary private education as in other regions, 
e.g. Diwan schools in Brittany, Calendretas in Occitanie, Iskatolas in the Basque 
Country, and progressively to integrate them within the public sector. In Corsica, only 
one association seized the opportunity and only two such schools were opened, in 
Haute-Corse. Public authorities however launched additional initiatives: two more 
bilingual state schools were opened and the education authorities also facilitated the 
experimental development of integrated Corsican language education, whereby 
Corsican became the medium of instruction rather than merely a taught subject. By 
the 1980s, then, cultural movements and associations that had originally borne the 
demand for teaching and programmed language courses had largely abandoned the 
ground to official structures. Nevertheless, having cultural activists in key positions at 
the Rectorat meant that decentralised state authorities would more readily accompany 
the cultural movement and even supplement it where needed.
2,3 If funding was overtly for Corsican, this may seem an oddity since producing teaching material is 
funded under the LINGUA action that is normally exclusively for EU official languages. One o f the 
Archipelago aims was to extend that EU funding o f teaching material to RMLs (see chapter 3, p. 89)
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Overall, the early 1980s thus witnessed structural progress for LCC education and 
encouraging, but not massive, popular support for it, though the population appeared 
to be divided on the relevance and legitimacy of such education. As Fusina (ibid: 195 
and 198) indeed indicates, the issue of LCC education has remained a controversial 
focal point for Corsican society in general going well beyond educational frames.
Another evaluation report - the Arrighi de Casanova Report - released in 1989 - 
entailed more institutional developments. It observed a pause in attendance rate, 
indicating that out of 44,077 pupils in state education, a mere 5,454 (13%) attended 
Corsican classes. (Silvani, 1988, in La Corse-, quoted by Fusina, 1994: 202) Its 
conclusions pointed to the need to further generalise educational provision, inter alia 
by boosting teacher training programmes so that all state schools could offer Corsican 
language education, at all levels214. Departing from a previous essentially institutional 
and structural approach to Corsican language educational provision and in view of 
growing disputes around language planning, moreover, the report also emphasized the 
need to take account of the language ideologies behind them and, in so doing, 
reasserted the necessity of considering Corsica’s cultural and linguistic kinship with 
Italy: *[...] afin que le corse ne devienne pas une sorte de volapük à la sauce 
méditerranéenne: [sic] (Rapport A. de Casanova, 1989: 5; quoted by Fusina, 1994: 
205)215 Finally, but most importantly, it strategically suggested reinstalling Corsican 
language revitalisation as a priority within the State/Region Planning Contracts and 
underscored the crucial role to be played by the University of Corsica in language 
revitalisation efforts.
During the 1990s, finally, institutionalisation continued with the creation of a 
Corsican CAPES and of the IUFM. The CAPES generated important symbolic and
214 Hence, it proposed to train 180 additional schoolteachers a year and anticipated the creation o f  
IUFMs and the extension to Corsican o f  the CAPES, the national diploma required to teach in 
secondary schools.
215 As Vinciguerra, member o f the L’Assemblée de Corse and current president o f  its ad hoc 
Commission for the promotion o f LCC, more recently put it:
Le corse a trouvé ses marques [...] Il n'a aucune raison d'être frileux vis-à-vis de l'italien. En 
réactivant les liens avec la langue de Dante, tout le profit sera pour lui (ressourcement à des 
origines communes, intérêt de puiser dans les référentiels la terminologie technique). S ’en 
priver serait risquer de laisser le corse isolé face au seul français, qui, de plus en plus, le 
grignoterait jusqu’à l ’effacement. L'italien nous rendra aussi la mémoire de notre histoire 
écrite en toscan [...] Le corse grâce à l ’italien nous offre la possibilité de nous ouvrir à une 
aire linguistique de 400 millions de locuteurs. (Corsica, July 2002: 53)
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practical advantages. On the symbolic front, it brought teacher qualifications for 
Corsican secondary teachers into line with other disciplines through a national 
examination216 217. On the practical side, it meant that teaching positions were secured for 
graduates and that professional opportunities were created for Corsicans following the 
LCC academic path . With these innovations, the formal institutionalisation of 
Corsican within state educational structures was largely reinforced and secured. In the 
process, a number of Corsican activists - primary and secondary teachers, university 
lecturers and Rectorat civil servants - gained responsibilities in the RML policy 
network and gained control of implementation processes. Another illustration of the 
importance of such control has to do with the adaptation, in secondary education, of 
the EU initiative of European classes into Mediterranean classes. The objective of that 
EU initiative, launched under the EU education umbrella, was to encourage the 
simultaneous learning of three European (national) languages and their progressive 
use as teaching medium. In Corsica, European classes were adapted into 
Mediterranean classes, in which Corsican came to replace one of the ‘national’ 
languages, e.g. English, and was studied alongside ‘Mediterranean’ national 
languages, e.g. Italian, Spanish. Again, this adaptation was possible because activists 
held the key positions that made such adaptations possible. In the process, notably, 
Corsican was given a status on a par with ‘national’ languages. Finally, in quantitative 
terms, as we will see later, the number of students also increased during the 1990s as 
Corsican language provision became progressively generalised.
The University o f Corsica
Opened in 1982 with 500 students, the University of Corsica now trains over 5000 
students across a variety of faculties. In Humanities, from the early days, academic 
positions were occupied by cultural and/or language activists of the 1970s who, in 
turn, trained students to become schoolteachers and university lecturers. Its opening 
was important both in terms of the possibility of developing Corsican studies ‘at 
home’ and of offering a full curriculum for them. This was done under the aegis of the
216 However, the LCC CAPES is also the only RML CAPES where LCC is the only subject taught; all 
other RML CAPES are bivalent: candidates have to have two areas o f  expertise, e.g. Occitan and 
history.
217 There were 14 graduates at the first session; there are now more than a hundred certified teachers on 
the island.
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Corsican Studies Institute (which became the Corsican Research Centre (CRC) in 
1988) and the Diplôme d’Etudes Universitaires Générales (DEUG) d’Etudes Corses 
(first two-year University Diploma in Corsican studies) was offered from academic 
year 1983-1984, recruiting students from all over Corsica. Today the Corsican studies 
path delivers up to PhD degrees in LCC. Besides, the primary role of the university in 
language-in-education activism was further enhanced in 1990-1991 when IUFM and 
CAPES courses in LCC were created. Since then, university lecturers have assumed 
full responsibility for the training of primary and secondary teachers and higher 
education teachers and researchers.
In the field of research, the CRC developed research teams across a variety of 
disciplines, including archaeology, history and geography, ethnology and 
ethnomusicology, linguistics, applied linguistics and pedagogy, and most importantly 
sociolinguistics from the early days (Thiers, 1989: 151-152). The research outcomes 
produced have then fed in the curriculum. This has turned out to be especially 
important as regards the language ideologies of a whole generation of LCC teachers 
who, since the 1980s, have been ‘moulded’ within the sociolinguistic classes. The 
importance of the sociolinguistic approach for corpus and acquisition planning will be 
explored in depth in the next chapter on ideological struggle: we will see that the 
hegemonisation in language plans of sociolinguistically-informed discourses on 
language has been one of the main reasons for elite and popular resistance to current 
Corsican language-in-education planning efforts. Finally, research has also served to 
revalue Corsican culture and history and has certainly contributed to nourishing the 
Corsican sense of specificity and ‘national’ pride. In turn, enhanced feelings of 
nationhood and forms of national pride can fuel more political commitments.
Beyond teacher-training, the university also occupies a central role in the life of the 
island for several reasons. First, it has provided a basis for and given scientific 
validity to Corsican studies and propelled Corsican research to new symbolic heights, 
as some of its research teams received accreditation from the highest national 
scientific authorities. In the process new intellectual elites have become more visible 
in Corsican society. Second, it has developed a network of academic and socio­
economic partners. In that connection, academics have received funds from the 
European programmes for networking and/or the organisation of conferences, cultural
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and literary activities, and exchanges with other regions with a RML community, as 
platforms for language promotion, e.g. through INTERREG (Interregional 
cooperation) (see chapter 6, pp. 203-204). Third, it has brought together Corsican 
youths who found a new forum for political activism and Corte, where it is located, 
thus became a crossroad and/or cradle for student nationalist groups. At a more 
linguistic level, this has also facilitated the contact between various Corsican varieties 
and thereby accelerated linguistic change and the koîneisation of Corsican. Fourth, on 
a small island like Corsica, Corsican studies academics, many of whom are also 
prolific literary authors and/or journalists and have occupied official positions in the 
LCC unit of the Rectorat, have also gained enormous prestige. Fifth, as members of 
one of the main language institutions of the island, academics have been largely 
involved in the consultation process of the Assemblée de Corse's consultative body 
(see below), making a scientifically legitimised input to the State/Region Contract and 
the tripartite negotiations between the Rectorat, the Assemblée de Corse and the 
University over education plans. As Bierbach and Hartamann (1980: 13-14) put it:
Es ist ein spezifischer aspekt der Regionalfrage, dass discours militant und 
discours scientifjgue zusammentreffen, eben weil diejenigen, die in Frankreich 
ber Regionalbewegung arbeiten, in vielen Fllen als “Betreffene ” selbst in ihr 
engagiert sind. Die Grenze zwischen “objektiver ” Analyse und politischer 
Handlungsandleitung verschwindet. (Quoted by Grob, 1987: 35)218
In sum, beyond their important teacher and teacher training roles, academics play a 
multitude of roles in Corsican society, being involved in academic, literary and 
cultural and journalistic activism and often, Corsica’s political life. Their role as 
language policy actors is therefore central and multifaceted, transcending dichotomies 
between the scientific and the political, and the public and the private.
Finally, the University has its own internal language policies which it has been able to 
develop as an autonomous body since a 1984 law that granted universities more 
autonomy in establishing their own curriculum. One such policy is particularly
2,8 ‘The conflation of the activist and scientific discourses is an aspect specific to the Regional 
Question, precisely because those who, in France, study regionalist movements are themselves actively 
committed. The boundary between “objective” analysis and involvement in planning thus disappears’ 
(My translation) v
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interesting for our purpose: that of co-officiality adopted in 1990, which in practice 
resulted first in bilingualism for signposting and drafting of official documents and, 
second, in the organisation of LCC classes for all students throughout their curriculum 
with an average of 1.5 weekly hours. This teaching is compulsoiy and counts towards 
the validation of diplomas, which goes against the French state’s legal voluntary 
principle of language education but has hitherto been unnoticed, or deliberately 
ignored. Here, the national law of autonomy for universities was interpreted ex 
maxima.
During the 1990s, as was noted in chapter 5 (p.170), RML education in Corsica 
considerably evolved and Corsican language-in-education provision was increasingly 
negotiated in regional institutions in situ rather than nationally. Amongst Corsican 
regional institutions, the Assembly of Corsica played a central role through its 
specific powers and through the ex maxima interpretations of the Corsican language- 
in-education provisions of the State/Region Contracts established from 1989.
L ’Assemblée de Corse
The Assemblée de Corse elected in 1982 was the first political body to represent the 
island as a whole and was largely constituted by the traditional political class: the 
clans. Although it did not enjoy legislative powers, article 27 of Corsica’s first Statut 
Particulier gave it the right to address proposals to the prime minister pertaining to 
the economic, social and cultural development of the island. Regarding the language 
education issue, in 1983 it passed a first Resolution that read as follows:
L ’Assemblée de Corse [...] a pris acte du caractère fondamental de la langue 
comme ciment de la culture et de l ’urgence de mettre en oeuvre une réelle 
politique de réappropriation culturelle qui traduise la volonté de l ’assemblée 
de rendre sa langue à son peuple [...] [Elle] a décidé de s ’engager dans une 
politique de bilinguisme dans le cadre d ’un plan triennal [...] avec l ’Etat, ce 
bilinguisme étant comprise de la maternelle à l'Université [...] Dès la 
prochaine rentrée scolaire [...] l ’enseignement de la langue fera l ’objet d ’une 
modulation horaire sur la base du principe de l ’enseignement obligatoire [...] 
l ’usage de la langue corse sera généralisé dans le cadre de la toponymie des
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lieux, des villages, des villes, dans le cadre de l ’information et de la formation 
audio-visuelles, ainsi que pour certains actes de la vie publique. (Quoted in 
Marchetti, 1989: 209)
This amounted to a form of officialisation of the lunguugc through its increased 
institutionalisation. The resolution was altogether rejected by the French Prime 
Minister on the ground that mandatory bilingual education was incompatible with 
respect for individual freedom.
Two subsequent motions moved in similar directions: a 1985 motion for a resolution 
suggested making Corsican language education mandatory for the state and optional 
for students and a 1989 resolution sought to establish French and Corsican as co- 
official on the island. Both motions had been prepared by the Assemblée's 
consultative council representing ‘[...] les milieux associatifs et considéré parfois 
comme un contre-pouvoir stimulant de la vie culturelle régionale.' (Fusina, 1994: 
219), which by law must be consulted on cultural and educational actions, notably 
those related to the safeguard and diffusion of the Corsican language and culture. This 
consultative body thus constitutes a gateway to official institutions for various 
interests groups seeking to have an input in policy design219. In these particular 
instances, Assemblymen voted them down, which testifies to the fact that the 1983 
discursive convergence about mandatory bilingual education between nationalists and 
certain clans had disappeared (see next chapter).
On the national scene, despite the socialist regime’s multiple pledges to respect and 
promote cultural and linguistic diversity, the government also progressively stepped 
back into less radical positions between 1982 and 1986. Nor was much improvement 
to be expected from the right-wing government in power between 1986 and 1988. 
This is not to say that the Assemblée de Corse's potential for actions became 
nonexistent. Indeed, in its 1986 contrat particulier with state authorities it
219 During the consultation process in preparation for the 1997 State/Region Plan de développement de 
la LCC, a number o f contributions were made. For instance, the Cullettivu Pà a Lingua Corsa [Inter- 
Organisation for the Corsican Language] submitted a series o f  proposals inspired by the European 
Charter for RMLs, demanding the generalisation of LCC education, more media space for Corsican 
and its co-official use in public services. This ad hoc organisation consisted o f a large number of 
cultural and/or political organisations, e.g. trade unions, polyphonic bands, Corsican language 
associations with a notorious nationalist agenda like Scola Corsa Bastia, etc. b
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supplemented and/or sponsored language revitalisation actions such as the creation of 
a lexical database for the Corsican language, the establishment of language 
laboratories in all secondary education schools and the production of textbooks and 
teaching materials. Yet, its more ‘legislative’ attempts had marked the limits of its 
political powers and reflected the ongoing dominance of central state authority in 
state/region negotiations.
Nonetheless, the return of a socialist government to power after 1988 augured further 
progress, especially after the 1988 visit of Education Minister Jospin who requested 
the aforementioned Casanova report and subsequently announced his intention to 
generalise Corsican language education and to create a Corsican CAPES.
In 1991, Corsica became the Collectivité Territoriale de Corse (CTC) through its 
second Statut Particulier, which consecrated further devolution and gave its assembly 
new powers. Draft article 1 included a historic motion recognising the peuple corse:
La République française garantit à la communauté historique et culturelle 
vivante que constitue le peuple corse, les droits à la préservation de son 
identité culturelle [...] (quoted by Fusina, 1994: 227).
However, the Constitutional Council deemed such an ‘institutional recognition’ of the 
peuple corse contrary to the French Constitution, according to which there exists only 
one, indivisible people: the French people. Nonetheless, in the field of education and 
cultural planning, article 53 of the Statut stipulated that:
[...] l ’Assemblée adopte un plan de développement de l ’enseignement de la 
langue et de la culture corses prévoyant notamment les modalités d ’insertion 
de cet enseignement dans le temps scolaire. Ces modalités font l ’objet d ’une 
convention conclue entre la collectivité territoriale de Corse et l ’Etat, (ibid: 
228)
This formulation significantly departed from that of the 1982 Statut, granting the CTC 
more than a simple advisory, consultative role and reinforcing its powers in 
negotiating education plans with the state via the Rectorat LCC services. The
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Assemblée’s new powers were implemented through the successive contract plans. 
Starting in 1989, the efforts of the Assembly and the state - and the Rectorat for 
educative actions - were increasingly combined within the frame of the successive 
Planning Contracts (1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2003 and 2003-2006). These 
contracts consecrated further devolution to the CTC, whose role within the policy 
network increased along its new political and increased budgetary powers. Through 
the successive plans, LCC education gradually became generalised220, first throughout 
the school curriculum, then into teacher training programmes, and increasing funds 
were progressively devoted to didactic, artistic, cultural and literary production in 
Corsican. Notably, the 1994 Plan led to the opening of two educational centres for full 
Corsican language immersion, which was formally legalised post facto the following 
year by an April 7th 1995 national circular221 2. In the latest Plans, then, the Assemblée's 
lobbying action has concentrated on the generalisation of bilingual education as the 
only path for producing Corsican speakers and it has also sought to generalise the 
bilingual topographical signposting voted in 1989. Today this is still not implemented, 
which illustrates the resistance of some part of the population to the increased 
institutionalisation of the language, as Jaffe shows (1999: 9-11).
The last important developments regarding the institutional emancipation of the 
Corsican region were the Matignon Negotiations, initiated in 1999 between the 
government and the CTC, which led to the 2002 Loi No 2002-92 relative à la Corse 
(Journal Officiel [JO], January 17th 2002). After long and heated debates, notably 
about the mandatory character of Corsican language education demanded by a 
number of activists, negotiations resulted in the following ‘diplomatic’ provision for 
Corsican language in primary education planning: La langue corse est une matière 
enseignée dans le cadre de l’horaire normal des écoles maternelles et élémentaires de 
Corse222 (Art. L. 312-11-1) This provision consecrated the generalisation of Corsican 
language education at pre-school and primary levels.
220 This was achieved for 95% o f students in collèges from the 1999-2000 school year (CTC April 
1999).
221 As was noted in chapter 5 (p. 173), this measure, initially specific to Corsica, was then generalised 
to other RML regions in 2001.
222 The original formulation included the concluding expression '[...]  sauf volonté contraire des 
parents. ' which a number o f  opponents saw as a mandatory clause a contrario (Le Monde May 16th 
2001: 7). This was suppressed by the French parliament’s Commission des Lois, (see also Corse-Matin 
February 10 1 2001: 19; April 19lh 2001: 2; May 15th 2001: 2 and the issue o f  Journal de la Corse o f  
May 25th-3 Ist 2001: 7-8, for a report on the debates on the Corsican language at the parliament).
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In that connection, finally, the report established in preparation for the June 2003 
State/CTC Convention for the Development of LCC Teaching underlines that all 
efforts now tend towards the generalisation of bilingual education in infant schools223 
and its follow-up throughout the curriculum, as well as towards more creation of 
LCC-specific primary school teaching positions. This ‘generalisation’ objective is still 
not fully achieved but progress is undeniable and has been deemed a priority of the 
devolved authorities’ actions on RML education, with the necessary budgetary 
allowance. Today, it appears that once the targeted generalisation is completed, 
Corsica will have obtained the maximum that national RML laws can grant.
Overall, during the 1990s, even before the Matignon negotiations were concluded, 
through the progressive generalisation of the LCC provision, enrolment in LCC 
classes became the default choice in early collège classes. As of 1999, following a 
decision emanating from the Rectorat, the voluntary nature of LCC education has 
modified from parents opting into LCC provision to parents opting out of it 
(L ’Express, June 21st 2001: 97-100; Arrighi, 2002: 94)224. Many voices have however 
been raised against this shift which is seen as effectively making LCC education 
mandatory. In that respect, the positions of the Association pour la défense des droits 
de la Corse dans la République are clear:
Contraindre les parents à accomplir une démarche pour faire dispenser leurs 
enfants de l ’obligation de suivre cet enseignement, équivaut à le rendre 
obligatoire. Cela procède bien de toute l ’hypocrisie qui entoure l'élaboration 
d ’un texte destiné à répondre uniquement aux exigences d ’une minorité (2000: 
8)
I now conclude this section on the processes and extent of language 
institutionalisation in Corsica with two observations on the almost total lack of 
interest for the Europeanisation of Corsican language revitalization among Corsican 
language activists (beyond the funds received for the production of teaching material
223 In that context, Corsican language education is de facto mandatory when teaching is provided since 
pupils do not leave the classroom during LCC lessons (Corsica, September 2000: 52).
524 Interestingly, the author, Jean-Marie Arrighi, is the highest Rectorat civil servant coordinating LCC 
education. He is also a cultural activist, has authored many publications on Corsican history, and writes 
columns and papers on Corsican in the monthly review Corsica. His conception o f language is similar 
to that o f  the Corsican sociolinguists (see chapter 9).
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and ad hoc allowances granted to Corsican academics via INTERREG for trans- 
regional cultural exchanges and the publication of literary works in Corsican; see 
chapter 6, pp. 198-200). My contention is that this limited interest for EU support 
results from the equally limited nature of EU opportunities for RMLs (see chapters 3 
and 4) but also from a general apathy that hinders private initiatives to language 
revitalization (illustrated above by the total disappearance of private Corsican 
language schools). In that connection, finding that EBLUL’s national secretary was 
Corsican and based in Bastia, I interviewed him during my fieldwork and he readily 
admitted that EBLUL was not more than a letterhead in the Corsican sociolinguistic 
panorama. Another example of apathy was that only one association put in a bid for 
funding during the EYL 2001, and it was the anti-racism association. No other 
cultural/linguistic manifestations took place. I will return to the rationales underlying 
such apathetic attitudes in chapter 9 and in the general conclusion of the thesis.
In the next, final section, I attend to the presence of the language within the Corsican 
community.
Corsican Language Use in Today’s Corsican Society: Quantitative and Qualitative 
Aspects
Significant institutional progress has been made since the 1970s to thwart language 
shift and promote Corsican. As we saw above, Corsican entered diglossic domains 
from which it had previously been excluded, in particular education. Advances were 
also made in a number of other domains which increased the social visibility of the 
language. I now briefly sketch advances in literary production, the media, and artistic 
creation and conclude with some tentative quantitative and qualitative patterns of 
language use in the population.
Regarding literary production a first distinction must be established between 
Corsican-medium productions and others with Corsican themes but in another 
language. Here I focus on the former. A second distinction separates out oral and 
written literature. As we saw, the former has always existed in Corsica whereas the 
latter constitutes a more recent development, finding a new impetus especially from 
the 1970s as a symbol of Corsican’s sociolinguistic maturation and individuation, in
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the effort to transcend the political language/dialect dichotomy. Put otherwise, oral 
literature, and in particular poetry and singing, is traditionally ingrained in Corsicans’ 
experience, while using Corsican in ‘cultural’ writings cannot be completely 
separated from politico-cultural developments. Today’s literary production is largely 
sponsored by public authorities but publication figures reflect the tiny size of 
Corsican-medium readership (Arrighi, 2002: 111-122).
Use of Corsican in the written press remains rare except in the only remaining literary 
review Bonanova. In the daily, weekly, and monthly press, articles in Corsican are 
scarce. However, as we will see in the next chapter, articles in French about the status 
of Corsican and LCC education abound. According to Arrighi, the scarcity of articles 
in Corsican is mainly due to the tiny size of the readership since older Corsican­
speaking generations do not necessarily read the language and younger generations’ 
reading skills are not yet sufficiently developed (2002: 90). Nonetheless, the 
development of various cultural and/or political websites has helped diffuse the 
language more widely in ways that as yet remain unexplored.
Corsican appeared in the broadcasting media - radio and television -  from the 1980s, 
most importantly after the creation of the ADECEC’s radio Voce nustrale [our voice] 
broadcasting entirely in Corsican, and after the régionalisation of the national radio 
Radio France - that became Radio Corsica Frequenza Mora (RCFM) - and the TV 
channel FR3 (1982)225. RCFM is a bilingual radio channel that devotes a large space 
to Corsican alongside French and has acted as a channel for dialectal contacts through 
a number of typical radio promotion activities (helping to make it what Thiers calls a 
langue socialement circulante-, Thiers, 1989: %Sff). From 1991, its staff has benefited 
from language training programmes sponsored by state education authorities and the 
CTC. So has that of FR3 although it devotes much Jess air space to Corsican226. 1 will 
return to the practical and symbolic importance of a radio and TV channelling 
Corsican language use(s), and to popular attitudes to Corsican-in-the-media planning 
in the next chapter.
225 Interestingly, some space was given to Corsican in these media long before the law formally 
allowed it (1987)
226 Both media offer Corsican-medium daily news updates. FR3 also broadcasts a regional magazine at 
peak times - Noi [us] -  as well as a weekly documentary - Ghjente [people] - on various aspects o f  
Corsican culture, traditions, history, etc, and a cartoon and sitcom.
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Finally, drama production and polyphonic singing have grown as popular forms of 
performing arts and I previously mentioned the enormous impact and emulation that 
groups like Cantu u populu covsu have catalysed and the immense popular success 
they have encountered. Importantly, they militated by means of a collective oral 
patrimony to which Corsicans could relate more easily than through the promotion of 
Corsican as an institutionalised written medium, which in effect was alien to most 
Corsican speakers. To many observers, polyphonic creation in particular bears the 
hope of sustained ‘natural’ traditional practice in the language, and they remain 
essential channels of diffusion of nationalist themes.
What emerges from this presentation is that Corsican has progressed into new 
domains of use whilst traditional domains of socio-cultural language use, like 
polyphonic singing, have revived and often sustain the diffusion of nationalist 
rhetoric. To a significant extent, the scarcity of readers of Corsican has however 
limited the success of written-medium channels of language revitalisation and 
confined these developments to the Corsican literate elites. Oral media like radio, by 
contrast, have propelled popular Corsican use into new ‘public spaces’, albeit in 
‘private space’ guise because, unlike written production where the sense of hierarchy 
and authority is intrinsic and omnipresent, radio-channelled forms of practice appear 
unmonitored and are thus more congruent with traditional Corsican-medium orality. 
TV is a different issue as it combines spontaneous expression from Corsicans with 
more formal journalistic genres and their set of diglossic ‘high’ themes, e.g. 
international news, from which Corsican was previously excluded. As we will see in 
the next chapter, popular attitudes towards such developments have varied. I now 
tentatively assess quantitative and qualitative patterns of language use on the island as 
revealed by successive language surveys and then by statistics provided by the 
Rectorat on LCC class attendance in recent years.
Various quantitative surveys have been conducted by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) and the National Institute of Demographic 
Studies (INED) on Corsican language use and competence, reception and/or 
transmission and/or reading skills since the 1970s. Methodologically, such surveys are 
limited by their reliance on self-evaluation questionnaires, which were not 
corroborated by qualitative data and did not address the question of what ‘speaking
240
Corsican means. The results obtained are therefore to be taken with extreme caution 
as *[...] they are representations o f language use rather than accurate reports o f  
practice’ (Kristol, 1996: 7) and are especially problematical in the Corsican context 
‘[...] where language issues carry heightened social and political significance.’ 
(Thiers, 1986: 29; both quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 87). A further difficulty is that 
questions differed from one survey to another.
T o ta l
c la im in g
flu e n c y
T o ta l a b le  
to  w rite  
C o rs ic a n
T o ta l c la im in g  
s o m e  p ro fic ien cy  
(a  little)
T o ta l c la im in g
u n d ers ta n d in g
C o rs ic a n
T o ta l a b le  to  
re a d
C o rs ic a n
1 9 77 6 9 % 33%
1982 68% 12%
1995 64% 81% 57%
Table 2: Self-Evaluation of Language Proficiency in Corsican between 1977 and 
1995 [INSEE statistics; adapted from Arrighi, 2002: 83-85]
Bearing in mind the aforementioned methodological weaknesses, the most complete 
language survey conducted was that of 1999 when sociolinguistic questions were 
added to the enquiry on families in the national census. In Corsica, 200,800 adults 
(over 18) were surveyed and asked the following questions on language reception,
transmission and use:
1. In what languages, dialects or ‘patois’ did your parents usually talk to you 
when you were about 5?
2. In what languages, dialects or ‘patois’ did/do you usually talk to your children 
when they were about 5/now?
3. Today, do you sometimes speak with family, friends, colleagues, shopkeepers, 
etc, in languages other than French?
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W e r e  s p o k e n  to in C o rs ic a n  a t th e  a g e  o f 5  (%  o f th e  to ta l o f  
a d u lts  s u rv e y e d )
U s u a lly O c c a s io n a lly T o ta l T o ta l born  on  
C o rs ic a
T o ta l a d u lts 26 26 53
B o rn  b e fo re  W W I 60 15 70 90
D u rin g  W W II around 30 around 30
B o rn  a f te r  W W II 55 80
L e s s  th a n  3 5  
y e a rs  old
Less than 10% 30 41 44
Table 3: Evolution of the use of Corsican with parents during the 20"' century 
(Source: INSEE and INED, 2004; from data collected in the 1999 census)
T o ta ls  
p a re n ts  
o u t o f  all 
a d u lts  
s u rv e y e d  
in C o rs ic a  
(% )
T o ta l p a re n ts  
s p o k e n  to  in 
C o rs ic a n  
(% )
P a re n ts  s p o k e n  to  in 
C o rs ic a n  w h o  
s p o k e /s p e a k  C o rs ic a n  
to  th e ir  5  y e a r-o ld  
c h ild ren  o u t o f  to ta l 
p a re n ts  w h o  w e re  
s p o k e n  to  in C o rs ic a n  
(% )
P a re n ts  s p o k e n  to  
in C o rs ic a n  w h o  
s p o k e /s p e a k  
C o rs ic a n  to  th e ir  5  
y e a r-o ld  ch ild re n  
o u t o f  to ta l p a re n ts  
s u rv e y e d  (% )
P a re n ts  liv ing  
on C o rs ic a
72.1 51.9
Occasionally: 27 .9  
Usually: 27
59.9
Occasionally: 41 .9  
Usually: 18.4
31.1
Occasionally: 21 .7  
Usually: 9 .5
P a re n ts  b o rn  
a n d  liv in g  on  
C o rs ic a
32 .6 81 .5
Occasionally: 37 .6  
Usually: 48 .6
61 .2
Occasionally: 42.1  
Usually: 19,4
23
Occasionally: 15.8  
Usually: 7 .3
P a re n ts  b o rn  
on C o rs ic a  
b u t liv in g  on  
m a in la n d  
F r a n c e
25.1
Occasionally: 21 .2  
Usually: 3.8
N /A  because not 
surveyed on the  
island
Table 4: Use of Corsican with 5-year children by parents spoken to in Corsican 
(except last row) (Sonree: INSEE, 2002, provisional results227; from data 
collected m the 1999 census) om t,ata
227 1 use the figures from the 2002 provisional report rather than those o f the 2004 final analysis here 
because the former are more detailed in terms o f the frequency of use with children, i.e. occasional or 
usual.
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Finally, the survey indicates that 45% of all adults - about 90,000 people- claim to 
speak Corsican with family and/or friends and/or colleagues, etc. The survey revealed 
the following age differentiations:
A d u lts  s u rv e y e d  s p e a k in g  C o rs ic a n  to d a y
G e n e ra t io n s  born  b e tw e e n  
1 9 0 0  a n d  1 9 2 5
60%  '  ~
G e n e ra t io n s  b o rn  in th e  1 9 4 0 s Below 50%
G e n e ra t io n s  born  in th e  m id  
1 9 6 0 s
40%
G e n e ra t io n s  b orn  in th e  la te  
1 9 7 0 s
33%
U n d e r  3 5  y e a rs  old 1. 50%  (bom  on Corsica)““ 0
2. 60%  (born on Corsica with parents born on Corsica)
Table 5: Use of Corsican in today’s Corsica according to age (Source: INSEE, 
2004)
Overall, this survey indicates a gradual decline in both usual and occasional use: 53% 
of adults surveyed declared they had been spoken to in Corsican (table 3) but, in turn, 
only about 23 and 31% of all pass it on, more occasionally than usually (less than 
10% do so usually) (table 4). Today, older generations still speak the language (with 
differences according to birthplace, residence and socio-professional categories) but 
only a third of younger generations do, with somewhat higher figures when Corsican 
born (table 5). In sum, throughout the century, native speaker competences seem to 
have progressively declined whilst non-native competences have increased. Language 
shift seems to have accelerated from the interwar period (tables 3 and 5), which 
correlates with the patterns of emigration and demographic change outlined in chapter
6.
Other sociological indicators further refine the picture, showing that Corsican use 
varies across socio-professional categories with significant differences between 
Corsican borns or not. For instance, the highest rates of use are for peasants,
228 The proportion of Corsican bom between 1975 and 1999 has evolved from 73% to 60%.
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pensioners, and craftsmen and shopkeepers - usually Corsican born by more than 70% 
- with respectively more than 70%, 50% and 47% using Corsican. At the other end of 
the social scale, professionals, and workers, less often Corsican born, speak it between 
35 and 40%.
As was said above, however, the design of the questionaires leaves inexplicit what 
speaking Corsican means - With what level of competence? In what registers? - and 
the categories usually and occasionally are far too vague for precise interpretations. It 
is therefore impossible to draw precise conclusions about the vitality of the language 
on the strength of such data although the trends elicited above do seem to confirm 
language shift and increasing change in competence towards receptive rather than 
productive skills. Also it is too early to observe any significant impact on Corsican 
use from the institutionalisation of the language. As we have seen, school education 
now almost exclusively leads the revival effort, but it is impossible to predict whether 
this will suffice to reverse language shift as those who have benefited from it are not 
all yet parents and most were not included in the survey.
I now look at statistics on school attendance provided by the Rectorat to examine the 
extent of parental support towards LCC education. 29
229 In that respect, the survey also indicates that today 1 in 10 children speak Corsican with their 
parents, usually or occasionally
N u m b e r  o f
s tu d e n t s
s tu d y in g
L C C  in
P r im a r y
E d u c a t io n
N u m b e r
o f
p r im a r y
s c h o o l
te a c h e r s
te a c h in g
L C C
N u m b e r  o f 
s tu d en ts  
stu d yin g  
L C C  in 
C o llè g e s  
(s e c o n d a ry  
e d u c a tio n , 
firs t cyc le )
N u m b e r  o f 
stu d en ts  
stu d yin g  L C C  in 
L y c é e s
d 'e n s e ig n e m e n t
g é n é ra l
( ‘g e n e ra l’ h ig h  
sch o o l)
N u m b e r  o f 
s tu d e n ts  
s tu d y in g  L C C  in 
L y c é e s
p ro fe s s io n n e ls  
(v o c a tio n a l 
tra in in g  h igh  
s c h o o l)
T o t a l  o f
s tu d e n t s
s tu d y in g
L C C  in
S e c o n d a r y
E d u c a t io n
2 0 0 0 -
2 0 0 1
1 9 ,6 1 4
(7 8 .0 9 %  o f all 
s tu d e n ts )
604
(50 .08% )
6 ,408
(51 .63% )
8 9 6 (1 5 .3 6 % ) 895  (3 7 .4 5% ) 8 ,19 9
(3 9 .7 4 % )
2 0 0 1 -
2 0 0 2
N o statistics 
available
No
statistics
available
7 ,017
(55 .08% )
8 8 7 (1 5 .9 9 % ) 2 ,27 6  (4 3 .2 8% ) 8 ,88 9
(4 3 .2 3 % )
2 0 0 2 -
2 0 0 3
20 ,031
(8 4 .6 4 % )
619
(54 .66% )
7 ,108
(52 .1% )
1 ,1 1 7 (1 8 .3 % ) 451 (3 8 .3% ) 8 ,6 7 6
(4 1 .4 3 % )
2 0 0 3 -
2 0 0 4
20,031
(8 4 .6 4 % )
619
(54 .66% )
6 ,733
(48 .03% )
1 ,1 4 3 (1 8 .5 % ) 828  (3 7 .7% ) 8 ,7 0 4
(3 8 .9 4 % )
Table 6: Primary LCC education provision and attendance - Secondary LCC 
education attendance (source: Rectorat; http://www.ac-
corse.fr/communication/stat/Statistiques.htm: accessed June 25,h 2004)
As this table indicates, LCC education now involves almost all primary school 
students despite the fact that only half of primary schoolteachers teach LCC. 
However, the provision of three hours a week applies to only 16% of pupils, the rest 
benefiting from an average of two hours (Journal de la Corse, March 22nd-28th 2002: 
6-7). With the creation of a special exam to recruit LCC-specific primary 
schoolteachers since 2002, these figures should nonetheless increase in coming years.
In secondary education, results remain more mixed with high enrolment rates during 
the first two years of collèges (for which enrolment is automatic and opting out 
requires a written request) but a significant fall from the third year in collèges™. At 
lycée level where enrolment is no longer automatic, rates also fall, although this fall is 
somewhat less marked in vocational education where LCC enrolment remains higher. 
This seems to indicate that students destined to working and lower middle class 
positions are keener to learn Corsican, perhaps because in those social strata Corsican 
speaking retains a higher value. Interestingly in that connection, a 2000 article by 
President of the Assemblée consultative body, entitled Dix ans pour réussir, lamented 230
230 The Rectorat’s statistics indicate that the rate o f enrolment between the second and third year in 
collèges fell from 68.54% to 27.30% (2000-2001), from 72.3% to 35.68% (2001-2002), from 71 8% to 
32.8% (2002-2003) and from 66% to 33.4% (2003-2004).
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that elite and bourgeois classes seem less interested in LCC education, essentially 
because of the lower market value of Corsican. This is perhaps also due to the 
ongoing perceived political overtones of Corsican speaking: speaking Corsican is still 
marked as a nationalist political statement. All this reflects varying parental attitudes 
(with differentiations according socio-professional categories that echo the survey 
results above) regarding the institutionalisation of the language now that provision is 
more widely available, and enrolment practices significantly conflict with discourses 
according to which a large majority of Corsicans - 62% according to a 2000 opinion 
poll - actually support mandatory Corsican language education (Corsica, January 
2000: 12).
In her detailed account of the mid-1980s debates surrounding mandatory Corsican 
language education, Jaffe reports on the large variety of opinions - pro- or anti- 
mandatory language education - among both elites and the population, and she shows 
that these opinions are grounded in a wide array of attitudes towards the 
institutionalisation of language and towards the various values linked to the freedom 
of choice in matters relating to language use (see Jaffe, 1999:170-177 and next 
chapter). In other words, language revitalisation is not merely a matter of reversing 
diglossic language asymmetries by extending the boundaries of Corsican’s official 
domains of use, but it also involves various, often antagonistic, attitudes that can 
potentially hinder the implementation of language plans.
This chapter has shown that glottopolitical powers have been largely devolved to 
Corsican activists in devolved institutions. To some extent, the Corsican Assembly’s 
1983 failed attempt to make Corsican a compulsory subject at school and the later 
attempt to prompt French-Corsican co-officiality were somewhat compensated by the 
de facto generalisation of Corsican language education in secondary schools and 
higher education. However, although the generalisation of LCC provision guarantees 
that a certain freedom of choice regarding LCC education can be exercised in schools, 
it does not guarantee that this freedom will be exercised. The amalgamation of the 
possibility of choice and of the actual exercise of choice is tantamount to assuming 
that the desire for institutionalised language education is universal. Moreover, as was 
reiterated by Kristol and Thiers above (p. 240) and as Jaffe’s study constantly 
emphasizes (Jaffe, 1999), and as the statistics on school attendance presented in this
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chapter confirm, the discrepancy between discourses on language use - what people 
say that they do or want - and actual language behaviour must be taken into account: 
the discourse on mandatory language education - 62% of opinions favourable to it - 
does not necessarily translate into 62% of pupils attending LCC classes. In that 
connection, the shift noted above (p. 236) from the generalised possibility to the 
eventual quasi-imposition of LCC education triggered unexpected forms of popular 
disinterest and/or resistance to language institutionalisation, which quantitative data 
on the continuous decline of language use and mixed patterns of school attendance 
tends to confirm.
As was claimed in chapter 1, and as will be illustrated in detail in the next chapter, in 
the very design of language plans, language planners must give careful consideration 
to the various folk ideologies at play in a given situation, and the attitudes they 
determine (and to the fact that people may behave in complex, and sometimes 
inconsistent, ways). Although people are not policy actors strictu sensu, language 
policy acceptance (as shaped by political and/or language ideologies), or the lack 
thereof, ultimately conditions language policy success or failure, as chapter 9 
dramatically shows.
Conclusion
The 1970s attested to mass popular mobilisation for the language led by nationalist 
movements. This resulted in greater tolerance from the state towards the teaching of 
all France’s regional languages and cultures, even though this was initially enacted 
through limited legal provisions and modest and uneven structural and 
implementation measures. At a symbolic level though, these measures constituted a 
giant step that began to meet nationalist language demands and was therefore 
instrumental in divorcing the language question from the more radical political claims 
with which it had been conflated from the late 1960s and to a large extent around the 
Deixonne Law issue. In this way, the state treated Corsican on the same terms as 
France’s other RMLs and could thereby significantly undermine nationalists’ 
mobilising claims that Corsicans were systematically discriminated against. 
Nevertheless, as a Corsican stage actor observed in 1986, under the socialist 
government allegedly more prone to promote RMLs: ‘ [...] la situation [de la langue]
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n ’a fait qu’empirer [...] le pouvoir actuel, en récupérant la revendication culturelle 
tout en la vidant de son contenu politique, est en train de donner à l ’assimilation le 
dernier coup d ’accélérateur.’ (Quoted in Marchetti, 1989: 212) The law’s central 
emphasis on the voluntary basis for such teaching, both for teachers and families, 
meant that the state initially accompanied rather than directed teaching initiatives. The 
responsibility for language reacquisition was thus reattributed to Corsicans 
themselves and the limited results initially obtained soon entailed new demands from 
language activists, i.e. mandatory LCC education and co-officiality.
From the 1980s, new public institutional structures were created which catalysed the 
emergence of a Corsican language policy network. Within this network, in addition to 
central state authorities, the dominant actors have since been the political 
representatives and members of the consultative body of the Corsican assembly on the 
one hand, and civil servants from the Rectorat and university and IUFM lecturers, and 
among them sociolinguists, on the other. The former deal essentially with issues of 
status but with limited political outcomes; the latter have largely captured the corpus 
planning process and, in general, deal with the interpretation of national law and/or 
the implementation of the new educational provisions. Thus, new institutionalised 
elites largely took over the revitalisation process from civil society’s organisations, 
and in particular from language associations with a nationalist agenda (e.g. Scola 
Corsa), even though the re-birth of cultural forms of language promotion (e.g. with 
polyphonic bands and in performing arts) has continued to diffuse a more or less 
radical nationalist discourse. However, Corsica constitutes a unique case among the 
largest French RML communities in that Corsica’s associative schools have almost 
disappeared.
This absence of associative initiatives may originate from its political history under 
the French umbrella, when it was maintained in a greater state of dependence vis-à-vis 
state administration from an early stage than other regions (see chapter 6) and, as was 
noted above, the resulting apathy may help partially explain the lack of interest for 
EU support among language activists. One consequence of that enduring, exclusive 
reliance on state intervention has been that, in the absence of associative initiatives, 
those actors who occupy public positions from which they promote RMLs have a 
quasi-monopoly of control over public resources and structures/institutions (i.e.
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schools). Because of their institutional position, their freedom of expression may be 
more constrained but, on the other hand, having prime access to public resources for 
RML confers them a dominant status on which (natural) forms of resistance to (their) 
institutional authority can in turn focus (see chapter 9).
Notwithstanding, most importantly, Corsican has penetrated formerly out-of-reach 
diglossie domains of use: the media and in particular education. The quantitative 
impact of the former has remained rather limited but, in education, the status and 
presence of Corsican improved to an extent unprecedented and unequalled in other 
French regional communities. This perhaps also partially explains why language 
planners have not looked up to the EU to find RML support: the EU has little to offer 
in terms of RML support and Corsican activists have already obtained the maximum 
that can be retrieved from current national RML legislation. By contrast with the other 
French RML communities, indeed, and thanks to ‘zealous’ state education executives, 
the provision of LCC education is about to become almost universal on the island and 
LCC has become the default choice, to such an extent that it can arguably be seen as a 
form of quasi-mandatory provision. Despite such structural improvements, activists 
still lament the decrease in the use of Corsican and the perceived disengagement of 
the population, illustrated by the quantitative data examined. This disengagement is 
especially marked among certain sociological and socio-professional categories, 
which may bring about the imminent death of Corsican if the community does not 
accompany and supplement structural and institutional achievements.
The next chapter will seek to explain why the 1970s massive discursive support for 
institutionalisation has apparently failed to be sustained and transformed into actual 
support for LCC education from the 1980s. As this chapter illustrates it cannot be 
blamed on the absence of structures or funds.
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Chapter 9: Language Ideologies, Language Planning and Language Attitudes
in Contemporary Corsica
Introduction
In this final chapter, I explore the various ideologies underlying Corsican language 
debates and language-targeting decisions, status and corpus planning measures. Thus, 
I propose another, complementary reading to the previous chapters, focusing on the 
different ideological and normative positions on language and language planning of
the local language network’s various actors, and on whose positions are hegemonic in 
the actual planning process.
After being a bone of contention between the region and central authorities, language 
revitalisation largely became an internal matter when its institutional organisation was 
devolved to regional actors. In this chapter, I show that this did away with the original 
large consensus that had formed around the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne 
Law. The initial wider (symbolic?) popular support for Corsican linked with 
nationalism dissolved, due to both the progressive disfavour of nationalist movements 
(see chapter 6) and the fact that once relocated into Corsicans’ hands the politics of 
language became more contested because LCC-related policy powers were captured 
by educational elites and to a lesser extent the traditional political class (see chapter 
8). These disputes may partially reflect the pattern suggested in chapters 6 and 8 
whereby, due to their ‘natural’ rejection of external authority, in their conflicts with 
outsider powers Corsicans tend to unite, whereas in internal politics divisions prevail. 
As institutional provisions for LCC were gradually secured, the language status 
question which had initially to do with Corsican being granted legal recognition, also 
became embedded in other, more corpus-based, issues linked to the principles and 
modalities of implementation of the LCC policy. A number of new issues became 
salient and increasingly divisive: Is Corsican a language? What should be the link 
between Corsican and Italian in the revitalisation strategy and process? How can
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language/dialectal diversity be tackled in education policy? What Corsican variety 
should be taught?
In this chapter, I identify what and whose answers to such questions have prevailed. 
In other words, I investigate which discourses on language and language planning are 
hegemonic in contemporary Corsica and I assess the amount of consensus built 
around that hegemony. My ultimate aims are to understand what the dominant order 
of discourse on language and language planning is in contemporary Corsica, to 
scrutinise the resistant discourses in that order, and to analyse the policy outcomes of 
discursive struggles in their implication for the revitalisation process, and eventually 
to examine how Corsica’s internal glottopolitical dynamics affect the interaction 
between the local and supra-local levels.
In the first section, I broadly contrast two largely antithetical models of language, 
identity, and their interrelation: the ‘diglossic’ model and the ‘polynomic’ model. I 
first review the set of norms and attitudes persisting from the earlier hegemony of the 
diglossic model and the problems they posed in the Corsican context, and then outline 
the theoretical contours of the polynomic approach as an alternative, plural model of 
language, identity and language planning. The polynomic model has been largely 
promoted by language planners since the 1980s in an attempt to overcome some of the 
problems created by a language planning framework based upon diglossic ideology, 
and eventually to gain the popular support so sorely needed for language 
revitalisation. In the following sections, I show that, although the polynomic model 
has become dominant in educational practice, it faces a large amount of constestation. 
Specifically, I sketch three forms of resistance to language planning efforts embedded 
in various ways in the diglossic model and its essentialist assumptions: what I call, 
after Jaffe (1999), the ‘resistance of separation’, the Italianist position and language 
purism. In doing so, I show that all language models posit the equation of national 
unity with language unity, but that they differ radically in their conception of 
linguistic unity. In the following section on the implementation of the polynomic 
model in education and its limitations, I then show that some of the thorniest issues 
dividing Corsicans have to do with the dialectics of linguistic unity and diversity and 
the meaning of that dialectics for definitions of language and the modalities of its 
planning. In the final section, I then focus on what elite and popular reactions to these
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have been, largely basing my analysis on press-mediated debates on Corsican 
language status and corpus planning gathered during my fieldwork on the island in 
2000-2001. In the conclusion, I tentatively delineate routes of evolution of the 
Corsican sociolinguistic situation on the island and then in the broader trans-regional 
and supranational contexts.
Contrasted Models o f  Language and Identity for Language Planning: Diglossie 
Ideology and the Polynomic Response
Chapter 1 showed that as a synchronic structural-functional concept, diglossia has 
limited value in that it gives only a very coarse picture of the functional distribution of 
languages, and says little about actual language repertoires and language practices. 
Looking diachronically at the construction of diglossie situations does reveal the 
process whereby language status inequalities are established as a correlate of the 
construction of political inequalities between language groups, and thus helps 
understand the establishment and contemporary functioning of political economies of 
language. Yet even historically-informed analyses of glottopolitical economies say 
little about actual language practices
In the account of the processes of construction of Corsican-French diglossia, I evoked 
the range of essentialist discourses on the link between language and nation and on 
language itself that the architects of diglossia summoned and instrumentalised (see 
chapters 1 and 5). These discourses contributed to secure the dominance of French 
political and linguistic identities, to the detriment of Italian and then Corsican political 
and linguistic identities. However, dominated identities did not disappear altogether, 
glottophagy was incomplete and resistant political and linguistic ideologies became 
salient, borne by regionalist and nationalist groups. As was claimed in chapter 6, the 
political philosophy invoked by the nationalist groups seeking to secure a popular 
basis to legitimise their political claims at various times of nationalist upsurges was 
embedded in the romantic, cultural model of language nationalism that had taken root 
in Corsica during the nineteenth century (chapter 7).
In their opposition to the state, nationalists called upon the cultural model of the 
nation in order to claim a separate Corsican identity, thus reinforcing the French-
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Corsican diglossic binary model of opposition in which Corsican-ness is defined as 
everything that French-ness is not, and vice versa. Ultimately, their purpose was to 
reverse language shift by revitalising the Corsican identity through the institutional 
promotion of the Corsican language. They tapped into their experience of how French 
had come to dominate and applied the same method to Corsican. This is what Jaffe 
called the resistance o f reversal (1999: chapter 1). The previous chapter showed that 
the basic strategy consisted in installing Corsican into High diglossic domains. To do 
so, literacy - the passage to writing - and language standardisation and elaboration - 
were key goals to attain to prove that Corsican was a language (recall the initial 
objections to the inclusion of Corsican in the Deixonne Law on the grounds that it 
was not yet unified nor codified in chapter 7) and could thus fulfil all High diglossic 
functions: literary expression, education, media communication, etc. However, as 
Jaffe usefully highlights, this strategy reproduced the dominant set of values 
underlying the diglossic ideology they had internalised, rather than challenged its 
fundamental tenets about the nature of language (Jaffe, 1999). As a result, before such 
key goals were attained, the problem for Corsican activists was that Corsican varieties 
fulfilled none of the linguistic criteria for ‘language-mss': Corsican had no apparent 
unity, it was mainly characterised by infinite geographical variation, it had no 
standard form and no literary models (ibid: 24 ff).
In short, nationalists claimed some political legitimacy and sought popular support by 
summoning a separate, Corsican identity indexed by a distinct language but, in doing 
so, embraced the very strategy and values that had served to devalue their own 
identity and values and to dismiss Corsican’s status as a language. With such a 
paradoxical attitude, they faced significant popular resistance to their strategy which 
this chapter later examines as the ‘resistance of separation’.
To respond to the urgency of the situation, some Corsican activists proposed a model 
of language in which language-ness would also be based on unity, but where unity 
would not be conceived as uniformity as in traditional models of standardisation. 
Rather, they suggested adopting a plural model of language unification based on the 
notion of unity in diversity rather than conceiving unity as uniformity. This model 
was then fostered by the Corsican sociolinguists dominating the Corsican language
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policy network from the mid-1980s. It was predicated on the concept of polynomic 
languages.
The concept was first coined at a 1983 symposium by Marcellesi but, arguably, it is 
implicit in Geronimi and Marchetti’s 1971 definition of the Corsican language in their 
proposal for a spelling/pronunciation system that could almost exhaustively account 
for all Corsican varieties, Intricciate e Cambierini:
Nous appelons langue corse la somme de tous les parlers, distingués entre eux 
par de minces variantes, qui sont utilisés sur le territoire de l ’île de Corse [...] 
nous rejetons ‘l ’idée préconçue d ’une clarification par réduction à des formes 
idéales’ [...] Nous estimons que si l ’uniformisation ne peut être que l ’effet 
d ’un usage constant, général et prolongé de la langue, V ‘unification’, au 
demeurant irréaliste, serait un appauvrissement résultant d'amputations 
décidées par des juges dont on se demande qui les instituerait tels, et qu ’à bon 
droit les usagers du corse se hâteraient de récuser,231
Marcellesi’s 1983 definition of polynomic languages referred to:
[...] les langues dont l unité est abstraite et résulte d ’un mouvement 
dialectique et non de la simple ossification d ’une norme unique, et dont 
l ’existence est fondée sur la décision massive de ceux qui la parlent de lui 
donner un nom particulier et de la déclarer autonome des autres langues 
reconnues... (1983: 314).
Both approaches rest upon the refusal to establish a single, arbitrary norm and endorse 
the fact that there can be language unity in dialectal diversity. The former leaves open 
the possibility for a uniform variety to emerge naturally in the long run - a koine - and 
re-emphasizes the importance of non-authoritative attitudes. The latter relates the very 
existence of the language to the popular will to identify it as autonomous and distinct 
from other languages. As Marchetti (1989: 195), citing Thiers (1986: 19-20), recalls,
231 As DiMeglio (1997: 157) indicates, this spelling system has been almost universally acclaimed in 
Corsica within ten years after its publication. For an early illustration o f the deconstruction o f the idea 
that variation hinders obtaining the status o f  a language, see also Thiers (1977, cited by DiMeglio 
1997:148). ’
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however, the notion of popular will, found in Heinz Kloss’s theory of language 
elaboration, ‘[...] n ’est pas toujours l ’expression d ’une majorité de parlants, ni celles 
des membres de toutes les couches de la population concernée’ and he adds that 
popular will can be ‘[...] l'opinion d ’une partie de la classe moyenne, et plus 
particulièrement d ’une intelligentsia.’ For Marchetti, the limited nature of ‘popular 
will’ delegitimises its possible role in the birth of the Corsican language. It is, he 
claims, little more than a theoretical creation of language activists with nationalist 
inclinations, to legitimate their politicisation of the language situation (ibid: 195-196). 
In subsequent definitions of the polynomic character of languages, its proponents 
have then increasingly insisted on the centrality of the social psychological criterion 
of tolerance towards and within diversity and objection to any form of linguistic 
hiérarchisation. As Marcellesi (1989: 170; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 185) writes:
[A polynomic language is] une langue à l ’unité abstraite à laquelle ses 
utilisateurs reconnaissent plusieurs modalités d ’existence, toutes également 
tolérées sans qu’il y  ait entre elles hiérarchisation ou spécialisation de 
fonction. Elle s ’accompagne de l ’intertolérance entre utilisateurs de variétés 
différentes sur les plans phonologiques et morphologiques, de même que la 
multiplicité lexicale est conçue par ailleurs comme un élément de richesse.
The notion of polynomic languages thus underscores the refusal to create a hierarchy 
between linguistic varieties for and through standardisation processes. In theory, thus, 
it seems to offer solutions to one of the premises underlying Corsicans’ resistance to 
authority and hiérarchisations: with a plural norm, there is no need for selection and 
all varieties are equally valued. As opposed to diglossic ideological attitudes and 
values, polynomic attitudes thus seek to de-stigmatise dialectal loyalty and linguistic 
diversity by representing them as richness rather than as problems, and therefore as 
compatible with Corsican’s status as a language. Put otherwise, polynomic theory 
implies attitudes of inter-tolerance directly opposed to diglossic ideas of linguistic 
hiérarchisation based upon praise or stigmatisation, and it is anchored in people’s 
practices.
Yet, as we will see below, the implementation of polynomic theory in the educational 
system requires establishing some limits to variation and diversity. The polynomic
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approach to how language should be conceptualised in a minority language 
revitalisation situation like Corsica can thus be located somewhere on a ‘language 
status’ continuum between a diglossic model presenting an idealised vision of 
language repertoires where languages are monolithic, bounded and distinct, and 
ethnographic accounts of language performance showing that languages are 
polymorphous and that mixed codes are central in minorities’ language repertoires.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that language planners of the sociolinguistic school 
of thought seeking to promote such a practice-based model of language and language 
planning as polynomy have encountered both elite and popular resistance to language 
planning due to this wide discrepancy between deeprooted diglossic representations of 
language use and actual language practices.
In popular discourses on language (i.e. metalinguistic discourses), indeed, the binary, 
oppositional dichotomisation of linguistic systems is often fiercely maintained against 
ethnographic evidence of plural language uses (i.e. code mixing and code switching; 
for empirical evidence, see Thiers, 1989: 70-115 and Jaffe, 1999: 108-117) because of 
the symbolic weight language practices acquire in a diglossic ideological framework: 
language practices become a metaphor for political identities and loyalties. This 
further attests to the ideological force of diglossic ideology with its fundamental, 
essentialist logic of separation of both languages and cultural and/or political 
identities. By contrast, the polynomic framework implies that this dichotomisation is a 
construct and by showing that, in situations of language contact, languages are often 
mixed, it is suggested that identities too can be mixed and/or plural.
I now show that one main source of resistance to language planning, as it developed 
in Corsica, is linked to the internalisation of the diglossic model of oppositional 
identities which, following Jaffe (1999), I call the resistance o f separation. This 
attitude is to be found amongst some of the remaining native speakers who, according 
to the evidence of table 4 above (chapter 8, p. 242), were/are spoken to in Corsican in 
‘Low’ diglossic domains and who have managed to pass it on ‘naturally’. Typically, 
they do not abide by moderate or radical nationalist claims for Corsican’s co- 
officialisation and want to keep Corsican in the private sphere.
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The Resistance o f Separation
The resistance of separation’ is a direct social psychological product of the processes 
that have led to the Corsican-French diglossie situation. In Corsica, it refers to the 
resistance to the imposition of French-ness at the political and linguistic levels 
outlined in the previous three chapters.
We saw that diglossia was produced by the French nationalist dichotomisation of 
language versus dialect, in which the French language was glorified, inter alia 
because of its (uni-)formal qualities, and the ‘dialects’ stigmatised for the opposite 
reason. Paradoxically, however, these normative, hierarchical grounds for separation 
helped preserve Corsican and Corsican-ness from everything French-ness embodied 
and sought to assimilate. This is what Bourdieu (1991) calls the alternative market232: 
whereas in the market dominated by French hierarchies Corsican varieties and 
Corsican-ness were devalued, Corsicans maintained a parallel market in which 
Corsican-ness could retain its value. In this reactive alternative market, discourses 
reinforce group boundaries in such ways that French-ness cannot permeate them: in 
discourse Corsican-ness crystallises as everything French-ness is not233. Within this 
dichotomy, any link between language and identity remains natural, local and 
typically rural, and non-hierarchical, and communication is exclusively oral.
Thus, the resistance of separation endorses the biological essentialist theory of the 
nation in which language, as the primary marker of identity, is acquired naturally as 
the ‘mother-tongue’: 7c corse ne s ’apprend pas à l ’école’ (Thiers, 1989: 238). The 
groups who take pride in having maintained family transmission perceive 
institutionalisation as dispossessing in that the very process contradicts the existence 
of Corsican as a natural feature of the Corsican nation - i.e. the mother tongue image. 
Of course, it is now established that Corsican is no longer anyone’s ‘mother tongue’ 
(which in diglossie essentialism implies exclusive early monolingualism in Corsican) 
although it is sometimes still family-transmitted. Thus, for sociolinguists like Thiers 
(1989: 242), it matters to raise popular awareness of the dichotomy between the
232 For a similar pattern and concept, see also Hechter’s theory o f reactive ethnic group formation 
(1975).
233 For other examples o f the logic o f  total opposition, see McDonald (1989) on Brittany and Woolard 
(1989) on Catalonia.
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‘mother tongue’ image that symbolically reflects the collective identity function of 
language but is today un-real, and the plural reality of language practices and 
sometimes of language transmission. Further, from the deep-rooted essentialist 
equation ‘one language = one culture = one nation’, substituting the state for the 
family implies denying the naturalness of language transmission which, Jaffe suggests 
(1999: 125), has the following implication: ‘no language = no culture = no nation.’ 
Institutionalisation can thus be de-authenticating.
Paradoxically, institutionalisation can also deprive Corsican of prestige in that only 
very restricted intellectual elite groups, and not the bulk of the Corsican -speaking 
population, possess a command of the institutionalised, written Corsican language. In 
redefining Corsican as a written medium used in High diglossic domains, and 
therefore in transposing Corsican into the strongly hierarchised world of French 
values, the alternative Corsican values of orality, informality and tradition become 
relegated to a position of secondary importance. The institutionalisation of the 
language through writing can thus be seen as an attempt by some newly-emerged 
intellectual class to establish new power hierarchies, with the result that their 
discourse of language democracy is simply not heard (see below).
As was claimed above, the question of mixed forms is interesting because it illustrates 
the discrepancy between actual practices and discursive positioning. Whereas mixed 
forms are highly stigmatised in the dominant linguistic market, in the alternative 
market they are common practice and *[...] index a (minority) community o f use 
defined by its ability to manipulate more than one language ’ (Jaffe, 1999: 26). Whilst 
constructing a new form of minority identity, therefore, local plural uses also question 
and challenge dominant views of language as monolithic and bounded. However, in 
discourse, the unity/purity and exclusive integrity of minority language use as a 
reflection of the separation of identities can be fiercely defended (see Thiers’ fable 
d ’identité, 1989: chapter 11). As Jaffe (1999:29) puts it:
[...] The diglossic schema [...] comprises multiple and conflicting values 
attached to both Corsican and French that are in simultaneous operation in 
Corsica. The coexistence o f these competing discourses means that in actual 
practice, dominant and alternative linguistic marketplaces are not always
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clearly delineated. [...] These moments o f integration o f plural identities, 
however, are seldom articulated in the public discussion o f language and 
identity.
And she adds (ibid: 31):
[...] explicit linguistic ideology seems to bolster the simple, exclusionary 
nature o f the binary model, even though people express contradictory opinions 
and behave in complicated ways. This is [...] one o f the reasons that literary 
and academic justification o f a plural model o f language identity fall on deaf 
ears: they keep the focus at the metadiscursive level where the hold o f  
dominant language ideology seems to be difficult to avoid.
Other motivations underlying the resistance of separation include the denial that 
language planning is necessary, even when it is aimed at the survival of Corsican234, 
or even legitimate. Regarding the latter, as a form of exertion of political power and 
therefore authority, institutionalisation and planning indeed run counter to the non- 
authoritative value system of the alternative market, and passive or active resistance 
to this system sustains a consistent logic of total or partial opposition. The resistance 
of separation therefore thwarts the resistance of reversal and rejects hierarchy and 
authority at all costs, even to the risk of language death. The refusal of Corsican 
Assemblymen to vote for obligatory bilingualism and mandatory Corsican language 
education (1985) and co-offxciality (1989) may be interpreted as an illustration of that 
logic whereby the natural, un-institutional, non-authoritative value of Corsican 
initially precluded its official imposition (chapter 8, p. 233; see also Jaffe, 1999: 170- 
177).
Finally, and most importantly in a context where linguistic identity remains 
predominantly local, the institutionalisation of the language through education (even 
in a polynomic approach as will be seen below) triggers a process of code selection 
for standardisation, which will alienate the speakers of all un-chosen varieties. 
Additionally, other channels of language elaboration may also clash with traditional
234 In that connection, having maintained it themselves, Corsican ‘natural’ speakers often deny that it is 
in danger and can altogether dismiss the need for language planning.
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registers of use so that radical forms of the resistance of separation can entail 
‘separatist’ reflexes against the creation of new domains of language use (e.g. TV, the 
radio, etc; see below). In brief, the resistance of separation can manifest itself in 
attitudes towards both the socio-political status of the language and its corpus, and can 
be expressed in more or less radical ways. In all its numerous guises, it is immersed in 
diglossic ideology.
In the two following sections, I return to the initial, more corpus-based objections to 
including Corsican in the Deixonne Law and to the institutionalisation of Corsican 
from both the legislators and some proportion of the Corsican people. I explore issues 
linked to linguistic kinship with Italian and to purist challenges to language 
revitalisation processes.
Language o f  France or Dialect o f Italian? The Italianist Position
The objections to Corsican’s inclusion in the Deixonne law were dual: first, it was not 
a language but a group of dialects; second, it was a group of dialects of Italian. The 
first task for activists was to respond to these two objections. I dealt with the issue of 
Corsican’s status as a language in the opening section above. With reference to 
linguistic kinship with Italian, this has remained a hot potato in activist milieus to 
date: how close/distant is Corsican to/from Italian?
Following Jaffe (1989: 132-133), I believe that it is not possible to discuss the kinship 
issue only in strict linguistic terms because the selection of particular linguistic 
criteria of assessment (e.g. syntax) rather than others (e.g. lexis) cannot remain 
politically and ideologically neutral. Linguistic boundaries serve to establish 
boundaries between identities and are therefore inherently political and ideological. 
As Comiti (1992: 57) writes:
L ’essentiel n ’est pas de savoir ce qui rapproche les langues romanes [...] 
mais plutôt ce qui les distingue suffisamment aujourd’hui, pour pouvoir dire 
qu ’il s'agit de langues différentes.
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He thus implicitly acknowledges that the identification of some ‘sufficient’ difference 
is subjective and therefore ideological. But were the features that serve to emphasize 
the distance today non-existent yesterday or was there rather no political will to solicit 
them? Echoing Walker Connor’s (1990; excerpt reproduced in Hutchinson and Smith, 
1994: 154-159) question when is a nation? one could ask: when is a different 
language? When does a variety cease being a dialect? The answer can only be 
political and ideological; therefore it ought to be acknowledged upfront as a 
political/ideological decision. As Letia (Corsica, January 2000: 62) puts it: Entre 
langues voisines, l ’affirmation d ’une langue autonome est un choix d'ordre social et 
politique. The question then becomes: what political/ideological purposes do uses of 
the essentialist discourse on language and identity serve?
The issue of the nature of Corsican’s linguistic kinship with Italian - assertions of 
linguistic distance or closeness - largely predates the 1970s cultural revival. As we 
saw in chapter 7, during the 19 century Corsican and Italian were perceived as two 
varieties of the same linguistic system, by both the people and some acclaimed 
intellectuals hesitating between France and Italy (e.g. Tommaseo, Viale). This is still 
the Italianists’ position today (Marchetti, 1989 and 1997). At the turn of the century, 
the move towards Corsican’s individuation actually came from two directions with 
two contradictory purposes. First, Santu Casanova’s A Tramuntana empirically 
‘invented’ Corsican as a journalistic and literary language and as a cultural substitute 
for fading Italian, thus signing one of the birth certificates of Corsican regionalism 
through the individuation of a language of the Corsican nation. Second, the French 
state also invoked linguistic distance between Corsican and Italian - implicitly 
endorsing the individuality of Corsican - but as a means to dismiss Italian (Thiers, 
1989: 28-29). In both cases, linguistic individuation was strategic or political. By the 
same token, the interwar review L ’Annu Corsu advocated maximum distance from 
Italian in order to oppose the strategic discourse of kinship adopted by Fascist 
irredentism (which the Muvrists had endorsed; see chapter 7, pp. 213-214). Similarly, 
in the post-WWII context, as the state then invoked again linguistic kinship with 
Italian but as a reason for excluding Corsican from the Deixonne Law, Corsican 
cultural revivalists sought again to dismiss linguistic kinship between Corsican and 
Italian (Fusina, 1994). In the 1970s again, as was said above, activists had to prove 
that Corsican was not (any longer?) a dialect of Italian and, as Jaffe (1999; 136 «&
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141) illustrates, even in the 1990s they had to face objections to the ‘language’ status 
of Corsican, from both state officials and Corsicans.
The Italianist voice nevertheless reappeared in the late 1980s, in part because of the 
perception by some that Corsican was increasingly ‘bastardised’ by French 
interference (see the discussion of the Casanova Report in chapter 8 and of purism 
below). The Italianists’ emblematic figure is Pascal Marchetti, a linguist, language 
historian and journalist, opposed to the individuation of Corsican from Italian. In La 
Corsophonie, a history of the Corsican language, he largely documents Corsican’s 
linguistic and sociolinguistic debt to Italian. In the late 1980s he was followed by a 
significant number of intellectuals who petitioned for the teaching and learning of 
Italian and/or objected to the instrumental, sometimes ‘constructed’ distantiation 
between the two .
The Italianist position largely rests on the essentialist position discussed in chapter 7: 
‘l ’italien n ’est pas pour nous une langue étrangère mais la langue de notre histoire 
et de notre culture [ ...] ’ (Poli, 1989; quoted by Jaffe, 1999: 137). Two points are 
never questioned: Corsican and Italian are mutually intelligible, and the knowledge of 
Italian gives access to Corsica’s whole written tradition - historical, literary and legal - 
before French annexation. From that essentialist perspective, Italian thus constitutes a 
historical reference point in that it anchors Corsican in its antique, cultural cradle, and 
also in its linguistic structure from which, Italianists say, French has begun to uproot 
it (Casanova, 1996; cited by Jaffe, ibid: 139-140). As Mondoloni (Corse-Matin, 
March 2001) put it, following Marchetti’s publication (2001a) - L ’Usu Corsu, a 
Corsican-Italian-French lexicon:
[...] Marchetti est [...] la conscience linguistique et critique de la 
Corse [...] D ’où ce soucis de ne pas couper le corse de ses racines 
évidentes et naturelles; d ’où aussi ce refus constant du calque 
paresseux qui, sous prétexte de faire survivre la langue, ne saurait que 
l ’appauvrir en l ’altérant un peu plus. 235
235 See also the various positions expressed in the Italian-medium, pro-ltalian Corsican magazine A 
Viva Voce created in 1993. F magazine A
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The Italianist position flatteringly and devotedly expressed here is thus also a form of 
language purism calling upon natural and obvious roots’ and refusing to endorse 
linguistic interference from French that is perceived to impoverish the language and 
end up killing it. In that connection, when interviewed a few weeks later and asked if 
Corsican could survive, after vituperating against code mixing and the sociolinguists 
(see below), Marchetti further stated:
Oui, si par un enseignement conjoint et m e pratique simultanée des deux 
registres on renoue courageusement avec la langue mère, dénominateur 
commun et indispensable contrepoids pour équilibrer l'autre plateau de la 
balance qu’occupe solidement le français [...] (JDC, March 2nd-8th 2001) 
(Emphasis added)
Also interesting in Marchetti’s quote above, although this may seem paradoxical, is 
how essentialism can also be summoned to establish a difference between Italian and 
Corsican by emphasizing that Italian is Corsican’s ‘mother language’ understood as 
its standardised variety and actually the standardised variety of the whole Italian 
world {dénominateur commun). For Marchetti, this locates the unity of Corsican 
varieties in Italian and the latter has instrumental value in that it can thwart French on 
its own (Linguistic? cultural? political? all together?) terms236.
Implicitly, however, this undermines the idea that Corsican possesses a cultural 
existence on its own (recall Thiers’ quotation on Italian jeopardizing Corsican via 
hegemony whereas French threatened it via glottophagy, p. 204). Further, the 
subordination of Corsican to Italian has inclined some Italianists to define the future 
role of Corsican as an auxiliary to the Italian language like Alsatian is an auxiliary to 
German (Peretti, 1995: 1) and to underscore Corsican’s important role at the dawn of 
newly-defined trans-regional relations within the framework of the European Union 
(e.g. through the INTERREG European exchange programme)237. In educational 
practice, as was indicated in chapter 8, the Corsican/Italian association has been
236 See also Jaffe (1999: 139-140)
237 Corsica receives about € 15 million for cross-border exchanges as part o f  the EU budget for the 
development program Interreg III A - Italy/French Islands. These exchanges involve Corsica, Tuscany 
and Sardegna and can serve to fund various cultural and/or academic events. See 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional policv/countrv/prordn/details.cfm?gy PAY=FR&nw re<*=AL 
l.&gy PGM=2000RG160PC015&LAN=5: accessed November 2004.
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implemented through the Mediterranean classes (in which Corsican is taught in 
parallel with Romance languages such as Italian and Spanish)238.
Of course, seeing Corsican pragmatically as a mere auxiliary for learning Italian 
denies that Corsican is autonomous, with a cultural personality of its own, and 
therefore a cultural value - in the Whorfian sense - per se (and ultimately a political 
value - in the Fichtean sense - for nationalists). For Geronimi, this is the heart of the 
dispute: he posits that the only value of the Corsican language is to actualise a specific 
Corsican identity and worldview and dismisses its pragmatic value for accessing the 
Italian culture: ‘[...] autrement on devrait apprendre directement l ’italien'. 
(Geronimi, May 2001)
The subordination of Corsican to Italian, finally, also implicitly expresses an anti­
nationalist position which has further crystallised antagonistic views of language(s) 
and political identities amongst Corsicans, and incidentally, denies twenty five years 
of militant, nationalist rhetoric and planning efforts. As Létia writes:
Il s ’agirait apparemment de conclure à l ’échec de l ’action pour faire du corse 
une langue à part entière, et de reconstituer un couple langue-dialecte entre 
italien et corse [...] (Corsica, January 2000: 63).
It is therefore anachronistic, as Létia’s use of the conditional mood satirically shows: 
the autonomy of Corsican has largely been built and there is no turning back. 
Arguably, it nevertheless reflects a major source of division between the elites on the 
legitimacy of Corsican cultural nationalism (in both its moderate and radical forms) 
and further undermines the chances for popular support to language planning.
The next section sketches the position of language planners towards another major 
theme of debate in Corsican language activism, which is a most prominent 
manifestation of linguistic essentialism: language purism. As I argue in the 
subsequent and last section this also constitutes an obstacle to successful language 
planning.
238 A s a more recent synthesis o f arguments in favour o f  the massive réintroduction o f  Italian in the 
school system, see Vinciguerra’s quotation, p. 228.
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Language Purism and the Sociolinguistic Response
In the Corsican context, language purism is a prescriptivist reaction against linguistic 
interference - semantic, syntactic, lexical and phonological - from French and, to a 
lesser extent, Italian. Like all forms of purism, it rests upon some ideology of an 
original, ideal state of the language from which any subsequent deviance can but be a 
‘bastardisation’ and thus an impoverishment. From a biological essentialist 
perspective, further, this bastardisation is related to a dilution of a perfect state of 
Corsican identity, its corruption by alien influences, and can therefore have nationalist 
overtones (see chapter 1). Linguistic impurities thus become a symptom of cultural in­
authenticity: the loss of traditional linguistic distinctions impoverishes the language 
and signals a loss of identity (Franchi, 1984 and 1988; quoted by Jaffe, 1989: 150). 
Put otherwise, language purism is a constitutive element of a radical diglossic attitude 
of separation in which both language and identities are and must remain bounded and 
exclusive.
Nevertheless, if one accepts the idea that the language must be elaborated to survive 
and that diglossic boundaries must disappear, from the purist viewpoint, language 
planners must revive authentic, but forgotten, vocabulary and coin new words using 
the language’s own morphological mechanisms to adapt it to the linguistic needs of 
modern life (see the actions of the ADECEC and Franchi’s description of the 
philosophy of Rigiru the main literary review in the 1970s, in Corsica, March 2000: 
57). In doing so, they participate in the effort to reverse language shift by providing 
the dominated language with the vocabulary to fulfil the functions formerly reserved 
for the dominant one. In this conception, language planners ought to help diffuse a 
model of correctness and authenticity after identifying pure original, uncorrupted 
forms (because they have been tasked with preserving authentic identities by 
preserving authentic language).
In line with diglossic compartmentalization, however, language purism can be more 
or less salient according to the degree of formality of the context. As an illustration of 
that kind of diglossic or ‘compartmentalized’ purism, a very eminent cultural and 
linguistic activist, once president of the Conseil de la Culture, de l’Education et du 
Cadre de Vie (CCECV), said:
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Moi quand je  discute avec quelqu'un dans la rue, il ne m'appartient pas de 
dire, il ne parle pas bien le corse ou il le parle bien ’. Mais je  considère 
qu aujourd hui que le corse n 'est plus du tout parlé et que nous ne 
l entendons plus qu à la radio et un peu à la télé, que ceux qui le parlent à la 
radio et à la télé soient tenus de parler un corse correct. C ’est ce que nous 
attendons de n ’importe quelle personne qui intervient à la radio en français. 
Maintenant dans la rue cela ne me dérange pas: moi je  discute du matin au 
soir avec des gens qui parlent corse qui mettent les trois quarts des mots en 
français, ou les structures, mais cela ne me regarde pas je  ne suis pas un juge. 
Mais je  dis que ceux qui ont en charge de faire écouter la langue, ceux qui ont 
en charge de l ’enseigner [...] eux doivent parler [correctement]. Hélas, je  
voudrais des Capétiens239 qui soient très compétents dans la langue, 
culturellement très fort, etc [...] (Bassani, 2001)
For sociolinguists, language purism is unjustifiable for both philosophical and 
practical reasons. On the philosophical front, even though they acknowledge that 
certain forms can hurt some linguistic sensitivities, they object to purist, normative 
attitudes on the fundamental ground that the assumption of original pure forms is a 
construction. Tackling that question, Thiers (1989: 43-47) claims that, in Corsica’s 
essentialist historiography, Santu Casanova’s A Tramuntana plays the symbolic role 
of the ‘founding father’ of pure, written Corsican. Yet, as he forcibly demonstrates, 
the linguistic analysis of excerpts of A Tramuntana underlines the discrepancy 
between its symbolic representation a posteriori as an icon of the original uncorrupted 
norm, and its instrumental use as such in cultural nationalist discourses, and the mixed 
linguistic reality of the text. As Thiers (ibid: 40) concludes: ‘Quand les monuments ne 
sont pas disponibles, on en crée de toutes pieces. Et si l ’on en possède de trop 
pauvres [...] on les passe à l'or fin.'
Put otherwise, in the Corsican context, in the absence of any description of the so- 
called ideal state of the language via early grammars and/or a substantial literary 
corpus, any attempt to judge the quality of language practices with reference to some
239 Those who passed the CAPES examination.
266
former ‘pure’ state of the language is illegitimate. Thiers’s vision is thus that language 
is best seen as a social construct: there is no absolute linguistic essence; there are no 
objective, ‘natural’ language boundaries. In this social constructionist philosophy, but 
also for the practical purposes of a prominent language planner like Thiers240, the 
Corsican language is what Corsicans collectively speak and say it is. As Jaffe (1999: 
153) summarises the sociolinguistic position: ‘Thiers thus does not accept the purist 
premise that French influences deform the essence o f the Corsican language because 
he defines language as practice, not as form.'’
On the practical front, the objection of sociolinguists to purism and purist censors is 
that the idealisation of linguistic form as the index of cultural authenticity intrinsic to 
essentialism, rather than legitimising actual practice, risks leaving non-speakers or 
imperfect speakers out of the ‘national’ community. Thus, purism either denies 
national identity to non-speakers or silences ‘semi-speakers’ already anxious to prove 
their identity by using Corsican (see Hill, 1985; cited in Jaffe, 1999: 24). As Comiti 
puts it (in Corsica, July 2001: 58):
[...] ceux qui portent un discours puriste sur la langue, sur le respect des 
authentiques formes anciennes héritées de l ’Histoire, [...] paradoxalement, 
accélèrent les processus de disparition. Car c ’est un discours inhibiteur, qui 
alimente fortement l ’angoisse de locuteurs terrorisés par la faute de langue et 
qui finit par susciter le mutisme [...]
This postulate - one language equals one national identity - also largely ignores or 
willfully denies the actual plurality of identities in minority populations which surface 
in multiform language practices and mixed codes. Yet, in contexts of language 
endangerment, all speakers are needed to revitalise the language, no ‘waste’ can be 
afforded.
240 Thiers was one o f the earliest language activists. When the University of Corsica opened, he became 
a lecturer. He was trained in sociolinguistics, diffused the controversial concept o f  polynomy in 
Corsica and organised its hegemonization in teacher training and subsequently LCC education. He was 
president o f  the CAPES panel for years. He is also an acclaimed Corsican medium literary author, and 
is a regular interviewee in Corsica. As director o f the Cultural Centre o f the University [CCU], finally, 
he has also played a central role in organising cultural exchanges and conferences with other regions 
notably with European funds, e.g. from Interreg.
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Finally, too much emphasis on the ‘retrieval’ of original forms can hinder 
understanding and communication. This has led to both academic and popular forms 
of condemnation of purism. An oft-given example is the purist attitude of Sicurani (a 
prescriptivist columnist in and on Corsican in the weekly Corse-Matin) whose 
approach consists in systematically digging out words from his own experience and 
knowledge of the oral tradition to substitute them with more gallicized equivalents. 
Another highly stigmatised derived approach, according to a number of my 
informants, is the use of Sicurani’s vocabulary in the news by TV presenter J. 
Castellani (see also Létia, in Corsica, September 2001: 49-50).
In his column in Corsica (February 2001: 53), Arrighi underlines the counter­
productivity of such an approach:
Poussés par le désir louable de maintenir un patrimoine, des obsédés du 
lexique ont lancé une sorte de croisade qui risque, hélas, de se retourner 
contre le corse en exaspérant ceux qui le parlent. Le principe est simple. Pour 
désigner tel objet ou tel fait, on assure connaître le vrai mot, issu d ’une 
mémoire invérifiable, du genre ‘entendu en juin 1923 d ’un berger 
nonagénaire dans tel village.’ [...] On veut imposer, en les répétant sans 
cesse, une vingtaine de ces mots devenus emblématiques. Cette pédagogie du 
ressassement utilise pleinement quelques lieux de diffusion, chronique du 
quotidien local [by Sicurani] et informations télévisées [by J. Castellani], qui 
ne servent plus dès lors à communiquer, ce qui est la fonction première de 
toute langue, mais à enseigner du vocabulaire. [...] Ces mots proposés, à 
l ’évidence sortent plutôt d ’un dictionnaire latin que de traditions villageoises 
[...]
Likewise, in another criticism of purism but with a different agenda, i.e. to justify the 
restoration of Italian, Marchetti (Corsica, 2002: 53-54) condemns the aforementioned 
media practices:
[...] les médias audio-visuels qui, incapables de mettre en oeuvre le corse que 
la population comprend cherchent à en imposer un autre: un calque grossier
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du français dans les mots et la syntaxe [...] truffé au surplus de néologismes 
ridicules.
The various forms and degrees of language purism further underline the persistent 
hold of diglossic ideology and of the biological essentialist position in the context of 
reversing language shift. Besides this, in a number of discussions I had during my 
fieldwork, I was told that forms of radical purism like the ones described above could 
sometimes even put off the most motivated Corsican-speaking language activists and 
discouraged them from watching TV news in Corsican at all. Overall, even though 
some forms of purism can be praised when they motivate an interest in lost lexical 
patrimonies, purism that hinders communication is counterproductive and damages 
the revitalisation process. In Corsica, such forms of purism are quantitatively scarce 
but their presence in TV news gives them a wide audience, stimulating mockery and 
trivial attitudes detrimental to the revitalisation process.
In the next section, I will show how language-in-education planners have challenged 
both the essentialist dimension of the aforementioned language ideologies (both the 
Italianist position and language purism) and the oppositional model of identity 
intrinsic to diglossic ideology, in their implementation in schools of the polynomic 
principles outlined above.
Challenging Diglossic Ideology? Implementing Polynomy in Schools
Despite persisting challenges to calling Corsican a language, it gained institutional 
status as a language in 1974. As we have seen, the main public to convince has been 
Corsicans themselves because it is their support for the revitalisation effort that has 
been strikingly absent despite institutional gains. The previous sections have outlined 
various forms of resistance to planning effort deeply rooted in the ideological 
premises of the diglossic model. In the opening section, I sketched the principles 
underlying the polynomic approach to language and language planning, underlining 
how it seeks to respond theoretically to some of the problems created by diglossic 
assumptions in a context of minority language revitalisation like Corsica, e.g. dialectal 
diversity hinders language unity. In what follows, drawing largely on DiMeglio’s PhD 
thesis on Corsican glottodidactics, I critically examine how the Corsican
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sociolinguists in charge of Corsican language education have translated the theoretical 
polynomic principles into practical didactic strategies
As DiMeglio (1997: 141-194) illustrates, the incorporation of the main philosophical 
precepts of polynomy (i.e. inter-tolerance between dialectal varieties and refusal to 
hierarchise) into the field of education practices from the late 1980s has posed a 
number of problems, notably because pedagogical strategies relating to minority 
languages that take account of their specific condition as un-standardised languages, 
run counter to dominant pedagogical practices (see also Comiti, Corsica, July 2000). 
In theory, polynomy means that teachers, pupils, and later students, are moulded to 
accept and tolerate all variability and diversity. Yet this does not abolish the necessity 
of norm-setting in practice.
For reasons of space it is not possible here to detail all the problems of implementing 
polynomic principles in the education domain, so I will just mention a few core 
issues. First, all educational actors agree that some minimal teaching norms are 
unavoidable. As DiMeglio (ibid: 124) points out,
Intricciate e Cambierini n en a pas moins le mérite d ’en poser les premiers 
jalons et opère ainsi les premiers choix de limitation de la norme plurielle afin 
d ’éviter m e dérive vers la graphie anarchique ou une norme trop fidèle aux 
microlocalismes.
The limitation of the number of norms chosen can be seen as a plural standard. As 
DiMeglio (ibid: 136-137) writes:
[...] nous avons figé la norme dans un cadre de variation. [...] Ainsi, 
l ’enseignement du corse développerait une tendance originale à l ’ossification 
dans la mesure où elle donne aux éléments écrits, non pas une forme unique, 
mais un ensemble fixé de formes possibles qui peut aller jusqu ’à trois et 
rarement au-delà. Ce que fait exceptionnellement le français pour le mot 
clé/clef le corse tend à le systématiser, non dans l ’impossible objectif de
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refléter l ’ensemble de la variation dialectale mais dans ce qui nous apparaît 
comme une représentation symbolique de celle-ci.
Put otherwise, for practical purposes in education, some difficult compromise has to 
be reached between the need of a teaching norm, however minimal, and respect for 
the plurality of linguistic identities (ibid: 144). An additional difficulty is linked to the 
actual management hie et nunc, in educational practice, of codemixing, including 
phenomena of koineisation.
Addressing the first difficulty, in practice, has meant reducing linguistic diversity to a 
manageable set of variants reflecting differentiations between three supra-local 
dialectal zones - Northern, Central and Southern. Comiti labels them regiolectes and 
distinguishes them by typical phonological features such as consonantal change in 
stressed, intervocalic position, and/or grammatical/morphological features, e.g. in the 
northern regiolecte, the mark for feminine plural agreements is e whilst the masculine 
plural i, whereas in the central and southern regiolectes, there is only one plural form: 
i (1992: 71-75). ‘Applied’ polynomy thus implies some choice and some reduction of 
linguistic diversity. In the reduction of diversity to regiolectes the choice allows for 
diversity whilst inciting Corsican speakers to project their local linguistic identity 
onto a supra-local, symbolic representation of sub-regional variation. In turn, this 
maybe instrumental in transforming localism into supra-local, pan-Corsican forms of 
identity. Notwithstanding, not all variability can be accounted for in a symbolic 
representation and attempts to do so can provoke some resistance from those 
Corsicans most radically attached to their local variety and unwilling to consent to 
any sacrifice of their natural variant.
As DiMeglio shows, however, this characterisation of linguistic diversity has become 
hegemonic in didactic materials since 1987 (ibid: 130). This places upon the 
secondary school teacher the difficult task of knowing the whole system of variability 
in order to be able to introduce it to pupils and to teach them a tolerant approach 
towards variations. At primary school level, as far as possible, teachers are to teach in 
the local variety and, at university level, students are expected to command the whole 
system and its variations (ibid: 147). For educators, moreover, the strategy of
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adopting regiolectes is increasingly justified by the fact that, in school populations, 
especially in secondary school education, Corsican local varieties are increasingly 
mixed as local variants come into contact with one another (Marcellesi, 1987: 14). 
Finally, the reduction to three forms has the symbolic advantage that it tends towards 
unification which heightens Corsican’s language status.
This management of diversity has found some consensus amongst certain educational 
actors as increasing numbers of LCC teachers have been trained according to the 
sociolinguistic principles inhering in the approach, at the University from the mid- 
1980s and later at the IUFM. Voices have nevertheless emerged that challenge these 
very principles. For instance, as Fusina (1994: 190) indicates, by refusing to publish a 
document facilitating the implementation of polynomic principles in the late 1980s, 
certain members of administrative authorities clearly manifested their opposition to 
such plural premises for norm-setting.
Most importantly, protest has emerged regarding the implementation of the principle 
of tolerance towards mixed forms. Comiti (1992: 80-87) distinguishes between two 
ideal-type categories: intralectes (mixed varieties resulting from the contact between 
various Corsican varieties) and interlectes (mixed varieties resulting from the contact 
between Corsican and other linguistic systems like French). As was said above, the 
polynomic language philosophy implies a refusal to hierarchize and a commitment to 
linguistic tolerance, which has led advocates of this sociolinguistic school of thought 
to accept mixed forms within the Corsican linguistic system (i.e. intralectes) and 
across different linguistic systems (i.e. interlectes) as legitimate forms of expression, 
in order to avoid linguistic insecurity and sociolinguistic silencing (Thiers, 1989: 56- 
57). To the extent that such mixed forms are becoming common due to increased 
contacts between local varieties, the ‘implementation’ of tolerance has had to adapt to 
this new phenomenon of koineisation.
In the context of educational practice, however, accelerating koinisation creates new 
pedagogical problems. Arrighi (1990: 41), for instance, emphasizes that some 
standards of acceptability are necessary in order to preserve linguistic identity, 
warning against the danger of conceiving polynomy as some form of anomie. For 
instance, he argues that polynomic writing should nevertheless remain internally
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coherent and avoid co-locating feminine plurals in e and in / in the same text because 
this can create confusion. This constitutes the very limit of polynomic tolerance and 
its ability to dismiss linguistic essentialism: when does a new linguistic form cease to 
be a mistake and come to reflect a new form of linguistic identity? Or, in other 
words, just as we observed various degrees of purist attitudes, polynomic attitudes can 
also range from simply tolerating variation in speech, to tolerating intralectal 
varieties, and finally perhaps even interlectal varieties.
Regarding popular language attitudes in Corsica, Comiti (1992) shows that Corsicans 
have developed polynomic attitudes in that they recognise other varieties than their 
own as Corsican and authentic (the autonomy criterion). However, he also shows that 
both intralectes and interlectes, and particularly the latter, are highly stigmatised in 
Corsica, which evidences that the polynomic attitude remains limited to what is 
perceived as (ideal-typical) natural or territorialized, ‘pure’ or bounded varieties and 
that the population does not fully endorse the implications of the polynomic 
philosophy. In other words, the polynomic spirit is bounded by essentialist values. 
Even in academia, objections to the polynomic philosophy have surfaced, vested with 
purist rationales and condemning the blind acceptance of interlectal mixed forms: 
‘[...] il est clair, et les médias enfant quotidiennement la démonstration, que Von ne 
peut comprendre ce corse-là qu ’en passant par le français dont il est un recodage. ’ 
(Dalbera-Stefanaggi, 1989; quoted in DiMeglio, 1997: 193)
As we will see below, the question of how to deal with mixed codes has reinforced 
the popular ‘resistance of separation’ and the wariness and condemnation of 
‘revolutionary’ academic positions and discourses on language and language planning 
that bolster or endorse mixed uses, especially in school education. In turn, this has 
somewhat contributed to radicalise forms of language purism as a reaction to what is 
perceived as at best unacceptable laxity and at worst a (socio-)linguistic coup (recall 
Bassani’s ‘diglossic’ purism in the previous section and his final judgement on certain 
LCC teachers). According to the particulars of the context(s) in which they are 
expressed, the dialectics of identity and linguistic norm-setting versus respect for and 
acceptance of diversity, including new speech and written forms, remains extremely 
divisive and the hegemonic positions of sociolinguists in educational spheres are still 
extremely controversial and contested.
273
In the next, final section, I analyse the representation of language debates in the 
Corsican media at the time I did my fieldwork (2000-2001) to identify the bones of 
contention and attempt to assess if attitudes are embedded in continuity with the past 
or if they are changing.
Elite and Popular Responses to Language Planning: The Media Discourse
The data drawn upon in this chapter originated mainly from Corsican researchers (e.g. 
Thiers, 1989; Marchetti, 1989; DiMeglio, 1997) although I have also borrowed widely 
from Alexandra Jaffe’s (1999) ethnography of language ideologies, language planning 
and language attitudes on Corsica. Both the Corsican sources I used and Jaffe’s work 
span the 1980s/1990s and both illustrate the issues I have detailed in the previous four 
chapters. I did my own fieldwork research during the academic year 2000-2001 at the 
propitious time when the Matignon discussions spectacularised language debates and 
disputes between mainland France and Corsica and within Corsica. Consequently, 
considerable media space was devoted to language issues. My data is drawn from 
articles from the daily Corse-Matin and its weekly supplement La Corse-Votre 
Hebdo, the weekly Journal de la Corse (JDC), and the monthly magazine Corsica. In 
this final section before concluding, I attempt an updated synthesis of all the positions 
in the language debates presented above and the way they come into conflict at this 
level.
The thematic analysis led to two main findings. First, unsurprisingly, very many 
articles dealt with the various institutional phases of the Matignon discussions and 
their impact on the evolution of language-in-education provision through these 
phases. On other language-related, more corpus-based issues, however, it also 
emphasizes the continuity of discursive positioning on language and language 
planning: all the antagonistic ideologies and political positions found in the literature 
discussed above appear in the various newspapers articles unchanged. Thus, we find 
various illustrations or reiterations of Italianist, purist and polynomic discourses, 
advocating strategies of reversal of language shift or simply manifesting some well 
ingrained strategy of separation (for the former two) or seeking to de-legitimise 
diglossic ideology under its various manifestations (for the latter).
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Second, and this is striking throughout the wealth of articles, writing styles reflect and 
express antagonistic views with bitter acrimony. In other words, positions are 
criticised and their defenders are sharply attacked, sometimes by name, sometimes 
not: ad hominem feelings often permeate more academic arguments. The following 
excerpts are taken from the few Corsican newspapers and magazines mentioned in the 
previous chapter and show that, once institutionalised, Corsican has become a 
desirable and contested object, all the more so as it is generally acknowledged that 
sociolinguists have captured the (corpus) planning process. A series of increasingly 
acrimonious exchanges published in the JDC between January and March 2001 attests 
to the sensitivity of language issues and the acid tenor of the arguments is so blatant 
that it requires little critical commentary.
The JDC ‘fired off in its December 2000-January 2001 issue:
0/10 au professeur Jacques Thiers et à quelques-uns de ses disciples pour le
mélange anarchique et inconsidéré des idiomes du Nord et du Sud.
To which Thiers replied, in the Forum des lecteurs of the February 2nd- 8th 2001 issue 
accusing the newspaper of purism and anachronism:
[...] Valmanach des communautés dialectales d'antan et le gardien jaloux 
d ’isoglosses bien désuets [...]
In his reply, the newspaper journalist used ad hominem arguments:
Thiers supporte mal la critique et ... s ’énerve lorsqu’on ne lui tresse pas des 
couronnes de lauriers.
And in the February 23rd to March 1st issue he referred to Thiers’
[...] mépris de mandarin universitaire qui confine hélas au racisme.
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In the same issue the Forum des lecteurs also features a longer and more 
sociolinguistically-informed attack against Thiers in particular, and the University’s 
sociolinguists in general, by a teacher Marc Biancarelli who accuses sociolinguists of 
engineering ‘[...] une nouvelle langue, artificielle et arbitraire, [qui sera] demain le 
triomphe du néant, l ’institutionalisation de la faute et de l'incompétence\ and states 
that sociolinguists attempt to seize power through language:
[...] L ’enseignement de la langue, avec son corollaire institutionnel (CAPES, 
Université, IUFM, IUT, rectorat, médias, etc...) peut apparaître effectivement 
comme l ’enjeu d ’une certaine prise de pouvoir. Elaborer un nouveau langage 
pour les corsophones de demain, comme on inventerait un novlangue 
Orwellien, [...] c ’est se prendre un peu pour Dieu le père [...] Plus 
qu’aujourd’hui, la langue sera demain outil de pouvoir. Ceux qui maîtriseront 
la langue maîtriseront les outils de communication qui vont avec et leur 
pouvoir ne sera pas alors "cortenais" mais bien au-delà car totalement 
institutionnel (donc politique), scientifiquement référencé, financé et 
incontournable, donc indéboulonnable. C ’est là, selon moi, tout l ’enjeu que 
pourrait représenter le novlangue corse [...]
Illustrations of this brand of verbal violence can be multiplied coming from Italianists 
against sociolinguists:
On a raison, tant au Sud qu ’au Nord, de refuser le mélange arbitraire que des 
régisseurs désinvoltes et auto-investis tenteraient d ’imposer [...] le circuit 
officiel dont je  constate cependant qu’en 20 ans... il n ’a produit aucun outil 
didactique pertinent (Marchetti, in JDC, March 2001: 5),
or from purists like Sicurani responding to Arrighi’s aforementioned criticism (see 
previous section on purism) (Corsica, May 2001: 50):
Arrighi supporte mal le fait que les médias soient ouverts à des intervenants 
qui ne partagent pas ses opinions ...Contrairement à ce que je  vois faire je  n ’ai 
jamais rien imposé à personne et j ’abandonne à d ’autres le rôle de donneurs 
de leçons ...Travail de terrain sans prétention si ce n ’est de vouloir sauver ce
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qui pouvait encore l ’être, sans penser que cette initiative me serait reprochée 
un jour par ceux qui se sont fait une situation dans la transmission de la 
langue...D ’autres feignent de croire que le corse est encore à créer et qu ’ils 
ont été investis pour cette tâche...Nous avons connu ceux qui étaient avides 
d ’imposer leur griffe à la langue, ceux qui voyaient déjà les bénéfices qu ’ils 
pouvaient en tirer... Nul n ’a aucun droit sur l ’idiome. Nous savons ce qu’il 
était en 1970, il est devenu aujourd'hui une chasse gardée... Aussi quand JM  
Arrighi annonce que 100% des auteurs et 90% des auteurs se sont pliés aux 
normes imposées, j ’y  vois un bon score pour un régime totalitaire [...],
or from Comiti (Corsica, 2001: 56) referring to criticisms against sociolinguists as: 
‘[...] polémiques stériles orchestrées par des trublions en manque de 
reconnaissance.’, etc, etc.
These statements illustrate one of the issues which undermine successful language 
planning in a small society like Corsica, pointed out to me by one my informants: 
‘everyone knows everyone’ among the ‘handful’ of language activists, planning 
cannot be anonymous, and ultimately, to understand language disputes, one cannot 
ignore the political economy of biographies and personal relationships. Typically, 
debaters are all actors from the 1970s or their followers: some have gained decision­
making prerogatives through the process of institutionalisation of the Corsican 
language, others not; some have kept these positions and others not. The resentment 
and/or envy thereby created governs reactions or at least makes their expression more 
scathing. Thus, in perhaps a slightly caricatured way, my impression is that the way 
Corsican society has had to address language issues in the changing socio-political 
and institutional contexts since the 1980s, has created new forms of clanic loyalties 
along patterns of unreasoned defence of highly sensitive issues of identity from which 
language questions are inseparable, and that the opposition of the ‘heads of clans’ has 
cascaded down to the population.
With the institutional hegemonization of sociolinguistic approaches to acquisition 
planning, more importantly, the biological essentialist views of linguistic identity 
underlying nationalist/purist and Italianist discourses have become increasingly
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challenged by more plural, social constructionist - or practice-based - views of 
linguistic identity and their corresponding planning orientations. In other words, 
beyond the strict linguistic issue, polynomists seek to legitimise a plural, unifying 
conception of the Corsican society, rich from the diversity of its constituents, rather 
than a view of Corsica as divided internally and/or doomed by the political and/or 
cultural and/or linguistic minoritization of its natural, ethnic, ‘pure’ population. Their 
position is perceived as all the more threatening to other ‘heads of clans’ (e.g. 
Marchetti and Sicurani) and their followers because they can be diffused to the 
island’s entire youth throughout the curriculum. Thus, it is perhaps also because 
polynomists have captured the RML planning process that a certain proportion of the 
population has resisted an institutionalisation of the language resting on social 
constructionist principles. Finally, the disputes were perhaps most extremely acerbic 
in 2000-2001 because the outcomes of the Matignon negotiations could well have led 
to the creation of new institutional structures such as a language office, for a 
(reconfigured?) LCC policy network.
Conclusion
This final chapter has explored the various contending ideologies informing current 
language debates in Corsica and their actualisation, or not, in the language planning 
process. It has shown that the essentialist conceptions of language and identity, and 
how they interrelate, inherited from the experience of French nation-building 
processes and the correlated construction of French-Corsican diglossic ideology retain 
enormous purchase in both elite discourses on and popular attitudes to what a 
language is and how it should be planned. However, in Corsica, an alternative, 
pluralist discourse on language, identity and their interrelation - the polynomic 
approach - has been developed by Corsican sociolinguists at the same time as they 
have captured the Corsican corpus language planning process so that it became 
hegemonic in the Corsican language revitalisation process.
This alternative model has sought to overcome the discrepancy inherent in diglossic 
models of language planning (and in theories of nationalism) between representations 
of language use and actual language practices, by grounding its approach to language 
planning into actual practices rather than in idealised - reified and totemized -
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conceptions of language, such as in the diglossic model. The objective of that model 
has thus been to promote a potentially wide-ranging model of language unification 
based on intertolerance and the refusal to create inequalities through language 
hiérarchisation. In doing so, however, the proponents of that approach have 
encountered various forms of resistance themselves directly grounded in various, 
complex diglossic essentialist representations of language and identity: the ‘resistance 
of separation’, the Italianist position and language purism, so that the struggle for 
glottopolitical hegemony has remained very acute in Contemporary Corsica.
The ‘resistance of separation’, which we have seen retains significant purchase in the 
Corsican population, opposed the polynomic approach inter alia because it is 
recognised that even a plural model of language unification cannot be totally 
dissociated from (well-known) individuals - here the sociolinguists - and therefore 
constitutes some form of authoritative discourse and power stake. The discrepancy 
between the absolute notions of equality between dialects underlying polynomic 
theory and the necessity to reduce dialectal diversity to a manageable set of variants in 
education has reinforced the authoritative character of the polynomic proposal in a 
context of resistance of authority where language planners are forced to negotiate 
every norm they wish to adopt. The Italianist and purist positions, in their diverse 
strands, also illustrate that, constructed though forms of essentialism may be and as 
well-informed as their critiques might be in deconstructing them and in highlighting 
the inequalities and wrong beliefs on which they lie, essentialism remains well 
ingrained in popular approaches to language and identity and it sustains attitudes of 
opposition against what plural models of language and identity propose.
As Jaffe claims, ‘[...] it is the only discourse o f legitimate identity that has political 
currency.’ (Jaffe, 1999: 121) In the French-Corsican diglossic context, forms of 
linguistic essentialisms have generated a large array of both elite and popular 
positions and opinions on language, identity and their interrelations. An implication of 
such a diversity of opinions is that they betray the divisions amongst the language 
planning elites and their respective followers. Through their mutual ideological and 
discursive oppositions, leaders display a lack of unity (to say the least!). As the press 
excerpts show, the content of language debates is shadowed by acrimonious open 
conflicts, which in turn preclude any enactment and representation of a successful
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planning process. This certainly has some deplorable social psychological effects 
amongst the Corsican ‘attentive publics’ - Corsican society writ large - and constitutes 
no incentive to transmit/re-acquire/learn/promote the Corsican language.
Another implication of the perpetuated spectacularisation of disputes about language 
and identity is that they convey an image of the Corsican society as doomed by 
conflicts and incapable to create a pan-Corsican identity that would unify society in 
its diversity. The ideals of equality and tolerance that the polynomic model seeks to 
embody could be usefully exported to other minority language contexts where 
relatively similar problems of fragmentation of and conflict over language and 
identity exist, e.g. Occitany. In that case, the Corsican example could acquire a 
genuinely transregional and perhaps even supranational dimension. Because of the 
continuous rejection of any form of authority in Corsica, though, this model fails to 
receive all the attention that it may deserve beyond the walls of academic conferences. 
Put otherwise, before the Corsican model can be exported, Corsicans must overcome 
their inner divisions.
In that connection, in recent years, the suggestion was made to create a language 
office, as if more institutionalisation could solve ideological problems by imposing 
another authoritative voice. Interestingly, the creation of such an office was suggested 
by almost all language debaters. For sociolinguists, DiMeglio (1997: 193) thus calls
for:
[...] une instance administrative et/ou scolaire qui, sans être une académie, 
aurait en charge la régulation et l ’harmonisation des problèmes de normes 
officielles. Les questions de la codification encore en suspens, du cadre établi 
de la plurinorme écrite, de la prise en compte de phénomènes d ’évolution 
linguistique dans la norme d ’enseignement, de l ’harmonisation de la néologie, 
de l ’élaboration et orientations des programmes ne peuvent pas être réglées 
sans une instance compétente et autorisée.
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The collective association Pa a Lingua Corsa, composed of many political, cultural 
associations, trade unions, etc, (see previous chapter) also suggested in 1997 the 
creation of an:
[•••] Office du bilinguisme [...] formé de représentants des divers groupes 
politiques de l ’Assemblée, des syndicats, des associations culturelles et autres 
experts de la LCC [...] [avec] pour mission d ’impulser et de mettre en oeuvre 
la politique linguistique et culturelle, de vérifier et d ’évaluer son niveau 
d ’exécution. (1997)
More recently, the same idea was suggested by M.J. Vinciguerra, General Inspector of 
National Education, who argued that a Centre d ’Action pour la Langue Corse could 
optimize Corsican language related resources, both material and human resources, and 
achieve the de facto officialisation of the language on the island (in Corsica, July 
2002: 53) and, according to the CTC’s LCC department, the idea is also becoming 
more popular amongst members of the CTC executive bureau.
Finally, if this Office was eventually created, the current debates may simply be 
relocated into a new arena, which would not bring solutions to disputes because 
policy actors would still have their own, respective, antagonistic and (irreconcilable?) 
agendas. On the contrary, this might only exacerbate disputes as the various language 
clans would fight again for hegemony in the new institution.
In the meantime, criticised though they may be and contested though their legitimacy 
may appear to a number of Corsicans, sociolinguists have held most of the 
institutional reins of the revitalisation process since the mid-1980s. In the medium or 
long run, they may well eventually naturalise the polynomic solution.
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Cenerai Conclusion
This study has assessed the impact of the construction of the EU on regional and/or 
minority glottopolitics in the EU in general and French-Corsican glottopolitics in 
particular. Its main objective was to examine whether EU construction has created a 
new order of discourse on language, and in particular on RMLs, and language 
planning, and whether this has had repercussions on the RML legal and/or 
institutional and/or policy frameworks at and across supranational, national and 
regional levels, with special reference to France and Corsica. Put more briefly, 1 
looked at the interaction between various discourses on RMLs and RML 
legal/institutional/policy frameworks at each level and across levels.
Chapter 1 established a multi-theoretical, multi-methodological framework in order to 
study the dynamics o f language policy formation at each level o f analysis per se, and 
in its relations to other levels. In doing so, it brought together analytical frameworks 
and theories from political theory, social theory and sociolinguistics, thus broadening 
the social theoretical foundations o f sociolinguistics. At supranational level, the 
governance approach, combined with such analytical tools as the policy network 
concept, power dependency theory and the Critical Discourse Analytical method, has 
provided useful tools to understand how language policy making actually takes place - 
through which processes, with what actors and according to which norms and values, 
and within which limits. This manifold approach to language policy formation - as 
resulting from the interplay of ideological motivations, legal provisions and 
institutional practice - has proved a useful approach at other levels of society, and 
contributed to the refining of traditional sociolinguistic approaches to language policy 
formation where such language decision-making processes are scrutinised in less 
sophisticated ways.
Regarding language policy formation at national levels, I argued that neither students 
o f linguistic nationalism nor sociolinguistic conceptualisations o f diglossia had 
satisfactorily documented the glottopolitical conflicts inherent in nation-building 
processes and their implications for current issues o f RML policy formation at sub­
national, national and supranational levels. In that respect, Bourdieu’s sociology of
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language and power brings useful tools broadly to conceptualise the power relations 
underlying processes of language maintenance and/or language shift during nation­
building processes. Specifically, Bourdieu’s central concepts of popular resistance 
and alternative markets help deconstruct uncritical historiographies of nation-building 
processes articulated around what I called the ‘evolutionary fallacy’. Thus, Bourdieu’s 
notions of conflict and resistance bridge the gap between contradictory 
historiographies and point to the specificities of each situation of 
compliance/resistance. In turn, such specificities need to be informed by ethnographic 
data on the relations between dominant/resistant political and language ideogies, and 
actual elite and popular attitudes that determine behaviour vis-à-vis such ideologies, 
in the context of RML policy formation, at subnational levels.
At regional and grassroots levels, focusing on Corsica, indeed, I highlighted the 
enduring purchase of essentialist political and linguistic ideologies and the difficulty 
of challenging essentialist premises in language policy making processes. I showed 
that planners seeking to foster alternative, social constructionist models of language, 
identity, and their interrelation, in language planning formation have encountered 
great resistance when they have endeavoured to challenge the essentialist premises 
intrinsic to the diglossic model.
As indicated above, at and across all levels of analysis, I argued that language policy 
formation resulted from the interplay of ideological positions on language, identity 
and their interrelation, legal provisions, and institutional practices involving a variety 
of actors with various motivations and uneven bargaining powers.
Chapters 2 to 4 scrutinised the EU’s own approach to language issues in general and 
to RMLs in particular. Chapter 2 showed that the principle of language equality that 
had seemed to prevail in the EU’s original sociolinguistic design established in 
Regulation 1/58 had gradually become de facto undermined by the growing 
dominance of English as a working language and de jure challenged by the 2001 
judgement of the Court of First Instance. Chapter 3 then showed that RML activists’ 
efforts to interpret rather vague legal definitions of cultural and linguistic diversity in 
primary legislation (articles 149 and 151) in a way that may have granted RMLs some 
symbolic recognition at EU level and more practically a durable legal basis for RMLs
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per se were also legally proscribed by restrictive patterns of legal interpretations (as 
with the Archipelago project). Chapter 4 finally showed that the RML policy 
networks that had emerged on the supranational scene since the late 1970s have been 
accessible to RML communities and have managed to obtain some EU protection for 
RMLs but also that this protection was still decided on an ad hoc basis and could/did 
not constitute a challenge to member-states sovereignties on language issues. These 
chapters thus show that, for the time being at least, member states retain full 
glottopolitical powers on their minorities’ language rights at EU level. If, however, 
they concede some minimal protection to RMLs, they can wield legal power because 
no supranational binding legal texts constrain them otherwise.
International law needs changing before RML status and glottopolitics evolve and as 
law making at those levels remains a prerogative of states, it is clear that issues of a 
formal RML status and protection continue to be decided at national levels. The main 
reason for that state of affairs and for the politicisation of language issues resides in 
the fact that languages have been central elements of nation-state building processes, 
however these may be ideologically informed. As such they constitute primary 
markers of nation-states’ identity, image and sovereignty.
Chapter 5 therefore scrutinized the construction of glottopolitical hegemonies, or 
political economies of language, in one particular nation-state: France. I showed that 
the historical construction of language hierarchies in France had deep historical roots 
and that through drastic changes in ideological and political environments, languages 
had been reified and totemized since the 17th century in France. In other words, I 
showed how languages have been loaded with immense ideological value at an early 
stage of French political history. This politicisation of languages was based upon 
formal distinctions and hierarchies that have persisted throughout French modem 
history and have been used as rationales to discard the recent opportunities to have the 
protection and recognition of RMLs durably enshrined in French national and 
international law. In that respect, we saw in chapter 5 that the radical politicisation of 
French in relation to other - both national and sub-national - languages through the 
reinforcement of protectionist French language legislation since 1992 has isolated 
France on the international scene, where more sociolinguistic devolution has 
generally taken place, e.g. UK, Italy. In France, RMLs gained a significant place in
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the education sector only, and any form of officialisation beyond this and to some 
extent the media sector remains currently unachievable, as the 1999 debates around 
the European Charter on RMLs showed. This is because the essentialist approach to 
language and identity inherited from the construction of the French nation-state 
retains significant purchase among the language planners who are currently 
hegemonic in France.
At the same time, like other nation-state building processes, French nation-building 
has been uneven which has resulted in various patterns of compliance and resistance 
to acculturation in the regions: as was seen, nation-building processes significantly 
varied across time and space. As a result, the uneven (inter alia glottopolitical) 
conquest of the national territory during nation-building processes facilitated the 
actualisation from the 1960s of patterns of resistance to ‘internal colonisation’, and 
the concomitant organisation of social movements of protest against the 
(glottophagic) establishment of dominant (linguistic) markets.
In chapters 6 to 9, I first examined some of the reasons that explained this uneven 
acculturation (chapters 6 and 7) and then the consequences of uneven acculturation 
for the contemporary language revitalisation process (chapters 8 and 9). In the 
dialectical processes of acculturation and resistance, in Corsica, the Corsican language 
became invested with political symbolism against the immoderate dominance of 
French. Thus Corsican cyclically served as a rallying symbol and political banner for 
other socio-political and economic grievances during the nineteenth and twentieth 
century (chapters 6 and 7). As a result of protest forms and the salience of a new 
orthodoxy of decolonisation from the 1960s, eventually, French traditional political 
and linguistic Jacobinism has become less forceful and restricted RML rights have 
been granted as part of a package of devolved powers.
As chapter 8 showed, in Corsica, this eventually resulted in increased political, and to 
some extent sociolinguistic, devolution from the 1980s, and the actualisation of a 
devolved Corsican language policy essentially in the education sector. It is in that 
context, that Corsican language activists have sought to reverse the language 
hierarchies and patterns of language shift inherited from the experience of French 
domination through language institutionalisation. The institutionalisation of Corsican
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continued steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s under the impetus of a very active 
Corsican policy network that exploited fully, and often in innovative ways through 
their interpretation ex maxima of national RML laws, the small concessions made in 
national legislative acts and, in particular, in regulatory acts. As quantitative data on 
language use showed, however, substantial language institutionalisation did not 
suffice to reverse language hierarchies and language shift (chapter 8).
Several reasons for this state of affairs were indicated in chapter 9, which showed that 
popular attitudes to what a language is and how it relates to identity - which remain a 
determining factor in the success or failure of language plans - were shaped in very 
complex and often contradictory ways during nation-building processes in Corsica. I 
showed that various forms of resistance to the legitimacy and/or modality of language 
revitalisation processes have emerged (i.e. the resistance of separation, the Italianist 
position, language purism), which are deeply embedded in essentialist conceptions of 
language, identity and the language-identity link. These forms of resistance then 
became even more acute in the Corsican context from the 1980s as the language 
policy network rapidly became dominated by sociolinguistically trained policy 
makers, and as these proposed a very innovative model of language acquisition that 
has sought to counter (the negative effects of) essentialist ideologies and promote 
instead a plural model of what language is and of the language-identity link. Indeed, 
both the reified and totemized approaches to language, identity and their relations that 
are intrinsic to essentialist models, and the deeprootedness of such models in popular 
attitudes to what languages are and mean, make it difficult for a plural model of 
language and identity to receive popular endorsement and active support.
This model has been intensely contested and its innovative character creates one of 
the main difficulties for language revitalisation in Corsica because it goes against both 
(some) elite and folk ideologies of language and identity. Initially developed as an 
alternative to authoritarian - monolithic and essentialist - models of language and 
identity engineered and naturalised in the national arenas, furthermore, this model has 
paradoxically become so hegemonic in the almost exclusively education-channelled 
processes of language revitalisation in Corsica that it is now largely perceived as a 
form of local authoritarianism, which has historically been abhorrent to Corsicans.
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As chapter 9 illustrated, finally, much of the language debates in contemporary 
Corsica revolves around corpus rather than status issues so that the actual co- 
officialisation of Corsican desired by all language activists would probably not 
resolve internal corpus-oriented disputes.
In turn, the focus on such corpus issues also means that the developments and 
lobbying strategies for status change at national and supranational levels are less 
useful in Corsica than perhaps in other RML contexts, where corpus issues are less 
salient and/or no longer massively divisive, e.g. Catalonia, Wales, Ireland. In that 
connection, more ethnographic analyses, like the one on which the present study is 
based, of what sociolinguistic situations are at grassroots level may also help devise 
better adapted proposals for a RML policy at supranational level.
It is too early to attempt to predict how the sociolinguistic situation may evolve in 
Corsica, since the original planning solution adopted there is very recent given the 
time language planning takes to foster new attitudes and obtain actual changes in 
language behaviour and use, as was clearly seen in the case of the sociolinguistic 
construction of France. Progress is steadily being made in Corsica both in terms of 
corpus development, notably through literary production and constant lexical 
development, two important factors of legitimation of status development, and in 
terms of institutional status development, through the generalisation of Corsican 
language education and bilingual education. As for attitudes to what a language is, as 
we saw, the education system now very largely promotes a plural, sociolinguistic 
approach to and reflection about the definition of language and the complex, 
multifaceted nature of the language-identity link. If this strategy succeeds, and if the 
education system manages to undermine essentialist ideologies, in the medium or 
long-term, Corsica might pave the way to the recognition of new, genuinely post­
modern, conceptualisations of language(s) and its/their relation(s) to identity/identities 
that could be exported to other RML contexts where similar issues are salient, e.g. 
Occitany?
At the national level, especially in France, language issues remain extremely divisive 
and participants in language debates, when these arise, are extremely antagonistic and 
polarised. As a result, it is unlikely that the general movement of officialisation of
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RMLs in numerous other nation-state contexts in Western Europe wili inspire similar 
evolutions in France in the near future, notably because conservative ideologies are 
well represented in society, both among elites and the population, and language 
hierarchies are strongly supported by the legal and state institutions, and to some 
extent, civil institutions.
At supranational level, the limited extent to which identity issues are tackled and the 
limited scope of the legal protection of language diversity is clear. Notwithstanding, 
several chapters of this study showed that changes in RML status are not always 
planned and that changes in political environments can trigger changes in RML status 
in an unplanned fashion. The EU is currently undergoing drastic political and legal 
change coming from two connected directions: on the one hand, the Draft 
Constitution and its inclusion for the first time of provisions for minority rights in 
primary legislation and, on the other, the emergence since the 1990s of new forms of 
political conditionality for EU accession including minority language provisions. I 
will conclude by looking at ways in which these current developments may have an 
influence on future RML-oriented debates and developments, which may cascade 
down to lower levels of society.
Within the context of the 2004 negotiations in relation to the Draft Constitution for 
Europe (and in particular having regard to the commitment made in the Final Act of 
the June 2004 IGC to pay ‘special attention’ to ‘regional’ official languages), recent 
moves have been made by national governments to have certain ‘RMLs’ granted 
some official status at EU level, e.g. Irish (July 2004), Welsh (August 2004) and 
Catalan, Basque and Galician (September 2004), which would make them Treaty 
languages and languages of communication between the EU, regions and citizens. 
The outcomes of such motions are still to be established, but if they lead to a situation 
in which these languages gain a new status in the EU this will imply a radical 
reconfiguration of the current EU sociolinguistic regime.
For RMLs non-official in their state, moreover, this ‘special attention’ might also 
come from the implementation of Article II of the Draft Constitution. The draft 
Constitution, indeed, now implicitly includes minority rights, which could include 
RML rights, under the category of human right:
288
The union is founded on the values o f respect for human dignity, liberty, 
democracy, equality, the rule o f law and respect for human rights, including 
the rights o f persons belomins to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States [...] [TEU Article 6(1); Emphasis reflecting the new 
formulation in the Draft Constitution, Article II]
This provision, if it finally goes through, might open new doors for RML lobbying 
but the consequences of this linkage must be fully assessed in the light of existing 
critical evaluation of the Linguistic Human Rights approach (e.g. May, 2000 and 
2001; Freeland and Patrick, 2004).
Finally, more glottopolitical change may come from the recent enlargement wave of
2004, with drastic consequences for the RML network and future RML policy
measures. In Chapter 4, I mentioned the relationship between Enlargement and
\
linguistic rights in the EU. In my treatment of parliamentary questions, I merely 
evoked the ‘double standard’ existing today, and denounced by MEPs, between 
provisions for RML rights in current member states and the demands made on 
candidate countries with respect to linguistic rights: France is a case in point. My 
contention is that in the enlarged EU this ‘double standard’ may not be sustainable.
From the new member states’ viewpoint, having had to adopt some RML-supporting 
measures in their domestic contexts, they may well seek to redouble their efforts to 
obtain EU-funding to sustain the costly language policies entailed by EU demands in 
their application pre-requisites. On the other hand, they may well seek to guarantee 
that their national languages receive equal treatment as working languages, as other 
official languages do. In that scenario, the cause for RMLs could well be deemed of 
secondary importance, especially where a significant number of minority languages in 
applicant countries are ‘majority’ languages in neighbouring countries and do not 
need the same support as unique regional or ‘indigenous’ languages. In yet another 
scenario, they may also resist granting linguistic rights to their minorities, especially 
where their current minorities are sometimes yesterday’s ‘colonial oppressors’ (e.g. 
the Russian minority in Latvia) (Poleshchuk, 2001, 2002, 2003; Adrey, 2005). 
Considering that there exists as much a variety of minority contexts in recent member 
states and candidate countries as in Western Europe, the sort of ethnocentrism that has
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underlain academic research on Western RML activism might be at odds with Eastern 
and Central European majority-minority relations, and their concomitant 
glottopolitical expectations and priorities. Academic research in that ‘enlarged field’ 
is still budding. The unprecedented, recent EU Enlargement will undoubtedly 
precipitate its growth.
As can be seen, there is considerable uncertainty as to what will happen to the 
sociolinguistic regimes of the EU after enlargement and its concomitant RML 
network and policy change. What is not in doubt is that RML activists will need to 
adapt to a newer ‘New Europe’ with re-shaped patterns of multi-level and multi-actor 
governance and that developments in this newer Europe may catalyse sociolinguistic 
developments at national and sub-national levels in ways that remain to be explored.
290
A n n ex  1
Table 1: The phases leading to the textual production of the Preamble of
Decision 1934/2000/EC: Intertextuality, Authorship and Thematic/Discursive 
Content
Paragraphs/Clauses 
(the emphases are added)
Inter/Intra-
textual
References
Author/
Initiator
Functional Value/Thematic 
Content
1. In the preamble to the Treaty, 
it is stated that the Member 
States are: "Determined to 
promote the development o f the 
highest possible level o f 
knowledge for their peoples 
through a wide access to 
education and through its 
continuous updating.
Preamble of the 
Treaty
Commission Language as contributing to 
developing the level of 
knowledge of the peoples.
2. Article 18 of the Treaty 
establishes the right of every 
citizen of the European Union 
"to move and reside freely within 
the territory o f the Member 
States". The ability to use 
foreign languages is essential in 
order in practice fully to 
exercise that right.
Article 18 Commission Language as a condition for free 
mobility.
3. Article 151 of the Treaty 
states that the Community shall 
contribute to the flowering of the 
cultures of the Member States 
while respecting their national 
and regional diversity, and shall 
take cultural aspects into account 
in its action under other 
provisions of the Treaty. Among 
the cultural aspects, matters 
pertaining to languages are o f  
great importance.
Article 151 EP Opinion Language as an important aspect 
of cultural diversity.
4. All the European languages, 
in their spoken and written 
forms, are equal in value and 
dignity from the cultural point of 
view and form an integral part of
None explicit EP Opinion Language equality
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European cultures and 
civilisation.
5. The languages question is a 
challenge that must be tackled as 
part o f  the European integration 
process and the European Year 
o f  Languages may therefore 
prove to be highly instructive as 
fa r as the formulation o f 
measures to encourage cultural 
and linguistic diversity is 
concerned.
None explicit EP Opinion - Language questions as a 
legitimate domain of 
supranational commitment.
- the EYL as a pilot experience 
to design future EU language 
plans.
6. Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union states that the 
Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.
- Article 6
- Council of 
Europe’s 
European 
Convention for 
the Protection 
o f Human 
Rights and 
Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
(Rome,
November 4th 
1950).
EP Opinion Language discrimination as 
against EU law.
7. Access to the vast literary 
heritage in the languages in 
which it was originally produced 
would contribute to developing 
mutual understanding and giving 
a tangible content to the concept 
o f  European citizenship.
None explicit EP Opinion Access to literature in the 
original languages as a means to 
enhance European citizenship.
8. It is important to learn 
languages as it enhances 
awareness of cultural diversity 
and helps eradicate xenophobia, 
racism, anti-Semitism and 
intolerance.
None explicit CoR’s 
Opinion, 
then taken 
up by EP
Language learning as a means to 
enhance cultural diversity to 
combat racism.
9. In addition to the human, 
cultural and political advantages, 
learning languages is also o f  
considerable potential economic 
benefit.
None explicit EP Opinion Language diversity as a source 
of economic benefit.
10. A command of the respective 
mother tongue and knowledge of 
the classical languages, in 
particular Latin and Greek, can 
make it easier to learn other 
languages.
None explicit EP Opinion Latin and Greek as facilitators of 
language learning.
11. It is important to raise None explicit EP Opinion Community objectives to
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awareness among public and 
private decision-makers of the 
importance of easy access to 
language learning facilities.
12. The Council Conclusions of 
12 June 1995 on linguistic 
diversity and multilingualism in 
the European Union emphasised 
that linguistic diversity must be 
preserved and multilingualism 
promoted in the Union, with 
equal respect for the languages 
o f the Union and with due regard 
to the principle of subsidiarity. 
Decision No 2493/95/EC of the 
European Parliament and
Council241 of 23 October 1995 
establishing 1996 as the 
"European Year of Lifelong 
Learning" highlighted the
importance of the role of lifelong 
learning in developing
competencies, including
linguistic, throughout an 
individual's lifetime.
Council 
Conclusions of i 
June 12th 1995 
on linguistic
diversity and 
multilingualism.
Decision 
2493/95/EC 
establishing the 
European Year 
of Lifelong
Learning, (see 
also paragraph 
1 above)
Commission
13. The Commission's 1995 
White Paper "Education, 
training, research: Teaching and 
learning: towards a learning 
society" established as its 
Objective Four proficiency for 
all in three Community 
languages. The Commission's 
1996 Green Paper "Education, 
Training, Research: The
obstacles to transnational 
mobility" concluded that 
"learning at least two 
Community languages has 
become a precondition if citizens 
of the European Union are to 
benefit from occupational and 
personal opportunities open to 
them in the single market".
- Commission’s j Commission
1995 White 
Paper on the 
Learning 
Society.
- Commission’s
1996 Green
Paper on
mobility
14. Council Resolution of 31 
March 1995 on improving and 
diversifying language learning 
and teaching within the
facilitate access to language 
learning.
- Economic and cultural value of 
language diversity; Language 
equality.
- Language as a major dimension 
of lifelong learning.
Council
Resolution of I 
March 31st 1995 
(responding to
EP Opinion
Community Objective o f  
individual trilingualism.
- M ultilingualism as a pre­
condition for econom ic 
competitiveness.
Community Objective o f  
individual trilingualism
241 OJ L 256, 26.10.1995, p.45.
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Commission 
White Paper; 
see paragraph 
13)
11 EU Official 
Languages)
education systems of the 
European Union242 states that 
pupils should as a general rule 
have the opportunity of learning 
two languages of the European 
Union other than their mother 
tongue(s) for a minimum of two 
consecutive years during 
compulsory schooling and if 
possible for a longer period.
15. The measures in the Lingua I The Lingua 
programme, adopted bv Council Programme (= 
Decision 89/489/EEC243, were | education in the 
reinforced and partially
integrated as horizontal
measures into the Socrates 
programme adopted by Decision 
819/95/EC of the European 
Parliament and the Counci 1(8).
Those measures have promoted 
the improvement o f knowledge o f I 
the languages o f  the Union and 
have thus contributed to greater 
understanding and solidarity 
between the peoples o f the 
Union. The European Parliament 
and Council in their Decision No 
253/2000/EC244 propose that 
those measures be further 
developed and reinforced in the 
second phase of the Socrates 
programme.
programme, adopted by Decision da 
94/819IEC245 of the European Programme (= 
Parliament and the Council, has, vocational 
building on the results achieved training; legal 
under the Lingua programme, basis: TEU
supported activities aimed at article 127) 
developing linguistic skills as 
part of vocational training 
measures. That support will be 
further developed and reinforced 
in the second phase of the 
Leonardo da Vinci programme.
Commission Multilingual education and 
multilingualism as a means of 
understanding and solidarity 
between the peoples o f the 
Union.
Language skills as part of 
vocational training measures.
242 OJ C 207, 12.8.1995, p .l.
243 OJ L 239, 16.8.1989, p.24.
244 OJL 28, 3.2.2000, p .l.
245 OJ L 340, 29.12.1994, p. 8
294
adopted by Council Decision 
1999/3 82/EC246.
17. The Culture 2000 
programme adopted by Decision 
No 508/2000/EC247 also 
contributes to improving mutual 
understanding o f the cultural 
achievements o f the European 
peoples, especially by 
highlighting cultural diversity 
and multilingualism.
The Programme 
Culture 2000
EP Opinion Cultural Diversity and 
Multilingualism as a means of 
improving mutual understanding 
between the European peoples.
18. A multi-annual programme 
to promote the linguistic 
diversity of the Community in 
the information society was 
established by Council Decision 
96/664/EC. 248
Council
Decision of 
November 28th 
1996 on 
Linguistic 
Diversity in the 
Information 
Society
Commission Multilingualism as an economic 
asset in a modernising, 
increasingly computer-ruled 
world.
19. The Report of the High 
Level Panel on the Free 
Movement of Persons presented 
to the Commission on 18 March 
1997, considered "the 
multiplicity o f  European 
languages [to be] ... a treasure 
to be safeguarded" and 
suggested measures to foster 
language training and the use of 
languages in the Community.
Expert Report 
on the Free 
Movement of 
Persons (see 
also Treaty 
Article 18).
Commission - Language as a condition for 
free mobility.
-language Diversity as a treasure 
to be safeguarded.
20. In accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity as 
defined in Article 5 of the 
Treaty, the objectives of the 
proposed action cannot be 
sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States, inter alia 
because of the need for a 
coherent Community-wide 
information campaign avoiding 
duplication and achieving 
economies o f scale. Those 
objectives can be better achieved 
by the Community, owing to the 
transnational dimension o f 
Community actions and
Treaty Article 5 
on Subsidiarity
Commission Legitimatization of Community 
Action in Language Promotion 
on account of the principle of 
subsidiarity to guarantee optimal 
efficiency.
246 OJL 146, 11.6.1999, p. 33.
247 OJ L 63, 10.3.2000, p.l.
248 OJL 306, 28.11.1996, p. 40.
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measures. This Decision does 
not go beyond what is necessary 
to achieve those objectives.
21. However, it is also important 
that there should be close 
cooperation and coordination 
between the Commission and the 
Member States, so as to ensure 
that measures undertaken at 
European level are underpinned 
by small-scale measures 
undertaken at local, regional and 
national level which are likely to 
be more suited to the needs of 
target groups and specific 
situations, and that cultural 
diversity is strengthened as a 
result.
Intra-textual 
reference to 
paragraph 20.
CoR 
Opinion, 
taken up in 
the EP 
Opinion
Legitimatization of Community 
Action in Language Promotion 
on account of the principle of 
subsidiarity to guarantee optimal 
efficiency (Commission/Member 
States cooperation)
22. It is important to develop 
appropriate cooperation between 
the European Community and 
the Council of Europe so as to 
ensure consistency between 
measures undertaken at 
Community level and those 
undertaken by the Council of 
Europe, and such cooperation is 
expressly mentioned in Article 
149 of the Treaty.
Article 149, 
paragraph 4.
Commission Legitimatization of Community 
Action in Language Promotion 
on account of the principle of 
subsidiarity to guarantee optimal 
efficiency (EU/Council of 
Europe cooperation)
23. It is important to take into 
account the fact that the 
European Year of Languages 
will take place against the 
background of preparations for 
the enlargement of the Union.
None Explicit EP Opinion Multilingualism and 
Enlargement: EYL as a pilot 
experience to build on in 
preparation for enlargement.
24. This Decision lays down for 
the entire duration of the 
programme, a financial 
framework constituting the 
prime reference, within the 
meaning of point 33 of the 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 
May 1999 between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission249, for the 
budgetary authority, during the 
annual budgetary procedure.
Inter­
institutional 
agreement on 
budgetary 
authority
Commission Budgetary Authority
249 OJC 172, 18.6.1999, p. 1.
2 9 6
25. The Joint Declaration of 4 
May 1999 by the European 
Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission sets out the 
arrangements for the 
implementation of the co­
decision procedure laid down in 
Article 251 of the Treaty.
Joint
Declaration of 
May 4lh 1999 
on the 
implementation 
of Treaty 
Article 251.
Commission Co-Decision Procedure.
26. The measures necessary for 
the implementation of this 
decision should be adopted in 
accordance with the Council 
Decision \999I46%IEC of 28 
June 1999 laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of 
implementing powers conferred 
on the Commission* 251
Council
Decision of 
June 28th 1999 
on the 
Commission’s 
implementing 
powers.
Commission Implementation Procedure
25° o j  C 148, 28.5.1999, p. 1.
251 OJ L 184,17.7.1999, p.23.
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Table 2: Evolution of Article 1 through the legislative process: Language covered 
by the EYL.
Commission 
Proposal (October 
1999)
CoR Opinion 
(February 2000)
EP Opinion (April 
2000)
Council/EP 
Decision (July 
2000)
1.2. These 
measures will 
cover the Official 
language of the 
Community, 
together with Irish 
and Letzeburgesch, 
and other 
languages 
recognised by the 
Member States, 
(emphasis added)
3.3.1 In line with 
the principle of the 
equal value of the 
Community 
languages, Article 
1 of the draft 
decision states that 
the European year 
will cover all the 
official community 
languages, plus 
Irish,
Letzeburgesch and 
other languages 
recognised by the 
Member States.
3.3.2 The 
Committee is 
pleased that 
Member States will 
be free to decide 
for themselves 
which languages to 
involve.
3.3.3 The Decision 
to make 2001 
European Year of 
Languages is 
welcome for the 
contribution it will 
make to protect 
linguistic 
minorities...
1.2. These 
measures will 
cover the Official 
languages of the 
Community, 
together with Irish 
and Letzeburgesch, 
and other 
languages as 
identified by the 
Member States 
for the purpose of 
implementing this 
Decision.
(emphasis added)
1.2. These 
measures will 
cover the Official 
languages of the 
Community, 
together with Irish 
and Letzeburgesch, 
and other 
languages in line 
with those 
identified by the 
Member States 
for the purposes 
of implementing 
this Decision, 
(emphasis added)
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A n n e x  2
LOI n° 94-665 du 4 août 1994 
relative à l'emploi de la langue française
L'Assemblée nationale et le Sénat ont adopté,
Vu la décision du Conseil constitutionnel n 94-345 DC en date du 29 juillet 1994. 
Le Président de la République promulgue la loi dont la teneur suit :
Cette version tient compte des modifications apportées par la 
décision du Conseil constitutionnel du 29 juillet 1904 
ainsi que de la modification introduite au deuxième alinéa de l'article 5 par 
la loi n° 96-597 du 2 juillet 1996 de modernisation des activités financières.
Art. 1er. -
Langue de la République en vertu de la Constitution, la langue française est un 
élément fondamental de la personnalité et du patrimoine de la France.
Elle est la langue de l'enseignement, du travail, des échanges et des services publics. 
Elle est le lien privilégié des États constituant la communauté de la francophonie.
Art. 2. -
Dans la désignation, l’offre, la présentation, le mode d'emploi ou d'utilisation la 
description de l'étendue et des conditions de garantie d'un bien, d'un produit ou d'un 
service, ainsi que dans les factures et quittances, l'emploi de la langue française est 
obligatoire.
Les mêmes dispositions s'appliquent à toute publicité écrite, parlée ou audiovisuelle 
Les dispositions du présent article ne sont pas applicables à la dénomination des 
produits typiques et spécialités d’appellation étrangère connus du plus large public 
La législation sur les marques ne fait pas obstacle à l'application des premier et 
troisième alinéas du présent article aux mentions et messages enregistrés avec la 
marque.
Art. 3. -
Toute inscription ou annonce apposée ou faite sur la voie publique, dans un lieu 
ouvert au public ou dans un moyen de transport en commun et destinée à 
l'information du public doit être formulée en langue française.
Si l'inscription rédigée en violation des dispositions qui précèdent est apposée par un 
tiers utilisateur sur un bien appartenant à une personne morale de droit public, celle-ci 
doit mettre l'utilisateur en demeure de faire cesser, à ses frais et dans le délai fixé par 
elle, l'irrégularité constatée.
Si la mise en demeure n'est pas suivie d'effet, l'usage du bien peut, en tenant compte 
de la gravité du manquement, être retiré au contrevenant, quels que soient les 
stipulations du contrat ou les termes de l'autorisation qui lui avait été accordée.
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Art. 4. -
Lorsque des inscriptions ou annonces visées à l'article précédent, apposées ou faites 
par des personnes morales de droit public ou des personnes privées exerçant une 
mission de service public font l'objet de traductions, celles-ci sont au moins au 
nombre de deux.
Dans tous les cas où les mentions, annonces et inscriptions prévues aux articles 2 et 3 
de la présente loi sont complétées d'une ou plusieurs traductions, la présentation en 
français doit être aussi lisible, audible ou intelligible que la présentation en langues 
étrangères.
Un décret en Conseil d'État précise les cas et les conditions dans lesquels il peut être 
dérogé aux dispositions du présent article dans le domaine des transports 
internationaux.
Art. 5. -
Quels qu’en soient l'objet et les formes, les contrats auxquels une personne morale de 
droit public ou une personne privée exécutant une mission de service public sont 
parties sont rédigés en langue française. Us ne peuvent contenir ni expression ni terme 
etrangers lorsqu il existe une expression ou un terme français de même sens 
approuvés dans les conditions prévues par les dispositions réglementaires relatives à 
l'enrichissement de la langue française.
Ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables aux contrats conclus par une personne morale 
de droit public gérant des activités à caractère industriel et commercial, la Banque de 
France ou la Caisse des dépôts et consignations et à exécuter intégralement hors du 
territoire national. Pour l'application du présent alinéa, sont réputés exécutés 
intégralement hors de France les emprunts émis sous le bénéfice de l'article 131 
quater du code général des impôts ainsi que les contrats portant sur la fourniture de 
services d'investissement au sens de l'article 4 de la loi n° 96-597 du 2 juillet 1996 de 
modernisation des activités financières et qui relèvent, pour leur exécution, d'une 
juridiction étrangère.
Les contrats visés au présent article conclus avec un ou plusieurs cocontractants 
étrangers peuvent comporter, outre la rédaction en français, une ou plusieurs versions 
en langue étrangère pouvant également faire foi.
Une partie à un contrat conclu en violation du premier alinéa ne pourra se prévaloir 
d'une disposition en langue étrangère qui porterait préjudice à la partie à laquelle elle 
est opposée.
Art. 6. -
Tout participant à une manifestation, un colloque ou un congrès organisé en France 
par des personnes physiques ou morales de nationalité française a le droit de 
s'exprimer en français.
Les documents distribués aux participants avant et pendant la réunion pour en 
présenter le programme doivent être rédigés en français et peuvent comporter des 
traductions en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères.
Lorsqu'une manifestation, un colloque ou un congrès donne lieu à la distribution aux 
participants de documents préparatoires ou de documents de travail, ou à la 
publication d’actes ou de comptes rendus de travaux, les textes ou interventions 
présentés en langue étrangère doivent être accompagnés au moins d'un résumé en
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français.
Ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables aux manifestations, colloques ou congrès qui 
ne concernent que des étrangers, ni aux manifestations de promotion du commerce 
extérieur de la France.
Lorsqu’une personne morale de droit public ou une personne morale de droit privé 
chargée d'une mission de service public a l'initiative des manifestations visées au 
présent article, un dispositif de traduction doit être mis en place.
Art. 7. -
Les publications, revues et communications diffusées en France et qui émanent d'une 
personne morale de droit public, d'une personne privée exerçant une mission de 
service public ou d'une personne privée bénéficiant d'une subvention publique 
doivent, lorsqu'elles sont rédigées en langue étrangère, comporter au moins un résumé 
en français.
Art. 8. -
Les trois derniers alinéas de l'article L. 121-1 du code du travail sont remplacés par 
quatre alinéas ainsi rédigés : "Le contrat de travail constaté par écrit est rédigé en 
français.
"Lorsque l'emploi qui fait l’objet du contrat ne peut être désigné que par un terme 
étranger sans correspondant en français, le contrat de travail doit comporter une 
explication en français du terme étranger.
"Lorsque le salarié est étranger et le contrat constaté par écrit, une traduction du 
contrat est rédigée, à la demande du salarié, dans la langue de ce dernier. Les deux 
textes font également foi en justice.
En cas de discordance entre les deux textes, seul le texte rédigé dans la langue du 
salarié étranger peut être invoqué contre ce dernier.
"L'employeur ne pourra se prévaloir à l'encontre du salarié auquel elles feraient grief 
des clauses d'un contrat de travail conclu en violation du présent article."
Art. 9. -
I . -
L'article L. 122-35 du code du travail est complété par un alinéa ainsi rédigé :
"Le règlement intérieur est rédigé en français. Il peut être accompagné de traductions 
en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères."
II.-
II est inséré, après l'article L. 122-39 du code du travail, un article L. 122-39-1 ainsi 
rédigé :
"Art. L. 122-39-1. - Tout document comportant des obligations pour le salarié ou des 
dispositions dont la connaissance est nécessaire à celui-ci pour l'exécution de son 
travail doit être rédigé en français.
Il peut être accompagné de traductions en une ou plusieurs langues étrangères.
"Ces dispositions ne sont pas applicables aux documents reçus de l'étranger ou 
destinés à des étrangers."
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III. -
Aux premier et troisième alinéas de l’article L. 122-37 du code du travail, les mots : 
"articles L. 122-34 et L. 122-35" sont remplacés par les mots :
"articles L. 122-34, L. 122-35 et L. 122-39-1". IV. -
IV.-
II est inséré, après l’article L. 132-2 du code du travail, un article L. 132-2-1 ainsi 
rédigé :
"Art. L. 132-2-1. - Les conventions et accords collectifs de travail et les conventions 
d'entreprise ou d'établissement doivent être rédigés en français. Toute disposition 
rédigée en langue étrangère est inopposable au salarié à qui elle ferait grief."
Art. 10. -
Le 3° de l'article L. 311-4 du code du travail est ainsi rédigé :
"3° Un texte rédigé en langue étrangère
"Lorsque l'emploi ou le travail offert ne peut être désigné que par un terme étranger 
sans correspondant en français, le texte français doit en comporter une description 
suffisamment détaillée pour ne pas induire en erreur au sens du 2° ci-dessus.
"Les prescriptions des deux alinéas précédents s'appliquent aux services à exécuter sur 
le territoire français, quelle que soit la nationalité de l'auteur de l'offre ou de 
l'employeur, et aux services à exécuter hors du territoire français lorsque l'auteur de 
l'offre ou l'employeur est français, alors même que la parfaite connaissance d'une 
langue étrangère serait une des conditions requises pour tenir l'emploi proposé. 
Toutefois, les directeurs de publications rédigées, en tout ou partie, en langue 
étrangère peuvent, en France, recevoir des offres d'emploi rédigées dans cette langue."
Art. 11. -
I .  -
La langue de l'enseignement, des examens et concours, ainsi que des thèses et 
mémoires dans les établissements publics et privés d'enseignement est le français, 
sauf exceptions justifiées par les nécessités de l'enseignement des langues et cultures 
régionales ou étrangères ou lorsque les enseignants sont des professeurs associés ou 
invités étrangers.
Les écoles étrangères ou spécialement ouvertes pour accueillir des élèves de 
nationalité étrangère, ainsi que les établissements dispensant un enseignement à 
caractère international, ne sont pas soumis à cette obligation.
II. -
II est inséré, après le deuxième alinéa de l'article 1er de la loi n 89-486 du 10 juillet 
1989 d'orientation sur l'éducation, un alinéa ainsi rédigé :
"La maîtrise de la langue française et la connaissance de deux autres langues font 
partie des objectifs fondamentaux de l'enseignement."
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Art. 12. -
Avant le chapitre 1er du titre II de la loi n 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 relative à la 
liberté de communication, il est inséré un article 20-1 ainsi rédigé :
"Art. 20-1. - L'emploi du français est obligatoire dans l'ensemble des émissions et des 
messages publicitaires des organismes et services de radiodiffusion sonore ou 
télévisuelle, quel que soit leur mode de diffusion ou de distribution, à l'exception des 
oeuvres cinématographiques et audiovisuelles en version originale.
"Sous réserve des dispositions du 2 bis de l'article 28 de la présente loi, l'alinéa 
précédent ne s'applique pas aux oeuvres musicales dont le texte est, en tout ou partie, 
rédigé en langue étrangère.
"L'obligation prévue au premier alinéa n'est pas applicable aux programmes, parties 
de programme ou publicités incluses dans ces derniers qui sont conçus pour être 
intégralement diffusés en langue étrangère ou dont la finalité est l'apprentissage d'une 
langue, ni aux retransmissions de cérémonies cultuelles.
"Lorsque les émissions ou les messages publicitaires visés au premier alinéa du 
présent article sont accompagnés de traductions en langues étrangères, la présentation 
en français doit être aussi lisible, audible ou intelligible que la présentation en langue 
étrangère."
Art. 13. -
La loi n 86-1067 du 30 septembre 1986 précitée est ainsi modifiée :
I . -
Après le sixième alinéa du II de l'article 24, il est inséré un alinéa ainsi rédigé : 
"- le respect de la langue française et le rayonnement de la francophonie."
II.-
À l'article 28, il est inséré, après le 4 , un 4 bis ainsi rédigé :
"4 bis. Les dispositions propres à assurer le respect de la langue française et le 
rayonnement de la francophonie
III. -
À l'article 33, il est inséré, après le 2 , un 2 bis ainsi rédigé :
"2 bis. Les dispositions propres à assurer le respect de la langue française et le 
rayonnement de la francophonie
Art. 14. -
I. -
L'emploi d'une marque de fabrique, de commerce ou de service constituée d'une 
expression ou d'un terme étrangers est interdit aux personnes morales de droit public 
dès lors qu'il existe une expression ou un terme français de même sens approuvés 
dans les conditions prévues par les dispositions réglementaires relatives à 
l'enrichissement de la langue française.
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Cette interdiction s'applique aux personnes morales de droit privé chargées d'une 
mission de service public, dans l'exécution de celle-ci.
II.-
Les dispositions du présent article ne sont pas applicables aux marques utilisées pour 
la première fois avant l'entrée en vigueur de la présente loi.
Art. 15. -
L'octroi, par les collectivités et les établissements publics, de subventions de toute 
nature est subordonné au respect par les bénéficiaires des dispositions de la présente 
loi.
Tout manquement à ce respect peut, après que l’intéressé a été mis à même de 
présenter ses observations, entraîner la restitution totale ou partielle de la subvention.
Art. 16. -
Outre les officiers et agents de police judiciaire agissant conformément aux 
dispositions du code de procédure pénale, les agents énumérés aux 1 , 3 et 4 de 
l'article L. 215-1 du code de la consommation sont habilités à rechercher et constater 
les infractions aux dispositions des textes pris pour l'application de l'article 2 de la 
présente loi.
A cet effet, les agents peuvent pénétrer de jour dans les lieux et véhicules énumérés au 
premier alinéa de l'article L. 213-4 du même code et dans ceux où s'exercent les 
activités mentionnées à l'article L. 216-1, à l'exception des lieux qui sont également à 
usage d'habitation.
Ils peuvent demander à consulter les documents nécessaires à l'accomplissement de 
leur mission, en prendre copie et recueillir sur convocation ou sur place les 
renseignements et justifications propres à l'accomplissement de leur mission.
Ils peuvent également prélever un exemplaire des biens ou produits mis en cause dans 
les conditions prévues par décret en Conseil d'État.
Art. 17. -
Quiconque entrave de façon directe ou indirecte l'accomplissement des missions des 
agents mentionnés au premier alinéa de l’article 16 ou ne met pas à leur disposition 
tous les moyens nécessaires à cette fin est passible des peines prévues au second 
alinéa de l'article 433-5 du code pénal.
Art. 18. -
Les infractions aux dispositions des textes pris pour l'application de la présente loi 
sont constatées par des procès-verbaux, qui font foi jusqu'à preuve du contraire.
Les procès-verbaux doivent, sous peine de nullité, être adressés dans les cinq jours qui 
suivent leur clôture au procureur de la République. Une copie en est également 
remise, dans le même délai, à l'intéressé.
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A r t .  1 9 . -
Après l'article 2-13 du code de procédure pénale, il est inséré un article 2-14 ainsi 
rédigé :
"Art. 2-14. - Toute association régulièrement déclarée se proposant par ses statuts la 
défense de la langue française et agréée dans les conditions fixées par décret en 
Conseil d'Etat peut exercer les droits reconnus à la partie civile en ce qui concerne les 
infractions aux dispositions des textes pris pour l'application des articles 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 et 
10 de la loi n 94-665 du 4 août 1994 relative à l'emploi de la langue française."
Art. 20. -
La présente loi est d'ordre public.
Elle s applique aux contrats conclus postérieurement à son entrée en vigueur.
Art. 21. -
Les dispositions de la présente loi s'appliquent sans préjudice de la législation et de la 
réglementation relatives aux langues régionales de France et ne s'opposent pas à leur 
usage.
Art. 22. -
Chaque année, le Gouvernement communique aux assemblées, avant le 15 septembre 
un rapport sur l'application de la présente loi et des dispositions des conventions ou ’ 
traités internationaux relatives au statut de la langue française dans les institutions 
internationales.
Art. 23. -
Les dispositions de l'article 2 entreront en vigueur à la date de publication du décret 
en Conseil d’Etat définissant les infractions aux dispositions de cet article, et au plus 
tard douze mois après la publication de la présente loi au Journal officiel 
Les dispositions des articles 3 et 4 de la présente loi entreront en vigueur six mois 
après l'entrée en vigueur de l'article 2.
Art. 24. -
La loi n 75-1349.dq 31 décembre.1975 relative à l'emploi de la. langue française est
abrogée, à 1 exception de ses articles 1er à 3 qui seront abrogés à compter de l'entrée 
en vigueur de l'article 2 de la présente loi et de son article 6 qui sera abrogé à la date 
d'entrée en vigueur de l'article 3 de la présente loi.
La présente loi sera exécutée comme loi de l'État.
Fait à Paris, le 4 août 1994.
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